Free Day Urged for JFK Visit." Dallas leaders were anxious to avoid any right-wing demonstrations that might embarass the city as it had been embarrassed by the Adlai Stevenson incident.

That Sunday afternoon, June was playing with Ruth's phone dial and Marina said, "Let's call papa." Ruth called the rooming house number and asked for Lee Oswald. The man who answered told her there was no Lee Oswald at that address. Oswald had registered as O.H. Lee—a circumstance he had forgotten when he gave Ruth the phone number during Marina's last stage of pregnancy. On Monday, November 18, Oswald called Marina as he usually did after work. Marina testified, "I told him that we had telephoned him but he was unknown at that number."

> Then he said that he had lived there under an assumed name. He asked me to remove the notation of the telephone number in Ruth's phone book, but I didn't want to do that. I asked him then, "Why did you give us a phone number, when we do call we cannot get you by name?"
>
> He was very angry, and he repeated that I should remove the notation of the phone number from the phone book. And, of course, we had a quarrel. I told him that this was another of his foolishness, some more of his foolishness. I told Ruth Paine about this. It was incomprehensible to my why he was so secretive all the time.
>
> Q. Did he give you any explanation of why he was using an assumed name?
>
> A. He said that he did not want his landlady to know his real name because she might [have] read in the paper of the fact that he had been to Russia and that he had been questioned.
>
> Q. What did you say about that?
>
> A. Nothing. And also that he did not want the FBI to know where he lived.

Ruth overheard Marina's side of the argument, and afterward Marina, who was obviously upset, told her it wasn't the first time she had felt caught between "two fires." But she didn't mention to Ruth that Oswald wanted her to cross out the phone number. Oswald was clearly afraid that Ruth might give the number to the FBI, which could then use it to determine where he lived.

That evening President Kennedy gave what was to be his last major address. Appearing in Miami, the president spoke on Latin America, and his remarks on Cuba were similar to the message he wanted Jean Daniel, who was now in Havana, to deliver to Castro.

no mention of cancelled motor cade because of threats

> . . . The genuine Cuban Revolution, because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past, had the support of many whose aims and concepts were democratic. But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed. The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana. It is important now to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from the other countries of the hemisphere. It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone, divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it, everything is possible. . . . Once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance. . . .

The speech was written in part by McGeorge Bundy, who knew of Daniel's current trip to Havana, and its evident intent was to let Castro know that the United States could reach an accommodation with Cuba if Cuba backed away from the Soviet Union and ceased its interference in other Latin American countries. But the message was capable of being read another way.

On November 19 both Dallas newspapers reported on the president's speech. The afternoon *Times Herald* said that President Kennedy had "all but invited the Cuban people . . . to overthrow Fidel Castro's Communist regime and promised prompt U.S. aid if they do." The headline was "Kennedy Virtually Invites Cuban Coup." Under its front-page article about the speech, the *Morning News* gave a street-by-street layout of the motorcade route, making it clear that the president would travel down Elm Street past the School Book Depository. The afternoon paper carried a comparable story on the motorcade route. Thus, on Tuesday Oswald could have known the unique vantage point his workplace had given him, and in the same issue he may have read an article suggesting that the president was calling for a coup against Fidel Castro.

Late that afternoon there was a change in Oswald's routine—he didn't call Marina after work, or on Wednesday. Marina attributed this change to the quarrel they'd had on Monday, and that seems to be a reasonable explanation. But there was something else—a small slip of the mind that suggests he was no longer thinking about eluding the FBI and had turned his attention to some other matter. On Monday Oswald had been extremely anxious for his wife to remove

his number from Ruth's phone book. He was furious with Marina for refusing to do it. But after Monday he said no more about the phone number, and when he next went to Irving on Thursday, he didn't remove the number himself, as he might have done.

At the Depository on November 20 a textbook salesman brought in a new hunting rifle to show Roy Truly and some of the employees who happened to be in Truly's office, Lee Oswald among them. Oswald filed this incident away for future use—he would refer to it later that week.

On the morning of Thursday, November 21, Oswald approached Wesley Frazier at work and asked him for a ride to Irving that afternoon. Frazier readily agreed, but asked him why he was going home on a Thursday. Oswald said, "I am going to get some curtain rods. You know, put in an apartment." Later that afternoon Ruth came home from the grocery store and saw Oswald with Marina and June on her front lawn—"I was surprised to see him. . . . I had no advance notice and he had never before come without asking whether he could." As they all went inside, Ruth said to him, "Our President is coming to town." Oswald replied, "Ah, yes," and walked on into the kitchen.

Oswald told his wife he had come home to make up with her. That night he watched TV, helped Marina fold diapers, and talked about getting an apartment in Dallas right away. Before Marina got up the next morning, Oswald tucked $170—almost all the money he had—into a wallet they kept in a drawer and left his wedding ring in an antique Russian cup on top of the bureau. When she woke he told her to buy something for herself and the children, and she wondered why he was being so kind all of a sudden. In the garage he picked up the disassembled rifle he had secretly wrapped in brown paper the night before. Then he rode into work with Frazier. After the Depository workers broke for lunch and most of them went outside to see the president pass by, he would have the sixth floor to himself.

In Fort Worth early that morning President Kennedy addressed four thousand people who had assembled in a misting rain at his hotel parking lot. Like the crowds in San Antonio and Houston the day before, they gave him an enthusiastic welcome. "Where's Jackie?" someone shouted, and Kennedy joined in the laughter. "Mrs. Kennedy is organizing herself," he said. "It takes longer, but, of course, she looks better than we do when she does it. We appreciate your welcome." During a breakfast speech later on, the president answered his right-wing critics by pointing to his efforts to improve

the national defense. Afterward, at his hotel suite, he looked through the Dallas *Morning News* and saw a full-page advertisement that accused him of selling out to the Communists. Entitled "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" and bordered in black, the ad asked twelve impertinent questions, among them, "WHY do you say we have built a 'wall of freedom' around Cuba when there is no freedom in Cuba today? Because of your policy, thousands of Cubans have been imprisoned, are starving and being persecuted—with thousands already murdered and thousands more awaiting execution and, in addition, the entire population of almost 7,000,000 Cubans are living in slavery?" And, "WHY have you scrapped the Monroe Doctrine in favor of the 'Spirit of Moscow'?" Referring to the ad he told his wife, "Oh, you know, we're heading into nut country today." It reminded him of something he had realized since he took office. Despite Secret Service protection, anyone who was willing to exchange his life for the president's could do so. Now, to his aide Kenneth O'Donnell he said lightly, "Anyone perched above the crowd with a rifle could do it." Always fatalistic, and having a fine sense of irony, Kennedy put himself in the assassin's place—he pantomimed the imagined action, extending a forefinger like a weapon.

At 11:40 that morning, *Air Force One* brought the presidential party to Love Field, where Kennedy greeted a crowd of well-wishers. An open limousine driven by a Secret Service agent was waiting. The president and Mrs. Kennedy sat in the back, and Governor and Mrs. Connally took the jump seats in front of them. With another limousine carrying armed Secret Service agents behind them, the motorcade formed and left for downtown Dallas.

At 12:30 P.M., Lee Harvey Oswald entered history. Three shots from a sixth-floor Depository window hit Governor Connally once and the president twice. Oswald fled the building minutes later, caught a bus, and, when it got stalled in traffic, got out and took a cab to his rooming house. He picked up his revolver and a jacket and rushed out—on his way, Albert Newman believes, to try to assassinate Walker, too.[3] At approximately 1:15 P.M., he was stopped by Patrolman J.D. Tippit, who had been cruising the area in a squad car. When Tippit got out to question him, Oswald shot and killed him. Within minutes, the manager of a shoe store a few blocks away heard police sirens and saw a disheveled young man outside his front window glancing back over his shoulder. The manager watched as he ducked into the lobby of a nearby movie theater.

15...The Arrest

REPORTER Seth Kantor had been waiting at the Trade Mart for the motorcade to arrive. Upon learning of the assassination attempt, he joined the general scramble for transportation to the hospital where the president had been taken. Kantor's first emotion was revulsion toward Dallas right-wing extremists. Running toward a station wagon, he wanted to scream, "God damn you, Dallas. Smug Dallas. God damn you."

At that hour AM/LASH was meeting with his case officer in Europe. The CIA man referred to President Kennedy's November 18 speech and told AM/LASH that he could take Kennedy's remarks on Cuba as a signal that a coup against Castro woudl receive American support—the CIA man was asking the Cuban official to read between the lines of the president's speech. He told AM/LASH that the weapons he had asked for would be provided, and to establish his credibility he handed him a poison-pen device. As they were coming out the door from their meeting, they were told that President Kennedy had been shot.

Fidel Castro was meeting with Kennedy's unofficial envoy, Jean Daniel. When he received word of the shooting, Castro slumped in his chair and said, "Es un mala noticia" (This is bad news"). After Kennedy's death was confirmed, Castro said, "Everything is changed. Everything is going to change. . . . I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."

Michael Paine was at work. Someone turned on a radio, and when he heard the Book Depository mentioned, his heart jumped. Frank

Krystinik asked, "Isn't that where Lee Oswald works?" Krystinik thought Paine should call the FBI, but Michael resisted. He didn't want to accuse Oswald unjustly. Even so, when he went back to his job, his hands trembled so badly he was unable to assemble a vibration meter he'd been working on. Then an eyewitness who had seen the assassin in he window came on the radio. He said that the rifleman fired "coolly," that he took "his jolly good time," and then drew his rifle back "just as unconcerned as could be." Paine thought it sounded like Oswald.

Oswald was arrested at the Texas Theater in Oak Cliff at 1:40 P.M. After a struggle, an officer took from his hand the Smith & Wesson with which he had shot Patrolman Tippit. As he was hauled through the lobby, Oswald was heard to shout, "I protest this police brutality," and "I am not resisting arrest." A large crowd of people had gathered outside the theater, and when they saw the policemen emerge with Oswald in tow some of them yelled, "Kill the s.o.b." and "Let us have him." The lawmen hustled him into a patrol car and drove away.

Oswald wasn't visibly shaken. When one of the men in the car asked him if he had killed Tippit because he was afraid of being arrested, Oswald said he wasn't afraid of anything, and asked, "Do I look like I am scared now?" As they drove into the police department basement, Oswald was asked if he wanted to conceal his face from the photographers. "Why should I cover my face?" he asked. "I haven't done anything to be ashamed of."

From the written reports and testimony of the police detectives, FBI agents, and Secret Service agents who questioned Oswald at the police station, we have the following account.

His chief interrogator was homicide captain Will Fritz. Fritz recalled that Oswald would talk to him readily "until I asked him a question that meant something, that would produce evidence," and then Oswald would immediately tell him he wouldn't answer. Fritz thought he seemed to anticipate what he was going to ask. Others who were there also got the impression that Oswald was quick with his answers and that he appeared to have planned what he was going to say. The one thing Oswald discussed willingly was his political beliefs —he said he was a Marxist and gave his views on civil rights. He said he supported the Cuban revolution.

On Friday afternoon Fritz apprised Oswald of his rights—his immediate response was to say he didn't need a lawyer. Fritz had just begun asking some general questions about his background when FBI agents Hosty and James Bookhout came in. When Hosty introduced

He asked for John Abt

himself Oswald reacted angrily and said, "Oh, so you are Hosty. I've heard about you." He accused Hosty of "accosting" his wife and called the FBI a gestapo. According to one report he added, "I am going to fix you FBI." During this scene Hosty became 100% certain that the unsigned note in his workbox came from Oswald. Unable to calm him down, Hosty took a seat in the corner with Bookhout and let Fritz continue with his interrogation.

In the past, when Oswald was questioned by agents Fain and Quigley and Lieutenant Martello, he had told many calculated lies. Some of his responses now showed the same calculation. When Fritz asked Oswald if he owned a rifle, he replied that he had seen his superviser, Mr. Truly, showing a rifle to some other people in his office on November 20, but he denied owning a rifle himself. He maintained that he had been eating his lunch when the motorcade passed by and that afterward he assumed there would be no more work that day, so he went home and decided to go to a movie. When he was asked why he took his pistol with him, he said it was because "he felt like it." He claimed that he had bought the pistol from a dealer in Fort Worth. At one point, when Hosty spoke up and asked him if he had ever been to Mexico City, Oswald again displayed anger. According to Fritz, he "beat on the desk and went into a kind of tantrum." He said he had never been in Mexico City. The interview was interrupted several times for identification lineups in which witnesses identified Oswald as the man they had seen shooting Tippit or running away from the scene.

Sometime that day FBI agent Manning C. Clements asked Oswald for some routine background information, including his previous residences. In his reply Oswald mentioned the addresses of every place he had lived since he returned from Russia—*except* the Neely Street apartment in Dallas, where Marina had taken pictures of him holding a rifle in the backyard. Instead, he claimed that he had lived on Elsbeth Street for about seven months, that is, the entire time he had been in Dallas in early 1963.

At 7:10 P.M. Oswald was arraigned for Tippit's murder. Around midnight he was taken downstairs for an interview with the press corps, which had been clamoring to see him. There Oswald said of his arraignment, "I protested at that time that I was not allowed legal representation during that very short and sweet hearing. I really don't know what the situation is about. Nobody has told me anything except that I am accused of, of murdering a policeman. I know nothing more than that and I do request someone to come forward

to give me legal assistance." A reporter asked, "did you kill the President?" He answered, "No. I have not been charged with that. In fact nobody has said that to me yet. The first thing I heard about it was when the newspaper reporters in the hall asked me that question."

Among the observers crammed into the room was Jack Ruby, the owner of a nightclub featuring stripshows. A well-known character in Dallas, a habitual gladhander and publicity-seeker, Ruby was a police buff who knew several dozen members of the local force. He also had an old arrest record for disturbing the peace, carrying a concealed weapon, and assault, and he knew several individuals in the Mafia. Perhaps because of the nature of his business, Ruby often carried large sums of money and a pistol. Despite his rough background, acquaintances had noticed that Ruby, like many other people, seemed greatly affected by the president's murder.

At approximately 10 o'clock on Saturday morning the interrogation resumed. Oswald denied that he had told Wesley Frazier he was going to Irving to pick up curtain rods. He said the package he brought to work contained his lunch. He said he had gone to Irving on Thursday because Mrs. Paine was planning to give a party for the children that weekend and he didn't want to be there then. In fact, the party had been held the weekend before, but if Ruth were questioned about it, he could say he had simply misunderstood. As so often happened, Oswald was twisting the truth to fit his own purposes—it was almost as though he saw reality itself as nothing more than raw material to be shaped and used. Oswald said that when the motorcade passed the building he had been in the second-floor lunchroom with some of his co-workers, one of them a Negro named Junior. In fact, Junior Jarman didn't see Oswald in the lunchroom that day. Jarman finished eating before noon and went up to the fifth floor to watch the motorcade with Harold Norman and Bonnie Ray Williams. They heard the shots going off over their heads. Norman was at the window directly beneath the sniper and could hear the ejected shells hitting the floor above him.

According to a Secret Service report, Oswald refused to answer any more questions concerning the pistol or rifle until he had seen a lawyer.

> . . . He stated that he wanted to contact a Mr. Abt, a New York lawyer whom he did not know but who had defended the Smith Act "victims" in 1949 or 1950 in connection with a conspiracy against the Government;

that Abt would understand what this case was all about and that he would give him an excellent defense. . . .

Upon questioning by Captain Fritz, he said, "I have no views on the President." "My wife and I like the President's family. They are interesting people. I have my own views on the President's national policy. I have a right to express my views but because of the charges I do not think I should comment further."

Oswald was returned to his cell before noon.

Seth Kantor had joined the horde of reporters inside the jail, and at one point he saw the prisoner being led through the hall. Reporters were shouting, "Why did you kill the President?" One asked if he blamed the wounded Governor Connally, a former secretary of the navy, for his dishonorable discharge, and Oswald shouted back over his shoulder, "I don't know what kind of newspaper reports you are getting but these are not true." Kantor's impression of Oswald was visceral: "He was defiant. He looked alert at all times. In his profile, he was sharp-featured. Full-faced, he had a cunning look." He reminded Kantor of the demonstrators who had disrupted a House Un-American Activities Committee hearing in September. The demonstrators had seemed to time their actions to get the best camera angles when the police dragged them out of the room. "This was Lee Harvey Oswald," Kantor wrote in his notes. "He was living the part of a martyr." Oswald also told the reporters, "I'm just a patsy."

On November 23 Aline Mosby picked up a newspaper and saw a photograph of the young defector she had interviewed in 1959. The picture, taken after his arrest, had a caption that said he was "glaring at photographers defiantly." Looking at his face, Mosby disagreed. She thought Lee Oswald was probably enjoying every minute of it.

That morning the police had returned to Ruth's house armed with a warrant for a more thorough search than they had conducted the day before, and they found copies of the photographs showing Oswald holding a rifle, and one negative. In the meantime Michael Paine had been questioned about Oswald's previous residences and mentioned the Neely Street apartment. After lunch Fritz asked Oswald about the Neely address and found that he was "very evasive about this location."

Afterward Oswald was allowed to speak with his wife. Marina had been apprehensive ever since she first heard from Ruth that the shooting took place near the Depository. She hadn't known the motorcade would pass by her husband's place of work. Even if she had, she

wouldn't have suspected he would kill the president—Walker, yes, but not Kennedy. When the police came on Friday she showed them where Oswald kept his rifle. The blanket was still there, neatly tied, but when a policeman picked it up the ends fell limp and she turned ashen, realizing the rifle was gone. That night she had found the two pictures of her husband in June's baby book. Marguerite had by that time arrived at the Paine house, having heard that her son had been arrested. Marina showed her one of the photographs of Lee brandishing a rifle, and Marguerite groaned and shook her head to indicate that she shouldn't tell anyone.

Before she went to see Lee that afternoon Marina folded the pictures and stuffed them inside her shoe. She wanted to ask him what she should do with them. Separated by a glass partition they spoke over a pair of telephones. Thinking of the pictures, she asked him, "[C]an we talk about anything we like? Is anybody listening in?"

"Oh, of course," he said. "We can speak about *absolutely* anything at all." And she knew from his tone that he was warning her not to say anything significant.

He assured her everything would work out fine, but she didn't believe him. He told her she had friends who would help her, and if necessary she could get help from the Red Cross. Marina could tell that he was guilty. If he hadn't been, she thought, he would have been loudly protesting his arrest, and besides, she sensed that he was saying goodbye to her with his eyes. McMillan has written that Marina didn't know if he would confess or not: he might claim that his act had been justified, or he might insist that he was innocent. Either way, eh would take the opportunity to proclaim his ideas.

Concerning their conversation, Marina testified, "He spoke of some friends who supposedly would help him. I don't know who he had in mind. That he had written to someone in New York before that. I was so upset that of course I didn't understand anything of that. . . . I told him that the police had been there and that a search had been conducted, that they had asked me whether we had a rifle, and I had answered yes. And he said that if there would be a trial, and that if I am questioned it would be my right to answer or to refuse to answer."

Oswald was perhaps referring to the lawyer in New York, John Abt, who had represented Gus Hall and Ben Davis. Oswald hadn't written to him, but he had written a letter to the Hall–Davis defense committee in 1962. Abt, an attorney for the Communist party, had never heard of him and would undoubtedly have been horrified to be

asked to take this case. The Left certainly had no intention of rallying to Oswald's cause, even if he claimed he was innocent. Since John Abt's name had appeared several times in *The Worker* during the months Oswald was planning his attack on Walker, it's probable that this was the lawyer he had intended to ask for if he had been arrested after shooting Walker. In any event, it's clear that Oswald was now planning ahead for his trial, and it's likely he had already given it considerable thought. Evidently he intended to charge the FBI with harassment and say he'd been framed because of his political beliefs. Even from his jail cell, he still expected to manipulate events. He would try to turn his trial into a political cause célèbre like the Rosenberg case, thus making propaganda and ensuring his place in leftist history.

If this was Oswald's plan, it was typical of his thinking—grandiose, perverse, manipulative, unrealistic.

Sometime that afternoon Robert Oswald visited his brother and found him "completely relaxed"—he talked "matter-of-factly, without any sign of tension or strain." As soon as they picked up the telephones in the visiting room, Oswald said, "This is taped [sic]." (When Marguerite spoke with Robert alone at the police station, her first words were, "This room is bugged. Be careful what you say.") As with the police, Oswald seemed willing to discuss anything but the assassination. Robert later wrote that he asked, "Lee, what the Sam Hill is going on?"

> "I don't know," he said.
>
> "You don't know? Look, they've got your pistol, they've got your rifle, they've got you charged with shooting the President and a police officer. And you tell me you don't know. Now, I want to know just what's going on."
>
> He stiffened and straightened up, and his facial expression was suddenly very tight.
>
> "I just don't know what they're talking about," he said, firmly and deliberately. "Don't believe all this so-called evidence."

Robert stared into his eyes, trying to find the truth, and Oswald said quietly, "Brother, you won't find anything there."

Although Oswald was uncommunicative, he made two statements to Robert that suggest he saw the assassination as an act similar to both his defection and the attack on General Walker. When Robert asked him what he thought was going to happen to Marina and his children, he said, "My friends will take care of them," and indicated that he meant the Paines. He was depending on other people to look after his family, just as he had done when he tried to kill Walker. Shortly before Robert left, Oswald told him not to get invovled in his case, or he might get in trouble with his boss and lose his job. He had said the same thing in Moscow. He told Aline Mosby, "I don't want to involve my family in this," and "My brother might lose his job because of this."

After talking with his brother, Oswald telephoned Ruth and asked her to call John Abt for him, giving her two numbers he had gotten from information. He had already tired to reach the attorney himself. He made no reference to the reason he was in jail, and Ruth was appalled and irritated that he sounded so apart from the situation. He sounded to her "almost as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened." Later she tried to reach Abt, but he was out of town.

Meanwhile the president of the Dallas Bar Association, H. Louis Nichols, had been getting long-distance calls from other attorneys who had seen Oswald's press conference and were afraid his legal rights weren't being protected. Nichols decided to offer Oswald his assistance. When he saw Oswald in his cell that afternoon, the prisoner seemed calm and appeared to know "pretty much what his rights were." Oswald told him he wanted Abt or a member of the American Civil Liberties Union. If he couldn't get either one, Oswald said, and if he could find a lawyer in Dallas who "believes as I believe, and believes in my innocence—as much as he can, I might let him represent me." Oswald told Nichols he didn't think he would need his assistance but that he "might come back next week." Nichols left, having satisfied himself "that the man appeared to know what he was doing. He did not appear to be irrational."

By this time the police lab had enlarged one of the backyard photographs and Fritz had Oswald brougt in at six o'clock to confront him with this evidence. Oswald claimed that the photographs were fakes and that he had never seen them before. He said he knew all about photography and that the small picture was a reduced copy of the large one. Fritz reported, "He further stated that since he had been photographed here at the City Hall and that people had been taking his picture while being transferred from my office to the jail door that someone had been able to get a picture of his face and with that, they had made this picture. He told me that he understood photography real well, and that in time, he would be able to show that it was not his picture, and that it had been made by someone else. At this time

he said that he did not want to answer any more questions and he was returned to the jail about 7:15 P.M."

This was probably the line Oswald intended to pursue had the backyard photographs been found after he shot Walker. For years to come there would be a controversy about the authenticity of these pictures. The House Assassinations Committee had a panel of photographic specialists examine the recovered photos and negative. Using sophisticated analytical techniques, the panel could find no evidence of fakery. In addition, the panel used similar techniques to uncover a unique mark of wear and tear on the rifle in the photos that corresponded to a mark on the weapon found in the Depository, and concluded that the two weapons were identical.

On Sunday morning the accused assassin was questioned for the last time by Fritz, two Secret Service men, and a Dallas postal inspector, Harry Holmes. During this interview Oswald denied knowing anyone named A.J. Hidell, the name on an I.D. card in his wallet and on his post office box application, and denied using the name as an alias. He began talking politics again, and said that Cuba should have full diplomatic relations with the United States. Asked if he was a Communist, Oswald said, "No, I am a Marxist but I am not a Marxist Leninist." When Fritz asked him the difference, Oswald said it would take too long to explain it to him. When a Secret Service inspector asked him if he thought the assassination would have any effect on the Cuban situation, Oswald at first responded with a question. "I am filed on for the President's murder, is that right? Under the circumstances, I don't believe that it would be proper [to respond]." Nevertheless, he went on to say that he thought there would probably be no change in America's attitude toward Cuba with Vice-President Johnson becoming president "because they both belonged to the same political party and the one would follow pretty generally the policies of the other."

Detective J.R. Leavelle was also present that morning. Oswald gave him the impression "of being a man with a lot better education than his formal education indicated. . . . for instance the long elaboration that he went into on the Cuba deal would tell—indicate that he had a fairly better than high school education that he was reported to have had." Leavelle told the Commission the prisoner seemed very much in control of himself at all times and added, "In fact, he struck me as a man who enjoyed the situation immensely and was enjoying the publicity and everything [that] was coming his way."

Inspector Holmes later reported:

> Oswald at no time appeared confused or in doubt as to whether or not to answer a question. On the contrary, he was quite alert and showed no hesitancy in answering those questions he wanted to answer, and was quite skillful in parrying those questions which he did not want to answer. I got the impression he had disciplined his mind and reflexes to a state where I personally doubted if he would ever have confessed. He denied, emphatically, having taken part in or having had any knowledge of the shooting of the policeman Tippit or of the President, stating tht so far as he is concerned the reason he was in custody was because he "popped a policeman in the nose in a theater on Jefferson Avenue."

Priscilla Johnson also believed he would never have confessed. Soon after the assassination she wrote that if there was one thing that stood out in the conversation she had had with him in Moscow, "it was his truly compelling need . . . to think of himself as extraordinary. A refusal to confess, expressed in stoic and triumphant silence, would have fitted this need. In some twisted way, it might also have enabled him to identify with other 'unjustly' persecuted victims, such as Sacco and Vanzetti and the Rosenbergs."

Oswald was scheduled to be transferred to the county jail at ten o'clock. The questioning ran longer than expected, past eleven, but yielded nothing further. Oswald chose a black sweater from among those offered to him from his clothes and put it on over his T-shirt. He was now dressed entirely in black, as he had been in the rifleman photographs Marina had taken. To the end, he was playing out the role he had created for himself and had been rehearsing, in one way or another, for most of his life. Then he was handcuffed to Leavelle's left wrist and walked to the elevator. Outside the building a large crowd waited, and the basement was packed with police and reporters. At 11:17 Jack Ruby was at the Western Union office across the street sending a money order to one of his strippers. He walked out and went to the police station. Less than four minutes later, as television cameras followed Oswald being brought out toward a waiting car, Ruby rushed forward and shot him once in the abdomen. Ruby was immediately wrestled to the floor by several policemen, to whom he said, "You all know me. I'm Jack Ruby." When the crowd outside heard what had happened, it let out a cheer.

Police detective Billy Combest had the presence of mind to try to get a statement from Oswald before he died. The author of *Conspiracy*, Anthony Summers, interviewed Combest in 1978. Combest told him, "I got right down on the floor with him, just literally on my hands and knees. And I asked him if he would like to make any confession,

any statement in connection with the assassination of the President. . . . Several times he responded to me by shaking his head in a definite manner. . . . It wasn't from the pain or anything—he had just decided he wasn't going to correspond with me, he wasn't going to say anything."

In a footnote Summers added something he had left out of the text. Combest had told him that Oswald accompanied his headshaking with "a definite clenched-fist salute." Summers then argued, "This cannot be taken as good evidence of a political gesture, given Oswald's condition at that moment. It may indeed have been an expression of pain." He added that Combest had said nothing about the clenched-fist salute in his statements to the Warren Commission. Two comments can be made on Summers' argument. When Combest testified in 1964 he probably didn't know what a clenched-fist salute was. Although the gesture had been a socialist salute in Spain in the 1930s, it didn't become a widely recognized symbol of political militancy in this country until the late 1960s. It was probably then that Combest reinterpreted Oswald's gesture as a political statement. Second, a news photograph taken of Oswald after his arrest shows him raising one manacled arm in what appears to be a clenched-fist salute.

In any event, a raised fist was Oswald's last comment.

16 . . . Reactions

> I really look with commiseration over the great body of my fellow citizens who, reading newspapers, live and die in the belief that they have known something of what has been passing in the world in their time.
>
> —Harry Truman

A STUNNED nation groped for a meaning. Trying to assimilate the president's death into the only context they knew, many saw it as a continuation of the violent opposition to the civil rights movement in the South—the murder of Medgar Evans, the bombing of the Birmingham church. Editorial writers and television commentators immediately blamed the anti-Kennedy environment in Dallas or American violence in general.

As more information came out, the possibility that Oswald had a political motive became ever more remote. When reporters learned that Oswald had once tried to join Carlos Bringuier's organization in New Orleans, this was taken as an indication that he was politically erratic. In December the discovery that Oswald had tried to murder Walker—whose political philosophy was radically different from Kennedy's—produced a similar impression.

An accepted picture of Oswald gradually emerged. He was seen as a confused drifter who acted out of personal frustration—he couldn't hold a job and his wife didn't want to live with him. The assassination had no political significance, except as a timely lesson about right-wing extremism and its consequences.

Fidel Castro's first reaction was given in a *New York Times* head-

line: "Castro Mourns 'Hostile' Leader: Deplores Slaying But Says Kennedy Courted War." Later, however, after details of Oswald's background were revealed, Castro began to suspect "a Machiavellian plan against Cuba." In a speech in late November he declared:

> Oswald never had contacts with us—we have never heard of him. . . . We have searched through all our files and this man is not listed as president of any committee. Nowhere is there any mention of any Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas or New Orleans. . . . Oswald is an individual expressly fabricated to begin an anti-Communist campaign to liquidate the President because of his policy. This plan to call Oswald a Castro Communist is designed to pressure the new Administration. All people, including the U.S. people, should demand that what is behind the assassination be clarified. Those who love peace and the United States intellectuals should understand the gravity of this campaign.

Apparently Castro sincerely believed this. He was afraid a public clamor about Oswald's politics might lead to war. American government officials were also aware of this danger, and they too were worried. There was a general fear among cabinet members that the American people might demand retribution from Russia or Cuba or both. When the new president, Lyndon Johnson, asked Chief Justice Earl Warren to head up the investigation, he stressed that rumors about Oswald's foreign connections had created a grave international situation. He made Warren understand that it was his duty to head up a responsible investigation to dispel these rumors, and Warren reluctantly accepted the assignment.

When the Warren Commission began taking testimony a few months later, some of the witnesses who knew Oswald were asked what they thought his motive might have been. None of these witnesses thought Oswald acted because he was irrational or because he had personal problems. Several said they believed his motive was somehow political. Their opinions are remarkable in that they ran counter to the contemporary news media interpretation and popular belief.

Michael Paine had initially doubted that Oswald was guilty because he "didn't see how this could fit, how this could help his cause, and I didn't think he was irrational." Paine came to believe that the president was a target of opportunity: "I thought it was a spur of the moment idea that came into his head when he realized that he would have the opportunity with sort of a duck blind there, an opportunity

to change the course of history, even though he couldn't predict from that action what course history would take, that in my opinon would not have deterred him from doing it."

John Hall, Elena Hall's husband, said he wasn't surprised when he heard that Oswald had been arrested because he thought Oswald was the "kind of guy that would do something like that." Not that he believed Oswald was insane—"He was pretty sharp. If he had the right training in the right direction, he could have done something with his life." Hall thought the assassination was a violent expression of Oswald's resentment not only of the American government but of "our whole way of life." Max Clark, the Fort Worth attorney, also said he didn't think Oswald was mentally unstable. But he thought Oswald was capable of assassinating Kennedy in order "to go down in history, because he seemed to think he was destined to go down in history some way or another."

Lee's cousin Marilyn disagreed with the news media explanations, as well. She didn't think he acted because he was "jealous of Kennedy and all that Kennedy stood for," or because he wanted to "be somebody." In her view, Lee Oswald already thought he *was* somebody and always seemed perfectly satisfied with the way he was. She thought his motive might have been "to discredit America in the eyes of the world"—or "perhaps because he was turned down by Russia and then turned down by Fidel, that perhaps he wanted to show them that he could commit such a great act without the help of any others."

Marina gave several contradictory opinions about her husband's motive, but at one point she testified that her first impression had been that he wanted "by any means—good or bad, to get into history." Then she added, "But now that I have heard a part of the translation of some of the documents, I think that there was some political foundation to it, a foundation of which I am unaware."

Police Captain Fritz seems to have come closer to the truth than anyone else. He testified: "I got the impression he was doing it because of his feeling about the Castro revolution, and I think that . . . he had a lot of feeling about that revolution. I think that was the reason. I noticed another thing. I noticed a little before when Walker was shot [sic], he had come out with some statements about Castro and about Cuba and a lot of things and if you will remember the President had some stories a few weeks before his death about Cuba and about Castro . . . and I wondered if that didn't have some bearing. I have no way of knowing that other than just watching him and talking to him." Asked if Oswald acted afraid, Fritz said, "No, sir; I don't

believe he was afraid at all. I think he was a person who had his mind made up what to do and I think he was like a person just dedicated to a cause. And I think he was above average for intelligence. I know a lot of people call him a nut all the time but he didn't talk like a nut. He knew exactly when to quit talking."

Oswald's death left Marina in a predicament. The FBI and Secret Service now turned to her for the answers to their questions, and although Marina had no foreknowledge of the assassination, she did have knowledge of some of Oswald's past activities that she was afraid to admit. On November 27, when FBI and Secret Service agents confronted her with the backyard photographs showing Oswald with his rifle, she admitted taking them, but said nothing about his attack on Walker. Instead, she said that before the assassination "she had never had any inkling that he would be so violent to anybody"—she must have realized that she would be blamed for not going to the police after the Walker shooting. At the end of the interview she volunteered the information that when Oswald came to Irving on Thursday he told her he wouldn't be coming back that weekend because "he had something very important to do." Asked about this statement a few weeks later, Marina said she couldn't remember, and the matter was dropped.

A Secret Service report of November 28 quotes her as saying that at "one time she became so exasperated with Lee Oswald she asked him 'What are you trying to do, start another revolution?' " Interviewed again the next day, Marina said that when she left New Orleans with Ruth no arrangement had been made for Oswald to go to Mexico City. The interviewer noted, "Inasmuch as Mexico City had not been mentioned, she was asked why she had said no arrangements had been made. . . . She replied she had been looking at television the past few days and had seen or heard that Oswald had been in Mexico City." Later she admitted she had known about his visits to the Cuban and Russian embassies.

And yet, despite her evasions, it does appear that Marina was trying to convey the truth, but in such a way that she cold avoid getting into any trouble. On November 30, when Oswald's attack on Walker still hadn't been discovered, she told the FBI that Oswald had once told her "Hitler needed killing," since by killing Hitler others could have been saved. But Marina didn't mention the shooting incident that had inspired that remark until she had to—after the note Oswald had left her was discovered by the Secret Service on December 2, tucked inside

her Russian "Book of Useful Advice." She then admitted that he had told her Walker was the leader of the fascist organization in Dallas "and it was best to remove him." She explained that she had saved the note so that she could threaten to take it to the police if Oswald ever spoke of doing such a thing again.

After she appeared before the Warren Commission in February, the Commission lawyers weren't satisfied with her testimony. Wesley J. Liebeler thought she might have been approximating the truth in order to tell the Commission what she believed it wanted to hear. On the other hand, the Commission seemed more ready to hear some parts of her testimony than others. It preferred to believe, for instance, that Oswald became disillusioned with Cuba.

In 1978 Marina explained the inconsistencies in her testimony when she appeared before the House Assassinations Committee:

> At the beginning, if it is possible to understand . . . I am just a human being and I did try to protect Lee—that was my natural instinct that I followed. Some things I did not want to talk about because I tried to protect Lee. So they can hold this against me, there is nothing I can do about it.
>
> I had to protect myself, too. I didn't have any home to turn back to. I was not eligible or qualified to live right here so I really was trying to save my skin, to put it bluntly, but it was not for the reasons that I was protecting somebody, that I was part of any crime, that is not so. That was just a very human mistake that you make but it was not—maybe legally you call this perjury, I don't know. But it was not because I was afraid that I might betray some secrets that I knew in order to be punished for . . . I was not aware of the crime that he was planning and I am sorry that all this happened like the rest of us suffer. So I don't think I can add any more.

It was within this context that Marina told the Commission a story that led to one of the earliest and most often repeated theories about Dallas—that on the night before the assassination Oswald begged his wife to live with him and she refused.

> Q. Did your husband give any reason for coming home on Thursday?
>
> A. He said that he was lonely because he hadn't come the preceding weekend, and he wanted to make his peace with me.
>
> Q. Did you say anything to him then?
>
> A. He tried to talk to me but I would not answer him, and he was very upset.

Q. Were you upset with him?

A. I was angry, of course. He was not angry—he was upset. I was angry. He tried very hard to please me. He spent quite a bit of time putting away diapers and played with the children on the street.

Q. How did you indicate to him that you were angry with him?

A. By not talking to him.

Q. And how did he show that he was upset?

A. He was upset over the fact that I would not answer him. He tried to start a conversation with me several times, but I would not answer. And he said that he didn't want me to be angry at him because this upsets him.

On that day, he suggested that we rent an apartment in Dallas. He said that he was tired of living alone and perhaps the reason for my being so angry was the fact that we were not living together. That if I want to he would rent an apartment in Dallas tomorrow—that he didn't want me to remain with Ruth any longer, but wanted me to live with him in Dallas.

He repeated this not once but several times, but I refused. And he said that once again I was preferring my friends to him, and that I didn't need him. . . . And I told him to buy me a washing machine, because two children it became too difficult to wash by hand.

Q. What did he say to that?

A. He said he would buy me a washing machine.

Q. What did you say to that?

A. Thank you. That it would be better if he bought something for himself—that I would manage.

Ruth Paine, who saw them together that night, saw nothing of this. She thought they seemed "cordial," "friendly," and "warm"—"like a couple making up after a small spat." Ruth also testified that shortly after Oswald's arrest, Marina let her know she was bewildered and hurt that he should do such a thing when just the night before he had talked of their getting an apartment soon.

Marina later admitted to McMillan that she had never asked her husband to buy her a washing machine, and that it was Lee who had brought that subject up on November 21. McMillan concluded, "Lee and Marina did not fight that evening about a washing machine." Nor, apparently, did they fight about anything else. When Marina appeared before the Assassinations Committee and was questioned for perhaps the twentieth time about the events of November 21, she showed her impatience. She was asked what her husband said to her when he arrived. "Did he say hello?" someone asked, and she replied, "Isn't is usually people say hello when they see each other? Probably."

But the way she eventually described that evening was quite different from the story she had told in 1964:

> He was more in [a] peaceful mood . . . and was willing to listen.
>
> Well, like, for example, if maybe before I would say I would like for us to be together, and he woudl tell me to, oh, just stop dreaming, or just cut me off, or not listen at all, but now at least he was listening at what I had to say. . . .
>
> [W]e were looking forward and talking about him renting [an] apartment for us . . . it was a very big imposition to live with Mrs. Paine, and I thought we . . . should live as a family. . . .

In the earlier version Oswald had begged her to live with him and *she* had refused to listen; now, it was Marina who was repeating her request that they be together, and Oswald for the first time seemed willing to hear her out. No wonder, then, that she was bewildered and hurt when he was arrested for the president's assassination the following day. oswald had led her on about their future together—because, I believe, he wanted to ensure that she wouldn't guess what he planned to do and tell Ruth, who would have instantly called the police. "You and your long tongue," Oswald had once chided Marina, "they always get us into trouble." It would not have been the only instance that Oswald had manipulated her shamelessly to get what he wanted.

Marina's story was not entirely a fiction. McMillan believes that Oswald did in fact ask her to move into an apartment, not once but three times, and that each time Marina said no, saying that she preferred to wait until they had saved some money. But as McMillan wrote:

> He knew how to get his wife back—indeed, he had done so one year before when she ran away from him and he wanted her back in time for Thanksgiving at Robert's on November 22, 1962. Had Lee, on November 21, 1963, genuinely wanted Marina back, he knew how to arrange it—the telephone call in advance, a little cajoling, believable tenderness. It seems a fair guess that, unhinged as he must have been, Lee still, on November 21, knew how to obtain the answer "Yes."

The story that Oswald was rejected by his wife on the eve of the assassination has been so widely accepted that it seems almost perverse to challenge it. But I believe Marina's account was part of an understandable impulse to distance herself as much as she could from

the president's assassin. Consider the situation. On November 21 she knew tht her husband had attacked Walker, that he continued to keep a rifle, and that he was using an alias. If she told the Commission she was still warm and friendly, how would it look? How did you treat him that night, Mrs. Oswald? I was angry, of course; I wouldn't have anything to do with him. And this was probably not even a calculated lie—it just came out that way. It was not only a facesaving answer, it was probably also what she fervently *wished* she had done, instead of falling for another one of Oswald's deceptions.

Furthermore, it was a story that was readily accepted and never questioned. It was exactly the kind of thing everyone wanted to believe—that the assassin was such an obvious miscreant, even his own wife spurned him. It was Ruth Paine who warned the Commission that if people thought that Oswald was someone who would be instantly recognized as a potential assassin, someone who would stand out in a crowd as being unusual, then they didn't know this man and had no way of recognizing such a person in the future.

Marina may have reasoned that her marital relationship was not important and not the Commission's business—as indeed it wasn't, except insofar as it related to the cause of the assassination. But by maintaining that she had coldly rejected Oswald, she inadvertently distorted the perception of his motive.

George de Mohrenschildt's testimony to the Commission reflected his own difficult situation. By the time he appeared, Marina had revealed that he had guessed, after the fact, that Oswald might have been the unknown sniper who shot at Walker. (When de Mohrenschildt and his wife had stopped by the Oswalds' apartment a few days after the incident, George had said jokingly, "How did it happen you missed?" Both Marina and the de Mohrenschildts reported that Oswald had turned pale and quickly changed the subject.) In his manuscript on Oswald, de Mohrenschildt confessed that because he had felt intimidated and wanted to clear his name, he said untrue things about Oswald in his testimony that he later regretted, such as that he was "a poor loser" who was envious of other peoples' success and money. He wrote that he believed Oswald had been framed: "Lee, an ex-Marine trained for organized murder, was capable of killing but [only] for a very strong ideological motive or in self-defense."

By coincidence, de Mohrenschildt had known Janet Auchincloss, Jacqueline Kennedy's mother, and Jackie herself as a child. De Mohrenschildt claimed that after he gave his testimony in Washington, he

was invited to the Auchincloss house in Georgetown. He said that he suggested to Jackie's mother that the family should finance a real investigation of Kennedy's murder, because he doubted Oswald's guilt, and that Mrs. Auchincloss said, "He's dead, nothing can change that." De Mohrenschildt then speculated that Kennedy's relatives may have suspected anti-Castro Cubans were involved and didn't want his death associated with the Bay of Pigs, "his biggest mistake."

Despite that story there is reason to believe that de Mohrenschildt actually felt guilty, perhaps believing that he might have somehow prevented Kennedy's death. According to Edward Jay Epstein, de Mohrenschildt told a friend in Houston in 1964 that he had inadvertently given Marina the money Oswald used to buy his rifle. Marina supposedly said to him, "Remember the twenty-five dollars you gave me? Well, that fool husband of mine used it to buy a rifle."

In 1967 de Mohrenschildt revealed that he owned one of the backyard photographs showing Oswald with his rifle. His copy had a signed inscription on the back in Oswald's hand, "To my dear friend George, from Lee," with a date written Russian-style: "5/IV/63"—that is, April 5, 1963, or five days before the Walker shooting.[1] There was a second inscription in Russian that McMillan believes Marina wrote: "Hunter of fascists ha-ha-ha!!!" De Mohrenschildt explained that he had discovered this photograph among his stored belongings when he returned to Dallas in 1967 from Haiti, where he and his wife had lived since May 1963. He said that it was inside an unopened package of records Marina had returned to him by mail shortly before the de Mohrenschildts left Texas that April. But when Marina was shown this photograph during her Assassinations Committee testimony, she indicated that she had seen her husband show the picture to George, presumably in April 1963. At that point in the transcript she seemed flustered, and the Committee didn't pursue the question further. In his manuscript de Mohrenschildt wrote that this photograph demonstrated that Oswald "might have been considering hunting fascists—and in his mind General Walker was one—but certainly not our President Kennedy."

De Mohrenschildt also wrote that the Warren Commission investigation had virtually ruined his life. He claimed that he had lost work because of the FBI's interest in him and that the subsequent conspiracy theories produced "strange idiocies"—that he was Oswald's "CIA handler," for example—that made him seem "controversial and even gruesomely threatening." He began getting strange phone calls, apparently from assassination buffs who believed he was part of a CIA

conspiracy. (The Assassinations Committee investigation found no evidence that he had ever worked for the CIA.)

In later years, de Mohrenschildt became depressed and voluntarily underwent treatment in a sanitarium. In 1977, shortly before he was to be questioned by the Assassinations Committee, he fatally shot himself.

Our perception of what happened in Dallas was distorted, for several reasons. Since Oswald was highly secretive, his motivation had to be pieced together as one would reassemble a shredded document. In 1963 his political motive was invisible, largely because the public lacked knowledge of the context in which he had operated—it didn't know about the attempts to kill Castro. If Oswald were alive and on trial today, he might be seen as a revolutionary terrorist.

Another circumstance blocked our view of this event. The president's murder had aroused Washington's fears of a dangerous international crisis. As a result, the overriding concern of the official investigation was to prevent the situation from getting out of control. As the Church committee amply demonstrated, the CIA and FBI downplayed the possibility of a Cuban connection from the beginning.

At 5:00 P.M. on November 23, 1963, CIA headquarters learned that the Mexican police were about to arrest Silvia Duran, the Cuban Embassy employee who had dealt with Oswald. Agency personnel telephoned the Mexico station and asked them to stop the arrest. After discovering that this couldn't be done, Richard Helms's deputy, Thomas Karamessines, cabled the station that her arrest "could jeopardize U.S. freedom of action on the whole question of Cuban responsibility." When the Church committee asked him about this statement in 1976, Karamessines

> speculated that the CIA feared the Cubans were responsible, and that Duran might reveal this during an interrogation. He further speculated that if Duran did possess such information, the CIA and the U.S. Government would need time to react before it came to the attention of the public.

On November 24 the FBI legal attaché in Mexico cabled headquarters that the American ambassador there believed that the Cubans were unsophisticated and militant enough to have directed Oswald's action, and he suggested that the bureau might want to poll its Cuban informants in the U.S. "to confirm or refute this theory." But in

Washington an FBI supervisor wrote a note on the cablegram: "Not desirable. Would serve to promote rumors." This view was shared by the CIA and the State Department. On November 28 Helms notified the CIA in Mexico:

> For your private information, there [is a] distinct feeling here in all three agencies that Ambassador is pushing this case too hard . . . and that we could well create flap with Cubans which could have serious repercussions.

In the months ahead, the CIA repeatedly failed to follow up leads that seemed to point toward direct Cuban involvement. Its investigation of this area became "passive in nature," as did that of the FBI. The CIA and FBI had both laudable *and* self-serving reasons for wrapping this case up quickly, like spoiled fish. Each was aware that a flap with the Cubans might lead to a nuclear confrontation like the 1962 missle crisis. But at each agency, there were private considerations as well.

J. Edgar Hoover pushed for a quick solution. He was convinced that Oswald acted alone. But he was eager to avoid public criticism that the bureau neglected its job by not keeping Oswald under closer surveillance after he returned form the Soviet Union. If a foreign conspiracy were found, the FBI would look even worse. Although he publicly defended the agents handling Oswald's case, Hoover secretly disciplined seventeen employees, including James Hosty, for not pursuing Oswald more aggressively.

A full investigation of a possible Cuban involvement might have proved even more embarrassing to the CIA. Warren Commission member Allen Dulles, who resigned as the agency's director in 1961, knew about the Mafia plots and withheld this information from the other members. Perhaps he reasoned that it wasn't relevant, since these plans ended well before the assassination. But the few CIA officials who were aware of the AM/LASH operation took steps to make sure that the Commission never got wind of it.

Although the Commission was kept in the dark, it seemed reluctant to raise the Cuban issue on its own: Castro's warning and Oswald's alleged threat at the Mexico Embassy were omitted from its report. Even fourteen years later the House Assassinations Committee found this subject hot to the touch. With remarkable frankness, its chief counsel, G. Robert Blakey, has written that one reason the Committee formally concluded that Cuba was not involved in Dallas was that

"the Committee, as a responsible body of government, had an obligation to determine that the Cuban government was not involved in the assassination, if it could not find convincing proof that it was." In other words, if it couldn't prove Cuba was involved, it had to say Cuba was not involved.

Blakey was referring to the question of direct Cuban responsibility, but the same rule seemed to apply to the question of indirect involvement, that is, Castro's influence on Oswald, a possibility that was never discussed in the Committee's report. When members of the Committee interviewed Castro and showed him the passage in Daniel Schorr's book dealing with the Comer Clark interview, Castro denied that Oswald had threatened Kennedy at the Cuban Embassy. Counsel Blakey didn't believe him—he suspected that Oswald probably did make the threat and that Castro felt it was in Cuba's interest to deny it. But the Committee not only decided to accept Castro's denial, it went further. Although its report discussed Castro's warning and Oswald's alleged threat a few weeks later, it said nothing about Schorr's theory that the one event inspired the other. The report didn't mention that Castro's warning appeared in Oswald's local newspapers. Moreover, the report dealt with the warning and the threat in separate sections, thus stripping away the connective tissue that would have been provided by a simple chronology.

Finally, there may be one other reason that our perception of Dallas was flawed. After a traumatic event, people naturally seek a reassuring explanation, not one that is disturbing or painful. To believe that Lee Oswald was a drifter with no motive or the victim of a high-level conspiracy is easier to bear than the idea that American-backed murder plots helped bring about the assassination of President Kennedy.

17 . . . Conspiracy Thinking: *Best Evidence* and Other Theories

> It is wiser, I believe, to arrive at theory by way of the evidence rather than the other way around. . . . It is more rewarding, in any case, to assemble the facts first and, in the process of arranging them in narrative form, to discover a theory or a historical generalization emerging of its own accord.
>
> The very process of transforming a collection of personalities, dates, gun calibers, letters, and speeches into a narrative eventually forces the "why" to the surface. It will emerge of itself one fine day from the story of what happened. It will suddenly appear and tap one on the shoulder, but not if one chases after it first, *before* one knows what happened. Then it will elude one forever.
>
> —Barbara W. Tuchman, *Practicing History*

BUILDING a conspiracy theory is easy. One might say, it's what the mind does best. Consider this hypothetical example. According to a 1982 ABC television documentary, J. Edgar Hoover once spoiled an important investigation of Soviet espionage by publicizing the case too soon. And for years Hoover put his faith in a Soviet defector who later turned out to be a phony, a KGB plant. After a pattern such as this has been noticed, additional information tends to be filtered through the screen of that pattern. Thus, if one examined Hoover's career in

detail, one would undoubtedly find other instances in which decisions he made turned out badly and helped the Soviet cause. Upon such documented evidence one might build a theory that Hoover was a high-level mole working for the KGB. But to make the theory stick, one would have to ignore two things: alternative explanations for those "pro-Soviet" actions (publicity seeking, bad judgment), and the entire context, that is, everything else we know about J. Edgar Hoover. Still, the notion that Hoover might have been a KGB agent is titillating—and who can prove that he wasn't? All the conspiracy books about Dallas are constructed in this way.

The paperback edition of David S. Lifton's *Best Evidence* cites reviews that called the book "a meticulously detailed detective story," "rigorously documented." The author's theory began, he tells us, when he saw the Zapruder film of the assassination for the first time and saw Kennedy's body fall violently backward and to the left after the fatal head shot. Having been a physics major, Lifton understood Newton's laws. He concluded that the backward movement of Kennedy's body could only be explained by a bullet striking him from the opposite direction—the direction of a grassy knoll west of the Depository. Many earwitnesses thought the shots came from this knoll, and some of the doctors who examined Kennedy in Dallas described wounds consistent with a shot from the front. Yet the autopsy X rays and report clearly indicated that Kennedy was struck only from the rear. How could this be?

Unable to accept that the grassy knoll theory might be wrong, Lifton reconciled the conflicting versions in an original manner. He decided both versions were true: the Dallas witnesses were right and so were the autopsy surgeons—they saw different things because *someone altered the president's body before the autopsy.*

Stated baldly, Lifton's theory is preposterous. He contends that all the bullets that struck Kennedy were fired from the front, and that to conceal this fact a large group of unnamed conspirators managed to steal Kennedy's body from its casket aboard *Air Force One,* slip it aboard a helicopter after the president's plane reached Washington, alter the body so that it appeared that Kennedy was shot from the rear by Oswald, and then sneak the altered body into Bethesda Naval Hospital for the official autopsy. That much is complex enough, but after Lifton began interviewing people who had been at Bethesda Hospital that night he found new conflicts in the testimony. Most of the witnesses said the body arrived in an expensive casket, and was wrapped in a sheet with a plastic mattress cover laid underneath. This

was how the body left Dallas. But three hospital employees thought they remembered seeing Kennedy's body arrive wrapped in a body bag inside a plainer casket. Most witnesses put the time of arrival at about 7:15, but one written report said 8 o'clock. As he had before, Lifton now attempted to reconcile these differences. As he put it, "Had this been an ordinary case, the choice of which witnesses to believe would have been left to the jury. But this was no ordinary case." He decided that the body must have entered the hospital *twice* —once in the plain coffin/body bag, and later in the bronze coffin/-sheet. This is comparable to saying that if some witnesses say the robber wore a black hat and others say he wore a red hat, there must have been two robberies.

But how could witnesses recall a body bag, if there wasn't one? Elizabeth Loftus is a psychologist who specializes in eyewitness testimony. Loftus says, "No matter how well meaning or how well trained observers are, there are ways to make people see, hear, and even smell things that never were." Over time, she explains, memory doesn't fade, it grows. "What may fade is the initial perception, the actual experience of the events. But every time we recall an event we must reconstruct the memory, and so each time it is changed—colored by succeeding events, increased understanding, a new context, suggestions by others, other people's recollections. We can get people to conjure up details that are pure fantasy."

When Lady Bird Johnson testified before the Warren Commission, she vividly described ascending and descending a flight of stairs when she went to pay her condolences to Jacqueline Kennedy at the Dallas hospital. But there were no stairs—the two women were on the same floor. Mrs. Johnson had apparently confused this incident with another—when she went upstairs to visit Mrs. Connally.

The first witness who remembered a body bag, Paul O'Connor, told Lifton his story thirteen years after the event. During the intervening time, body bags had been shown repeatedly in newscasts out of Vietnam. In his reconstruction, O'Connor may have transmuted the plastic mattress cover into a body bag, or he may have confused two separate events. Lifton was able to find two other witnesses who "remembered" a body bag and/or cheap casket, but only after he asked them leading questions. For instance,

> LIFTON: . . . was he in any kind of bag or anything, or in a sheet?
> REIBE: I think he was in a body bag.

Reibe said that his recollection was "vague."

Lifton knew, of course, that memories fade and that witnesses make mistakes. But he apparently never realized how often witnesses recall images they never saw—nor did I, until I read *Best Evidence.* This failing leads him into extending the labyrinth of his theory, time after time:

> I found O'Connor perfectly credible when he said the throat wound was unsutured when the body arrived. I also found Ebersole credible when he said it *was* sutured at what *he* thought was the outset of the autopsy. I thought they made their observations at different times.

Similarly, the chief of surgery at Bethesda recalled seeing an intact bullet "roll out from the clothing of President Kennedy and onto the autopsy table." Nobody else saw this, and it is beyond dispute that Kennedy's body was unclothed. Yet Lifton accepted this testimony and used it to build another corridor in his theory. He concluded that the bullet the chief "saw" must have been the same bullet the conspirators had earlier planted on a hospital stretcher in Dallas (before they changed their plans, brought the bullet to Bethesda, then decided to go with their original plan).

In *The Mechanism of Mind,* Edward de Bono has said, "Ideas must advance and if they miss the right direction they move further and further in the wrong direction." De Bono was describing the weaknesses of what he calls vertical thinking, which he defined as the sequential development of a particular pattern. As soon as a pattern is recognized, it provides the framework for processing incoming information. The established pattern in fact *selects* the new information. This method of thinking is extremely efficient when the perceived pattern coincides with reality. But when it doesn't, it leads to the creation of a myth.

When a perceived pattern is firmly established, alternative explanations are ignored or rejected. If Kennedy was struck from the rear, why was his body propelled backward? Three alternative explanations have been given, none of which violates the laws of physics: (1) Neuropathologist Richard Lindenburg told the Rockefeller Commission that the movement could have been caused by a violent neuromuscular reaction resulting from "major damage inflicted to the nerve centers in the brain." (2) Physicist Luis Alvarez experimented by firing a rifle into melons wrapped with tape. Each time, the melon was propelled backward in the direction of the rifle. Alvarez cited the law

of conservation of momentum—as the contents of the melon were driven forward and out by the force of the bullet, an opposite force was created similar to the thrust of a jet engine, propelling the melon in the opposite direction. (3) In a documentary on the assassination, CBS pointed out that the Zapruder film showed Mrs. Kennedy touching her husband's left arm at the moment the fatal bullet struck, and that in her shocked reaction she may have caused the president's backward movement by a pressure on his arm. Any of these explanations, or a combination of any of them, might explain the backward motion.

When Lee Harvey Oswald's body was exhumed in October 1981, reexamined by pathologists, and reburied, a conspiracy theory put forward by British author Michael Eddowes was buried with it. In a book called *The Oswald File* Eddowes had argued that the man killed by Jack Ruby was not Lee Harvey Oswald but a Russian impostor. Eddowes's theory was never very popular, but since it has now been conclusively disproved, it may serve as an undisputed example of the way a conspiracy theory can go wrong.

There is usually a predisposition toward a certain point of view. The introduction to Eddowes's book says that the author had suspected Russian involvement even before he began investigating the assassination. When the Warren Hearings and Exhibits were published, Eddowes and several assistants began looking for evidence to support his suspicions—and found it. As it always happens in conspiracy theories, Eddowes ignored the larger pattern of Oswald's life and zoomed in on some tiny but puzzling anomalies in the record. Just before Oswald left the Marines in 1959, his height was measured twice—once by a doctor—and recorded each time as 5′11″. Yet after Oswald was arrested in Dallas, his height was measured as 5′9½″, and the autopsy report later recorded his height as 5′9″. Furthermore, at age six Oswald had undergone a mastoidechtomy, and the Marine medical records noted the resulting scar behind his left ear. But the postmortem on Oswald didn't mention a mastoidechtomy scar. (In conspiracy theories, people don't make mistakes.) There was more. Oswald's brothers noticed changes in his appearance after his stay in Russia: thinner hair, a ruddier complexion, a slimmer build. Asked about this difference, John Pic testified, "I would never have recognized him, sir." Pic also noticed that, after coming back, Lee referred to him for the first time as his *half*-brother. Of course, Pic knew perfectly well that the man *was* Oswald, but on the basis of these inconsistencies

Eddowes constructed a theory that the man who returned from Russia wasn't the young defector but a shorter Russian look-alike who was working for the KGB.

Once this theory was in place, everything else was interpreted to fit it. Oswald's Marine Corps fingerprints inconveniently matched those of the man killed in Dallas. Undeterred, Eddowes concluded that the KGB must have somehow replaced the authentic Oswald's fingerprints in the Marine files with those of the Russian. But the results of the exhumation prove that Eddowes was wrong. The team of pathologists unanimously concluded that the body in Oswald's grave was beyond all doubt that of Lee Harvey Oswald. The dental X rays matched, and they located the mastoidectomy scar the original autopsy surgeons had overlooked.

Although the solutions proposed by Lifton and Eddowes are more farfetched than some, they use the same style of reasoning found in other conspiracy books. All these theories are based on unexplained discrepancies in the record. As in the J. Edgar Hoover analogy, alternative explanations and the overall pattern of the evidence are given little attention, if any.

Significantly, in these books, Oswald is almost always offstage. Lifton scarcely mention him. Eddowes left him trapped in Russia, not even present at the murder scene. The odd thing is, we never get a good view of Oswald in the other conspiracy books, either. This is their major flaw, for although it is easy to point to anomalies in the mountain of evidence the Warren Commission accumulated, it is something else again to weave those anomalies into a credible scenario that illustrates how a conspiracy might actually have been carried out. The few authors who have attempted to do so have presented stories that are grotesquely improbable.

In *Betrayal,* for instance, Robert D. Morrow casts Oswald as an American intelligence agent who was sent to Russia as a bogus defector. On returning to this country, he continued his clandestine work, taking orders from Jack Ruby, the CIA, and an anti-Castro group while working as an FBI informer on the side. Among other things, Oswald was supposedly directed to fire a shot over General Walker's head and to establish a left-wing reputation by writing letters to the Communist party and making himself conspicuous at an ACLU meeting. On November 22, according to Morrow, Oswald completed his last assignment: bringing his rifle to the Depository and arranging a sniper's nest on the sixth floor. After neatly stacking a pile of boxes near the window, "Oswald went to the men's room on the second

floor, opened the window slightly, and sat quietly in a stall to wait." Having explained Oswald's whereabouts at the critical moment, Morrow now faced another hurdle—Oswald was arrested with the Tippit murder weapon in his hand. How to explain this? As Morrow tells it, an Oswald look-alike shot Tippit with a similar gun, after which the team of conspirators arranged for the gun, bullets, *and* shell casings to be switched—by Jack Ruby, the FBI, and the Dallas police, respectively.

Most conspiracists wisely eschew the narrative method. My point is that the wild implausibilities in *Betrayal* are *implicit* in every other conspiracy book. If the others seem more persuasive, it is largely because they do not present a scenario of the events, but simply point to one suspicious-looking anomaly after another. The reader will understand the difficulty these writers have sidestepped if he or she tries to invent a story that explains why an *innocent* Oswald went to Irving for "curtain rods," left his wedding ring behind the next morning, brought a package into the Depository, and so on. Because the evidence against Oswald is strong, any detailed reconstruction that argues a frame-up will inevitably sound less plausible than one that argues his guilt.

It is not surprising, then, that most conspiracists now concede tht Oswald was at least *involved* in the assassination. But they contend that he was the instrument of others, typically a renegade element of U.S. intelligence, anti-Castro activists, or the Mafia. This hypothesis also lacks a credible story line, mainly because its proponents imply that Oswald was either a closet right-winger who participated willingly or a gullible Marxist who was tricked into it. These writers turn aside the plentiful evidence about Oswald's politics and nature and create, by implication, a different person entirely. As before, Morrow made the problem explicit when he tried to illuminate Oswald's motivations for his "intelligence work":

> If Oswald had any misgivings about the things he was asked to do he put them aside, pleased to be gainfully employed and able to do things for Marina. Bizarre as some of his assignments were, he cooperated without question.

This is not Lee Harvey Oswald, but a fictional character.

Virtually every argument the critics make looks weak when its hidden implications are stated openly. For example, many writers suspect that someone impersonated Oswald at the Cuban Embassy.

In 1978 Consul Azcue insisted that the man he dealt with "in no way resembled" the president's accused assassin. But to accept this, one must assume the following. The impostor presented a photograph of Oswald for the visa application and forged his signature. Silvia Duran didn't notice that the picture looked nothing at all like the person who handed it to her. Duran and Alfredo Mirabal were mistaken when they later identified the applicant as Oswald. Back in Dallas, someone forged Duran's phone number in Oswald's notebook.

One might be able to swallow this story, however improbable, were it not for Oswald's November 9 letter to the Soviets in Washington —in which he talked about his run-in with the Cuban consul. Ruth Paine and Marina observed him writing this letter, and Ruth found a copy of it lying on her desk later that day. One is faced with two incredible alternatives: either Ruth and Marina were involved in the forgery/impostor scheme, or Oswald wrote about events that happened to his impersonator. As might be expected, the conspiracists say little, if anything, about the November 9 letter. Anthony Summers mentions it, but he omits entirely Oswald's reference to the Cuban Embassy. To do otherwise would have made his impostor theory sound ludicrous.

Were others involved in the assassination? The House Assassinations Committee believed that a tape recording of a police motorcycle radio transmission contained the faint sounds of four shots and that one of them came from the grassy knoll. It concluded that another gunman in that area had fired a shot that missed the motorcade completely. But in 1982 a new panel of acoustical experts reexamined the tape for the National Research Council and unanimously concluded that the sounds on the tape had been recorded about one minute *after* the shooting and that there was thus no evidence for a second gunman. And that is where the matter stands as of now. In any event, the bulk of the evidence about Oswald clearly suggests that if there had been a conspiracy, Oswald would not have been a patsy, but the ringleader. If he had any accomplices, which seems doubtful, I would nominate the two unknown men who helped him try to gull Sylvia Odio.

As the Assassinations Committee said, a conspiracy involving Oswald and someone else, "possibly a person akin to Oswald in temperament and ideology, would not have been fundamentally different from an assassination by Oswald alone." In a footnote it added, "If the conspiracy was, in fact, limited to Oswald, the second gunman, and

perhaps one or two others, the committee believes it was possible they shared Oswald's left-wing political disposition. A consistent pattern in Oswald's life was a propensity for actions with political overtones. It is quite likely that an assassination conspiracy limited to Oswald and a few associates was in keeping with that pattern." Conspirators are usually allies, not political enemies.

But there's no compelling reason to believe anyone else was involved. The police-tape theory overshadowed the other work done by the Committee that strengthened the case for Oswald's guilt. Having examined the Warren Commission's evidence, as well as new evidence it developed on its own, the Committee reached the following conclusions. President Kennedy was struck by two rifle shots fired from the sixth-floor window on the southeast corner of the Texas School Book Depository. All the wounds inflicted on President Kennedy and Governor Connally were caused by two bullets fired from the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle found on the sixth floor of the Depository, and this rifle belonged to Lee Harvey Oswald. Oswald was present on the sixth floor shortly before the assassination. A paper bag suitable for containing a rifle found in the sniper's nest bore a fingerprint and palmprint of Oswald's. Oswald had no alibi for the time of the assassination. Oswald shot and killed Patrolman J.D. Tippit. The evidence "strongly suggested that Oswald attempted to murder General walker and that he possessed a capacity for violence." Considering this and other evidence against him, the Committee concluded that Oswald assassinated President Kennedy. As Anthony Summers said, "If Oswald really was just a fall guy, he had been bewilderingly well framed."

Probably the strongest evidence the proponents of a Mafia or anti-Castro conspiracy have ever found is Oswald's alleged association with David Ferrie in New Orleans during the summer of 1963. Ferrie was a strange character who was violently anti-Kennedy and anti-Communist. After a disease caused the loss of his body hair, he began wearing a reddish mohair wig and fake eyebrows. He was also a homosexual and had been fired from his job as an Eastern Airlines pilot after he was charged with extortion and with molesting young males. In 1963 he worked as a private investigator, both for the lawyer of Carlos Marcello, the New Orleans Mafia boss, and for Guy Banister, another militant anti-Communist who ran a detective agency. Both Banister and Ferrie had connections with anti-Castro groups. On November 22, Ferrie was in a New Orleans courtroom with

Marcello and his lawyer.

The office of Banister's detective agency was in a building near the coffee company where Oswald worked until mid-July. The building had two entrances, and the address of the one around the corner from Banister's office was 544 Camp Street. Anyone who has read a conspiracy book should be familiar with that address, because it was stamped on some of Oswald's "Hands Off Cuba" leaflets.

So, the plot thickens. The conspiracists believe that Oswald's pro-Castro activities in New Orleans were a scam being run by the anti-Castroites Ferrie and Banister in order to discredit the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This is highly unlikely. Even if we knew nothing about Oswald, the fact that his first pro-Castro demonstration occurred *before* he got to New Orleans would seem to rule that out. I suspect that Oswald did have some contact with Ferrie and perhaps with Banister as well, but I believe it had nothing to do with the events in Dallas—which, at that point, no one could have foreseen.

Oswald may have approached Ferrie or Banister, as he approached Carlos Bringuier, with a plausible cover story and with an eye to pursuing his own ends. It may be that, after he lost his job at Reily's, he went to see Banister; working for a detective agency would probably have appealed to him. He certainly could have used the money. Marina said that by late summer of 1963 he was so stingy with his money because he was saving it for his trip to Mexico that he lost weight from not eating.

The best evidence that Oswald knew Ferrie, and possibly Banister, comes from the testimony of several credible witnesses who told the Assassinations Committee that they saw Oswald in Clinton, Louisiana, during late August or early September with a man who looked like Ferrie and another man whom they identified as Clay Shaw, the businessman involved in the Garrison investigation. The second man was almost certainly not Shaw—but Shaw looked very much like Guy Banister. According to these witnesses, Oswald was fist seen in nearby Jackson, where he asked a barber how he could get a job as an electrician at the local mental hospital. (Oswald had no training as an electrician.) The barber referred him to a state representative, who advised him to register as a voter to establish residency. Two secretaries said that Oswald applied for work at the hospital, and afterward he was seen standing in line at the Clinton voter registrar's office while Ferrie and the other man, presumably Banister, waited outside in a Cadillac. As it happened, blacks in the parish were conducting a voter registration drive that month, and there was a long wait. The registrar, Henry Palmer, testified that when it came his turn Oswald handed him a U.S. Navy ID card with his name and a New Orleans address on it, and Palmer told him he hadn't been in the area long enough to register.

Summers believes that Ferries and Banister may have brought Oswald to Clinton as part of a U.S. intelligence scheme to discredit the civil rights movement. Just how Oswald could have discredited the movement by standing quietly in line isn't clear. The chronology suggests that the right question is not why the man identified as Oswald was at the registrar's office, but why he wanted to get a job at the East Louisiana State Hospital. If this was indeed Oswald, he wasn't likely to be interested in a permanent job, because he had already made plans to go to Mexico City in three or four weeks, and with no training he couldn't have lasted long as an electrician. It's conceivable that Oswald wanted to get inside the hospital as an employee for a short time, possibly to photograph someone's psychiatric records for the detectives Banister and Ferrie. This interpretation is, of course, highly speculative, but it might explain why Ferrie always denied that he knew Oswald in 1963, if in fact he did.

Does this mean that Ferrie or Banister or both were involved in the assassination? Obviously not. If they had been planning to "use" Oswald to kill the president, they would hardly have come to a busy registrar's office with him, especially not in a Cadillac, which drew considerable attention that day.

How can we be certain, even so, that Oswald wasn't working for American intelligence or a similar group all along? I return to the principle that, in order to be plausible, a theory must fit the available evidence into a reasonable chronology of events. To argue that Oswald was merely *posing* as a leftist from the time he was 16 until, literally, the day he died, one must unravel the story of his life presented in this book and attempt to reweave it into an entirely new pattern. I can't say that it is impossible to do so, but thus far it hasn't been done.

No event aroused more skepticism about the lone assassin theory than Jack Ruby's murder of Oswald. Immediately after his arrest, Ruby said that he shot Oswald because he had been upset by the assassination and wanted to spare Jacqueline Kennedy the ordeal of returning to Dallas to testify at Oswald's trial (as news reports had indicated that she would have to do). Ruby added, "I also want the world to know that Jews do have guts."[1]

To many, Ruby's professed grief looked suspicious. At the apartment of his sister, Eva Grant, a few hours after Kennedy's death, he telephoned numerous acquaintances to bemoan the assassination. He tried to eat supper but threw up in the bathroom. As he was leaving, Eva thought he looked "broken." He told her, "I never felt so bad in my life, even when Ma or Pa died." Several other people who talked with Ruby that day or the next remembered that the expressed concern for the president's wife and children, saying in one instance, "those poor people, those poor people." These sentiments may seem excessive, or phony, but they were not unusual.

Before the end of November the National Opinion Research Center completed a poll on the public's reactions to the assassination. In 1964 the Center reported:

> The majority of all respondents could not recall any other time in their lives when they had the same sort of feelings. . . . Of those who could think of such an occasion (47%) the majority referred to the death of a parent, close friend, or other relative. . . .
>
> The first reactions of nine out of ten Americans were sympathy for Mrs. Kennedy and the children and deep sorrow that "a strong young man had been killed at the height of his powers."

During the four days following the event, 68 percent of those interviewed were "very nervous and tense," 57 percent felt "dazed and numb," 43 percent "didn't feel like eating," 22 percent had upset stomachs. Many felt a need to talk to someone they knew, and the nation's telephone lines were clogged with calls. One person in nine hoped that Oswald would be "shot down or lynched."

This intense outpouring of emotion had little to do with politics. Clearly some psychological nerve had been touched. Perhaps these people had unconsciously identified with John Kennedy—at any rate, his death was a sharp reminder of personal mortality. Whatever the underlying cause, Ruby's reaction was within the mainstream.

But more important for our purposes is Ruby's remark that he wanted to prove "that Jews do have guts." This is the kind of statement that appears nonsensical at a distance but has a surprising relevance on closer inspection. It turns out that Ruby himself was a conspiracy theorist and that his crime, like Oswald's, was the result of a deadly interplay between his past and the accidental circumstances of the moment.

Born in Chicago in 1911 as Jacob Rubenstein, Ruby was the fifth

child of an alcoholic father and a mentally ill, delusional mother. As a young boy, he was said to be "quick tempered" and "egocentric." Growing up in a ghetto surrounded by other ethnic groups, Ruby became a street fighter who reacted to anti-Semitic slurs with his fists. Before World War II, Ruby and his neighborhood friends disrupted several pro-Nazi rallies of the German-American Bund, "cracking a few heads" in the process. Although he took no other interest in politics, Ruby was described by an acquaintance as "cuckoo nut" on the subject of patriotism; he cried openly on learning of President Roosevelt's death in 1945.

In 1947 Ruby moved to Dallas to help his divorced sister, Eva, manage a nightclub. Over the next decade Ruby got into numerous fistfights with his employees and unruly patrons. According to Buddy Turman, a prizefighter friend, he "picked his shots": his victims were often drunk, female, or otherwise unable to defend themselves. By the fall of 1963 Ruby was running two striptease joints and having financial problems. He was also taking Preludin diet pills, commonly known as "uppers."

On the morning of November 22 Jack Ruby noticed the black-bordered "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" page in the Dallas *Morning News*. He telephoned Eva to call her attention to it—he was annoyed that a message attacking the president bore a Jewish name, Bernard Weissman, as chairman of the sponsoring committee. At about 11 o'clock Ruby made his customary visit to the *Morning News* building to place weekend ads for his nightclubs. After he completed his business, a newspaper employee, John Newnam, saw him sitting at a desk leafing through the day's paper, "killing time, as he always did." Ruby made a comment criticizing the "lousy taste" of the anti-Kennedy advertisement. "Who is this Weissman?" he wanted to know. Privately he suspected that someone had used a false name "to make the Jews look bad." (Actually, Weissman was a young conservative who had recently moved to Dallas.)

Five minutes later, another employee ran into the office and said, "Kennedy's been shot." Newnam saw Ruby respond with a look of "stunned disbelief." Soon telephone calls came in from people canceling weekend advertising—a development that Ruby interpreted as a protest against the "Welcome Mr. Kennedy" page. A few minutes later he used an office phone to call Eva again—and put the receiver to Newnam's ear so that he could hear her anguished reaction to the shooting. Ruby later explained that he wanted Newnam to know that he and his sister were "emotionally disturbed [by the assassination]

the same way as other people." It had never occurred to Newnam that they weren't, but Ruby was clearly worried that Weissman's untimely criticism of the president might provoke a backlash against other Jews.

Later that afternoon, Ruby checked the Dallas phone book: Weissman's name wasn't in it. Driving across town on November 23, Ruby noticed a billboard saying "Impeach Earl Warren" that listed a post office box number similar to the one given in the right-wing advertisement. Ruby wasn't sure who Earl Warren was, but he suspected a plot involving "the John Birch Society or the Communist Party or maybe a combination of both." After reaching his apartment, Ruby called Larry Crafard, an employee of his who had a Polaroid camera, picked Crafard up, and drove back to the sign and took pictures of it. Ruby's roommate, George Senator, went along. Ruby acted as though he had uncovered something important. Next the trio went to the Dallas Post Office, where Ruby tried unsuccessfully to find out who had rented the box indicated on the billboard. The men went to a nearby coffee shop, where Senator noticed that Ruby's voice sounded "different" and that "he had sort of a stare look in his eye."

When Ruby stopped by Sol's Turf Bar that afternoon, a patron, Frank Bellochio, began blaming Dallas for the assassination and pulled out a copy of the anti-Kennedy page as evidence. Ruby became "upset and loud" and said that he didn't believe there was such a person as Bernard Weissman, that the ad was the work of a group trying to create anti-Semitic feelings. An hour later Ruby was telling a friend that the black border was a "tipoff" that whoever placed the ad "knew the President was going to be assassinated." Thus, Ruby suspected a scheme to murder Kennedy and use the Jews as scapegoats.

After he shot Oswald the following morning, Ruby expected to get out of jail on bond and be interviewed by reporters as a hero. Instead, he found himself under suspicion of being involved in a plot to kill the president. Every aspect of his life was investigated, and reports of his past acquaintance with underworld figures made it appear that he was a Mafia hit man. Ruby assimilated this turn of events into the pattern that had already formed in his mind. He interpreted it as the work of the same people responsible for the Weissman advertisement.

For Ruby, the irony was nightmarish. His act was supposed to *absolve* the Jews, by removing any possible doubt about where their sympathies lay. But in his mind, it had done just the opposite. He now believed that he had unwittingly played into the conspirators' hands.

By the time Ruby testified to the Warren Commission in June 1964, his conspiracy theory was full-blown. As he imagined it, the John Birch Society had convinced President Johnson that he was involved in Kennedy's murder. Believing that, Johnson had "relinquished certain powers" to the organization, which was now beginning a widespread pogrom against American Jews. Speaking in his jail cell, Ruby insisted that he had shot Oswald on his own.

> And I have never had the chance to tell that, to back it up, to prove it. Consequently, right at this moment I am being victimized as a part of a plot in the world's worst tragedy and crime.

The bewildered Warren listened as Ruby tried to explain this plot:

> There is an organization here, Chief Justice Warren, if it takes my life at this moment to say it . . . there is a John Birch Society right now in activity. . . .
>
> Unfortunately for me, [by my] giving the people the opportunity to get in power, because of the act I committed, [this] has put a lot of people in jeopardy with their lives.
>
> Don't register with you, does it?
>
> WARREN: No; I don't understand that.
>
> RUBY: Would you rather I just delete what I said and just pretend nothing is going on?
>
> WARREN: I would not indeed. I am only interested in what you want to tell this Commission.

Ruby also said that his sister and brothers were going to be killed.

Although he sounded completely irrational, his explanation for the shooting was virtually the same one that he had given after his arrest. He mentioned his use of diet pills and suggested that this might have been a "stimulus" on the morning of November 24, when

> suddenly I felt, which was so stupid, that I wanted to show my love for our faith, being of the Jewish faith . . . the emotional feeling came within me that someone owed this debt to our beloved President to save [Mrs. Kennedy] the ordeal of coming back. . . .
>
> I drove past Main Street, past the [jail], and there was a crowd already gathered there. And I . . . took it for granted [that Oswald] had already been moved. . . . So my purpose was to go to the Western Union—my double purpose—but the thought of committing the act wasn't until I left my apartment. . . .
>
> I realize it is a terrible thing I have done, and it was a stupid thing,

but I just was carried away emotionally. . . . I had the gun in my right hip pocket, and impulsively, if that is the correct word here, I saw him, and that is all I can say. And I didn't care what happened to me.

Throughout the interview, Ruby returned to the plot against him, begging Warren to take him to Washington for a lie detector test.

I am as innocent regarding any conspiracy as any of you gentlemen in the room, and I don't want anything to be run over lightly. I want you to dig into it with any . . . question that might embarrass me, or anything that might bring up my background, which isn't so terribly spotted—I have never been a criminal. . . .

I am making a statement now that I may not live the next hour when I walk out of this room. . . . it is the most fantastic story you have ever heard in a lifetime. I did something out of the goodness of my heart. Unfortunately, Chief Earl Warren, had you been around 5 or 6 months ago . . . and immediately the President would have gotten hold of my true story . . . a certain organization wouldn't have so completely formed now, so powerfully, to use me because I am of the Jewish extraction, Jewish faith, to commit the most dastardly crime that has ever been committed. . . . The Jewish people are being exterminated at this moment.

A few minutes later, Ruby said:

It may not be too late, whatever happens, if our President, Lyndon Johnson, knew the truth from me. . . . But he has been told, I am certain, that I was part of a plot to assassinate the President. . . . I have been used for a purpose, and there will be a certain tragic occurrence happening if you don't take my testimony and somehow vindicate me so my people don't suffer because of what I have done. . . . All I want is a lie detector test. . . . And then I want to leave this world. But I don't want my people to be blamed for something that is untrue, that they claim has happened.

Some conspiracy theorists have taken Ruby's remark "I have been used for a purpose" to mean that he was "used" to kill Oswald. Others think that he was speaking in a sort of code and that the "certain organization" he referred to was really the Mafia. For some reason, it is extremely difficult to take Ruby's testimony at face value. Suspicious of his motives, one tends to focus on isolated details and give them a sinister interpretation. One naturally feels that there is "more to it" and that one must probe beneath the surface to get at it. This

is a symptom of conspiracy thinking, the same human malady that afflicted Ruby in a more virulent form.

But how can we be sure that Ruby wasn't faking mental illness in order to conceal his role in a plot? Consider the implications of that hypothesis. If Ruby's grief and delusions were sham, one must accept that prior to November 22 Ruby was persuaded to feign an obsession with the Weissman advertisement in order to legitimize the bizarre, puzzling explanation he would give after his arrest. Try to imagine a conspirator actually giving Ruby those instructions.

In 1965 Ruby was seen briefly on television after he left jail for a court appearance. As he walked along a corridor he was heard to say, "complete conspiracy . . . and the assassination too . . . if you knew the facts you would be amazed." Ruby's vision of the forces against him eventually grew to include President Johnson. In a letter from jail he wrote, ". . . they alone had planned the killing, by they I mean Johnson and the others." Ironically, these comments, and others like them, have been offered in support of the very allegation Ruby desperately wanted to disprove. These writers have never considered the possibility that Ruby was talking about a *different* conspiracy—not one in which he silenced Oswald on orders, but one *that tried to make it look as if he had.*

In December 1966 Ruby was diagnosed as having terminal cancer; he died less than a month later. In a tape recording made two weeks before the end, Ruby reiterated that his shooting of Oswald was pure chance and that he acted alone, not as part of a conspiracy. Sol Dann, one of his attorneys, told the press, "Ruby did not want to live. His death was a merciful release."

18...Oswald's Game

Who is the theoretician?
Davison

? / In large part, the assassination of President Kennedy was the tragic result of a steady accumulation of chance happenings, the elimination of any one of which might have spared Kennedy's life.

The chain of circumstance began in Oswald's childhood, when someone innocently handed him a political pamphlet that gave his anger and resentment a direction. Six years later, he failed in an attempt to sign away his citizenship, which meant that he would be able to go back to the United States in 1962. Less than a year after he returned, a bullet intended for General Walker missed. Then in September 1963, when he was trying to build a record to impress the Cubans, Castro's warning appeared and gave him a new target. Finally, after his trip to Cuba was blocked, a neighbor of a friend suggested a job at a school book warehouse.

Ultimately, these coincidences came to have a horrible significance, but only because they happened to a particular dangerous individual. The root cause of the assassination wasn't blind fate, but Oswald's sociopathic nature.

As a child, Oswald isolated himself from other people. Raised by a mother who was monstrously self-centered, he grew to resemble her. He came to feel as if there were a veil separating him from everyone else, a barrier that he preferred to remain intact. As Evelyn Strickman said, he withdrew into a solitary and detached existence in which he didn't have to obey any rules. Marguerite encouraged this tendency. Her constant defense of his rule-breaking fed his belief that he was a superior being who could do not wrong. Lee Oswald saw himself as an outsider, and he relished this role. (He would play it from youth

onward, as Marxist Marine, American defector, Russian-speaking returnee.)

With no personal relationships to anchor him in everyday life, Oswald created "his own world." Robert noticed his "love of fantasy," recalling that his kid brother would listen to children's stories on the radio and hours later would still be pretending to be one of the characters. It would have been an innocent pastime, but Lee's daydreams included visions of power and violence.

Early on, his imagination drew him to the larger world reflected in news reports—an arena that must have seemed more meaningful, more *real,* than his daily existence. As Marguerite recalled, he would stop whatever he was doing to listen to the news, because he considered it important.

Edward Voebel's testimony reveals where his fantasy life was leading him. From local press reports, Oswald had gotten the idea of stealing a pistol. One can turn this incident and see Oswald's ambitions reflected in it. He wanted to imitate the robbers—who had defied authority and gotten away with it. The theft would be dangerous and therefore exciting. Oswald made plans, obtaining a glass cutter and toy gun—the gun would be left in place of the stolen weapon, as a subterfuge. By outwitting his adversaries, he would assert his power over them.

Oswald's tactics and goals changed in the years ahead, but his psychological motivations did not. It would be for similar reasons that he tried to deceive Sylvia Odio, in another scheme inspired by a news report. In fact, the patterns seen in his robbery plan would be repeated in the three most dramatic episodes in his life. The defection, his attack on Walker, and the president's murder were all daring acts that allowed him to strike back at authority and put himself in control. In a literal sense, Oswald lived in his fantasies—he acted them out. As George de Mohrenschildt put it, he played with his life.

A few months after Voebel lost contact with him, Oswald discovered Karl Marx. He believed that Marxism gave him the "key" to his environment on an ideological level. But the system had a subconscious appeal. By redefining himself as the victim of an evil society, defiance of authority suddenly became not only legitimate, but heroic. He began thinking of himself as an idealist who acted on lofty principles. He immediately wanted to join the Communist party, a group of political outsiders, and achieve great things. By the time Kerry Thornley met him, Oswald saw Marxism as his religion, a means of justifying his life and obtaining a place in history.

After converting to Marxism, Oswald's conscious motives were political. He considered his defection to be a courageous protest against American military imperialism. His explanation for attacking Walker was also ideological: he would be eliminating a potential Hitler, thereby saving lives. Each time, he expected to be recognized as a fighter for justice. But his inner compulsions were the same as they had been. On learning that the Walker bullet had missed, he was disappointed, but Marina believed that he was also pleased "with the clever fellow he was" in getting away with the attempt. He had put one over on the police.

Strip away the politics, and Oswald's antisocial personality is evident. He resembles the typical St. Elizabeths criminal seeking power, control, and excitement. At Youth House he had been diagnosed as a "passive-aggressive" individual, someone whose outward compliance masked deep anger. This characteristic shows up in his political writings, where Oswald cast himself as a silent observer who waited in "stoical readiness" for the opportune moment to act.

This complex of motivations reverberated in the Kennedy assassination. It would be a violent protest against American imperialism toward Cuba and a retaliation for the plots against Castro. But beneath Oswald's rationalizations, there was a continuing self-aggrandizement and a desire for vengeance that came from something *other* than politics.

Each of these incidents was also derived, in some way, from Oswald's reading of press reports. His ideas were never entirely original. Oswald's defection was preceded by that of Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, a famous case that Oswald alluded to in a conversation with Nelson Delgado. It wasn't so much that news stories "put ideas in his head." It was almost the other way around: Oswald's grandiose self-image drove him to project himself onto the world stage. The international political scene was the reality that mattered to him, and he was determined to make his mark on it.

As each of his efforts was frustrated, Oswald's schemes became progressively more violent. His defection resulted in a week's publicity and two and a half years of obscurity. The Walker incident gained only a brief, anonymous attention. Then his plan to reach Cuba was thwarted by red tape—moreover, the Cubans didn't take him seriously. His repeated attempts to join a revolutionary movement had failed, leaving him as isolated and unrecognized as ever.[1]

After Oswald returned to Dallas in October 1963, events continued

to narrow his path. His perception of the plots against Castro had already led him to threaten President Kennedy's life on two occasions. On October 19th, a double feature about assassinations reminded him of "the actual situation" that existed in Cuba. The following evening his preoccupation was such that he didn't think to ask about the birth of his second child.

Having failed to get Russian visas, Oswald was stranded in Dallas. He made plans to renew his political activities. By "reading between the lines" of leftist newspapers, he would determine which line to follow. But in November there were new developments. His visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico had understandably reawakened the FBI's interest in him. Cornered, feeling unjustly persecuted, Oswald wrote a note to Hosty and a letter to the Soviets in Washington protesting the FBI attention. At this juncture, he learned that the president's motorcade would pass the building where he worked.

It must have seemed to him that fate had spoken. All his past life was a rehearsal for the moment when he decided to act out his violent fantasies against President Kennedy. After his arrest, Oswald appeared calm, introspective, at peace with himself. He behaved as if he were now in control—as, in a real sense, he was, until Jack Ruby's own obsessions intervened. At long last, Oswald had achieved what he had always wanted: vengeance power, and even an infamous immortality.

The assassination of John Kennedy was neither an act of random violence nor a conspiracy. It was carried out as a result of Oswald's character and background interacting with circumstance. It's likely that had there been no plots against Castro, Oswald would have eventually killed someone, but it would not have been President Kennedy. Castro's warning had simply deflected his aim.

If she had addressed the actual facts of the crime she would not have said this

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Notes

The following abbreviations are used in citing official reports:

Report of the President's Commission (Warren Report)	WR
The published hearings and exhibits of the Warren Commission	Volume and page number only—e.g., II, 11
The final report of the Select Committee on Assassinations (House Assassinations Committee)	HACR
The hearings and appendices of the House Assassinations Committee	HACH (followed by volume and page number)
The interim report of the Church committee	Interim
The final report of the Church committee, Book V	Book V

INTRODUCTION

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2. Mrs. Kennedy's reaction: Manchester, 407.

3. Rifle ordered by Oswald: WR, 118–121.
Murder weapon in hand; "It's all over now": WR, 171, 178.
Wedding ring left behind: WR, 421.
Warren Commission on motive: WR, 423–424, 22–23.

6. Butler on Oswald: "The Great Assassin Puzzle," 23, 24–28.

8–9. Ruby's testimony: Lane, 243, 244–245; V, 198–199, 210–212.

9A. Lie detector test results: WR, 809–816.

10. Stuckey on Oswald: XI, 170–171.

12A. President Johnson's suspicions: Janos, "Last Days of the President," 39; Means, King Features Syndicate column, April 24, 1975 (quoted by Schorr, "The Assassins," 22).

12A–14. Schorr on Oswald's threat: "The Assassins," 20–22.

14–14A. Liebeler on Castro's warning: Lifton, 57; memo of September 16, 1964, from Liebeler to Rankin, "Re: Quote from New Orleans *Times-Picayune* of September 9, 1963, concerning Fidel Castro's speech," National Archives, Washington, D.C.

14A. Hoover's letter: Schorr, "The Assassins," 21; letter dated June 17, 1964, from Hoover to Rankin (portions deleted), National Archives.

14A–14B. Commission on Oswald's trip to Mexico: WR, 308.

14B. Slawson and Hoover's letter: Schorr, "The Assassins," 21.
CIA plots withheld from Commission: Book V, 5–6, 7.

CHAPTER 1. A MOST UNUSUAL DEFECTOR

15. Cape Cod meeting: Damore, 165.

16. Oswald's activities in Moscow: WR, 690–693, 259–262; XVI, 96.

16–17. Handwritten note: WR, 261, 262.

Note 1: Oswald had a learning disability (dyslexia), which he largely overcame but which left him a poor speller (XXVI, 812–817). In quoting Oswald's writings throughout the book, I have corrected his spelling and minor punctuation errors for the sake of clarity.

17. Understood legal procedure: WR, 693, 262.
"Wound up," "rehearsing for a long time": Epstein, *Legend*, 95.
Previous defector: V, 267.

17–18. "Lonesome man," quizzed on Marxist theory: V, 299.

18. Snyder's impressions: V, 272, 290; XVIII, 98, 100, 103.
Offered military information to Soviets: XVIII, 98, 100; V, 265.
Tone of meeting: McMillan, 82.

18A. Snyder to State Department: WR, 748; XVIII, 98–103; Epstein, *Legend*, 96.

19. Refused phone calls: Oswald, 105.
Robert Oswald's reaction: Ibid., 98–99.

20. Letter to American ambassador: WR, 262, 263.

20–21. November 8 letter to Robert: WR, 694–695.

21–24. Mosby interview and her reactions: XXII, 703–705; XXVI, 90; Epstein, *Legend*, 98–99, 292 n. 18; WR, 388, 695–696.

Note 2: After a controversial trial in 1951, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of conspiracy to commit wartime espionage and sentenced to death. They had been accused of transmitting atomic bomb secrets to the Russians. After several legal appeals were denied and President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to commute their sentences to life imprisonment, they were executed in New York's Sing Sing prison on June 19, 1953. During the last months of their imprisonment, a Save the Rosenbergs campaign was mounted by leftist groups and others who felt their conviction, and especially the death sentence, was unjust.

24–25. Priscilla Johnson and Kennedy: McMillan, 3–4.

25–28. Johnson's interview of Oswald and her impressions: McMillan, 5, 83–85; XI, 448–449, 453; XX, 292–305 *passim;* HACR, 270.

29–29A. Second letter to Robert: XVI, 815–822; WR, 391–392.

29A–29B. Third letter to Robert, Oswald sent to Minsk: WR, 697.

CHAPTER 2. MARGUERITE'S SON

(Except where noted, minor details of Oswald's early years are taken from the Warren Report, 377, 383, 669–679.)

39. Father's death and funeral: I, 225, 268; VIII, 47; XXI, 491, 505.
"The son of an insurance salesman": WR, 395; XVI, 285.

39–39A. Marguerite's traits in Lee: Oswald, 23, 48.

39A. Lillian on Marguerite: VIII, 98.

39A. Marguerite's comments: Stafford, 30.

39B. Insurance policy: VIII, 47.
Sneaking out of house: Oswald, 33.
Marguerite on babysitters: I, 254–255.

40. Oswald brothers at orphanage: Oswald, 34–35; I, 271; WR, 671.
Pic on Ekdahl: XI, 21.
Ekdahl marriage: WR, 672–673.

41–42. Marguerite and other woman: I, 250–251.

42. Robert on Lee's imagination and love of intrigue: Oswald, 46–47.

43. Ekdahl divorce: I, 251–252; XI, 29; Oswald, 39.
Evans on Marguerite and Lee: VIII, 50–51.

43–44. Marguerite on Lee and neighbor boy: Stafford, 51–52.

44. Oswald solitary: WR, 675; VIII, 52, 119, 121–122.

44–44A. Marguerite on Lee's childhood: I, 225.

44A–44B. "Back down in lower class": WR, 674.

44B. Robert on "burden": Oswald, 39, 42.
Marguerite's false affidavit: WR, 378.

Pic's comments on Marguerite: XI, 73–74, 75.
Pic's resentment and enlistment: Oswald, 42; WR, 378, 675.

45. Letters to Pic: XXI, 73, 74, 109–110.
Robert's enlistment and Lee's plans: Oswald, 49.
Move to New York: Oswald, 50; WR, 675.
Pic's impressions of Lee: XI, 39; Oswald, 51.

45–46. Mrs. Pic's recollections: XXII, 687.

46–47. Pic and Marguerite on knife incident: XI, 38, 40; I, 226–227.

48. Oswald's truancy and comments: XIX, 315, 189; VIII, 210.
Truancy court and hearing: XIX, 309.

48–49. Sokolow's report: WR, 381

49–52. Evelyn Strickman's report: XXI, 485–509.

52–53. Strickman on Marguerite: XXI, 507.

53–54. Hartogs on Oswald: VIII, 214; VII, 223–224; Hartogs and Freeman, 318–320; XIX, 315, 317 (recommendation).

54. Oswalds' promise to cooperate: XIX, 317.
Canvass by *The Worker*'s supporters: *The Worker*, May 21, 1953.

54–55. Mother's Day leafletting: *The Worker*, May 8, 1953.

55. *The Worker* on Rosenbergs as victims: Front-page articles, June 1 and June 21, 1953.

56. Oswald's view of people as cardboard figures: McMillan, 482 (quoting Michael Paine).

57. "The key to my environment": XX, 300.

58. Thornley on Oswald's conviction: WR, 388.

59. Rosenberg and Mooney pamphlet: Nizer, 16.

59–60. Robert's visit: Oswald, 61–62; I, 301–302, 308–310.

60. Pic on psychiatrist: XI, 42, 43–44.
Teacher's report: XIX, 319.

61. Continuation of parole and Big Brothers: WR, 678–679; XIX, 321.

CHAPTER 3. DROPPING OUT, JOINING UP

62. Marguerite on averting a "tragedy": XXI, 83.

62. Oswald quiet and studious, read encyclopedias: VIII, 51, 55, 62, 63, 178.

62A. Lillian's recollections: VIII, 124–125.

62B. Move to French Quarter: WR, 680.

62B. Bus incident: Oswald, 68; WR, 383; VIII, 15, 124, 159, 174.

62C. Voebel's testimony: VIII, 7, 9–10.

63. Plans "military service": WR, 679.
Civil Air Patrol, Ferrie: WR, 679; VIII, 14; Oswald, 69.
Statements to Mosby: XXII, 703.
Marguerite's knowledge of Marxist books: I, 198.

64. Letter to school authorities, false affidavit: WR, 680, 681.

65. McBride's testimony: WR, 384; XXII, 710–711.

65–66. Eastland hearings and his comment: New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, April 6, 1956; *New York Times*, April 23, 1956, 40, and April 25, 25.

66. Wulf's testimony: WR, 384; VIII, 18–21.

Note 1: As McBride recalled it, Oswald wanted them to join the Communist party to "take advantage of their social functions." But since neither Oswald nor the Party was known to be interested in "social functions," it's likely that McBride mistook his use of the word "socialist" for "social."

67. "I Led Three Lives": Oswald, 47; I, 200.

67. Weinstein and others on the typical assassin: Restak, "Assassin!" 80–82.

68. Yochelson and Samenow: For a summary of the book, see *Science*, February 3, 1978, 511–514; *Newsweek*, February 27, 1978, 91.
Samenow's comments, "wraps himself in . . . secrecy," and "sees himself as unique": Interview on "Good Morning America," ABC-TV, February 28, 1978.

69. "The criminal believes he has been wronged": Yochelson and Samenow, 488.
"Although he had broken the law": Ibid., 438.

70. "Although he may forcefully present himself": Ibid., 463.
Study rejected by many: *Science*, February 3, 1978.

71. Rode bike, visited museums: WR, 679; VIII, 125.
Tried to interest classmates in Marxism: VIII, 81.
B football team, Robert's comment: VIII, 83; Oswald, 56.
Letter Socialist party: WR, 681; XI, 210.

Note 2: Oswald's letter was discovered in 1964 at the Duke University library by an employee who was setting up a chronological file of a large consignment of Socialist party papers that had been turned over to the library in January 1959 (letter to the author from Virginia Gray, Assistant Curator of the William R. Perkins Library at Duke, February 27, 1970).

CHAPTER 4. THE MARXIST MARINE

72. Warren Report critics on enlistment: Summers, 143.
Robert and Pic on enlistment: Oswald, 49, 57; WR, 384.
Oswald's explanation: De Mohrenschildt manuscript, HACH, XII, 82; II, 399.
Basic training, reading and aviation scores: WR, 681–683.

72–73. Allen R. Felde's recollection: XXIII, 797.

73. U-2s at Atsugi seen by radar crew, briefings: Epstein, *Legend,* 55, 279–280 n. 1. (In the late 1970s Epstein interviewed dozens of the men who had served with Oswald in the Marines.)
Bristling at Young officers: Epstein, *Legend,* 68.
Powers on Oswald: VIII, 288.

74. Bar girls: Epstein, *Legend,* 70–71.
Gunshot wound and court-martial: Ibid., 72–73; WR, 683; VIII, 319–320.

74–75. Second court-martial: WR, 684; Epstein, *Legend,* 78–79.

75. Comment on getting out of brig: Epstein, *Legend,* 79.
Claimed met Communists in Japan: IX, 242–243; XI, 172–173.
Began studying Russian: WR, 684.

75–76. Guard duty incident: Epstein, *Legend,* 81–82; WR, 684.

76. Radar crew: WR, 684.

76–77. Donovan's comments on Oswald: VIII, 290–293, 297, 295, 293.

77. Delgado on officer-baiting: VIII, 265.

78. "Pursue Russian": VIII, 297.
Pro-Russian behavior: VIII, 322, 323, 315–316.
Subscriptions to Russian paper and *Worker:* VIII, 323, 315, 320, 242.
Critics on pro-Russian behavior: Anson, 158; Summers, 149.
Donovan on Oswald's politics: WR, 686.

78–79. Captain Block: Interview with Epstein reported in *Legend,* 86.
"Unjustly put upon": XI, 100.
Delgado on helping Castro: VIII, 233.
Exile raids on Dominican Republic, other countries: Halperin, 320–321.
Morgan's background: Epstein, *Legend,* 88, 285–286 n. 2.
Delgado on Morgan and leading expeditions: VIII, 240.
"Do away with Trujillo": VIII, 241.
Learning Spanish: WR, 687; VIII, 241.

80. Oswald on Cuban purges: VIII, 240, 243, 255.
"Be part of revolutionary movement": VIII, 241.
Contacted Cuban consulate?: VIII, 241–243.
Oswald on religion, *Das Kapital,* and *Animal Farm:* VIII, 262, 244, 255.

80A. Delgado on Oswald's marksmanship: VIII, 235.

81. Rifle scores: WR, 681–682; *Time,* November 24, 1975, 37 (see also I, 233).

81–82. Thornley on Oswald: XI, 96, 87, 91–93, 97–98.

82A. Extinction without meaning, "no wonder men go into a rage": Navasky, 426, 422; Becker, 64, 141.

83. "Come the revolution": XI, 94–95.

CHAPTER 5. THE DEFECTION

84. Commitment to Reserves: WR, 688–689; Epstein, *Legend,* 89.
Equivalency exam, college application: WR, 687; XVI, 621, 625.
Robert on cover story: Oswald, 99.

85. Oswald's trips to L.A.: VIII, 241, 251.
Extradition treaties, defection route: VIII, 260–261.
Oswald denies plan to go to Cuba: Epstein, *Legend,* 89; VIII, 244.

85A. Letter to Robert, Marguerite's injury: Oswald, 93–94.
Letter to Marguerite: XVI, 581–582.
Marguerite's affidavits, Lee's discharge: WR, 688; HACR, 281–282.

85A–86. Application for passport: XXII, 78.

86. Promise not to divulge secrets: Epstein, *Legend,* 90–91.

86. Claims involvement in "export": I, 201–202, 212; Oswald, 95; WR, 689.

86. Farewell letter to Marguerite: WR, 690.

86–87. On board the *Marion Lykes:* WR, 690; XI, 115–117; Epstein, *Legend,* 92–93.

87. Arrival and departure at Southampton: WR, 690.

87–88. Moscow activities and "apparent suicide attempt": WR, 691–692; XVI, 94.

88. Hospital records: XVIII, 468; WR, 692.
Interviewed by new officials: XVI, 96.
Johnson on Soviets' suspicion: XX, 293.

89. Asked for credentials: XVI, 96.
Told to "go home": XVI, 94.
Embassy lost track of him: XVIII, 156, 120.
Suspicion of questioning by KGB: Epstein, *Legend,* 295 n. 4; Blakey and Billings, 123.
Low security clearance: XXIII, 796; XVIII, 116.

89–90. Access to confidential information: VIII, 298.

90. Scientist defector and *Air Review* photograph: De Gramont, 354–355, 258.
"Will talk to a Marine about . . . drill": Dave Murphy, former head of CIA Soviet operations in Berlin, quoted by Martin, 104, 157–158.

90–91. Application to Patrice Lumumba University, desire for education: WR, 705; McMillan, 104–123–124; HACH, II, 217–218.

91. Thornley on Oswald's expectations: XI, 98.
Other defectors' work assignments: De Gramont, 349, 353.
"Serves him right": V, 294.
Given apartment and stipend: WR, 697, 698.

92. Disliked manual work: XVIII, 430; IX, 136; McMillan, 104.

92. First U.S. plans to assassinate Castro: Interim, 74, 80.

92. 1961 State of the Union message: Quoted in Blakey and Billings, 136.

92A. House of Representatives resolution: Ibid., 137.

93. Church on "rogue elephant": Baltimore *Sun*, July 16, 1975.
Church committee's conclusion: Interim, 6–7.
"Nailing Jello to a wall": Walter Mondale, quoted in the *New York Times*, October 5, 1975.
Criticism of CIA and administration officials: Interim, 7.

94. Robert Kennedy briefing, Houston's comment: Ibid., 132–133.
Notes of November 4 meeting: Schlesinger, 476.

94–95. November 16 speech, MONGOOSE authorization and purpose: Interim, 139, 142.

95. January 19 meeting notes: Ibid., 141.

95–96. Helms testimony: Ibid., 149, 150.

96. Pressure from administration, McNamara's comment: Ibid., 159–160, 157–158.
Smathers testimony: Ibid., 325–326.
Kennedy's habit to question: McMillan, 4.

97. Dinner party comment on Cuba: Interim, 326.
Tad Szulc interview: Ibid., 324–325.
Board of National Estimates conclusion: Ibid., 325, 136–137.

98. Becket situation and Mathias–Helms exchange: Ibid., 316, 149.

99. Date of first known plot: Ibid., 73.

CHAPTER 6. GETTING OUT

100. Letter to U.S. Embassy: WR, 752; XVI, 685.
Snyder's reply: XVIII, 135.
Dispatch to State Department: XVIII, 133–134.
State Department reply: XVIII, 136.
Fear of being arrested: McMillan, 126.

100–101. March 12 letter: XVI, 702–704.

101. Snyder's reply: XXII, 33–34.
First meetings with Marina: McMillan, 72–75, 93–94.
Conversation with Marina's relatives: Ibid., 95.

101–102. Marina's attraction to Oswald: Ibid., 96, 101.

102. "Fell in love with the man": HACH, XII, 375.
Pechorin as Marina's ideal: McMillan, 38–39, 584 n. 1.
April 18 meeting and marriage: Ibid., 97–98, 107.

Proposal to Ella German: WR, 699, 704.

103. Lies during courtship and Marina's reaction: McMillan, 97, 142.
"I'd love the danger": Ibid., 116.
Reaction to Bay of Pigs, comments on Castro: Ibid., 157; I, 24.
Cuban students and Oswald's view of Cuba: McMillan, 157; IX, 370.

104. May 16 letter: XVI, 705–708.
Letter to Robert: XVI, 826.
Letter to Marguerite: WR, 705.

104–105. May 31 letter to Robert: XVI, 828–829.
Fear of arrest, comment to Marina: McMillan, 127, 133.
Appearance at embassy, phone call to Marina: Ibid., 128, 129.

105–106. Embassy questioning of Oswald: XVIII, 137–138; XI, 200.

106. Warren Report on Oswald's responses: WR, 706.

106–107. Snyder on Oswald's anxiety about imprisonment and new attitude: XVIII, 138–139.

107. Marina's reaction to Snyder's comment: McMillan, 134, 591 n. 13.

108. Oswald's "Historic Diary": XVI, 94–105.

108.
Note 1: Marina has said that she first saw her husband working on his diary in mid-July 1961, just after they returned from the American Embassy (McMillan, 144). Her recollection matches internal evidence in the diary. For instance, in describing his initial visit to the embassy in an October 1959 entry, Oswald referred to "Richard Snyder American Head Consular in Moscow at that time" and to his assistant, "(now *Head* Counsular) McVickers [sic]" (XVI, 96). McVickar didn't take over from Snyder until July 1961 (V, 306) and left Moscow that September (V, 300; XVIII, 154). Thus the entry reflected the situation that existed only between those two dates.

108. "Future readers in mind": WR, 259, 691.
January 1961 entry and Report's conclusion: WR, 394–395.

110. Suggestion that Oswald return before Marina and his response: XXII, 90; XVI, 717–718.
"If it hadn't been for you" and Marina's reply: McMillan, 170.
Marguerite on discharge change: WR, 710.

110–111. January 30 letter to Robert: XVI, 865–867.

111–112. Letter to John Connally: WR, 710.

112. February 15 letter: XVI, 870–871.

113. Powers's trial and defense attorney's statements: De Gramont, 282.

113A. Second letter to Robert mentioning Powers: XVI, 875.

114. Writing on board *Maasdam:* XVI, 110–120; McMillan, 194–195.

List of questions and answers: XVI, 436–439; WR, 399.

CHAPTER 7. HOMECOMING

115. Newspaper article on Oswald: IV, 415.
Oswalds' arrival and caution to brother: Oswald, 114–115.
Letter from *Fort Worth Press* writer: FBI document 102u, No. 2, National Archives.
Marina's first experiences in U.S.: Oswald, 118–119; XI, 53.

115–116. Oswald's complaints about Marina: III, 128; VIII, 135; II, 305.
Meeting with Peter Gregory: WR, 714.
Fluency in Russian: IX, 226, 259.
Fain's interview and report: IV, 415–416, 422, 418.

117. Refused to take lie detector test: Book V, 88.
Job and apartment: WR, 715; IX, 226.
Subscription to *The Worker:* XXII, 271–272; Newman, 239–240.

117A. Letter to Socialist Workers Party: X, 113.
Wrote to Fair Play for Cuba Committee: XXIV, 341; Newman, 39.
August 16 FBI interview, Marina's recollections: I, 20; Book V, 88.

118. FBI's concern: Book V, 89; V, 105.
"Extreme allergy to FBI": IX, 458.
Refusal to give Robert his home address: XVI, 887; IV, 422; Newman, 242, 320; Oswald, 127.
"Nervous and irritable": I, 32, 49.
Fain closes case: V, 5.

118.
Note 1: The Justice Department didn't prosecute Oswald for revealing military information because the only evidence against him was his own statement to Richard Snyder—a statement Oswald later retracted when he was questioned by Snyder and by the FBI (HACR, 266–267).

118. Émigrés' desire to meet Oswalds: IX, 236, 267; VIII, 350–351.
Meeting Bouhe and Meller, Bouhe's comments: VIII, 358, 355, 360–361, 371–372.

119. Bouhe at Oswald apartment: VIII, 384, 371
Meller's impressions: VIII, 382, 381, 384.
Refusal to let Marina learn English: II, 310; IX, 310, 357.

119–120. Paul Gregory and the Oswalds: IX, 145, 144, 155–157, 148; McMillan, 239; XXIII, 407.

120–121. John and Elena Hall: McMillan, 247; VIII, 407–408, 411, 409, 413, 402.

121. Oswald on émigrés: IX, 239, 250; I, 10.

121–122. De Mohrenschildt's background and personality: WR, 283; IX, 175, 181, 183–184, 268; VIII, 377; HACH, XII, 53, 56.

122. "Leftwing enthusiast": II, 327; IX, 266; X, 12.
Relationship with Oswald: IX, 277, 266; XXII, 783.
De Mohrenschildt's testimony: IX, 243, 241, 267.
"Looking for utopia": IX, 246, 312.

122–123. Oswald's political writings: XVI, 424, 426–427, 433–434, 436.

124–126. De Mohrenschildt manuscript, "a seeker for justice": HACH, XII, 81.
Oswald on defection and Russia: Ibid., 91, 86, 103.
On integration: Ibid., 127, 119–120, 133.
On world politics: Ibid., 121, 307.
On Hoover: Ibid., 121.
On death: Ibid., 151, 93.
On Marina and de Mohrenschildt's agreement: Ibid., 121, 261.
"Coup d'etat": Ibid., 147.
On President Kennedy: Ibid., 146–147.
Conversations on being a revolutionary and ideology: Ibid., 81, 144–145.

126. Oswald "an idealistic Marxist": VIII, 436.

126A. Oswald on Walker and Marines: I, 111.

127. Walker's release and arrival at Love Field: *New York Times,* October 7, 1962, 1, and October 8, 14; Newman, 55.
Émigrés' help and decision to move to Dallas: McMillan, 251–252; I, 5.

128. Rented post office box: WR, 119.
Claim he had just gotten out of Marines: X, 179.
Poster blowups to defense committee: X, 106.

130. Walker "another Hitler": II, 315–316; I, 16.

CHAPTER 8. TAKING ACTION

131. "Like two friends meeting": IX, 86, 82.
Oswald's striking Marina, rudeness: IX, 86, 313.
Similar treatment of Marguerite: VIII, 55, 57.

132. Marina's admiration of Castro: IX, 357; I, 24; XXIII, 390.
"Overblown opinion": IX, 351.
Oswalds' disagreement on priorities: III, 128; XI, 130; IX, 311, 376; XXII, 763.
Katya Ford on Oswalds' relationship: II, 305.
Marina's doubts Lee loved her: McMillan, 316, 393, 394, 395, 472–473.
Alexandra Taylor's testimony: XI, 128–129.

133. Gary Taylor and Oswald: McMillan, 256; IX, 82, 81.
Max Clark on Oswald's decision to leave Russia: VIII, 347, 350. See also VIII, 425; XXIII, 399; XI, 98.

134. Oswald's criticism of Kennedy: Epstein, *Legend,* 204.

135. Attempt to join Socialist Workers party: X, 113; XIX, 576–578; Newman, 270–271.

136. Mrs. Tobias on Oswald: X, 235, 237, 248.
Alexandra's comment: XI, 140.
Marina on quarrel: XVIII, 621–622. See also I, 11.

137. Marina's moving out, émigrés' assistance: VIII, 386; McMillan, 263, 283–284.

137–138. Marina and Valentina Ray on reconciliation: XVIII, 622–623; VIII, 418.

138A. Only the de Mohrenschildts remained friendly: McMillan, 285–286; WR, 282; II, 307.

138A. "Living in another world": XVIII, 624; I, 4–5.

139. Political posters: XIX, 579; XI, 208–209 (Socialist Workers party); XXI, 674–677 (Hall–Davis committee); XXI, 721, XX, 269 *(The Worker).*
Subscription to *The Militant:* X, 109.
The Militant on Kennedy's Miami speech: January 7, 1963, 1.

140. Walker's release and ordering of gun: Newman, 59; WR, 174; I, 16.
"Alek" nickname and James Bond: WR, 122; XXII, 82.
"Hidell" an "altered Fidel": I, 64; V, 401.

141. Hidell ID: WR, 723; McMillan, 319; Epstein, *Legend,* 316 n. 6.
Studying map and bus schedule: V, 417; WR, 404.
Pressuring Marina to return to USSR: I, 10, 12–13.

142. Letter to Soviet Embassy: XVI, 10; I, 35; Newman, 313.
Meeting Ruth Paine and Marina's comment: McMillan, 344, 606 n. 11.
February 1963 Marina's worst month: McMillan, 317.

143–144. Landlady's comments on Marina: X, 239, 244, 250.

144. Oswald's staying out late: I, 14; X, 18, 30–31; X, 243 (Tobias note); McMillan, 353 (call to de Mohrenschildt).

144. Decision to move, Mrs. Tobias's comment: McMillan, 329; X, 262–263.
Study in new apartment: McMillan, 330.

145. Pictures of Walker's house: WR, 185–186.
Notebook: Ibid., 404–405; XI, 292–293.
Rifle and pistol shipped March 20: WR, 723.
Renewed FBI interest: IV, 441–442; V, 5–6.

146. "Cooling off period," Hoover's later reaction: Book V, 90.
Oswald's case reopened: IV, 442.

146–147. Backyard photos with weapons: WR, 724; I, 15–16; XXIII, 420, 408; XI, 296; McMillan, 544.

148. Michael Paine, April 2 dinner: II, 393, 389–390, 402–403; XXIII, 502 (Michael's father); McMillan, 345–346.
Practice with rifle: McMillan, 347.

148–148A. Reasons for loss of job: X, 189, 190–191; XI, 479.

148B. Sam Ballen interview: IX, 47–53; McMillan, 278; Epstein, *Legend,* 209–210, 319 n. 11.

148B. Pro-Castro demonstration: XX, 511; XXII, 796.

149. Attack on Walker: WR, 183–187; McMillan, 608 n. 4; XI, 405–410; HACR, 59.

149–150. Oswald's note of instructions: WR, 183–185.

151. Marina on Oswald's explanation: I, 16; XXIV, 47; HACH, XII, 391; HACH, II, 236, 232, 251.
Instructions kept in Marina's book: XXIII, 391.
Destruction of notebook: XI, 292–293.

151A. On Marina's failure to go to police: McMillan, 353–354, 607–608 n. 23.

151B. Seeking asylum, "grandiose plans": Newman, 338–339; McMillan, 325–326; XI, 296.

151C. Nixon incident: WR, 187–189; V, 389–390, 392, 395; McMillan, 367–371; Newman, 349.

152. Move to New Orleans: II, 457–463; McMillan, 381.

CHAPTER 9. THE ACTIVIST

154. Castro agents among refugees: *New York Times,* April 13, 1963, 41.
Guerrilla attack in Venezuela: Newman, 269–270.
MONGOOSE disbanded, Special Group under Bundy: Interim, 170.

154–155. Opening to Cuba proposed, "separate track": Ibid., 173–174, 176 n. 1.

155. *Time* quotes administration official: February 15, 1963, 23.
Kennedy news conference and White House estimate: *Time,* February 22, 1963, 21.
Wall Street Journal quoted: *The Worker,* March 19, 1963, 2; *The Militant,* March 25, 1963, 7.
Alpha 66 raid and official crackdown: *New York Times,* March 20, 1963, 2, March 30, 1; April 1, 1, and April 6, 1.

155A. Kennedy April 19 speech: McMillan, 611–612 n. 2.
No ongoing CIA assassination plots: Interim, 85–86, 84.
Mafia not serious participants?: Summers, 269, 270; Blakey, 152.

156A. Oswald at home on April 21: McMillan, 369–370.

157. Standing Group and CIA on Castro's death: Interim, 171.

How could he know?

158. Call to Lillian Murret: VIII, 133–134, 164.
Unemployment benefits and job: WR, 725, 726.

159. Lillian's testimony: VIII, 136.
Renting apartment: VIII, 59.
Marina's discussions with Ruth and phone call: McMillan, 393, 394–395; II, 468.

160. Oswalds' reunion: II, 470–472.
Card to Fair Play for Cuba and reply: XX, 531, 517.

160–161. Oswald's response to Vincent Lee: XX, 512–513.

161–162. Newman on Oswald's plans: Newman, 42–43, 55–56, 71–72, 358.

162. Marina on purpose of pro-Castro activities: I, 24–25.

163. Oswald's political résumé: XVI, 337–346.

164. "Subversion airlift": *Time,* March 29, 1963, 19. See also *Time,* March 8, 1963, 25.

164A. President on travel ban defiance: *Time,* August 9, 1963, 31–32.
House Un-American Activities Committee chairman on travelers: New Orleans *Times-Picayune,* July 24, 1963, 1.
Hijacking plans: I, 22, 23.
"There's a Cuban Embassy in Mexico": McMillan, 447.
Letter from Soviet Embassy: XVIII, 514–515.
Pressuring Marina to answer letter: McMillan, 410–411.

165. Marina's letter to Ruth: XVII, 88.
Handbills: XII, 796–798; WR, 728.

165A. Letter from Vincent Lee: XX, 514–516.

166. Post office box rental: WR, 312.
Membership forms: XXII, 800–801.

166–167. Letter to Vincent Lee: XX, 518–521.

167. No response from Fair Play Committee: WR, 412.

167–168. June 10 letter to *The Worker:* XX, 257–258.

168. No evidence Oswald rented an office: WR, 292, 408. But see also Epstein, *Legend,* 321 n. 8.
Renewed FBI interest: XVII, 794; IV, 422–423.

169. Oswald at Dumaine Street dock: XXII, 806.

169–170. LeBlanc's testimony: X, 215.

170. At Crescent City Garage: X, 221.
Passport application: XVII, 666–667.

Note 1: Critics have expressed suspicion about the speed with which Oswald received his passport (Meagher, 336; Summers, 362). A July 21 story in the *Times-Picayune* headlined "Passports Are Now Easier to Obtain" pointed

Not in print - Just Pics

out that because of a new policy of decentralization, passports were being issued at New Orleans and other cities in 24 hours or less (Sec. II, p. 13).

170–171. Scene with Marina and letter to Soviet Embassy: I, 68; McMillan, 417–419; XVI, 30.

171. Ruth's offer to Marina: WR, 727–728.
Lost job, unemployment benefits: Ibid., 726–727.

172. Library books checked out: XXV, 929–931.

172. Subscriptions, *Agitator* a Party manual: WR, 743, 744; Epstein, *Legend,* 112.
Speech at Jesuit college: XXV, 923, 924, 919, 921, 926–927.

173. Robert Fitzpatrick's recollections: XXV, 924–925.

CHAPTER 10. "STREET AGITATION . . . RADIO SPEAKER AND LECTURER"

174. Size of New Orleans Cuban community: Blakey and Billings, 177.
DRE shelling of Havana: X, 34.
FBI raid: New Orleans *Times-Picayune,* August 1 and 2, 1963; Book V, 11–12.
Guerrilla camp disbanded: Brener, vii–viii, 69–70.

175A. Notebook entry: XVI, 67.
DRE leader Bringuier, store window sign: X, 34; XXII, 823.

176. Young boys collecting for DRE: XXVI, 767.
Oswald's offer to Bringuier: X, 35–36.
Suggestions to anti-Castro boys: X, 83, 77.

177. "I infiltrated the Cuban Student Directorate": XIV, 280.

Note 1: Oswald may also have seen a July 17 *Times-Picayune* story that began, "Hundreds of anti-Castroites were arrested in northern Camaguey Province after a militiaman infiltrated their guerrilla ranks and reported them" (p. 14).

178. Bringuier incident seen as infiltration attempt: Newman, 379–380; Blakey and Billings, 162, 364; Epstein, *Legend,* 222–223; Meagher, 384, 386.

178–179. Bringuier and friends confront Oswald: X, 37–38; XVII, 761.

179.

Note 2: Some theorists contend that the exiles' attack on Oswald was a prearranged mock battle, citing an August 1 letter from Oswald to Vincent Lee that seems to describe this confrontation eight days before it occurred: "Through the efforts of some exile 'gusanos' [worms] a street demonstration was attacked and we were officially cautioned by police. This incident robbed me of what support I had leaving me alone . . ." (XX, 524–525; Summers, 302–303). But Oswald also wrote to Lee *after* his clash with Bringuier's group, presenting his arrest as a victory for Fair Play. It makes little sense

that he would have given two versions of a staged incident. Actually, the August 1 letter suggests that there was another demonstration by Oswald in late July that a policeman quickly broke up and then failed to report. An oversight such as this wouldn't have been unusual, since the Warren Report doesn't mention that Oswald had distributed handbills on the city's Tulane University campus that summer. When a student called the FBI after the assassination to offer a copy, he was told it wasn't needed (Epstein, *Legend*, 222, 322 n. 15; XXVI, 575–576).

179. Marina checks rifle in closet: McMillan, 433.
"Hidell" an "altered Fidel": I, 64; V, 401.

180–181. Questioning by Martello and Quigley: X, 53, 56, 59; XVII, 758; IV, 436–438; Newman, 383.
Thornley on Oswald's definition of democracy: XI, 92.

181–182. Murret visit and Oswald's reaction: VIII, 146, 187; I, 25.
Bringuier on court appearance: X, 41.

183. Oswald pleased by his arrest: McMillan, 433; I, 24–25.
Newspaper clippings: XX, 261 (Arnold Johnson); XX, 526–528 (Vincent Lee); WR, 730 (pro-Castro file).

183A. Purpose of pro-Castro activities: I, 24–25.

184. Trade Mart demonstration: WR, 729.
Bringuier's friend and Oswald: X, 41–42; I, 25.
Oswalds' improved relationship: McMillan, 446, 453.
Marina's comments and his replies: Ibid., 436–437; I, 22, 23.

184A. Marina on "games" with the rifle: XVIII, 631.

185. Stuckey's impression of Oswald: XI, 162, 170–171.

185A–187. Transcript of radio interview: XXI, 621–632.

188. Cuban literacy campaign: Newman, 197, 392.
Cuban friend Alfred: XXIII, 477, 484; Epstein, *Legend*, 113.
Refugees "no better source": HACH, XII, 182.
Oswald invited to debate and appearance: XI, 166, 168.

189. Stuckey learns of defection: McMillan, 439–440, 615–616 n. 7.
Debate transcript: XXI, 633–641.
"I would not agree with that particular wording": XXI, 641.
Castro on Kennedy as ruffian: New Orleans *Times-Picayune*, July 27, 1963, sec. I, 3.

190. Marina on Oswald's view of Kennedy: McMillan, 413–414, 571.
Considered Marina unqualified, knew she admired Kennedy: HACH, XII, 408; McMillan, 414.
Stuckey, "We finished him on that program": WR, 410.

190–191. Stuckey and Oswald at bar: XI, 171–175; XVII, 764.

not other side, in his writing?

192–193. Letter to Central Committee, Johnson's reply: XX, 262–264, 265.

194. Admiration of U.S. Party members, letter: McMillan, 438; I, 23.
Dry-firing of rifle and explanation: I, 21–22; McMillan, 452.
Andrews on Mexican and Oswald's discharge: WR, 325, 727; XI, 329; Epstein, *Counterplot*, 86.

195. Oswald and the Habana Bar: XI, 341–342, 347, 351, 361.

196A–196. Résumé description and contents: WR, 731; XVI, 337–346; Newman, 411–413.

196C. Microdots: Epstein, *Legend*, 194–196; XVI, 53, 346.

196D. Cuba as "last escape hatch": WR, 414; Newman, 413.

196F. Covert operations stepped up in June: Interim, 173.

196G. Paramilitary operations and purpose: Ibid., 13.
Ray Cline and Cuban raider on plots: Branch and Crile, "Kennedy Vendetta," 61.

196H. Renewed contact with AM/LASH, CIA cable: Interim, 86–87; Book V, 3, 13, 14, 100.

197. Attwood's efforts, comments by Robert Kennedy and Bundy: Interim, 173.
Administration not informed of AM/LASH: Ibid., 173–175.

197A–B. Church committee on exile assassination talk: Book V, 14.

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197B. Raymond Rocca's comment: Ibid., 15 n. 21; Blakey and Billings, 143–144; CIA memorandum dated 30 May 1975 obtained from the CIA under the Freedom of Information Act, portions deleted.

197C. Oswald eager for Ruth Paine's arrival: McMillan, 452.
Oswald's travel plans: Ibid., 448, 461.
Concealment of destination from Ruth: III, 10, 27; WR, 413, 730.
Oswald seen leaving apartment and on bus: WR, 730, 732.

CHAPTER 11. THE TROUBLING TESTIMONY OF SYLVIA ODIO

198–203. Odio's testimony: XI, 368–382; HACH, X, 26–27; Summers, 411–414; Blakey and Billings, 163.

203. Odio a credible witness: HACH, X, 29, and Summers, 589 n. 96 (doctor); XX, 690 (father's letter); Staff Report to the Warren Commission by William T. Coleman, Jr., and W. David Slawson, pp. 109–110, National Archives.

203.
Note 1: Odio's description of "Leon" matched Oswald even in certain details the Warren Commission didn't notice. Odio recalled that "Leon" was unshaven, and McMillan mentions tht during the preceding summer Oswald

This theory gives no reason for LHO to be in Dallas and it does not explain why he would go north from Houston en route to Mexico

became slovenly in his appearance and "by mid-July shaved only every other day." During August he also lost considerable weight—and Odio remarked that the shirt the American had on looked too big for him (McMillan, 415–416, 459; XI, 371).

204. Efforts to establish Oswald's whereabouts: Epstein, *Inquest,* 104.

205.
Note 2: The Warren Report and its supporters argue that after reaching Houston on this bus at about 10:50 P.M., Oswald called the home of Horace Twiford, a member of the Socialist Labor party and therefore couldn't have been at Odio's apartment that evening. (In 1962 Oswald had requested literature from the New York office of the SLP, which forwarded his name and address to Twiford. On September 11, 1963, Twiford sent him a copy of the Party newspaper with his return address on it.) The report's claim that Oswald made this call on September 25 isn't supported by the affidavits of Twiford and his wife, who spoke with Oswald in her husband's absence. Neither mentioned a specific date, placing the incident only in "late September" or "during the week" prior to September 27 (XI, 179–180). Moreover, Mrs. Twiford felt certain that Oswald telephoned between 7 and 10 P.M., and made the reasonable point that a call at a later hour would have been memorable. She stated that "Oswald inquired as to how my husband had his address. He also said that he had hoped to discuss ideas with my husband for a few hours before he flew down to Mexico." She assumed it was a local call (XXIV, 726–727; WR, 323, 731). If Oswald left for Houston by car on September 24, he could have called the Twiford residence before 10 P.M. and still had almost twenty-four hours to reach Dallas, 245 miles away.

205. Unemployment check: WR, 323; XXIV, 716, 388.
Not seen on Houston bus, but on other buses: WR, 323, 732–733, 736; XXIV, 717; XXV, 607; Meagher, 381.
Marina on when checks were picked up: XXIII, 388.
Check cashed on Tuesday, September 17: WR, 308.

206. Liebeler, "Odio may be right," and Rankin's response: Epstein, *Inquest,* 105; memorandum from Liebeler to Howard P. Willens, September 14, 1964, pp. 4–6, National Archives. This is not the citation of one who used the archives

206–207. Rankin's letter to J. Edgar Hoover: XXVI, 595–596.

207. FBI explanation and Commission's conclusion: XXVI, 834; WR, 324.
Collapse of FBI explanation: Meagher, 387; Summers, 416–417; HACR, 165.

208–210. Meagher on Odio incident: Meagher, 386–387, 377.

210A. Odio considered truthful: Anson, "Congress and the JFK Riddle," 29 (Church committee); Blakey and Billings, 364 (House Assassinations Committee).
Assassinations Committee conclusion: HACR, 166–167.

210A–B. Blakey on Odio incident: Blakey and Billings, 165.

212. Marina on Oswald's boast he was a good shot: XXIII, 409.

215. Veciana and Gonzales plot: O'Toole and Hoch, "Dallas: The Cuban Connection," 96.

216. Castro on plot: *New York Times,* October 24, 1961, 14.

217. Odio's referral of Martin to Miami leader: XI, 375.
Odio on how she could have been located: XI, 380.
Rodriguez contacted by Oswald: Summers, 318, 575.

218. Denials by JURE leaders and Amador Odio: WR, 324; HACH, X, 29.

219–220. Assassinations Committee on Cuban intelligence agents: HACR, 150–151 n. 19.

220. "As far as taking orders . . .": HACH, XII, 405.

221. Oswald on Marine training: VIII, 278.
Oswald legalistic: XI, 171, 477; XVIII, 98; XIX, 264.
Marina on Oswald's masquerading: HACH, XII, 430.

221–221A. De Mohrenschildt on Oswald: HACH, XII, 310.

CHAPTER 12. CASTRO'S REVELATIONS

222. McFarland testimony: XI, 214–215.

223. At the Hotel Comercio and Soviet Embassy: WR, 733, 301.
Marina on Oswald's travel plans: I, 23.

224. Application for Cuban visa: XXV, 814–815.

229. Silvia Duran in Oswald's notebook: XVI, 54.

229–231. Duran's statement: XXIV, 588–590.

231. Return visits to embassies: HACR, 147, 322.
Conditional approval of visa: XXV, 817.
"Confidential sources" in Mexico: WR, 305.

232. Phone call overheard by CIA: *New York Times,* September 21, 1975, 1; *Washington Post,* November 26, 1976, 1.
CIA photographs, notification of other agencies: Epstein, *Legend,* 238; Summers, 380, 384, 374.

232A. Phillips on phone call: Summers, 388–389.
Oswald's finances: WR, 745.

232A–B. Ernesto Rodriguez's story: Summers, 389 (quoting a *Los Angeles Times* syndication in the Dallas *Morning News,* September 24, 1975).

233. Duran and philosophy professor, Contreras's account: HACR, 145–146; Summers, 377–378.

233.
Note 1: Contreras first told his story in 1967 to a U.S. consul in Mexico,

who reported it to the CIA, which confirmed that Contreras was a student in 1963 and a strong supporter of Castro. When Summers spoke to him in 1978, Contreras claimed that the man who identified himself as Oswald didn't resemble the president's assassin, but this was not what he had told the consul (HACR, 144, 146 n. 17).

234–235. Hoover's letter to Rankin, unseen by Slawson and Belin: Schorr, "The Assassins," 21; *New York Times,* November 14, 1976, 30.

235–236. Garrison investigation, Ferrie in poor health: Epstein, *Counterplot,* 71, 104–106, 119, 128; Brener, 80–81; Blakey and Billings, 48–49; *New York Times,* May 11, 1967, 35 (Helms subpoenaed).

236–237. Bergquist interview: Bergquist, "My Curious Row With Castro," 33–34, 50–51.

237. Turner Catledge on Castro: Wyden, 26.

237ff. Clark interview: Schorr, "The Assassins," 21–22; Summers, 391 (quoting Comer Clark, "Fidel Castro Says He Knew of Oswald Threat to Kill JFK," *National Enquirer,* October 15, 1967).

238. Castro on assassination: Mankiewicz and Jones, 67.

242. Assassinations Committee meeting with Castro: HACR, 149, 142–144; Blakey and Billings, 143–148.

244. Castro "a disciple of Machiavelli": Halperin, 48, 60.

245. Castro on difficulty in getting an interview, public restaurants: HACH, III, 209, 208.
At Arab restaurant: Mankiewicz and Jones, 34–35.
At all-night pizzeria: Lockwood, 243.

246. "A former trial lawyer": Mankiewicz and Jones, 13.

CHAPTER 13. OCTOBER 1963—READING BETWEEN THE LINES

248. Activities on returning to Dallas: WR, 737.
"They're such bureaucrats": McMillan, 471.
Apparent loss of enthusiasm for Cuba: WR, 413; McMillan, 471.
Marina, "his favorite subject": V, 395.

249. Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall recommendation: XI, 478–479; XX, 3.
Landlady's comment: VI, 406.
Registers as O.H. Lee: X, 294; VI, 436.

249–250. Ruth Paine's letter: XVII, 150–153.
Suggestion of job at Depository: III, 33–35; I, 29; WR, 738.
Truly's comment: XXII, 527.
Reading newspapers: VI, 352; III, 164–165, 218, 116.

250, 251. Kennedy and Russian troops, Venezuelan attacks: Newman, 441, 440, 446–447.

Oswald on exploitation: II, 400–401, 411.
People "like cardboard" to him: McMillan, 482; XI, 402.
Disliked Kennedy less than politicians to right: II, 414.

252. Oswald's view of Michael: V, 395.
Paine on Oswald as a revolutionary: XI, 402, 403, 411; II, 411.
Lawrence of Arabia comparison: II, 401, 410.

252A. Michael and bundle containing rifle: II, 414–418; IX, 437–448.

252A–53. Newspapers and magazines at Ruth's: III, 114–116, 418.
"Reading between the lines": II, 418–419; IX, 455–456.

254. Castro speech: *The Militant,* October 14, 1963.

255. Birthday party, Oswalds' improved relations: McMillan, 474; II, 422; I, 68.
Movies and Oswald's reactions: McMillan, 475–476; XXIII, 403; I, 71–72.

257. Oswald on Sunday night: III, 39–40; McMillan, 477.

258. Oswald at Walker rally and ACLU meeting: II, 412, 403, 408.

258–259. Krystinik's impressions: IX, 463.

259. Discussion after meeting: IX, 464–465, 468; II, 408; XXII, 714 (projectionist).

260. Conversation during drive home: II, 409, 408.

261. ACLU application, post office box: XVII, 671; XX, 172; WR, 312.

261–262. Letter to Arnold Johnson: XX, 271–273.

262A. Attwood's efforts, Kennedy–Daniel meeting: Summers, 423–424.

262A–B. CIA–AM/LASH meeting, weapons promised: Book V, 17–18, 101.

CHAPTER 14. NOVEMBER: THE DECISION

263. FBI attempts to locate Oswald: IV, 446–448; XI, 461–462.

263–264. Hosty visits Ruth and Marina: IV, 452, 449; III, 15; I, 49; McMillan, 494–495.

264A. Marina's remarks to Hosty: I, 57, 357; III, 103.
Hosty's address and phone number: III, 18.

264A–265. Oswald's reaction to FBI visit: McMillan, 499; III, 101; XXII, 786.

266. Second Hosty–Ruth Paine conversation: IV, 453; III, 96, 102, 104, 129.
Marina memorizes license number: McMillan, 498.

267. Marina on "a matter of privacy": III, 100.
November 8 conversation with Ruth: III, 102, 18–19, 101. See also I, 57.

267–68. Oswald's note to Hosty: Book V, 95–97.

No source, not true in any particular.

268.

Note 1: Hosty's receptionist claimed that the note was partly visible inside the unsealed envelope and that it contained a threat to blow up the FBI and Dallas Police Department, but this is unlikely. Hosty said the note was folded so that the writing couldn't be seen, and it would have been uncharacteristic of Oswald to put an incriminating statement on paper. Hosty's version also sounds more like Oswald, who frequently took his complaints to "proper authorities." Finally, Hosty's reaction—putting the note aside—suggests that Oswald made no violent threat.

268–269. Letter to Soviet Embassy: XVI, 33; III, 13; WR, 309–311.

270. Oswald's knowledge of Azcue's replacement: Newman, 495; WR, 310; XXV, 817 (October 15 letter from Cuba regarding Oswald's visa, addressed to Alfredo Mirabal, consul of Cuba).
Marina unaware of new visa request: McMillan, 506.

270.

Note 2: In an earlier, handwritten draft Oswald had written, "The agent also 'suggested' that my wife could 'remain in the U.S. under FBI protection,' that is, she could refuse to return to the——" The last five words were crossed out and the sentence completed with "defect from the Soviet Union." Oswald clearly felt that Hosty's routine assurances to Marina somehow threatened his plans to send her back to Russia. Ruth discovered this draft lying on her desk on November 9 (III, 13–18, 51–52; WR, 309). Puzzled and disturbed by its contents, she made a copy, intending to show it to Hosty if he returned.

271. Trip to shopping center, Oswald's mood: III, 14; IX, 391, 394.
Oswald asked not to return on weekend, Learner's permit application: I, 63; II, 515–517.

272. Marina's attempt to call Oswald: III, 43–44.

272–273. November 18 argument over alias: I, 46; III, 45; McMillan, 516–517.

273–274. President's Miami speech: Newman, 509; Summers, 425, 423.

274. Newspapers' coverage of speech and motorcade route: XXVI, 69; Newman, 511.

274–275. Marina on Oswald's failure to call: III, 45–46.

275. Hunting rifle in Truly's office: McMillan, 519; VII, 381–382, 387–388.
Conversation with Frazier: II, 222.
Ruth on Oswald's arrival: III, 46–48.

276. Oswald's activities at Ruth's house: McMillan, 521, 523–525.

276–276A. President Kennedy in Fort Worth: Bishop, 25, 28, 61; Manchester, 114, 121, 137; VII, 455.

276B. Oswald on his way to shoot Walker?: Newman, 47–49.

276B.

Note 3: There are other theories about where Oswald was headed. Commission lawyer David Belin believes that he was en route to a street at which he could have caught a bus to Mexico (Belin, 425–428). Congressman Harold Sawyer of the Assassinations Committee believes that Oswald was on his way to the home of an individual identified by the Dallas press as a Communist party defector who had helped the FBI destroy the Party in Texas. The news story had appeared on the same page as articles about John Abt defending Communists in New York and the president's proposed visit to Dallas. The informant's home was two blocks farther up the street in the direction Oswald was walking when Tippit stopped him (HACR, 673–674).

276B. Oswald seen by shoe store manager: VII, 3–4.

CHAPTER 15. THE ARREST

277. Seth Kantor's reaction: XX, 410.
AM/LASH meeting with case officer: Book V, 19–20.

277–78. Castro's statements: Daniel, "When Castro Heard the News."

278. Michael Paine's reactions: McMillan, 540–541.
Oswald's arrest: VII, 40, 52, 73; VII 54 (crowd); VII 41, 59 (in police car); Belin, 27.

279. Fritz on Oswald's answers: IV, 239.
Other questioners' impressions: XXIV, 839, 844; VII, 135.
Oswald discusses political beliefs: WR, 610; IV, 224.
Oswald apprised of rights, declines lawyer: IV, 216.
FBI agents join questioning: IV, 209, 210.
Oswald meets Hosty: IV, 210, 466–467.

279–80. Hosty realizes note was from Oswald: HACR, 245.

280. Oswald's statements on rifle, whereabouts, and pistol: WR, 619; XI, 613; WR, 181.
Denial he was in Mexico City: IV, 210.
Witnesses identify Oswald: WR, 166.
Concealment of Neely Street address: WR, 617.

281. Oswald at press conference: IV, 166; Newman, 547. Ruby's personality and arrest record: XXIII, 21, 22, 172, 356, 7, 125; WR, 796, 800. Ruby's large sums of money and pistol: WR, 797, 805.

281–282. Ruby's reaction to assassination: WR, 335, 337–338.

282. Oswald's assertions, Jarman's location: WR, 182, 635, 250.
Jarman, Norman, and Williams on shooting: III, 204–207, 191–192, 175–176.

282A. Secret Service report: WR, 635; Oswald asks for Abt: XX, 441; IV, 215; VII, 314.

282–83. Kantor and Oswald's remarks: XX, 416.

308F. Blakey's suspicion Castro's denial untrue: Ibid., 146, 147–148.

CHAPTER 17. CONSPIRACY THINKING: *BEST EVIDENCE* AND OTHER THEORIES

309–310. TV documentary: "J. Edgar Hoover," ABC News Closeup, June 3, 1982.

310. Origin of Lifton's theory: Lifton, 25–27.

311. Witnesses on casket and sheet: Ibid., 775, 777, 786–787.

311. Body bag, plain casket: Ibid., 746–747, 785, 794.
Time of arrival: Ibid., 516, 604, 605, 728.

312. "Had this been an ordinary case": Ibid., 775.
Elizabeth Loftus on memory: Rodgers, "The Malleable Memory of Eyewitnesses," 32, 34.
Lady Bird Johnson's flight of stairs: Manchester, 236.

312–13. O'Connor and body bag: Lifton, 747.
Two other witnesses: Ibid., 794, 785.
Lifton on sutured throat wound: Ibid., 755.
Chief of surgery's recollection: Ibid., 804, 810.

314. On vertical thinking: de Bono, 7, 88.

314–315. Other theories on backward movement: Kurtz, 102–103.

315. Eddowes and assistants: Eddowes, x.

316. Varying heights: Ibid., 211, 213, 214.

316. Pic on Oswald's appearance: Ibid., 36–37.

316–317. "Switching" of fingerprints: Ibid., 139.

317A–B. *Betrayal* scenario: Morrow, 108, 124–127, 176–177, 200–233 *passim.*

318A. Morrow on motivations: Morrow, 127.

318B. Evidence Oswald at Cuban Embassy, November 9 letter: Summers, 372, 374–376, 398; WR, 304–305, 309–310.

319. National Research Council on shots: *Science,* October 8, 1982, 127–133.

319–319A. Assassinations Committee on possible conspirators: HACR, 108–109, 109 n. 4.

319A–320. Committee conclusions on Oswald's guilt: Ibid., 40, 46–47, 53–54, 57–59.

320. "Bewilderingly well framed": Summers, 86.

320–321. Ferrie's background: HACH, X, 106–111, 127.

321–322. Marina on Oswald's saving money: McMillan, 459.

322. Oswald in Clinton?: HACR, 142; HACH, IV, 485; Summers, 334–335.

No training as electrician, HACH, XII, 400.

323. Clinton incident seen as intelligence scheme: Summers, 336–337.

325. *Note 1:* During his trial Ruby passed a note to his attorney, Joseph Tonahill, concerning his first lawyer, Tom Howard:

> Joe, you should know this. Tom Howard told me to say that I shot Oswald so that Caroline and Mrs. Kennedy wouldn't have to come to Dallas to testify. OK? [HACR, 193]

This would seem to prove that Ruby's professed motive was a fabrication. But that isn't so—Ruby gave this reason for his action in a statement to a Secret Service agent, Forrest Sorrels, shortly after his arrest, *before* he talked to Howard (XIX, 440; Blakey and Billings, 321, 324). What Ruby may have meant was that Howard had advised him to stick to that particular part of his statement and omit the other reasons he had mentioned.

325. Ruby's reactions: WR, 338, 344, 349.

325–326. Opinion poll: Henderson and Summerlin, 202–205, 207, 216–217.

327. Ruby's background: WR, 779–806 *passim.*

327–329. Ruby's activities November 22–24: WR, 334–352; Kantor, 84–86, 105, 110; Henderson and Summerlin, 44.

328. Weissman a conservative: WR, 295.

329–329A. Ruby's expectations after arrest: Kantor, 157, 224.

330–333. Ruby's testimony: V, 181–212 *passim.*

333. Ruby's statements on conspiracy, tape recording, Dann's remark: Meagher, 453, 452.

CHAPTER 18. OSWALD'S GAME

335. Oswald's "love of fantasy," radio program: Oswald, 46–47.

339. *Note 1:* Oswald's history resembles that of another American assassin, McKinley's assailant, Leon Czolgosz. A self-taught radical with few personal relationships, Czolgosz tried unsuccessfully to join anarchist groups in Cleveland and Chicago. The anarchists were put off by his eagerness and suspected him of being a police agent. After being rejected by these groups, he shot McKinley. Before his execution Czolgosz said, "I killed the President because he was the enemy of the good working people."