

# Vietnam's Bitter Kernel Is Exposed

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

IN THE PENULTIMATE ACT of America's quarter-century involvement in Indochina, we are now, at long last, down to the core, the kernel, the guts of what it has all been about.

The issue is simply who will control that part of Indochina we call South Vietnam together with the appendage of neighboring Laos. The showdown is ahead. The outcome is uncertain. But the portents are not happy for those who have backed the American involvement of these past few years.

The history of those 23 years was laid out in detail in these pages last June 2. That account ended with half the bombing of the North suspended and with President Johnson's decision not to run for re-election—but also with Hanoi's refusal to talk peace until all the bombing was halted.

Mr. Johnson ended all the bombing on Nov. 1 but he did so in the knowledge that the Saigon government was refusing to join in the "our side-your side" formula agreed upon by Washington and Hanoi for the substantive political talks to follow. The result has been a rapid crescendo of bitter words and hard feelings in Saigon

and Washington that must surely have brought smiles of delight in Hanoi.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk has tried to dismiss the dispute as an argument over "procedures" and White House assistant Walt W. Rostow as one over diplomatic "modalities." It is neither. It is an argument over principle.

The point of having an "our side-your side" conference table in Paris is to find a political solution to the war. Hanoi's aim is complete control of the South; its device, self-pro-

claimed is a coalition government in Saigon. The government of President Nguyen Van Thieu wants total victory over the North and its adjunct, the Vietcong. Hence it sees any conference in which Saigon is equated with the Vietcong (in the form of its political apparatus known as the National Liberation Front) as giving away half of the battle at the start.

For, as Saigon sees it, if the Thieu government and the NLF sit with the United States and North Vietnam, the pressure of compromise will be irresistible. And compromise, as Saigon sees it, means the creation of a coalition government in Saigon in which the NLF would be represented. The only bargaining would be the degree of NLF representation and whether it would clearly lead eventually to Communist control or only open that prospect.

The trouble in Washington is that the United States has over and over stated the goal as being, in the words of the Allied leaders in the Manila Conference communique of 1966, that

"the freedom of South Vietnam be secured." But last March 31, President Johnson decided that he had reached the limit of military involvement to reach that goal.

On Nov. 1, Rusk said at a press conference that the goal remained the same. He offered no terms for compromise even though the United States had clearly indicated, without ever really saying so on the record, that it is unwilling to continue the fight on the battlefield to reach that goal. After March 31, and especially now

since the bombing halt on Nov. 1, both sides are in a "tight and negotiated" phase. But neither side had talked of compromise; both talk of victory. And on the Allied side, Saigon is taking the while, in hard fact, the United States has been receding from its optimum desire.


McGeorge Bundy, the former White House foreign policy aide, declared in an Oct. 12 speech arguing for a reduction of the American troop commitment that such a "reduced level of effort is more than enough skill to sustain and execute the basic purpose of preventing defeat."

That statement of purpose is franker than the Administrations' Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford said last week that "we have been there as a military shield for South Vietnam." But either way, it is evident that the United States is trying to wind down its military involvement and that it is proposing to do so without any commitment as yet that Hanoi will do the same.

Hence it may be relevant to recall the words of Stanley Hoffman at a See VIETNAM, Page B2, Column 1

## Tougher Dealing By USSR Expected

By Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University, Brzezinski is a former State Department policy planner and more re-



## Russians Angle to 'Contain' Red China

By Stanley Karrison

Washington Post Press Service  
HONG KONG—The Soviet Union appears to be searching for ways to work out some kind of arrangement

prehensive that a settlement in Vietnam will prompt Southeast Asian nations to seek an accommodation with Peking that would diminish both Russian and American authority in the area. Therefore, the Russians contend, the United States should welcome the eventual emergence of a strongly nationalist Communist Vietnam as a buffer against China while maintaining or even building American bases elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

At the same time, Moscow appears to believe that the visible end of Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution will bring to the fore a pragmatic leadership group capable of far greater flexibility than the aged Communist dictator has shown in recent years. Such a group, the Russians submit, could exert either military or political pressure in the Far East—again to the detriment of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

### A Strange Echo

PROMOTING these arguments, Soviet diplomats often sound strangely like Dean Rusk or the late John Foster Dulles as they warn of Peking's subtle or picture hungry Chinese horde sweeping down through Southeast Asia in quest of food. Implicit, of course, is the apparent Russian fear that the United States and China may ultimately collaborate against Moscow.

The Chinese, for their part, appear to be equally fearful of encirclement, and their official press has lately grown increasingly shrill in its denunciations of alleged Soviet-American "plots for world domination." Among other things, Peking seems to have interpreted U.S. restraint during the Czechoslovakian invasion as evidence that Washington and Moscow tacitly respect each other's zones of influence.

Soviet diplomats in this area have interpreted U.S. behavior in the Czechoslovak crisis in much the same way. In substance, they suggest with an air of complicity that Russia and the United States "readily understand each other" as only two big powers can.

But whether or not they attempt an arrangement with the Nixon Administration, the Russians have already evoked responses of one sort or another from some of the most fiercely anticommunist regimes in Asia, which see the Soviet Union as a lever to employ against either Peking or Washington.

Preambuling under the aegis of President Chiang K'ai-shek's son and heir, Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, the Chinese Nationalists are believed to

By Richard Holloway

Washington Post Staff Writer Holloway recently returned from a two-year tour as this newspaper's Northeast Asia correspondent, based in Tokyo. He holds a master's degree from the University of Michigan's Center for Japanese Studies and has spent nearly 12 of the last 15 years as a student of Asian affairs.

URING THE final third of the 20th century," Richard Nixon wrote a year ago, "Asia, not Europe or Latin America, will pose the greatest danger of a confrontation which could escalate into World War III."

In an article in the magazine Foreign Affairs, the man who has since been elected President argued that this danger requires that we now assign to the strengthening of non-Communist Asia a priority comparable to that which we gave to the strengthening of Western Europe after World War II.

Curious as it may sound, the crucial question confronting President Nixon in his quest for a strong, free Asia will not be settling the Vietnam war or formulating a new policy toward an aggressive Communist China. Maintaining American security in the Pacific depends, in the long run, on reaching a workable relationship with a resurgent, nationalistic Japan.

By any measure, Japan is again the most powerful nation in Asia. Should it choose to exercise that

power, it can exert an influence inferior only to that of the American and Russian superpowers.

After two decades of inaction, a great debate is rumbling among Japan's political leaders over whether and how their nation should employ its political, economic, technical and military power. The outcome, which should come within two years, can be expected to alter fundamentally the

foundation on which the United States has built its Pacific security.

Yet, despite this fact and despite more than a century of American involvement with the Japanese in peace and war, Japan receives the least attention of all the major powers from American political leaders, press and public.

There are few, if any, signs that President Johnson, leading Cabinet officers, prominent Senators or influential Congressmen have given much thought to American relations with Japan. They have made little effort to guide public opinion by mention of Japan in public addresses.

Nixon has visited Japan six times and in his Foreign Affairs article, "Asia After Vietnam," noted the resurgence of Japan as an Asian power. But he did not mention it during the election campaign. Significantly, he sent former Pennsylvania Gov. William Scranton as a pre-election emissary to Europe—but he sent no one to Asia.

Moreover, there is no reason to assume that Nixon, when he takes office in January, will not get caught up in the crises of the day as his predecessors did. (A senior diplomat, asked once how many crises the U.S. Government could handle at one time, replied, "About a crisis and a half.")

Franker, the traditional pattern of change in Japan does not include the kind of crisis that demands immediate attention. Instead, Japanese policies form slowly, by accretion; they are likely to have acquired a great deal of substance before they are noticed. Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard scholar and former Ambassador to Tokyo, noted the limited American attention span regarding Asia in his book "Beyond Vietnam." Of that conflict, he wrote: "The Japanese are not one to Asia."



Members of a U.S. military advisory group observe a class in landscape target firing at Japan's Fujii Military School.

# The Lost Years of a Draft Resister

By John T. Bédell

This article is excerpted by permission from the Nov. 11 issue of the Harvard Alumni Bulletin, of which Bédell is editor.

ONE OF THE 100 inmates living in the farm dormitory of the Federal Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pa., is James R. Wessner, a 1967 Harvard graduate, who is serving the first year of a four-year term for resisting the draft. He works five days a week in the granary, sorting grain for hog feed. The work takes only a couple of hours a day, and Wessner fills out his time in diverse ways.

He prunes roses or pulls thistles in the fields, or hunts for mushrooms, herbs and wildflowers. He feeds his cats. He reads a great deal. He sits on the hill and plays the flute. He runs

He is free to run over much of the farm, although he is not supposed to pick the apples hanging from the trees he runs under.

The prison rules allow him to exchange letters with up to four approved correspondents. About once a week, he writes to his wife Heister. She is a 1966 graduate of Radcliffe and is currently staying in Cambridge with her parents, Herbert and Lynn H. Bédell. He is editor of the Adams Papers and consulting editor in history at the Harvard University Press; her mother, Elizabeth Dalton Bédell, is recorder in the Harvard Registrar's Office.

The Butterfields send paperback books to Wessner and provide him with subscriptions to Le Monde and the New York Review of Books. He reads another inmate's copy of the

New York Times and is given copies of the Peacekeeper and the Guardian by the chaplain. The prison psychiatrist, whose father is German and a student of German literature, brings Wessner books like Gunter Grass's "Blechtrommel."

Before he moved out to the farm, he read books in French, Spanish and Latin from the prison library. The farm library is limited to Westerns.

From outside, he has requested books by Swedish authors such as Eyvind Johnson and Lars Ahm (the specialist in Swedish literature at Harvard) as well as German editions of works in Old Norse and Old English. In modern English, he started his prison term reading "social stuff, Camus, Diderot."

In addition to his reading, Wessner spends a lot of his time socializing

with other inmates. The intelligence level of Federal prisoners is considerable; they include large-scale embezzlers, abortionists, income tax evaders, James Hoffa, William Marcus and Martin Sobell are at Lewisburg. So are a sizable number of moonshiners and drug peddlers.

Wessner has some interesting conversations.

"I'm trying to explain to a fellow inmate why I did not get to the truck on Saturday night. I developed a highly subtle and sophisticated theory of art. I said all art could either be classified as art that teaches one how to deal with life or art that allows one to escape from life. I do not like escape art. "But we actually talked about such a dichotomy and my friend pointed out that popular music, which he likes, has begun to deal with life—that Dylan

concerning Czechoslovakia. In effect, the Soviet Union has become the assassin of international communism. Moreover, the change of outlook of the present Soviet elite, with its emphasis on nationalism, anti-intellectualism and anti-Semitism, bears striking resemblance to some prewar fascist tendencies in Europe. Similar internal changes are taking place in East Germany and in Poland. Communistly, they suggest the ominous conclusion that the highest stage of communism is... fascism: the appearance in power of an essentially middle-class, intensely chauvinist political elite.

The Soviet elite in recent years has been gradually reassessing the value of détente and "peaceful coexistence." It has now concluded that peaceful coexistence, which meant that the Soviet Union exploited political openings in the West while the United States, France and even West Germany exploited openings in the East, is more dangerous to it than to the West. It has therefore decided to opt for a policy of "limited coexistence" in which greater emphasis is put on hostility and ideological rigidity vis-à-vis the West.

"Limited coexistence" does not exclude specific arrangements with the West, particularly in such mutually sensitive areas as arms control, but it does mean much less fraternization. The speech last week by First Vice Chairman K. T. Mazurov reflects this new approach.

### Rumania in Peril

THE PRESENT Soviet regime puts a high priority on preserving the division of Europe. Its new theory of intervention is designed to justify a policy designed to reconsolidate the bloc more or less to the degree that existed in the early 1960s. This means that in the foreseeable future there is danger to the independence of both Yugoslavia and Rumania, and especially Rumania. It is likely that the Soviet leadership will exploit the hiatus in U.S. policy leadership between now and January to put pressure on the Rumanian leadership to bring it back into line.

There is the danger that rigidity in the East, and even reconsolidation of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, will not lead to greater unity in the West but rather the opposite. The Western European nations, less certain of American commitment and involvement, may move toward neutrality, seeking security in independence. At arrangements with the Soviet Union. This development would enable the Soviet Union to re-

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**Stanley Karnow**  
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
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relations with NATO allies; relations with both Hanoi and Saigon in Vietnam. Stories on this page examine some of the confrontations.

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**U.S. Pacific Role Hinges on Japan**

**By Richard Halloran**  
 Post Staff Writer  
 Washington

Washington Post Staff Writer Hal-  
 lan recently returned from a two-year  
 tour as this newspaper's Northeast Asia  
 correspondent, based in Tokyo. He holds  
 a master's degree from the University

of the United States. He has written  
 extensively on Japanese politics and  
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# U.S. Asian Role Hinges on Japan

JAPAN, From Page B1

said, "I believe we could have had a clear enough idea of the dangers of the course we were following and enough of an understanding of the alternatives to have made wiser choices—if only we had bothered to study the problems we faced, carefully and in historical depth."

Raismaner found the same lesson in the fall of China to the Communists and in the Korean War. He said "there is a distressing repetitiveness in this pattern," noting that no one has been "willing to devote much attention to the ongoing problems of our relationship with Asia. This, he warned, is 'tragically wrong. After the Vietnam war is over, our interest may recede again, as it did after the Korean war, and American policy may be left to drift to new disasters.'"

## Crisis-Oriented Press

WITH ITS ORIENTATION to today's crises, the U.S. press must bear a large portion of the responsibility for American ignorance of Japan. John Hohenberg, professor of journalism at Columbia, concluded in a study for the Council on Foreign Relations that "on the excuse of public disinterest in Japan, a majority of the press and television in the United States either covered Japanese news minimally or ignored it altogether. Hohenberg said that the news agencies, which provide the hard core of information for most American newspapers, are "laid down by lack of staff, lack of time and lack of interest in Japanese news in the United States."

In many ways, news from Japan does not lend itself to the conventional treatment of American media. Prominent Japanese are mostly contemptuous, bland people not given to attention-grabbing words or action. Decisions are made by groups, not individuals, which robs them of punch and clarity. The course of events in Japan rarely takes sharp turns but eases around the bends in gradual, subtle moves. The Japanese, a deliberate people, don't like surprises and newsmakers see to it that changes come gently. This makes for few of the crises that are the staple of the American news diet.

Further, Americans are an Atlantic people by race, history and tradition. Events from Manifest Destiny to World War II have made the United States a Pacific power—but Americans are not yet a Pacific people.

parliament introduced from the West less than 100 years ago.

Takeo Fukuda, secretary general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, has said that the Diet is not yet fully effective because Japanese still make decisions by consensus rather than majority vote. He pointed out that there is no fundamental "unanimity" on the conduct of foreign policy or security.

Shuichi Nishio, retired chairman of the moderate Democratic Socialist Party, agreed. The process of molding Western form to Japanese practice is far from finished, he noted, but there has been much progress in the past five years and more can be expected in the next five.

It is also axiomatic that only a nation with economic strength can exert influence in the modern industrial world. Japanese economic power is already well established. Its gross national product is now \$115 billion and is expected to pass West Germany's this year to become third in the world. Japan is the world's largest shipbuilder, second biggest automobile maker, third largest producer of steel. The major economic weakness is a shortage of capital, expansion having outrun financial resources.

Japan's economic influence on Asia has been marked and, barring a worldwide depression, can only increase. Further, Japan's technical resources are the greatest in Asia and equal to those of any European nation. It has solved its agricultural shortages as nearly as its hand allows, imported the Industrial Revolution and headed into an era of original scientific and engineering research.

## Modern Military Force

ALTHOUGH THE FAMED ARTICLE IX is still in the Japanese constitution, prohibiting the maintenance of armed forces, it has long since died a quiet death. Japan's modest but modern military forces now have 250,000 men. The air force is equipped with Lockheed F-104 fighters built under license in Japan. Within a year, Japanese military leaders plan to select a new high-performance jet such as the U.S. F-4 Phantom. The Japanese navy has new submarines, destroyers and antisubmarine helicopter carriers on the way.

The ultimate in military power, of course, is nuclear weapons. The Japanese, for whom memories of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings are still vivid, have so far abstained not

to proliferate nuclear weapons, but by not signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and by insisting on periodic reviews if they do sign it. Most experts agree that the Japanese could build nuclear weapons within two or three years after making a decision to do so.


## Two Movements

ALTHOUGH JAPAN has the power, it has chosen so far to exercise restraint in international affairs. Today, however, two strong and opposing forces are contending over how and whether Japan should use its power.

One pacifist, neutralist, isolationist movement would have Japan opt out of international affairs. Many Japanese feel the weight of tradition, which has for the most part been a history of isolation. These people see the modern world largely in light of the destruction and defeat of World War II. A student once summed up the feeling by saying that a Japanese alliance with the United States—or anybody, for that matter—only makes Japan a target for somebody else.

Though this part of the movement is independent of ideology and cuts across Japanese society, another part is highly ideological and centers in the Japan Socialist Party. The avowed policy of the Marxist intellectuals who are its high priests is to see the alliance with the United States broken and for Japan to adopt "unarmed neutrality."

Kozo Sasaki, former chairman of the party and leader of its pro-Chinese wing, has said that "the United States is now provoking war with China, using Japan as a bastion. But if Japan



Superhighways and 155-mph. trains now slash across the ancient face of Japan.

China, whatever the latter may happen to be in ideological terms. This is why a Gaullist temptation intensifies the nationalistic conviction that Japan should play a more active international role."

A retired Japanese diplomat, also a member of the ruling elite, once spelled out another version of the same idea. He said that over the long run, the United States, China and the Soviet Union would not allow each other to dominate Southeast Asia. But some major power must move into the vacuum left in that Balkanized region. Why not Japan, he asked.

## A Catalytic Treaty

AMONG THOSE who can implement an assertive policy, Premier Eisaku Sato and his No. 1 supporter, Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Takeo Fukuda, have been trying for a year to form a consensus that would allow Japan to exert greater influence in Asia.

Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, who recently resigned to run against Sato for the party presidency and the premier's chair on Nov. 27, has been advocating the formation of an Asian-Pacific community under Japanese leadership.

Another leading conservative and possible premier in several years, Yasuhiro Nakasone, has been more quietly building political strength to lead Japan into an active, independent role. Nakasone is perhaps the most ardent Gaullist politician in Japan today. The collision between the neutralist and the assertive forces will most likely come within two years. In June,

# Russians Angling To Contain China

CHINA, From Page B1

to be making faint overtures to Moscow. Chingchiao was educated in the Soviet Union and is married to a Russian.

In recent months, for example, Nationalist diplomats and journalists have been encouraged to mingle with their Soviet counterparts abroad. Not long ago, Nationalist media were instructed to tone down their anti-Soviet propaganda. And in an unusual move last month, the Nationalists authorized Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist thought to be an important Moscow functionary, to visit Taiwan, the first Soviet citizen to do so in 19 years.

## Overtures to Manila

THE RUSSIANS have repeatedly tried to establish diplomatic links with the Philippines, which shuns relations with all Communist countries. The most recent Soviet overture was made last summer when the Philippine Ambassador to Washington, Salvador P. Lopez, visited Moscow to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty on behalf of his government. Now President Ferdinand Marcos has softened up to the point of receiving a 15-member Soviet cultural delegation while

Communist parties around the world, the Russians have criticized the harsh treatment of Indonesian Communist leaders implicated in the abortive 1965 coup d'etat. But they have reportedly been compensating by arming and training some Indonesian units fighting against pro-Peking Communist guerrillas.

## Fearful for Laos

THE RUSSIANS are similarly entangled in Laos, where they have continued to recognize Premier Souvanna Phouma's government while dutifully voicing sympathy for the Communist Pathet Lao movement that broke away in 1963.

Soviet diplomats now are vigilantly forecasting that Souvanna Phouma and the Communists may soon reopen talks. The Russians are worried that the Chinese will seep into Laos unless the conflict there is settled. Amid all their hopes and apprehensions, however, the Russians' attention is predominantly focused on Vietnam, which they regard as a future cockpit of Sino-Soviet friction. Tensions between Chinese and Russians in North Vietnam are so acute that several fights have erupted in the past few weeks.

alternatives to have made wiser choices —if only we had bothered to study the problems we faced, carefully and in historical depth.

Reissauer found the same lesson in the fall of China to the Communists and in the Korean War. He said "there is a distressing repetitiveness in this pattern," noting that no one has been "willing to devote much attention to the ongoing problems of our relationship with Asia." This he warned, is "tragically wrong. After the Vietnam war is over, our interest may recede again, as it did after the Korean war, and American policy may be left to drift to new disasters."

### Crisis-Oriented Press

WITH ITS ORIENTATION to today's crisis, the U.S. press must bear a large portion of the responsibility for American ignorance of Japan. John Hohenberg, professor of Journalism at Columbia, concluded in a study for the Council on Foreign Relations that "on the excuse of public interest in Japan, a majority of the press and television in the United States either covered Japanese news minimally or ignored it altogether." Hohenberg said that the news agencies, which provide the hard core of information for most American newspapers, are "led down by lack of staff, lack of time and lack of interest in Japanese news in the United States."

In many ways, news from Japan does not lend itself to the conventional treatment of American media. Prominent Japanese are mostly Communist, blind people not given to attention-grabbing words or action. Decisions are made by groups, not individuals, which robs them of punch and clarity. The course of events in Japan rarely takes sharp turns but eases around the bends in gradual, subtle moves. The Japanese, a deliberate people, don't like surprises and newsmen see to it that changes come gently. This makes for few of the crises that are the staple of the American news diet. Further, Americans are an Atlantic people by race, history and tradition. Events from Manifest Destiny to World War II have made the United States a Pacific power—but Americans are not yet a Pacific people.

### Roots of Power

JAPAN HAS BEEN useful to the United States for many years as the site of an air, naval and logstics base and as the No. 1 overseas market for American exports. But now it is a power in its own right, no longer a U.S. client state.

A hand of 100 million educated and industrious people, Japan has current leaders who are skilled. If unimaginative, politicians and a coming generation with promise of greater initiative. Japan's diplomats are among the world's most perceptive observers and tenacious negotiators. Japanese economists, businessmen and technicians are equal to those in the West. The labor

decisions by consensus rather than majority vote. He pointed out that there is no fundamental "unity" on the conduct of foreign policy or security.



Shuhiro Nishio, retired chairman of the moderate Democratic Socialist Party, agreed. "The process of melding Western form to Japanese practice is far from finished he noted, but there has been much progress in the past five years and more can be expected in the next five.

It is also axiomatic that only a nation with economic strength can exert influence in the modern industrial world. Japanese economic power is already well established. Its gross national product is now \$115 billion and is expected to pass West Germany's this year to become third in the world. Japan is the world's largest shipbuilder, second biggest automobile maker, third largest producer of steel. The major economic weakness is a shortage of capital, expansion having outrun financial resources.

Japan's economic influence on Asia has been marked and, barring a worldwide depression, can only increase. Further, Japan's technical resources are the greatest in Asia and equal to those of any European nation. It has solved its agricultural shortages as nearly as its land allows, imported the Industrial Revolution and headed into an era of original scientific and engineering research.

### Modern Military Force

THOUGH THE FAMED Article IX is still in the Japanese constitution, prohibiting the maintenance of armed forces, it has long since died a quiet death. Japan's modest but modern military forces now have 250,000 men. The air force is equipped with Lockheed F-106 fighters, built under license in Japan. Within a year, Japanese military leaders plan to select a new high-performance jet such as the U.S. F-4 Phantom. The Japanese navy has new submarines, destroyers and anti-submarine helicopter carriers on the way. The ultimate in military power, of course, is nuclear weapons. The Japanese, for whom memories of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings are still vivid, have so far elected not to acquire them. But conservative leaders have carefully kept open their op-



Superhighways and 155-mph trains now dash across the ancient face of Japan.

tions by not signing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and by insisting on periodic reviews if they do sign it. Most experts agree that the Japanese could build nuclear weapons within two or three years after making a decision to do so.

### Two Movements

ALTHOUGH JAPAN has the power, it has chosen so far to exercise restraint in international affairs. Today, however, two strong and opposing forces are contending over how and whether Japan should use its power. One pacifist, neutralist, isolationist movement would have Japan opt out of international affairs. Many Japanese feel the weight of tradition, which has for the most part been a history of isolation. These people see the modern world largely in light of the destruction and defeat of World War II. A student once summed up the feeling by saying that a Japanese alliance with the United States—or anybody, for that matter—only makes Japan a target for somebody else.

Though this part of the movement is independent of ideology and cuts across Japanese society, another part is highly ideological and centers in the Japan Socialist Party. The avowed policy of the Marxist intellectuals who are its high priests is to see the alliance with the United States broken and for Japan to adopt "unarmed neutrality."

Koro Sasaki, former chairman of the party and leader of its pro-Chinese wing, has said that "the United States is now provoking war with China, using Japan as a bastion. But if Japan shakes hands with China, then the United States will not be able to make war with China." Seicho Katsunuma, until recently party chairman, has charged the conservative Liberal Democratic Party with using the American alliance to foster a rebirth of militarism. In direct opposition to the isolationist movement is a strongly nationalist current that would have Japan seek what is seen as the nation's rightful place in the sun.

Some of these people, too, advocate withdrawal of American power from Japan but for different reasons. They believe that no sovereign nation can be truly independent unless it charts its own foreign policy and provides for its own defense. They advocate that Japan take over the political and economic leadership of Asia, acquiring enough

China, whatever the latter may happen to be in ideological terms. This is why a Gaullist temptation intensifies the nationalist conviction that Japan should play a more active international role."

A retired Japanese diplomat, also a member of the ruling elite, once spelled out another version of the same idea. He said that over the long run, the United States, China and the Soviet Union would not allow each other to dominate Southeast Asia. But some major power must move into the vacuum left in that Balkanized region. Why not Japan, he asked.

### A Catalytic Treaty

MONG THOSE who can implement an assertive policy, Premier Eisaku Sato and his No. 1 supporter, Liberal Democratic Party Secretary General Takeo Fukuda, have been trying for a year to form a consensus that would allow Japan to exert greater influence in Asia. Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, who recently resigned to run against Sato for the party presidency and the premier's chair on Nov. 27, has been advocating the formation of an Asian-Pacific community under Japanese leadership.

Another leading conservative and possible premier in several years, Yasuhiro Nakasone, has been more quietly building political strength to lead Japan into an active, independent role. Nakasone is perhaps the most ardent Gaullist politician in Japan today.

The collision between the neutralist and the assertive forces will most likely come within two years. In June, 1970, either the United States or Japan may give notice that it wishes to renegotiate the Mutual Security Treaty between the two nations. Neither Washington nor Tokyo, at this point, has indicated that it intends to revise the treaty.

The treaty could simply be allowed to run on. But it has become the symbolic focal point for the clash between two contending movements. (Also involved are the issues of whether American bases will be allowed to remain in Japan, regardless of decisions on the treaty, and reversion of Okinawa to Japan.)

No one can predict which movement will prevail or whether, in characterizing the Japanese fashion, a compromise will evolve. Five years ago, the Japanese were finally warned in a warning

# Russians Angling To Contain China

## CHINA, From Page B1

to be making faint overtures to Moscow. Chingkuo was educated in the Soviet Union and is married to a Russian.

In recent months, for example, nationalist diplomats and journalists have been encouraged to mingle with their Soviet counterparts abroad. Not long ago, nationalist media were instructed to tone down their anti-Soviet propaganda. And in an unusual move last month, the Nationalists authorized Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist thought to be an important Moscow functionary, to visit Taiwan, the first Soviet citizen to do so in 19 years.

### Overtures to Manila

THE RUSSIANS have repeatedly tried to establish diplomatic links with the Philippines, which shuns relations with all Communist countries. The most recent Soviet overture was made last summer when the Philippine Ambassador to Washington, Salvador P. Lopez, visited Moscow to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty on behalf of his government. Now President Ferdinand Marcos has softened up to the point of receiving a 15-member Soviet cultural delegation while encouraging Philippine businessmen to sound out the prospects of trade with Russia.

The English-language Bangkok Post, which frequently carries news that thinking, calmly noted not long ago that the likelihood of the Soviet Union playing an "active role" in Southeast Asia "cannot be ruled out." And there have been reports that the Thai government is negotiating a commercial agreement with Moscow and is planning to send a trade mission to Eastern Europe.

Commerce is booming between Japan and Moscow as well as between Malaysia and the Russians. In contrast to two years ago, when they were calling Malaysia an imperialist con-calling, the Russians are now the leading importers of Malaysian rubber.

Communist parties around the world, the Russians have criticized the harsh treatment of Indonesian Communist leaders implicated in the abortive 1965 coup d'etat. But they have reportedly been compensating by arming and training some Indonesian units fighting against pro-Peking Communist guerrillas.

### Fearful for Laos

THE RUSSIANS are similarly entangled in Laos, where they have continued to recognize Premier Souvanna Phouma's government while dutifully voicing sympathy for the Communist Pathet Lao movement that broke away in 1963.

Soviet diplomats now are wishfully forecasting that Souvanna Phouma and the Communists may soon reopen talks. The Russians are worried that the Chinese will seep into Laos unless the conflict there is settled. Amid all their hopes and apprehensions, however, the Russians' attention is predominantly focused on Vietnam, which they regard as a future cockpit of Sino-Soviet friction. Tensions between Chinese and Russians in North Vietnam are so acute that several fights have erupted in the past few weeks.

In the port of Haiphong, for example, Chinese and Soviet sailors take storm leave on alternate days to avoid skirmishes. In Hanoi not long ago, two truckloads of Chinese gunmen attempted to block a visiting delegation of Soviet youths from reaching the airport until North Vietnamese troops intervened.

Such incidents, while minor, symbolize to the Russians that the Chinese are present in North Vietnam—and that leads to conjecture about which way Hanoi may swing in the months ahead.

The Russians are expected to mount a heavyweight thrust into the area early next year with separate visits by President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin and other Moscow leaders. They are scheduled to visit Cambodia and

On the left, the author's photograph of the ancient face of Japan.

live, politicians and a coming generation with promises of greater initiative. Japan's diplomats are among the world's most perceptive observers and tenacious negotiators. Japanese economists, businessmen and technicians are equal to those in the West. The labor force, coming from a population 98 percent illiterate, is energetic and productive.

Political stability at home is, of course, a prerequisite to influence abroad. The Japanese people widely support the nature and form of their government, despite outbreaks of small left-wing or right-wing groups. Japan's underlying political problem is the continuing assimilation of Western forms of government, especially the Diet, the

# War's Bitter Kernel Exposed

VIETNAM From Page B1  
foreign policy meeting last June in Chicago:


"Our hubris has consisted of not taking seriously, or not applying to us, Raymond Aron's warning: In a revolutionary war, the insurgents win if they do not lose, the defenders lose if they fail to win." Hoffman added that "we have interpreted our failure to lose as a victory, and their failure to win as a defeat. We have, in the process, misread not only the realities of South Vietnam but our own."

If such an analysis is correct, it helps to explain the present Washington-Saigon imbroglio. The United States has failed to apply enough military power to win, on the battlefield (leaving aside the question of whether that is possible) and the Thieu government believes that the Americans therefore are about to compromise (leaving aside the question of whether the Communists are willing to compromise) to the detriment of the Thieu regime.

In short, Thieu is applying to the current situation the words uttered by Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith when he returned from the 1954 Geneva Conference which created what is now South Vietnam: "It will be well to remember that diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."

## Imposing a Coalition

THE UNITED STATES has insisted over and over that it will not "impose" a coalition regime on South Vietnam. When a story in The Washington Post last May said that the United States was prepared to accept



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a role in the political life of South Vietnam for the Communists, regardless of protests from the Thieu-Ky government, Rusk issued an angry statement denouncing the story as "mischievous and false."

Today Thieu quite obviously fears, as Rostow himself put it last week, that "the Paris arrangements were so structured as to force them into a coalition government." The South Vietnamese President knows that while the United States has never advocated a coalition government, it has never said it would not approve such a regime or some other form of compromise if it were agreed to by a Saigon government.

In the current situation, as so often is the case in dealing with Communist nations, the Allied governments quarrel in public. But Hanoi keeps for itself its own minimum terms while repeating ad nauseam its maximum demands. Furthermore, a critical factor in the equation is Hanoi's secret assessment of its military situation in South Vietnam. Is it, as the American military keep insisting, reeling from repeated defeats or is it fully able to keep on fighting at least one day longer than any American government, be it led by a Lyndon Johnson or a Richard Nixon, is willing to fight?

Bundy spoke of Allied troop reductions of 100,000 to 150,000 (which would be mostly Americans) by the end of 1969 and "a reduction of similar magnitude" in 1970. Will a President Nixon be prepared to embark next January on a policy that would mean around a quarter of a million men still in Vietnam halfway through his four-year term?

withdrawal of American power from Japan, but for sufficient reasons. They believe that no foreign nation can be truly independent unless it charts its own foreign policy and provides for its own defense. They advocate that Japan take over the political and economic leadership of Asia, acquiring enough military force to fill its own security needs. They would depend on America only for protection in a nuclear war.

This new nationalism in Japan has a distinctly Gaullist touch. Kimihide Mutsaers, a prominent intellectual and member of the ruling establishment, wrote three years ago that Japanese conservatism is torn "between the feeling of belonging to the Western bloc and the sense of closeness to

In short, it is very difficult to view this penultimate act in Indochina as anything other than a winding down of the American military commitment — a winding down which perforce means a thinning of the American political goal in South Vietnam.

It is this prospect that has hit the Thieu government so hard. The "producers" or "modulators" at Paris provide the issue of dispute on what is a major principle because Saigon is not yet prepared to trim its own goal.

## Nixon's Grant of Power

IN SUCH A CRISIS as the present one between Washington and Saigon, it is no wonder that President-elect Nixon went so far last week as to give President Johnson the right to speak for him between now and Jan. 20 on the Vietnam issue.

Whether that grant of power, or such blunt public talk as that of Clifford last week, can bring Saigon to accept the Paris Conference setup remains to be seen.

If Saigon does reverse itself and go to Paris, Hanoi doubtless will feel that it has won the opening round of the political talks—and with considerable justification. If Saigon refuses, the United States can attempt at Paris to bargain with North Vietnam for a mutual withdrawal of troops. That would further reduce the American "shield" for the South and lessen the Allied bargaining power at the table, according to Bedell Smith's aphorism. In either eventuality, there is no sign that there can be a resolution of the war before Nixon is sworn in as President. The denouement will be Nixon's to make, and it is not an enviable task.

to remain in Japan, regardless of decisions on the treaty, and reversion of Okinawa to Japan.)

No one can predict which movement will prevail or whether, in characteristic Japanese fashion, a compromise will evolve. Five years ago, the Japanese were firmly wrapped in a protective cocoon. Today, the evidence suggests that a proud and determined people will not long be satisfied without having their influence felt.

Whatever the outcome, the American position in East Asia will be profoundly affected.

Commerce is booming between Japan and Moscow as well as between Malaysia and the Russians. In contrast to two years ago, when they were calling Malaysia an imperialist con- colon, the Russians are now the leading importers of Malaysian rubber.

One of the trickiest problems for the Soviet Union in the Far East is Indonesia, which has switched since 1965 from former President Sukarno's benevolent attitude toward the Communists to President Suharto's rigorous anti-Communism.


To maintain their credibility among

ahead.

The Russians are expected to mount a heavy-weight thrust into the area early next year with separate visits by President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin and other Moscow leaders. They are scheduled to visit Cambodia and could conceivably go to Hanoi as well.

How significant their flag-waving will be depends on the progress Soviet diplomats can make in Southeast Asia between now and then. And that, in turn, may depend on the progress Moscow can register with a new administration in Washington.

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
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