When Deliber repeated the same questions she gave to her that it was the second shot she heard, she did not see impact.

Posner, who read and indexed every word, says, "Posner, who read and indexed every word, he wrote, obviously they had to know of Linda Kay's testimony and in knowing about it, he also knew that it refutes his concoction of a new semi-official mythology and he therefore makes no mention of her sworn testimony.

Need anything more be said of Posner and his book than he says for himself in the foreword? Need anything more be said about the published not having the traditional peer review? There could not have been an authentic one without my knowledge.

Did Posner and his publisher impose upon the trust of all of those who wrote the jacket, those glowing endorsements? Those who plugged the book with major TV attention, major reviews, glowing news stories?

Is there anyone whose trust was not imposed upon?

"Computer enhancements," huh?

Isn't that how Steven Spielberg brought dinosaurs back?

Because the little understood thrust of my writing is that in that time of greatest crisis and ever since then, all the institutions of our society failed and have continued to fall, and since then, in my book NEVER AGAIN! being prepared for publication as I write this, I reprint information I brought to light in earlier books because that information was from my publication readily available to one of our basic institutions, the media. I do that once again now because Posner also had that information. I know because he got it from me personally.

Posner makes a big deal of his interview of Nosenko. He does not tell the reader that the CIA delivered Nosenko to him, naturally. But he pretends that in his interview he did learn from Nosenko what was not already public knowledge. That is not true.
that interview was nothing more than sucker-bait promotional material for his book.

Those not familiar with the available fact, particularly not overly-busy people like those big-name types who provided pre-publication promotional statements, have no way of knowing Posner and Pennon had collaborated them in particular with the fraudulent and is important.

What Posner does not report and he did not have to get from Nosenko because I published it in 1975, in Post Morton a book Posner has not supposedly read. What I say there is considerably abbreviated but I also stated that in addition to what I was then publishing, "I have obtained hundreds of relevant pages, seek more and will be writing about this separately." (Page 621) Filled in an upgraded any documents.

With all those once-withheld records, some classified Top Secret, I should explain why I then devoted so little space to Nosenko and the information he had and gave the FBI. (pages 627-41-9.)

After my first book was rejected by more than 100 publishers internationally I decided to publish it myself. I became and remain, I suppose, the country's smallest publisher. My wife and I did all the work other than the actual printing. She substituted for the printing typesetter and I, having been taught by my friend the late Sammie (right) Abbott how to do it, did the makeup. Sammie did the covers.

Books are printed in what are termed "signatures," often of 32 pages or of sixteen pages. When the I made Post Morton up for printing there would have been blank pages.

Although the Nosenko content has no relationship to the rest of the book, wanting that information to be available, even for the kissers of official ass like Posner as well as for those with a genuine interest in trying to establish what truth could be established, I filled even available line in those four pages with information, was a real for it failure.

If Posner had not been playing Dr. Faustus to the CIA as "epistopheles, he would have paid close attention to how became that much-condensed writing:

Coming exposes will prove the CIA withheld vast amounts of relevant data from the Commission and that the Commission knew it, knew the CIA would and did lie, and allowed the CIA to suppress those records which would embarrass it. (Instead of investigating the crime, the CIA investigated critics of the covering up. I have copies of some of its espionage on me.)
If Posner were what he is not, a traditional American writer holding to traditional American beliefs, learning - if he did not already know it - that the CIA, for which it is prohibited by law - "instead of investigating the crime... investigated critics of the agency. They were invented..."

Posner and his wife Trisha were hero. Tri's receipt for the number of pages of my records she copied each time on February 13, 14, and 15, 1992. (They also borrowed and returned some photographs.) As he noted in his acknowledgements I "allowed him full run of "my basement, filled with file cabinets..."(Page 504) He also noted that I \textit{grant access to those hundreds of thousands of previously-withheld official records to all writing in the field.} He did not report that in fact I do not and cannot supervise those uses of my records and I also \textit{even allow all to use our copier.}

He also makes no reference to his getting copies of those records I got only after years of the most difficult and costly lawsuits under the Freedom of Information Act. This omission is not explained by a careful reading of his notes. He pretends \textit{themselves} he got those records by his own work. As a result, for all his self-described Herculean effort and all the knowledge he wants the reader to believe he has, he cannot even \textit{explain} and he \textit{does not explain} the meanings of the file numbers or why on some there is no file identification. In at least one instance that I notice without looking for them he is so ignorant of the FBI's main assassination file number at its Dallas office he misread the poor copy I got from the FBI and gave his readers an impossible number for those desiring to check him out. Is there any other legitimate reason for such notes?

At the time of that writing I did have "hundreds of relevant pages" and that "Casting exposes will prove the CIA withheld vast amounts of relevant data..."

I was then not able to do that further writing or to expose that "the CIA withheld vast amounts more" because as soon as I had the book in the hands of the printer I was virtually immobilized and then hospitalized for acute jugularphlebitis, a circulatory disorder that can cause excruciating pain.
The thrombophlebitis with which I began a decade and a half of the most intensive litigation in a dozen of those suits that filled my basement with filing cabinets was followed by a number of surgeries. Post-surgical complications when I was already a septuagenarian imposed serious limitations on what I am able to do. The use of the basement stairs is difficult, excessively tiring and not without potential hazard for me. So, I led Posner and his wife to the basement, showed them how the files are arranged and where each kind is located, especially those in which he had explained his exclusive interest. If he had been truthful in describing his book, he would have been able to read and copy hundreds of pages that would have made this book impossible for an honest writer. This is true of all parts of his book other than its section on Jack Ruby, the man who killed Oswald. It is particularly true of what Posner says about Mosenko and the CIA and about what he says about the shooting. I filed two of those dozen FOIA lawsuits against the FBI for the results of its scientific testing, including all the evidence relating to the shooting. It was over the first of those cases that the Congress amended the investigatory files exemption of the Act in 1974 to make FBI, CIA and similar files accessible under the provision of FOIA. If he had been truthful I would have given him pictures that prove some of what he would be writing of which I did not know is impossible. But, obviously, Posner did not want that. If he had been interested in the second of those two lawsuits for the results of scientific testing he would have found the suppressed scientific proof that Oswald did not fire a rifle that terrible day. But, again, Posner did not want that. Dr. Faustus wanted to have and to enjoy his Nephi~pho~th~ls time.
Knowing I had all those records and made them available without any supervision at all Posner did not ask me a single question about them. Not even how to find them more rapidly than an uninformed search could take.

They do hold what exposes one of his many ugly little services to the CIA in his book.

I was not in a position to volunteer what he would find records of interest to him if as I would have, I had assumed he was an honest writer writing an honest book because he deceived me about the book he was writing. He told me he was writing a book limited to exposing commercialization and exploitation of the assassination by some of that motley crew generally known as "critics" and I am all for setting that record straight.

The only information within I told him about because my impediments and medical problems make my use of the stairs difficult and potentially dangerous was information within his own description of the book he was then, as he told me, just beginning.

In what I quote above from the beginning of those rushed and bottled Nosenko passages I refer to the "vast amounts of relevant data withheld" by the CIA. Is it not at this point, worth considering whether there is or can be any connection between Random House's rushing of Posner's book into sales and promotions ahead of the announced schedule, even at the risk of losing some reviews thereby, to coincide with the actual flooding of that ocean of records into public availability? The book did reap a rich harvest of free and major publicity from the washoff of the great attention to the making of those records available, if "available" is the reality.

(parenthetically, I note that escaped all media comment at that time, that the mere volume of those records defied access. There were 800,000 pages in most accounts, and 1,500,000 in some, and that is a volume no individual and no even major media component can begin to cope with. The minimum cost of copies and cabinets to hold them would be a quarter of a million dollars or more. It would also require about one hundred and fifty file cabinets. Who has this kind of money to invest in those papers and who has the space for storing them and for getting access to them? As with all earlier disclosures of JFK assassination records, the government made a media event of it. The media were
hot for it the first day and by the third day it was no longer interested."

With all this Nosenko information free for his taking Posner had no interest at all. Again, if he were an honest American writer who believed in the fine tradition of American writers going back to Zenger who established basic rights for those who followed him or who believed in the responsibilities imposed upon us by our founding fathers, he should have been interested in a sentence on the next page of Post Mortem:

"Nosenko told the CIA (not one report from which we found in the Commission's files) and the FBI that the Russians actually believed Oswald was a 'sleeper' or 'dormant' American agent. This was the reason for the KGB's keeping Oswald under surveillance. Posner does report. Such agents are also called "agent in place," as for forward"

Posner also had no interest in that. Not while he was here, not after he left, not in our phone conversations or letters — absolutely no interest. Period!

Two paragraphs later I wrote that "The CIA could not deny the FBI access to Nosenko (referring to when he first defected). FBI agents known to have interviewed him are Maurice A. Taylor, Donald R. Garrett and Aleksa Popanovich, beginning 2/26 (1964). This is a date that would have horrified an honest, imperialist writer seeking truth to take to the people or a nation that, if its system of self-governance function requires knowledge. We return to this."

And then although Posner should have known it, I quoted from one of the Commission's executive sessions that dealt with the subject specifically and in general. Those sessions were so secret, classified 'Top Secret,' the Commission's staff was barred from them:

"The CIA knew, Dulles told the Commission, the FBI had no agents in Russia."

January 27, 1964

My citation is to the stenographic transcript of the session that after obtaining it in whatever form along with other relevant documents, in FOIA litigation, I published in facsimile. Posner got it from me. He had it. He knew.

So, Posner did not care about the Russian belief that Oswald could be an American agent, or that I had all those records he could have, or that if he had been an American agent, Oswald could not have been from the FBI. What, then, did Posner really care about? What did he really write if he did not go into the possibility that Oswald might have been an American agent with Nosenko in their interview and then what did Posner write.
Not a defined new thing that meant anything did he get from the Nosenko the CIA

made available to him, and extreme extreme rarity, as Posner is not reluctant to boast
without limit telling the reader is the CIA imposed and ground rules and if so what

Pretending the honesty he lacks, pretending the impartiality that is foreign
to him, pretending not to be snuggled in the CIA's bed (and if he had not been he would
have had no book at all other than dull and worthless rehash) he misleads the reader into
believing that he tells the whole story of how the CIA abused Nosenko and why.

It should by now be no surprise that he does no such thing!

And never intended to!

What he does report or this he presents as the result of his own work. That is
false. Worse, he hides the secret from his readers and from those who in the future may
have an interest in our history and make the mistake of trusting him and his book.

With the extraordinary attention Random House, added by the CIA, got for Pos-
er's book, many traces searchers of the future will find that lead to it will be impos-
sible to miss. They will thus be guided to a work of the most thoroughgoing, intended,
professional, dishonesty and that in a field that suffers no lack of them.

I do not use these words lightly. Before I stopped annotating Posner's book to

do this writing I found such a number of the most diligent dishonesties I fear no
challenge from him. Were they to do then there could be a public record
of what without that will exist only in private; for scholars of the future. I cannot
use all of them in this book.

It should be no surprise that all I can remember and they are on paper that I have

in them—

with out searching my files—and for them—

In his letter role Xadopts the new math of the official apologists that traces

to the misbegotten miserable mess made by the House Select Committee on Assassination,
the strange but major-media-accepted notion that the Commission could have been
right in just about everything it did and by some mystery or magic been right in its con-
(readers should remember Posner's criticism of Sylvia Meagher for her alleged
political beliefs allegedly appearing in her book and in her index when we get to this,
as we shall shortly.)
elusions nonetheless. The apologists always have some such convenient self-deception
they, thanks to the major media, always got away with. Such as when it was proven
that the world's best shots could not duplicate the shooting attributed to Oswald they
said that Oswald just got lucky that one time. This is an area of one of Posner's most
blatant dishonesties, where he quotes the official Marine record as indicating Oswald
was a superb marksman when the Marines officially evaluated him as a "rather poor shot."
No wonder! On his last testing Oswald scored one point over the minimum score required
of all in the military, and he was then aided in passing only by his fellow Marines who
scored four misses at as hits.

An uninformed person reading Posner on the impediments to Nosenko's defection
and on his subsequent long-lasting, incredible, subhuman mistreatment by the CIA for
close to three years would get the impression that Posner really exposed that fully.
He alone, as usual, too. And worst of all. going back to that KGB sus-
picion that Oswald could have been an American agent, he not only suppressed this he
fails to report its significance in what happened to Nosenko after that, such really
terrible abuse he is lucky to have survived it literally and emotionally.

Posner's Nosenko chapter is titled "The War of the Defectors." It has ninety-nine numbered notes. Of those more than half are to Nosenko interview. It has one
citation to the House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing, which is not to the
CIA's formal testimony relating to Nosenko, and one to that committee's report. The
reader is thus given to believe that all the information in the chapter is new and that
Posner personally developed it when he interviewed Nosenko. This is also how Posner makes
his contribution to the historical record appear to be. This is false. The Posner version
is ever so much kinder to the CIA than the CIA's own official admission of the beyond-
belief evils it inflicted on the man. Posner also gives an entirely different person in
responsible there
the Department of Justice for entire responsibility that the CIA did officially.

After a fantasy beginning to this chapter in which he palm"s off the CIA's nonsen-
sical reason for not trusting Nosenko, Posner starts to tell his version on page 36. Pos-
nor there says that when Nosenko "contacted an American diplomat in 1962
(it was in Geneva, and I think that "diplomat" was a CIA person with official cover) the
CIA was immediately notified. This meant CIA headquarters in Washington.

What he does not say here is that a year earlier Nosenko had done the same thing at the same place. That gave the CIA more time than it needed to check on Nosenko to the degree possible.

Posner says that the CIA "dispatched thirty-seven-year-old Tennent 'Pete' Bagley and an agent fluent in Russian, George Kisevalter, to meet Nosenko four times in a safe house near Geneva's center." Those meetings, Posner, says were taped and the tapes were transcribed. Posner admits that the information Nosenko provided was good information. Instead of citing the CIA's evaluation Posner, still pretending that there was no such thing, cites another book, one by Tom Mangold, a British reporter and another Faust whose book was largely provided by the CIA in return for which he protected the CIA as an institution and blamed all its excesses on Angleton's V Cold Warrior, his book on the then dead and buried James Jesus Angleton, who had headed CIA Counterintelligence.

Posner then says that while Bagley was "ecstatic" in his state of ecstasy when he returned to Washington ended/when Angleton, the dead man, when Posner wrote his book, remember, "was convinced no matter what that Nosenko said, he was a KGB plant." Angleton turned Bagley around, and thus it is that in Posner's version, in Posner's book, once again the CIA as an institution was exculpated as were those involved who outlived the well-known super-paranoid Angleton, the one.

A rather thick file of CIA records I did not get from the CIA, contemporaneous records, give an entirely different view of what really happened in Geneva, not after Bagley and Kisevalter returned to Washington. Those records, which it now is obvious Posner would have shunned like cholera, make it without question that Mosenko turned up in the Geneva station staffed trying to persuade headquarters that Mosenko was a "plant" and should not be allowed to defect.

The reasons were so childish in their transparent falseness that they had to be replaced with new, no less childish ones when they collapsed on superficial examination. This was the immediate CIA Geneva behavior and it was not after the team returned to Washington, Mosenko had to lie to force the issue and he was allowed to defect.

Not by accident Posner says (page 39) that on arrival Mosenko "was placed in a nice comfortable hotel room."
Then skip from February to June 24, when Richard Helms, soon to be the CIA's director and then deputy head of its dirty work with the euphemistic title of "plans," told Warren Commission chairman Earl Warren, that the CIA "doubted Nosenko's credibility." In fact, Helms threatened the Commission so it would not interview Nosenko. In writing still on one page or much did former_R

Helms did not tell the Chief Justice that since early April, with the backing of attorney general Robert Kennedy, Nosenko had been under hostile interrogation.

To refer to that as "hostile" is to praise it. Those with good memories can carry them back to September 15, 1978 and urge looking at TV or listening to the radio broadcasts of the CIA's official testimony on that barbarity may recall the truth.

The truth and the fact that Posner here pretends did not exist. To puff himself and his case "closing" up he makes not a single mention of the fact that most of the information he attributes to his private, secret interview of Nosenko was broadcast coast-to-coast when the CIA gave its testimony to that House committee.

That CIA witness was John Hart. He testified that September day, his testimony is published in the Committee's second volume of JFK assassination hearings beginning on page 437. Posner makes not a single reference to this or even to Hart's name, as his index (page 593) reflects.

In Hart's official testimony — remember Posner's cracks about Sylvia Meagher for her supposed political bias? — identifies the Department of Justice official with whom from the first and throughout was Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.

Not as Robert Kennedy, as Posner says (see on page 79):

So much for Posner's politics and his criticism of others for the beliefs he attributes to them.

If this is not enough to "open the case" on Posner, more follows.

If that is not enough, let us go to why Posner recounted the early stages of Nosenko's defection other than as the CIA's own records record it, with CIA opposition to his defection almost immediate in Geneva.
Those who believe that what the CIA says can always be depended upon should read that lengthy transcript beginning on page 43. By the time they reach page 62 they may be prepared for former CIA Director Allen Dulles when he and the other Commissioners expected perpetual secrecy, to say that swearing falsely under oath, the felony of perjury, is right and proper and is sometimes required. He also said that he might not have told the Secretary of Defense the truth if he were still hearing the CIA.
believe this needs emphasis so I repeat it.

In Posner's account, nothing happened between the time Nosenko was nested in that nice and comfortable house (it was in one of the better sections of Northwest Washington, the "Embassy Row" area) and the date he does not give for "early April" when that "hostile interrogation" began.

But something did happen. Posner's omission of it seems to be deliberate. He got the information from me in February, 1992, when he and his wife visited us. It is in Post Mortem, the pages quoted above. If for any reason Posner preferred not to cite my book, it even gives the numbers of the Commission's records I used in what I wrote, CDs (for Commission Documents) 434 and 451. Those are the FBI reports on its interviews with Nosenko. Nosenko, telling the FBI that Oswald had an openly anti-USSR record in the USSR also told them, as I reported and cited above, that the KGB suspected that "Oswald was a 'sleeper' or 'foment' American agent." (They are also referred to as "agents in place").

It was on February 4, 1964 that Nosenko defected and it was on February 26 that the FBI interviewed him and he told it of the KGB's suspicion that Oswald was an American agent. (Post Mortem, page 627)

The CIA did not have to be told, as its former director, Allen Dulles, told his fellow Warren Commissioners, that the FBI had no agents in Russia. (Post Mortem, page 628)

But if for some reason not apparent Posner had to be told, he had in it Post Mortem and he had in in the facsimile reproduction of that Top Secret Commission executive session in Whitewash IV.

So, in the unclosed case against Posner, he suppressed the facts and misrepresented them even to indulge his own politics. Aside from protecting the CIA in it all, he omitted what my files to which he had access also show, that the FBI immediately sent its reports on its interview with Nosenko. That informed the CIA that Nosenko said that the KGB suspected that Oswald was an American agent. That could not have meant for the FBI because it had no agents there.

And it was after the CIA learned that Nosenko pointed a finger at it that his
treatment by the CIA changed abruptly from princely to subhuman barbarism and that for three years! Inconceivable torture all that time, all that time in isolation for the arcane tortures the CIA dream up for him and to which Hart testified. Isolation without so much as a window, plus those terrible acts by the CIA. Not by Angleton, as Posner would place the blame. It was the CIA an institution.

The case is not yet closed. Far from it.

Beyond belief as it is that any American writer could bring himself to write such a knowingly false, distorted and dishonest account of one of the most awful things any part of our government has ever done; could rewrite our history, could bring himself to do such totally anti-American things for the book the CIA gave him with other rewards, he did more.

On page 39 he gets around to dating this change in Nosenko's treatment by the CIA. It was on April 4. He begins his account by saying that "Nosenko's ordeal had started on April 4, 1964 when he was driven to a three-storey safe house in a Washington suburb. Later he gets around to saying that in that nice place Nosenko was confined in its attic.

It took the CIA fourteen months to build the brick tank in which then was confined without widows or anything else, even something to read, and with inadequate meals and inadequate care and inadequate food from which he then suffered. While Posner makes it clear that Nosenko was treated badly, his account is far less than that testified to by the CIA official witness, John Hart. As Posner eases his way to the end he admits that it was not easy for Nosenko to "keep his sanity" and continues to limit the blame for it all to "Angleton and Bagley."

(Page 41) The worst that Posner attributes to the incredible official abuses by the CIA he attributes to that pair alone, saying they "debated drugging him to hasten his breakdown. ...an assortment of drugs were considered, including a so-called truth serum, an amphetamine and even LSD." (Pages 41-2) That was far from all, as Hart did testify. He testified to a deliberate attempt to drive Nosenko crazy so he could be confined and stifled in an institution, to various torturing of killing him, even to throwing him over the ocean and dropping him into it.
Some analysts!

Can anyone without their doctor of philosophy degrees believe for a minute that the USSR or its KGB preferred the hawk Johnson to the dove Kennedy?

The assassination made that authentic.

Then there was that juvenile/cold-war concoction that Nosnko was "dispatched" to "disinform" about the JFK assassination. This was exciting because it meant that the USSR had done the job and had to deceive the CIA and the world about it to avoid retaliation. This silliness was reported widely in the papers and I do not know of a single one that raised a single question about it.

Neither of these fairy tales was worthy of Posner's Olympian notice. Nor did either prompt him to any thinking of his own about them.

Inherent in the absurdity of the USSR having to disinform, to lead the assassination away from it, is that there was the possibility of the investigation going in that direction. There never was any such possibility and the USSR knew it, as well as did all others with any political wisdom at all.

This is because there never was any question about what the official conclusion would be. The FBI leaked it, knowing, as did all political analysts of all the world's major-power intelligence agencies, that no person and no body in government would dare disrupt it and bring its enormous power and fearsome retaliations down upon them with its well-known disposition do so.

The plain and simple truth is that only the FBI could have leaked it because only the FBI had copies of the report it leaked. That was the report President Johnson ordered it to make the night of the assassination.

The FBI did not distribute any copies until December 7, 1963. It then distributed very few copies including those it gave the Commission and the Department.

Aside from I learned about this leaking, and what I learned includes the name of assistant FBI director who was one of the leakers, from the FBI's own records I found its file copies of how what it leaked was reported and handled. The first of those was dated December 2. The major leaks were on December 5. That day Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
Katsenbach appeared before an executive session of the Warren Commission. He told it that while the FBI claimed it was "leaving no stone untumed" to learn who did the killing, he knew that only the FBI could have done it. It was not later than that that the Commission knew. There is little doubt that it knew from the first that only the FBI could leak what only the FBI had.

The Commission itself recognized and articulated the fact that it did nor dare oppose the FBI. In its executive session of January 21, 1964, which after obtaining it in under FOIA I published in Post Mortem in facsimile (pages 475-87), it could not have been more specific - or more terrified.

Naturally, the CIA also knew. As, in silence, did all the major media.

All the world's bookeries and foreign offices knew with as much certainty as if J. Edgar Hoover himself had phoned each and told them official what the conclusions of the Warren Commission would be.

The USSR knew with even more certainty from the questions it was not asked by the United States government.

So, as the CIA knew very well when it made that absurdity up as a justification for questioning Moseenko's "bona fides", it was an obvious fraud.

The USSR had nothing about which to disinform and on this simple basis it had no need to disinform. To plant to protect it disinforming.

All of the above also Posner, answering all questions as he has from the press of those dust-jacket celebrities and his publisher's own as he does in his book, makes no mention of it. In this, too, he pays the CIA back by again not embarrassing it all over again after the passing of so many years.

So, as the CIA knew and as Haley rhapsodized,

There were other reasons, like the fact that Kennedy was negotiating with Castro formally and informally and with Khruschev, with whom there was an exchange of some 40 letters, seeking a détente. Neither wanted to change that by offing JFK.
Writers can, do and should have different opinions about what is valuable and what is important but that Posner, Wall Street lawyer, Mengele-case closer (if that is what he did) and an experienced investigator could omit such fantastic intelligence disclosures as Honkeko made it simple cannot be believed that his suppressions in favor of the CIA and of sparing embarrassment all over again after so many years was not a payback for making his book and his fame from it possible.

Posner even suppresses what was probably the most public, the most sensational, the most stunning and politically significant disclosure of any KGB spying when Adlai Stevenson rose and addressed the Security Council of the United Nations and with eloquence and passion and heard throughout the world and reported by the press of the world. He held in his hand and displayed prominently
Endless, endless secret torture for all that time and then American government officers plotted murder!

This was the CIA! Posner knew it. And he *repeatedly* not only does not say it, he

softens that *unprecedented, official CIA abuse of a human being*

based only on fantasies imagined by the sick of mind in high position in the CIA and toler-

ated by all there who knew of it.

The pretended justifications of this were themselves insane. How anyone in the CIA,

which is supposedly composed of intelligent, well-educated, sophisticated, politically inform-

ated and mature people could have believed any of it is incomprehensible.

The information Nosenko provided voluntarily was not in any sense what the spooks

refer to as "throw-away information." It was the richest intelligence haul of all.

To a degree Posner admits this, as usual for him a limited degree. (Page 4).

He obviously often is the spooks' opinion: that it would have been 36

better if he had not offered his own opinion: that it was utter utter iracism for the KGB to hurt

itself in so unprecedented a way by having Nosenko give the CIA all that so hurtful him

information solo for a cover for himself. Here, for most of a short paragraph of

his "botched account of what Nosenko did give the CIA that has Bagley so ecstatic" to begin with, (in Switzerland, all the time the CIA Switzerland doing its best to present)

Nosenko a treasure-trove that the most valuable intelligence information, to "<s>on hang Gold</s>

and his CIA be k and to Posner to own Nosenko interview. He does not even suggest

that intimately more was testified to by Berk and he makes no mention at all of the most

dramatic exposure of intelligence operations I can recall. It came from Nosenko.

Our ambassador to the United Nations, then Adlai Stevenson, arose there

with a beautifully sculptured large seal of the United States, a gift to our Moscow embassy

by the USSR. Without mentioning Nosenko's name Stevenson then shocked the Security

Council of the United Nations by declaring that a microphone had been

hidden in that "gift" and that it transmitted every word spoken in the ambassador's

office, that this information and the discovery of many other bugs in that embassy

private office, is only part of what came from Nosenko.

With a minor attribution to Hangold, Posner again pretends that all that is known

he got from Nosenko even when he was reporting much less than the CIA learned from Nosenko.
Even that is not all. This self-promoting Posner knows of the earlier interviews Nosenko, meaning the CIA, gave during the chilliest time of the cold war. The first was to the politically-acceptable Washington editor of the politically-acceptable Reader's Digest, Barron. In his much earlier book KGB Barron disclose some of the valuable intelligence Nosenko gave the CIA. His book even identified spies Nosenko exposed by name.

No, Barron is not in Posner's bibliography. (Page 579)

Is this case now closed? No, it is not. It cannot be because Posner has not yet earned his reward.