

2/8/71. I am reminded of the well-known phrase - was it SHL's? - that war is too important to leave to the generals as I read the Pentagon papers (Courtney, in short, disjointed snatches). To me the least significant part, the least informative content, in confirmation of this view. History already records that simply, and not with our memory alone. To me the most significant disclosures can now, really, be considered new or disclosures, again no more than confirmation of what any intelligent analysis of what was public had to show. Government is too important to leave to the politicians. Interpretations of fact, decisions and recommendations on policy, all are too important to leave to the bureaucrat or professional scholars outside the government.

The logical extension of this is absurd. Government can't really work here. Perhaps the single most conspicuous thing in the reading I have done so far is that nobody had any capacity for really learning or, if we did, has not the courage to come out with it.

In the Jones approach, part II, that takes off from the end product of the "war", there is no way to know who was involved and, all of whom he was, what their intent was at other times, and what was done.

Nobody in my life could ever think that he had any project or the overall purpose he had any kind of clear idea. And indeed, right from the first, when his resolution to go against, and then to bring back the members of the Congress, and then to decide with the situation, the people, their history, the "lesson from history", seems to me to

The last chapter read in Carter's justification of his bombing, based on his experience studying, scratchy, certainly, in Germany in '68. But if he intended the study of which he has been an important part, it has to wait until after the war. Now, if you read this memo with care, he has generalized, if this is the word, about the conditions he could later cite as not only justification for a big move, but a contradiction of it because his conditions were not met, as they could not be.

And this is the reason he lost, the whole bombing, probably, and the same goes for without a doubt. Macmillan was right; if one does not learn from history is doomed to repeat it.

Therefore, to my obvious knowledge, and three one-page report papers, made from the permanent error and total failure of the administration, i.e., that there are not meant to understand what they say. Everyone should have known what they say.