By Harold Weisberg:

WHITEWASH: The Report on the Warren Report WHITEWASH II: The FBI-Secret Service Coverup

PHOTOGRAPHIC WHITEWASH: Suppressed Kennedy Assassination Pictures OSWALD IN NEW ORLEANS: Case for Conspiracy with the CIA (Out of

Print)

FRAME-UP: The Martin Luther King/James Earl Ray Case WHITEWASH IV: TOP SECRET JFK Assassination Transcript POST MORTEM: JFK Assassination Coverup Smashed!

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Warren Commission said so.

Another page of notes that apparently were made prior to the testing of Zapruder's camera - none of these pages is dated or signed or identified in any way - postulates a camera speed of 16 frames per second as well as the actual, approximately 18. In this version, the first shot is at Frame 190. This is when it could not have struck both men, when Oswald could not have fired it, and coincides with my own early analysis (WHITEWASH, 47).

There is another significant record. On it the CIA does commit itself. It has a column for the Life account and two other columns headed "Other Possibilities." There are two sets of other possibilities, tabulated under the headings, "Frames on Which Shots Occur" and "Seconds Between Shots." (On opposite page.)

Each possibility represents a separate, knowing and suppressed destruction of the official explanation of how our President was killed!

Assuming the official impossibility about the speed with which Oswald could have reloaded and fired a second shot, each column says it was totally impossible. Neither permits enough time.

The CIA is explicit in calculating the frames, too. With a minimum of 42 required for shooting never duplicated by the world's best shots, one version permits only 29 frames between shots, the other 36. The shorter time is 1.6 seconds.

One of the possibilities is that the first shot was fired at Frame 206. By itself, this eliminates Oswald as the lone assassin as it also ends the entire official account.

Both sets of possibilities agree that a shot occurred at Frame 242. There is no way the Zapruder film could have captured a shot that hit nobody. This alone means there has to have been at least a fourth shot, or still another destruction of the entire official explanation. The Commission admits no shot at Frame 242. None was possible within 32 frames. Not with one assassin.

Placing the fatal shot at Frame 312 does not present any basic disagreement. The impact of that bullet was between Frames 312 and 313. The results are visible in 313.

However, there is no doubt that the CIA did possess intelligence in which it is supreme, intelligence at the very least casting the most substantial doubt on the official explanation of how our President was killed and by whom - and kept it secret!

A shot at Frame 206 disqualifies the entire official account of the assassination.

So does one at Frame 242.

Whatever the interval between the first and second shots, in either case it makes the official explanation impossible.

This CIA withholding does not in any sense exculpate the Warren Commission. If it did not have the CIA's photo-intelligence work, it knew the CIA's photo-intelligence capabilities. It elected not to use them. Even though it knew its version was a theory, not a fact.

Its answer is a question, what else could have happened?

This is no answer. That Commission's assigned task was to find out and report what <u>did</u> happen, not theorize and convert its baseless and invalid theories into what it pretended was fact.

But this is information the CIA, the National Photographic Interpretation Center and the Director, Central Intelligence, withheld from the Presidential Commission.

From the sorrowing people, too.

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domestic improprieties and illegal acts of the FBI and CIA, in particular, the exposures that led the Senate to create the Church committee and its Schweiker-Hart subcommittee.

The agencies had to diminish what the Senate could learn and do while seeming to meet the needs of the investigation. Each had to seem to be cooperative. None could even appear to be withholding anything. It also had to be done in a manner that would not require the Senate to find that there had been any agency involvement in the assassination and other crimes. A "national security" claim became the means of withholdings that developed into total misdirection.

Republican Senator Schweiker's need in an election year was to protect his Presidential candidate, Ford, the former Warren Commissioner. This resulted in an irrelevant noninvestigation based on the assumption of the accuracy of the Report. To do this it was necessary to add some guilt on the part of the agencies, so the Schweiker report concluded that they had withheld essential evidence from the Commission. Only suppressions and a less than diligent press made this and acceptance of it possible. Some allegedly withheld evidence supposedly related to Oswald's simultaneous "connection" with the antagonistic pro and anti-Castro forces in New Orleans. There had been no pro-Castro activity or group in New Orleans and, in fact, Oswald was "connected" with no Cuban group of any kind - anywhere.

For a day there were sensational headlines, then it all faded into oblivion. Ford was saved. The agencies were saved. Orwell was more of a seer: control of the past enabled control of the future.

Public pressures demanded that some of the secret files be released. I filed more Freedom of Information Act requests than any other person. By the time of the Church-Schweiker investigation, seven had been in court. Three were then current. I levied more than 50 such demands for suppressed evidence on the CIA and Department of Justice, including the FBI, in addition to other agencies.

These kinds of pressures created other bureaucratic urgencies. One was the need to appear not to suppress while continuing to suppress. One variation was to disclose incompletely and thereby mislead and misdirect. The foregoing incomplete and not understood records on the NPIC's Zapruder film analysis are one illustration and one kind of illustration. Another set of CIA files gets to its special motive.

In fairness to the CIA, it should be understood that the FBI, which did most of the so-called investigating for the Commission, did the same thing in the same and in other ways. Because the FBI had to report to the Commission, it also had to protect itself while still giving the Commission information.

One example of this that is in the Commission's files and was ignored by it bears on the bugaboo of conspiracy. The FBI field reports on its investigation of the literature Oswald handed out in New Orleans state that the literature was not picked up at the printer's by Oswald. The FBI rewrote these field reports in Washington to say that Oswald, using the name Osborne, had picked up this printing. The identical false language is used in the Report.

Here the FBI deliberately gave the Commission what incriminated the Commission. Whether or not Oswald had associates could be evidence of conspiracy. Everybody involved in the government knew there was an official determination to declare that there had been no conspiracy. So, Hoover saddled the Commission with guilt in giving it both versions.

Under these public pressures, the CIA started a program of reviewing its suppressed records to decide which it could release

and in what form. Two of these memoranda of the countless ones that were not given to the Warren Commission have the serial identification of Document Number 657-831. They were reviewed in June 1976.

They are "sanitized" in a technique evolved after the 1974 amending of the FOIA, maskings, especially of names. The false claim is that these maskings were essential for "national security," to protect intelligence sources, methods and installations. To obtain the withheld information, it then becomes necessary to go to court. Few people can do this and none can without wasting time and money. The delay of even successful litigation perpetuates suppressions. Very often there is neither justification nor need for the maskings. They become a disinformation operation in themselves as well as a frustration of the law. While enabling the suppression of the embarrassing, they also hide the identities of those with personal knowledge. With these records there is no "national security" question. None is possible.

The undiligent Schweiker committee was taken in by this CIA trickery. Its report hides a series of nonsecret names. It uses the CIA's substitute, code names and initials. One is a deliberate fabricator of false information, a man who had intelligence connections and wanted to use the JFK assassination as a means of provoking an attack on Cuba. He is called "D." His fabrication is that he saw people in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City give Oswald \$6,500 to kill JFK. Nothing about this story stacked. But the CIA Mexico City station passed it on in excited, uncritical haste, even though on the basis of time alone the story was a complete impossibility. There is no secret about "D." He is Alvaredo Ugarte, as the FBI did not withhold from the Warren Commission. But imagine the Schweiker committee of a dozen years later pretending that suppression of his name is an urgent matter of real "national security." It did the same each time the CIA wanted this done. Thus, it refers to one AMLASH without saying he is Rolando Cuebela. Another example, again from the Warren Commission's nonsecret files, is a supposedly mysterious man who crossed the Mexican border at Nuevo Laredo on November 23, 1963, and left Mexico City for Cuba on the 27th. He is completely identified by the FBI. Even the number of his tourist permit is given. He is Gilberto Lopez. So far as the Commission not knowing, it knew this well: duplicates of these reports from its file CR205, Sec. 3, are also filed under "Susp. Persons."

Gerald Ford as a Warren Commissioner suppressed this and much more information. Schweiker did a job for Ford. They all did a job on all of us in all these suppressions and disinformation operations.

Some areas were particularly delicate for the CIA, whose former Director was a Commissioner. One of these is reflected in the CIA's kind of back-channel in Document Number 657-831. This is one of a series of records encompassed by my FOIA requests. They were released to another. They continued to be withheld from me, even after written reminders. This is one of several that came to my attention when they were fed to the Jack Anderson column. As they were explained to Anderson's associate, Mark Smolonsky, they are sinister in that they show a big recret, that Dulles conferred with his former associates in the CIA.

That was not secret. It would have been a serious failing for Dulles not to have used his connections to further the Commission's work. Dulles informed his fellow Commissioners of this often, sometimes asking if they would like him to ask special favors of the CIA. Dulles carried it to this extreme: he offered to have the CIA use its secret foreign intelligence sources to obtain a book that was printed and available in bookstores.

This is still another aspect of the perpetuated disinformational activities, of the continuing cover-up.

The CIA's internal records, those for which it expected per-

petual secrecy, are nonetheless carefully drawn. In those released it added obfuscation by masking the names. That of the author of an April 13, 1964, "MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD," if one were to guess, is most likely the vulnerable Richard Helms, then chief of dirty tricks as "DDP" or "Deputy Director, Plans." Guesses about the author of the attached three-page memo headed "Memo on Discussions with Mr. Allen W. Dulles on the Oswald Case on April 11" could begin with Thomas W. Karamessines. He was one of the CIA's liaisons with the Commission. Others include Raymond Rocca and Arthur Dooley. These and many other CIA names have not been secret and need not be.

Before final release, as masked as they are, these records had been further masked, in totally unnecessary ways. From the subject of this memo, the words "memo on" and the date of the conference had been masked. They were then written in on review.

What is of initial interest is that the author of the memo on the conference worked over the weekend to prepare it so he could show it first thing Monday morning. The ellipsis also is interesting, in part because more than a dozen years later it was still deceiving and misdirecting the most professional of investigative reporters. Naturally, the Rockefeller-Belin commission ignored it.

Complete analysis is impossible here. What follows is enough to show some of what was being hidden and how. Also important is the reflection of CIA attitude toward the Commission's work. A significant expression of it is the recommendation "that nothing further be done re preparation of an analysis of the OSWALD affair pending receipt of the questions from the Commission" that Dulles said would be sent.

Translated into plain English this means "do not tell the Commission what the CIA knows and instead react to its questions only." This provided the means for withholding information from the Commission with protection for the CIA if caught: it had not been asked.

Also significant is the request from the masked official "that we prepare, on a priority basis, a reply to the FBI communication containing two reports on the OSWALD case from Nosenko." Here the CIA hair is short. It had already conferred with and conned the Commission staff about KGB defector, Yuri Nosenko (POST MORTEM, 626-9).

The Commission's knowledge, the actuality other than the Senate's presumptions of a dozen years later, is contained in a series of formerly suppressed staff memos. Some are of more than a hundred pages. Those of greatest involvement in the Nosenko matter are William T. Coleman, now Ford's Secretary of Transportation, and W. David Slawson, Besides these two at a March 12 conference with three CTA representatives headed by Helms were Rankin, Howard P. Willens, Samuel A. Stern and Burt Griffin.

As the memo on that conference written by Slawson was originally declassified and then released to me, with maskings required by the CIA, the Archives withheld the second paragraph on the first page. This is the first real paragraph of that Slawson memo. The hidden words so urgent in the nation's security are, "The first topic of conversation was Yuri Nosenko, the recent Soviet defector. A general discussion was held on this problem (sic) with the CIA's recommendation being that the Commission await further developments." (POST MORTEM. 627)

Now if we put these two long-suppressed internal records together, we find that the CIA, under Helms, persuaded the Commission to "await further developments" and a month later was still preventing "further developments" by seeing to it that "nothing further be done re preparation of an analysis of the OSWALD affair" until it would be forced by the Commission's questions. Meanwhile, and on a "priority basis," a month after Helms et al. asked the Commission to