

knockdown price. It chose instead to change the tax laws so that corporations have effectively been relieved of all their tax liabilities, which has not only poured money back into the privately-owned sector, but done it without the need to be seen handing money over. With the threat of mass unemployment hanging over their members, the unions were in no mood to quarrel about the niceties of Socialist principle. But from that decision, the National Enterprise Board taking stakes in major companies, has been diluted to a holding company with a ragbag of state holdings that nobody wants and that is not allowed to move without approval from the private sector.

Proposals the left hoped would result in mandatory agreements being signed by all major companies about their actions in the coming years have all but disappeared. Instead, the government now hopes to make vague voluntary deals with a few firms.

The reason that the left has been powerless to protest these shifts in policy is that the union movement has acquiesced in them as part of the larger strategy for ensuring the survival of the Labour government. Many of the union leaders are left-wingers themselves, like Jack Jones, boss of Britain's biggest union, the Transport Workers. Jones is more than just the country's most powerful union boss. He is also a deeply idealistic Socialist who has long supported the Tribune group of left-wing MPs. But he is also the architect of the government wage restraint policy, which he sees as the only way to combat inflation. It is the failure of left-wingers to realize that the unions were swinging around in favor of such an anti-inflation policy, with a union-policed limit of \$12 a week on pay

increases, that has done more than anything to weaken their position. This is because union leaders are, above all, concerned with finding a workable solution for the short-term problems the country faces, of which inflation is the most serious. In their desire to maintain unity with union leaders, the left went on defending pay raises of 30 percent and up long after it was clear the unions' mood had turned against them.

The real challenge from the left, then, cannot come now or for some time yet. If the economy does not turn up, or if it does and it becomes clear that the government strategy of bolstering confidence and hoping that the private sector will invest more is not producing results, then the left in the Labour party will be in a strong position to mount a challenge to the effective ruling group of Foot, Jones and Healey, who whatever their differences on the longer term are agreed on what needs to be done now. But if that kind of economic setback overtakes this government, then its prospects of survival look bleak indeed. The broad outlines of the economic policy that will lead Labour into the next election have been laid down, and they represent a pretty right-wing program in Labour party terms. They also are the only kind of programs that can realistically be expected from a party facing the most serious economic crisis in the history of the UK at a time when it is clear that there is still no consensus to introduce a great leap forward into socialism.

**David Blake**

*Mr. Blake is foreign editor of business news at The Times (London).*

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## An Oriana Fallaci Interview

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# Otis Pike and the CIA

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One has to read the Pike report, even the censored version we have, in order to understand the indignation of the man who stood up against the CIA and Kissinger and the President of the United States. One has to meet Otis Pike to see the repressed tears that occasionally moisten his eyes, and comprehend the aberrant forms power can take—power dressed in the uniforms of a

manifest tyranny, power dressed in the suits of hypocritical tolerance. In either case opposing power serves only to keep alive a dream or keep our conscience clean. Bitter surprises crush those who think they'll win, like Don Quixote, acting the hero.

Otis Pike isn't exactly a hero. If he were, he would have faced to the end the consequences of his congressional investigation. He would have risked his seat in Congress and probably lost it; he would have



thrown it away. He would have published his original report without asking anybody's permission and without censoring it and without all the circumlocutions. Finally, he would have pursued legal action against Henry Kissinger. "What could happen to you if you did all that?" I asked him. "I would have been expelled from the Congress, I guess. And I would for sure have lost the next election," he answered. But he didn't persist. At a certain point, fatigued and bitter, he gave up. He turned the whole thing over to the House of Representatives, hence to the President. Maybe my judgment is naive (politics is not naive), but the fact remains that once in a while it would be good to have some naive heroes who die jousting with windmills.

Not exactly a hero, Otis Pike is something of a martyr. One can't expect everybody to stay in with the lions. (A certain lion named Henry Kissinger doesn't joke when he bites. He tears flesh from bone. And when he attacks he has all the power of the Establishment: at home and abroad. Abroad, some buddies like Brezhnev and Mao Tse-tung). One can't expect people to be saints, to give up everything and go live in a cave. Otis Pike himself belongs to the Establishment. He is not a grenade thrower who aims to change the society or peoples' minds. He isn't even a radical ready to go on hunger strikes to protest. Nor does he claim to be. He introduces himself as what he is: a good American citizen of the good American bourgeoisie, a good congressman who believes in the homely values of his youth. I mean God, the family, country, money well spent, democracy and freedom. I may be wrong, but somehow he reminds me of the character in an old movie by Frank Capra, like *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*. You know, the one with James Stewart leaving for Washington with his faith and his stubbornness and his provincialism, to cause trouble and to be defeated.

Pike's story justifies the analogy. He was born 55 years ago at Riverhead, NY, in the house where he still lives. During World War II, he was a Marine Corps pilot who spent 14 months dive-bombing in the Solomon Islands campaign, nine months nightfighting over Peleliu and Okinawa, occupying Peking. The war ended for him after 120 combat missions, five air medals and the rank of captain. He's been married since 1946 to the same woman, Doris Orth, and is so devoted to her that during my interview with him took only calls from her: "I'm always here for my wife." He has three children, all successful adults. He was graduated *magna cum laude* from Princeton and has several honorary degrees. He's a lawyer. He can navigate a boat, play a piano and a ukulele, catch a swordfish, play ping pong, sing a song, swing an axe. He's been a Democratic congressman since 1960, reelected every two years by one of the most conservative counties in the North: Suffolk County, NY. He's a product of the system, and a faithful one. For years he didn't even oppose the war in Vietnam. In 1973 he did vote against the bombings in Cambodia. But his criticism was never aimed at

Kissinger. He was convinced that Kissinger was a great man. He continued to be convinced until the inquest.

It's this Mr.-Smith-Goes-to-Washington innocence that seduces people like me; people who don't often trust promises, who think chatter about God and the family and country is foolishness, people who make Machiavelli possible and who fight only (when they fight) out of despair and rage and exasperation: knowing very well that the world changes but remains the same. It is Pike's late discovery of a truth complacently ignored for so long that makes him and others like him so respectable and likable. I did like Otis Pike from the moment I entered his office in the Rayburn building where he sat framed by a window that opened on the Capitol's dome. I liked his good-natured face, his hair so blond as to look white. I liked his carelessness in dress and movement, the nonchalant sloppiness of someone who always wears wrinkled trousers or jackets with a button missing. I liked his resonant voice, the voice of a preacher who claims to believe in the triumph of justice. And more than anything I liked his handcuffed sorrowful anger: "I hadn't understood that they were lying to me, that they were making fun of me." I interviewed him with empathy, I forgave him his reticence. He was cautious; I suspected he was saying much less than he could. A secret fear that he would never admit made his lips quiver. A fear of what "they" had done to him and still could do to him. They, the powerful.

*Oriana Fallaci: Mr. Pike, in his interview, William Colby stated that your report on the CIA is partial, and written to give a false impression of CIA. He also said it doesn't contain all of what he said.*

*Otis Pike: Good Lord, no. If we were going to print everything he had said, it would be his report and not ours. We were certainly not asked to write a report which would meet the approval of the CIA. Of course Mr. Colby is not going to like it. We said that the CIA did a lousy job. We said that they missed their basic mission, which was to provide good intelligence to the United States. So we did not expect him to thank us when we got finished. Yet, I don't care what he says about me. I ended my investigation with a higher regard for the CIA than for the people who told them what to do.*

*Fallaci: You're referring to Dr. Kissinger, aren't you?*

*Pike: Listen, I don't have any problem in admitting that when I finished my investigation I liked Dr. Kissinger enormously less than when I started it. With Kissinger it was a real problem to get access to information. Dr. Kissinger takes the position that all of his communications, not only those with the heads of foreign*



governments, but with other employees of the State Department are very personal. So the Congress should not be looking at them. As for Mr. Colby . . . Well, Mr. Colby is a very bright man and he knows how to play with words. But he isn't dishonest.

*Fallaci: Do you mean that William Colby has been a scapegoat?*

*Pike:* To a very large extent, yes. Sure. I do think that. Though I also think that he loved it. I told it to him, one day. I said: "You do love being the scapegoat, don't you?" He didn't answer. He just sat there. But it was so clear that he relished the role in which he was cast. Besides, nobody could have done it any better and with better results. Honest to us, loyal to his people . . . He won. And I lost.

*Fallaci: In what sense did you lose?*

*Pike:* In the most evident one: my report hasn't been published. They suppressed it. When the House of Representatives said that it couldn't be published until the President had determined that there was nothing in it that would affect foreign intelligence activities, it was clear that I had lost.

*Fallaci: But who wanted the House of Representatives' vote that put everything into the hands of the President?*

*Pike:* The White House. The State Department. The administration. Dr. Kissinger, of course. And a lot of people in the Congress, too. All the people, I mean, who liked the way oversight had been conducted in the past and who were very unhappy with our committee. They found any kind of excuse. The inopportunity of having a disagreement with the President was an excuse. The Welch case was another excuse . . . People asked me: "Are there names of CIA people in your report?" And I answered: "Yes, there are names, of course, but they are only the names of those who came to testify before our committee as representatives of the CIA". But all the same they acted very concerned. No name, they said, should come out to identify people who could get involved in some other Welch case. Those papers did not contain everything we knew. We had taken things out of them. We had taken out names. We, too, didn't want to get anybody killed.

*Fallaci: Let's face it, Mr. Pike. Some of the fault is yours. Why did you have to ask permission to print your report? Did you have to ask the President's permission?*

*Pike:* My personal judgement is that we did not have to ask the permission of the President. But I had to bring the case in the Congress. Thanks to the obstacles and delays imposed on us, we ran out of time at the end. We didn't have time to finish our report. I had to ask the House of Representatives to give us more time; I only needed two weeks. And they held the extra time as hostage to not publishing the report.

*Fallaci: Yes, and it seems to me that the whole thing is a hell of a hypocrisy. If they didn't want the truth to be published, then why did they ask you to do the investigation? Just to throw smoke in the eyes of Americans?*

*Pike:* I couldn't agree more. Hypocrisy is the word.

*Fallaci: Who has the uncensored version of your report?*

*Pike:* The President has it. Dr. Kissinger has it. The CIA has it. The CIA had everything we had all the time. They got our first draft the same day the members of our committee got it, at my insistence. I wanted them to tell me if there were any factual errors in it . . . Finally, four committees of the House of Representatives have it. And any member of the House can go and look at it, if he agrees not to reveal anything that is in it. But not many want to read it.

*Fallaci: Why?*

*Pike:* Oh, they think it is better not to know. There are too many things that embarrass Americans in that report. You see, this country went through an awful trauma with Watergate. But, even then, all they were asked to believe was that their President had been a bad person. In this new situation they are asked much more; they are asked to believe that their country has been evil. And nobody wants to believe that.

*Fallaci: The most baffling thing, in my opinion, is this pseudo-innocence of yours. Because all these reports confirm things that, in the rest of the world, we already knew. Take the example of Castro. He kept saying that the CIA tried to kill him and you didn't believe it.*

*Pike:* Right. And it turned out that it was true. The same thing happened with Cambodia. The press wrote about it, but the average citizen did not believe it. Even the average congressman, the average senator, did not believe it. They only believed what the government said. I was one of them. It took this investigation to convince me that I had always been told lies, to make me realize that I was tired of being told lies.

*Fallaci: Let's go back to the hypocrisy problem, Mr. Pike. Where did the major difficulties come from?*

*Pike:* The basic problem as I saw it came from the President, from the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, from the head of the CIA, from the FBI, and from the administration in general. They were always promising complete cooperation and they were always holding back information. They knew all the time that the life of our committee was limited. So they would give us what I call the dribble-treatment. When we said: "we need those documents," they did not necessarily refuse them. They gave us one piece of paper. Just one. So we had to ask again for the others, and wait again for



another piece of paper. They would dribble out papers one at a time. And we never got the documents we wanted.

*Fallaci: Yet Kissinger came to testify.*

*Pike:* We only had him one day, in the morning and in the afternoon. The report speaks for itself. I tried as hard as I could to make him tell what we needed to know. He always went back to his "very personal communications." I was prepared to cite Dr. Kissinger for contempt of Congress. I voted three resolutions to cite Dr. Kissinger for contempt. But the majority of the members of the Congress did not want to proceed. They would have had to choose between Dr. Kissinger and me, or between Dr. Kissinger and our committee. And nobody wanted a confrontation with him.

*Fallaci: But why is everybody so scared of Kissinger?*

*Pike:* I don't know. I really don't. All I can say is that I am not. The fact is that he has many horses, that Kissinger. He is a tremendously astute public relations man. When things don't go as he would like, he calls up his buddies in the media and he gets powerful editorials. As a matter of fact, he mounted an attack against our committee, thanks to his buddies. And since then support has dwindled.

*Fallaci: Why didn't you go after Kissinger yourself, alone? Why didn't you take him to court?*

*Pike:* I could have. But it would have taken too long. Our courts don't move rapidly enough, and the life of the committee would have expired before we got an answer. I had to give up and bear all those obstructions. They even silenced witnesses. They told them flatly that they couldn't talk about certain things. They said: "You cannot even be interviewed without having a representative of the State Department in the room."

*Fallaci: But in the case of the covert operations, from whom did the CIA have to take orders? Apart from the President.*

*Pike:* From the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

*Fallaci: Kissinger.*

*Pike:* Right. Then, from the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of State.

*Fallaci: Kissinger.*

*Pike:* Right. Then from the National Security Council.

*Fallaci: Which Kissinger belongs to.*

*Pike:* Right. What I mean is that the CIA can do by itself only some little tiny noncontroversial things. It cannot take any initiative on its own. I do not agree with Sen. Church when he refers to the CIA as a rogue elephant. I

came to the conclusion that the CIA did things somebody told it to do.

*Fallaci: Mr. Pike, I have to ask you something else. Do you think that Kissinger is democratic?*

*Pike:* No. I won't equivocate. The answer is no. First of all I think that Dr. Kissinger has very little respect for the Congress. And we may deserve very little respect, but the point is that he has very little respect for democratic processes too. Oh, yes, he's really impatient with democracy; he is not as good at democracy as he is at diplomacy. And we simply cannot have a man in his capacity, no matter how brilliant he may be, who is unwilling to accept the majority's views, claiming that he knows better.

*Fallaci: Tell me, Mr. Pike, did this investigation hurt your political career?*

*Pike:* I don't know yet. I will not know until the elections. Maybe.

*Fallaci: Do you feel or did you feel that the CIA would spy on you?*

*Pike:* Yes, I felt that during the investigation. But I didn't let it change anything I did. Now, don't take it that I had any evidence that they were spying on me. There are all kinds and degrees of spying. I have a hunch that the CIA knew all about me: what I like and what I dislike, what my eating habits and my drinking habits are, and other very personal things. I think they know me back and forth and sideways. But I don't fault them for that. An intelligence agency which is being investigated by a congressman would be sort of missing its own duty if it didn't find out what that congressman is like.

*Fallaci: The leaks must have hurt you a lot.*

*Pike:* A hell of a lot. They hurt the credibility of the committee, they hurt me personally as chairman of the committee, they hurt the concept of congressional oversight and the intelligence agencies in general. They benefited only the CIA and the top people. I would strongly support legislation punishing the leakers. Now, having said that, I will also say that if I had to choose between an assassination or a policy of assassinations and a leak that stops assassinations, I'd prefer the leaks.

*Fallaci: Colby denies the CIA had anything to do with the leaks.*

*Pike:* Well, having seen what the CIA is capable of, I wouldn't say they are incapable of leaking a newspaper story. It is quite possible, believe me.

*Fallaci: Mr. Pike, there is one point that leaves me bewildered in your judgement of the CIA. The incapability of the CIA to predict a surprise attack in case of war.*

*Pike:* If you talk about a surprise attack like Pearl



"Harbor, or one over some installation of ours somewhere in the world, we certainly wouldn't know about it from the CIA. I have seen nothing that could give me confidence in that sense. Probably our best intelligence in this regard is in Europe. In spite of what happened in Czechoslovakia, when we simply lost the Russian army for two weeks, I expect that we would know more in Europe. We have improved there, I guess, in seven years. But elsewhere! The Arab-Israeli war episode is discouraging. All right, it took place in an area where we are not immediately involved . . . where we have no bases or troops, I mean. Yet our intelligence was awful. Absolutely awful. Just imagine, after the war had already started, for three or four hours the CIA kept saying: "Nothing is going to happen."

*Fallaci: Colby says that your statements on this subject are irresponsible. He says that the CIA is the best intelligence operation in the world.*

*Pike: We did not start this investigation with the preconceived intention of revealing only their failures. I can assure you that. After we had looked at the money they spent, I said to the members of the committee: "Now we are going to examine the results." And I asked them to suggest situations which were important from the point of view of American foreign policy and it turned out that, in everything, the CIA had done badly. We chose the Tet offensive in Vietnam, the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, the coup in Cyprus, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Indian nuclear explosion, the coup in Portugal. And we found that in no way did the American taxpayer get value for what his intelligence cost. In all of those seven cases, the CIA performed badly, did a lousy job.*

*Fallaci: The time has come for me to taste my dessert—I mean the Italian covert action story. Does your report say everything there is to say about the pay-off in my country?*

*Pike: To the best of my knowledge, yes. Aside from the names, I would say yes.*

*Fallaci: Do you think we will ever know those names officially?*

*Pike: I have no idea. But I have mixed feelings about it. I mean, if I were a member of the Italian parliament . . . and the allegation had been made that some members*

of the Italian parliament had received campaign contributions from the CIA, and I had not received any contribution from the CIA, I would want those names to be published in order to clear my personal reputation. On the other hand, if I had accepted a campaign contribution from the CIA, and if I felt that this had helped to get me elected but in no sense had diminished my loyalty to [my country] then I would think it terribly unfair to see my name published. Because my life would be in danger.

*Fallaci: Are you speaking like those who suppressed your report, Mr Pike? Are you using Richard Welch's death as an excuse? Come on! There is a hell of a difference between an agent and somebody who takes money.*

*Pike: You say that there is a hell of a difference but someone killed Mr. Welch. You cannot rationalize everything because assassins are not rational people. I am not sure that anyone of those who took money from the CIA would be safe from terrorists.*

*Fallaci: What has paying off foreign politicians to do with your national security? What is this national security?*

*Pike: I guess it means the essential strength of the nation. And, in that sense, I can see how they might consider certain payoffs as connected to the national security. Yes, I can. You see, the basic fear in America, as far as the Italian Communists are concerned, is that if they won an election there would never be another election.*

*Fallaci: But the problem remains, as I said to Colby, that we want to take care of this in our way because we are not a colony of yours.*

*Pike: I couldn't agree more. Absolutely. The problem is: to what extent do the Soviets finance the Italian Communist Party? And what kind of policy do we Americans follow there?*

*Fallaci: A last question Mr. Pike. How did you feel when you discovered that part of your money had gone to the Italian neo-Fascists? Did you reproach anyone?*

*Pike: Of course, America does not have the right to do that. But reproaching someone after the fact isn't terribly useful. The goal is always to prevent abuses from recurring. You should ask me: was your reproach of any use? And I would answer: yes, I think it was of some use for a while. For a while . . . Now that they know they've gone too far in many areas and in many ways, the CIA and the NSA are going to be a little more careful for a while. What I am afraid of, in fact, is the consequence of the Welch assassination and of the leaks. There will be no congressional oversight in the near future, I'm afraid. The real oversight will have to come from the executive branch. And I don't think that the executive branch will ever completely monitor itself. So, after a while, I fear, the oversight will become *pro forma* again. And the abuses, I fear, will start again.*

### To our Readers

With this issue, Henry Fairlie joins *The New Republic* as contributing editor. Formerly editorial writer of *The Times* (London), he has written on American political affairs since 1966. Fairlie is also the author of *The Life of Politics* (1968), *The Kennedy Promise* (1973), and *The Spoiled Child of the Western World* (Doubleday, 1976). The Oxford English Dictionary identifies him as the *locus classicus* for the first use of the term "the Establishment."