about two blocks apart. It therefore seems unlikely that if Oswald had
been at the Cuban Embassy he would have telephoned the Russian Embassy
rather than walked over there, especially since by this time he was familiar
with the personnel. However, it is also possible that he believed that
he could get through to speak to the Consul if he telephoned, whereas if
he showed up in person he might be rebuffed by the receptionist or the guard
who by that time may have been able to recognize him and under orders to
keep him out.

The CIA and FBI representatives with whom we have discussed this
investigation point out that although they by no means rule out the accuracy
of Gutierrez’ observations for this reason alone, it is unlikely that money
would be passed for a sinister purpose in such an open manner as was al-
legedly observed by Gutierrez. First, it is unlikely that an agent would
be paid off right at the embassy or the consulate. Second, even if he
were, the payoff would more probably be carried out in the privacy of a
room. Nevertheless, investigation is continuing.

Unfortunately, Gutierrez’ description of the automobile allegedly
driven by the Cuban, a light tan Renault, happens to be a very popular
make and color in Mexico City.

The present owner cannot be ascertained, however, because the registration
of the automobile (as is common in Mexico) has been maintained under the
name of the original owner, who owned it several years ago, in order to
avoid the payment of transfer taxes. Efforts to trace the automobile from
owner to owner, beginning with the first, have been unsuccessful.

2. Statement of Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte.

On November 26, 1963, Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte, a 23-year-old Nicaraguan secret agent, at the time seeking to penetrate the Castro forces in Cuba by going to Cuba from Mexico to receive guerrilla training on the island, came to the American Embassy in Mexico City and declared that he had witnessed Lee Harvey Oswald receiving a payoff to kill the President in the Cuban Embassy on September 18. Alvarado said that Oswald was given $6,500, $5,000 as compensation and $1,500 for expenses. Alvarado recited that at noon on the 18th of September he went to the Cuban Consulate to turn some passport photographs over to the Consul, Eusebio Ascue, to be used in the fabrication of false travel documents so that he could leave Mexico for Cuba. He sat in the waiting room and saw a group of approximately eight persons enter the Consulate and go into Ascue's office and noticed that someone other than Ascue was sitting at Ascue's desk. He then asked a Cuban Consulate employee where the bathroom was, was told, and proceeded out of the waiting room in the given direction. While standing by the bathroom door, he said, he saw a group of three persons conversing in a patio a few feet away. One was a tall, thin Negro with reddish hair.
obviously dyed who spoke rapidly, with a Cuban accent, and who spoke some English. The second person was a Canadian with blonde hair, and the third person was Lee Harvey Oswald. Alvarado said that he did not know Oswald at the time, but recognized him after the assassination from photographs in Mexico City newspapers. Oswald was supposed to have been wearing a black sport coat, a buttoned-up shirt with collar tabs but no necktie, and clear eyeglasses. A tall Cuban joined the group momentarily and passed some currency to the negro. The negro then allegedly said to Oswald in English, "I want to kill the man." Oswald replied, "You're not man enough, I can do it." The negro then said in Spanish, "I can't go with you, I have a lot to do." Oswald replied, "People are waiting for me back there." The negro then gave Oswald $6,500 in large-denomination American bills, saying, "This isn't much." He also supposedly gave him about 200 Mexican pesos. Alvarado also filled in other details which are not material here.

Alvarado said that towards the end of September he telephoned the American Embassy in Mexico City several times in an attempt to report his belief that someone important in the United States was to be killed. He used a fictitious name to protect his identity, and told the person who answered the telephone that he did not want a visa but that he wished to speak to "a person of confidence" about "a political matter." He said he finally got through to a man who said he would call him back, and he, therefore, left his telephone number. The man never called back. Alvarado allegedly repeatedly called the Embassy and was finally told to quit wasting its time. Alvarado said that the next time he talked to the Embassy was after the assassination, when he recognized Oswald's picture in a newspaper.
The comment made on Alvarado by the CIA field man on November 26 was: "He is young, quiet, very serious person, who speaks with conviction, knows enough English to understand conversation."

Alvarado was, of course, immediately subjected to intensive interrogation and investigation.

Apparently he was indeed on his way to Cuba and had had dealings with the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in connection with preparation of false travel documents. Whether he was doing this as a soldier of fortune, out of conviction for the Castrolite cause or to place himself in a position where he would later be able to command a higher price from the Nicaraguan and other anti-Communist intelligence agencies for his information, we do not know.

Both the Mexican and American authorities continued to interrogate and cross-check Alvarado’s story.

He said that he had not seen Oswald at all, and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to telephone the American Embassy.
about the matter and that his first contact was in person on November 26 when, as we now know, he spoke to an Embassy security officer. He still maintained that he did in fact repeatedly visit the Cuban Embassy, however, as related above. The Mexican authorities stated that they were inclined to believe the last part of the story. Alvarado said that the motive in telling the fabrication was to help get himself admitted to the United States so that he could there participate in action against Fidel Castro. He said he hated Castro and hoped that the story he made up would be believed and would cause the United States to "take action" against Castro. In the meantime, American intelligence agencies in Mexico had checked back with Washington and learned that on the 17th and 19th of September information we had indicated that Oswald was in New Orleans. Although still theoretically possible, this of course made it unlikely that he was in Mexico City on the 18th.

Still later, American authorities interrogated Alvarado. Alvarado at first claimed that he had been pressured into retracting his statement by the Mexican police and that the retraction, rather than his statement, was false. He said that he did, in fact, see the things he claimed to have seen. American interrogation of him continued, and part of it was carried on in connection with a polygraph machine. When told that the polygraph indicated that he was probably lying, Alvarado said words to the effect, "I know such machines are accurate, and, therefore, I suppose I must be mistaken." He then added that he was uncertain as to the date when he saw someone "who looked like Oswald" at the Cuban Embassy, and perhaps
it was on a Tuesday, September 17, rather than September 18. (Alvarado
did not know it at the time, but the 17th would make it even more
unlikely than the 18th. On September 17 Oswald appeared at the
Louisiana State Unemployment Commission in New Orleans and also
cashed a check from the Texas Employment Commission at the Winn-
Dixie Store Number 1125 in New Orleans.) On the basis of the poly-
graph results and the qualified retractions made by Alvarado when
he saw the results, and on the basis of discrepancies which appeared
in his story,

[No further investigation of the Alvarado incident was carried on subsequent to the foregoing.]
IV. Anti-Castro Cuban Involvement.

In early August 1963, while he was still living in New Orleans, Oswald approached Mr. Carlos Bringuier, a man who is active in anti-Castro activities in that city and who was a lawyer in Cuba prior to Castro's overthrow of the Batista regime, and volunteered his services in the training of anti-Castro guerrillas. Oswald claimed that he had received guerrilla-type training in the Marine Corps and offered to pass on his expertise to Bringuier's group. Bringuier was of course interested in the offer and accepted Oswald's display of interest in a friendly manner. However, very shortly thereafter a member of Bringuier's organization observed Oswald passing out Fair Play For Cuba Committee literature, told Bringuier, and as a result there was a minor riot on the streets of New Orleans. The altercation led to the arrest of Oswald, Bringuier and Bringuier's friend, and Oswald was ultimately convicted and fined $10.00. Soon thereafter, in the middle of August, Bringuier sent one of his men to Oswald's home, the address of which he had observed on some of the Fair Play literature, under orders to pose as a pro-Castro Cuban interested in working for Oswald. Oswald received Bringuier's plant courteously and discussed Cuban politics with him in the evening on his porch, but Marina has testified that after the conversation Oswald told her that he strongly suspected that the man who had come was an anti-Castro Cuban pretending that he was pro-Castro. Consequently, both Bringuier and Oswald failed in their attempts to infiltrate the other's organization.

Later, the two men were to meet and debate each other on Radio Station WDSU in New Orleans. Bringuier has also testified to the Commission
that a bartender acquaintance of his observed Oswald in the "Havana Bar" in New Orleans in the company of a Mexican for whom the FBI was allegedly searching because of his communist activities and that the FBI was duly informed of these facts. No trace of this information is in the FBI files, however.

Mrs. Silvia Odio of Dallas, Texas, a 26-year old refugee from the Castro regime whose parents are still in a Cuban prison on the orders of Fidel Castro told a representative of the FBI shortly after the assassination that in late September or early October 1963 two anti-Castro Cuban leaders from cut of town came to her home in the company of a third man to ask her help in raising funds for their cause. She turned down their request, as she has turned down all similar requests, because she feared retaliation by Castro against her parents. Mrs. Odio has furnished the following facts about the two Cuban leaders:

One of them referred to himself as "Leopoldo," the other was probably "Rogelio Cisneros," and both of them were from Puerto Rico or Miami. She also gave the FBI their physical descriptions. The third man accompanying them, who said very little, she first told the FBI was introduced to her as "Leon Oswald." Now she is saying it was simply "Leon." When Mrs. Odio first spoke to representatives of the FBI, the physical description she gave of "Leon Oswald" roughly fitted Lee Harvey Oswald. She is now reported to be saying the "Leon Oswald" had a mustache or at least was unshave, and that he had a dark, Cuban-type complexion. According to her first story, "Leopoldo" called her back a few days later to say that "they" (presumably he and the other Cuban leader) had checked back on "Leon Oswald" in New Orleans and were told that he was "loco,"
and they were therefore dropping him. "Leopoldo" is also reported to have said "Leon" would do anything, saying that Leon had "laughed at" the Cubans, claiming they had "no guts." "It would be easy to kill Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs," he allegedly told Leopoldo.

Mrs. Odio is reported to have suffered a severe psychological reaction at her place of employment when she first saw Lee Harvey Oswald's picture on television after the assassination, presumably because she was struck by the fear that her own group was somehow involved in the killing of the President.

On November 1, 1963 Lee Harvey Oswald mailed a letter to the Communist Party in New York City. Among other things he mentioned that he had attended a meeting in Dallas on October 23, 1963 of a group headed by General Walker; investigation has led to the conclusion that this must have been an anti-Castro meeting.

With the sole exception of Mrs. Odio — and even she is now apparently changing her story — every member of the Dallas anti-Castro Cuban community who has been questioned on Lee Harvey Oswald denies ever having observed him or having had any contacts with him whatever prior to the assassination. Nor has any member of that community come forward to volunteer any information as to contacts with Oswald. However, Mrs. Odio has been checked out thoroughly through her psychiatrist and friends, and, with one exception — a layman who speculates that she may have subconscious tendencies to over-dramatize or exaggerate — the evidence is unanimously favorable, both as to her character and reliability and as to her intelligence.
Moreover, some of the details of Mrs. Odio's story, as it was first related to the FBI after the assassination -- unfortunately, in a rather brief interview -- check with what we now know about Oswald. For example: he was described as quiet and reticent, an impression Oswald usually gave; "Leopoldo" later told Mrs. Odio they had checked back on him in New Orleans, which is where Oswald in fact had come from; Leopoldo said he was told by New Orleans that "Leon" was "Loco," a term Carlos耳ringuier may very well have used to describe him; and most importantly, of course, the name "Leon Oswald" is so close to "Lee Oswald" as to raise the strongest suspicions. Even if it was only "Leon," there is a similarity. We contemplate taking Mrs. Odio's deposition at the earliest opportunity, in an effort to follow this lead.

The evidence here could lead to an anti Castro Cuban involvement in the assassination on some sort of basis as this: Oswald could have become known to the Cubans as being strongly pro-Castro. He made no secret of his sympathies, and so the anti Castro Cubans must have realized that the law-enforcement authorities were also aware of Oswald's feelings and that therefore, if he got into trouble, the public would also also learn of them. The anti-Cuban group may even have believed the fiction
Oswald tried to create that he had organized some sort of large active Fair Play For Cuba group in New Orleans. Second, someone in the anti-Castro organization might have been keen enough to sense that Oswald had a penchant for violence that might easily be aroused. This was evident, for example, when he laughed at the Cubans and told them it would be easy to kill Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs. On these facts, it is possible that some sort of deception was used to encourage Oswald to kill the President when he came to Dallas. Perhaps "double agents" were even used to persuade Oswald that pro-Castro Cubans would help in the assassination or in the get-away afterwards. The motive on this would of course be the expectation that after the President was killed Oswald would be caught or at least his identity ascertained, the law-enforcement authorities and the public would then blame the assassination on the Castro government, and the call for its forceful overthrow would be irresistible. A "second Bay of Pigs Invasion" would begin, this time, hopefully, to end successfully.

The foregoing is probably only a wild speculation, but the facts that we already know are certainly sufficient to warrant additional investigation.
APPENDIX

TO

OSWALD'S FOREIGN ACTIVITIES:

Summary of Evidence Which Might be Said to Show That
There was Foreign Involvement in the Assassination of
President Kennedy
MEMORANDUM BY JOHN A. McVICKAR

dated April 7, 1964
April 24, 1964

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Question No. 5 in Attachment A to your letter of March 23, 1964 requested a memorandum from Mr. John A. McVickar describing to the best of his recollection the specific facts which form the basis for his suspicions that Lee Harvey Oswald had been tutored in connection with his apparent attempts to renounce his American citizenship at the American Embassy in Moscow. In accordance with this request Mr. McVickar prepared the attached memorandum:

As you will see, Mr. McVickar states in paragraph 2 of his memorandum that it would have been significant if Oswald had been issued a "regular visa" and not a "tourist visa." Mr. McVickar did not, however, remember which type of visa Oswald had obtained. In fact, our files indicate that he applied for, and presumably received, a "tourist visa" in Helsinki. It should be noted, however, that Oswald stated that he applied for this visa on October 14, 1961, and was in Moscow on October 16, 1961. It appears, therefore, that he received the visa within a day or two. Usually it takes at least a week for Soviet authorities to process tourist applications, and so the speed with which Oswald received his tourist visa was unusual.

Mr. McVickar also states in paragraph 4 of his memorandum that "Oswald was accepted and sent to Minsk only about seven days (as I recall) after his arrival in Moscow." In fact, our files indicate that he was in Moscow for approximately six weeks prior to his departure for Minsk.

Mr. J. Lee Rankin, Esq.,
General Counsel,
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy,
200 Maryland Avenue, N.E.,
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Richard E. Snyder, mentioned in Mr. McVickar's memorandum, also made a statement by telegram dated November 27, 1963, concerning his contacts with Oswald, and a copy of this telegram was furnished to the Commission.

Sincerely,

Abram Chayes

Attachment:

Memorandum of 4/7/64 from Mr. John A. McVickar.
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

April 7, 1964

TO: Mr. Thomas Earlich, Special Assistant to the
   Legal Adviser, Department of State.

FROM: John A. McVicker, Principal Officer, American Consulate,
      Cochabamba, Bolivia.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

This is in response to the request contained in your letter of
March 27, 1964, to further develop the suggestion contained in my
memorandum of November 27, 1963, that there was a possibility that
(in coming to the Soviet Union and attempting to renounce his citi-
zenship) Oswald was "following a pattern of behavior in which he had been
studied by person or persons unknown." Although I now regret that I
made no notes on this even then unusual case, the following points
seem to me to lend weight to my suggestion, especially considering
the youth and relative inexperience of the subject:

(1) As I recall it, Oswald stated that he had come almost directly
to the Soviet Union after being discharged from the Marine Corps in
New Orleans and that he took a ship from New Orleans to Helsinki. Since
he arrived in Moscow in mid-October, 1959 and was discharged from the
Marines in September, 1959 (as I recall), he would have to have made a
direct and competently arranged trip. He would have had to have known
the not too obvious fact that Helsinki is a usual and relatively uncompli-
cated point of entry to the Soviet Union (one that the Soviets might
well choose for example if arranging the passage themselves).

(2) Oswald obtained a Soviet visa and apparently very promptly.
This point may be important; it depends on what kind of a Soviet visa
he had, and I do not know. If he had obtained a "tourist visa," he could
have probably gotten it rather easily through a travel agent, but he
would have had to either buy a $30.00 per day "individual tour" or he
would have had to join a group. I do not think or recall that he did
either. If he had obtained any other sort of Soviet visa, probably a
"regular visa," he would have had to obtain it from either the Soviet
Embassy in Washington (presumably by mail from New Orleans) or from
the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. In my experience, Soviet "regular visas"
(i.e., those other than issued to tourists, or to officials and
diplomats) were hard to come by. Such "regular visas" were ordinarily
issued only after checking with Moscow, and after some investigation of
the reasons given for the visit by the applicant, usually a process of months duration. A Soviet "regular visa" issued to a person (in Washington or in Helsinki) on short notice would only be to a person already known to the Soviet authorities.

I repeat, I do not recall what sort of a visa Oswald had, but I believe that it would be significant if it indeed was a "regular visa" and not a "tourist visa." If it is still available, an examination of his passport could provide the answer. Or perhaps, Consul Richard E. Snyder, who handled the case at the time of Oswald's arrival, might remember or might have noted it in the record.

(3) Oswald evidently knew something of the procedure for renunciation of citizenship when he came into the office. This seemed a bit unusual, since it was so soon after his first departure from the United States on his first trip abroad traveling as a private citizen. (He had apparently been abroad in the Marines, but would be unlikely to have gained much experience in travel and citizenship documentation in that status.) I do not recall the way that he framed his demand for renunciation, except that it was truculent and insulting, but it seemed to me that Oswald understood that he had a legal right to renounce in the consular office and was rather insistent upon doing it.

(4) Oswald's application to remain in the Soviet Union made in Moscow was, again in my experience, relatively quickly accepted by the Soviet authorities. For example, in other "defector" cases of which I had some personal knowledge, the Soviet authorities were rather cautious about definitely permitting persons to remain permanently before they had investigated and interviewed them thoroughly. Not that the authorities were reluctant to take them in if they thought they might be useful, or even if not too useful, but they tended to be bureaucratic and cautious. Oswald was accepted and sent to Minsk only about seven days (as I recall) after his arrival in Moscow. This seems short to me, if his application in Moscow was indeed the first time his case came to the attention of the Soviet authorities concerned with these matters; but it does not seem too short, if they had known about him months before. However, even if they had already had a file on him, he would still probably have had to come to Moscow for interviewing and final approval at headquarters.

(5) At the time, Oswald seemed surprisingly confident, competent and determined about what he was doing, considering his age and experience.

(6) Oswald's expressed willingness to tell the Soviets what classified information he may have learned in the Marines doesn't necessarily argue the point that he had advance help, since he could have easily thought it up himself. The statement seems irrelevant except perhaps as a means of shocking the consular officer into prompt action.
(7) I am afraid that I remember only very little of the actual statements in Communist terms which Oswald made to justify his desire to renounce his citizenship. I recall he said that he wanted to renounce "because he was a Marxist". I think he said bitterly that he had learned what the "class struggle" meant during his difficult youth in the U.S., and that he had learned about "capitalist imperialism" while overseas in the Marines (in Okinawa, I think). As I said in my previous memorandum, it seemed to me then that he was using words that he did not fully understand, but this does not necessarily mean that he was taught to say them...he might have read some books himself.

(8) A last point not related to my contact with Oswald in 1959: Oswald's reported statement that he had been permitted to belong to a rifle club and practice target shooting while in Minsk seems odd to me. My impression was that in the Soviet Union such a privilege would not have been usual. But this is mere speculation.

Finally, however, I think I should raise a question which may tend to offset some of the above points: If we suppose the Soviets might have arranged his trip to Russia, why would they have permitted Oswald to come to the American Embassy to renounce his citizenship? I see no answer to that, except that perhaps he was still being treated in a very tentative way and therefore being allowed to behave in a more or less "normal" fashion vis-a-vis the U.S. Government. The principal effect of renunciation would have been to make his legal return to the U.S. more difficult and it is not known to be a requirement for becoming a Communist or residing in the USSR.

I hope that the above comments are of some assistance. It seems to me that the only concrete point is the Soviet visa: its type, and its date and place of issuance.

cc: Mr. Robert I Owen, EUR/SOV, Dept of State
OPINION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IN REGARD TO
CIRCUMSTANCES OF OSWALD'S ACCEPTANCE
BY
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT : Reply to Questions Contained in Your Memorandum dated 12 March 1964

Attached herewith is the information which you requested in your memorandum dated 12 March 1964 and entitled "Certain Questions Posed by the State Department Files."

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment: As stated above

DECLASSIFIED (g)  
EO 11652, Sec. 3(b)

4/4/76
Such measures are taken, according to Soviet explanation, to protect the Embassy from intrusion by "hooligans" and other undesirable elements. OSWALD might well have been stopped by the militia at the gate, but since he carried a stateless passport and was probably identifiable as an American by name, accent and possibly clothing, would probably not have been prevented from entering. Marina also would probably not have been hindered, since she was the wife of a foreigner and had legitimate business in the Embassy.

4. OSWALD said that he asked for Soviet citizenship on 16 October 1959. According to his diary, he received word a month later that he could stay in the USSR pending disposition of his request, but it was another month and a half before he was given his stateless passport.

5. When compared to five other defector cases, this procedure seems unexceptional. Two defectors from US Army intelligence units in West Germany appear to have been given citizenship immediately, but both had prior KGB connections and fled as a result of Army security checks. Of the other three cases, one was accepted after not more than five weeks and given a stateless passport apparently at about the same time. The second was immediately given permission to stay for a while, and his subsequent request for citizenship was granted three months later. The third was allowed to stay after he made his citizenship request, but almost two months passed before he was told that he had been accepted. Although the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon after told the US Embassy that he was a Soviet citizen, he did not receive his document until five or six months after initial application. We know of only one case in which an American asked for Soviet citizenship but did not take up residence in the USSR. In that instance, the American changed his mind and voluntarily returned to the United States less than three weeks after he had requested Soviet citizenship.

6. So far as we are able to determine, there is no Soviet law which would prevent a Soviet citizen married to a foreign national from accompanying his or her spouse from the USSR. This situation is also believed to have existed at the time of the OSWALD's departure from the Soviet Union in 1962. In practice, however, permission for a Soviet wife / to accompany her.
TRANSLATION OF NOTE LEFT BY LEE HARVEY OSWALD
FOR HIS WIFE, MARINA,
AT TIME OF GENERAL EDWIN A. WALKER'S SHOOTING
1. This is the key to the mail box which is located in the main post office in the city on Ervay Street. This is the same street where the drug store, in which you always waited is located. You will find the mail box in the post office which is located 4 blocks from the drug store on that street. I paid for the box last month so don't worry about it.

2. Send the information as to what has happened to me to the Embassy and include newspaper clippings (should there be anything about me in the newspapers). I believe that the Embassy will come quickly to your assistance on learning everything.

3. I paid the house rent on the 2nd so don't worry about it.

4. Recently I also paid for water and gas.

5. The money from work will possibly be coming. The money will be sent to our post office box. Go to the bank and cash the check.

6. You can either throw out or give my clothing etc. away. Do not keep these. However, I prefer that you hold on to my personal papers (military, civil etc.).

7. Certain of my documents are in the small blue valise.

8. The address book can be found on my table in the study should you need same.

9. We have friends here. The Red Cross also will help you. (Red Cross in English)

10. I left you as much money as I could, $60.00 on the second of the month. You and the baby (apparently) can live for another 2 months using $10.00 per week.

11. If I am alive and taken prisoner, the city jail is located at the end of the bridge through which we always passed on going to the city (right in the beginning of the city after crossing the bridge).
1. Эта Невская. Розовый Аллыкы.

Но, в этом мире, находитесь в мире.

2. Носилки располагаются у дороги.

И могут быть убийцы и мои.

3. Я плачу за Аллыкы, который не дает нам.

Но мы не можем быть вместе.

4. За воду у меня нельзя.

5. Возможно, это делу с работником.

Она разоблачает самым деликатным образом.
7. Кому приданная документация находящаяся в сумках маленьким чемоданчик.
8. Адрессовать КИТЦУ на мою
имя Казири Тек.
9. Тут есть у нее другие
у которой Крест может быть 24-
номочит. (Red Cross)
10. Я отнесла Tesco в НХУ как 19-
чело в 15. в Абашев дом или 4-
Мен м.т. 10, Нецени, еще 2-
честь. 
11. Мне эта машина 3/4 везде.
не увидел, дорога Гопру.
назовемся на комнату то в мост,
через комнату и увидел 35.
мост 4. п. д. 2 моста 5.
через 2 через мост,
LETTER FROM CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
TO
SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK
Dated March 11, 1964

Requesting that the Soviet Government furnish the Commission with certain Documents
The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Secretary Rusk:

As you know, the Commission of which I am Chairman has been charged by the President with investigating all aspects of the assassination of President Kennedy with a view that a full report should be made to the American people. In particular, we have been engaged in collecting all possible information on the life and background of Lee Harvey Oswald, who was under arrest in Dallas on charges of murdering the President when he, in turn, was killed.

The Commission has already heard evidence given by Mrs. Marina Oswald, his wife, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald, his mother, and Mr. Robert Oswald, his brother. We have also received statements and documents pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald from other sources, including the consular files of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, which Ambassador Barykin was available to the Department of State. This consular file relating chiefly to correspondence between the Consular Section of the Soviet Embassy and Mr. and Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald in the period 1958-63.

While the Commission has found useful the material presented in the consular file by the Soviet Embassy covering the years 1952-63 after Lee Harvey Oswald returned from the Soviet Union with his Soviet-born wife, Marina, and their baby girl, it lacks material relating to the years 1959-62 during which Lee Harvey Oswald was in the Soviet Union. It would be especially valuable to the work of the Commission and for the presentation to the American people of a full report on the life and character of Lee Harvey Oswald.
of Lee Harvey Oswald if the Soviet authorities could furnish the United States Government with further details of his activities during his residence in the Soviet Union, including copies of any official records which the Soviet authorities may find it possible to supply.

The Commission is particularly interested in records related to the following aspects of Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union:

1. Copies of any records of medical and psychological examinations and treatment of Lee Harvey Oswald, especially those relating to treatment in October of 1959 when, according to Lee Harvey Oswald's diary, he was found unconscious in his hotel room by Tutsivist Guide Fiaa Shirokova after an attempted suicide and removed to a hospital.

2. Copies of any records of medical and psychological examinations and treatment of Marina Oswald as an adult, especially those relating to any treatment around October of 1961 when, according to Lee Harvey Oswald's diary, she was treated for nervous exhaustion.

3. Copies of any records showing drunkenness, violence, disorderly conduct or other abnormal behavior on the part of Lee Harvey Oswald, whether or not criminal.

4. Copies of correspondence between Lee Harvey Oswald and Soviet authorities with regard to his request to reside in the Soviet Union and obtain Soviet citizenship.

5. Copies of correspondence between Lee Harvey Oswald or Marina Oswald and Soviet authorities with regard to their efforts to leave the Soviet Union.

6. Copies of records showing Lee Harvey Oswald's places of residence and employment in the Soviet Union.
(7) Copies of any statements, before or since the assassination of President Kennedy, volunteered by Soviet citizens who knew Lee Harvey Oswald during his residence in the Soviet Union which relate to the above questions or might otherwise be of interest to the Commission.

The Commission has asked me to invite you in the above sense and, if you concur, to request the Soviet Government for any assistance it may find it possible to give in shedding further light on Lee Harvey Oswald.

Sincerely,

Earl Warren
Chairman
STATEMENT BY YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
HONORABLE J. LEE RANKIN
GENERAL COUNSEL
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
200 MARYLAND AVENUE, N. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 6, 1964

BY COURIER SERVICE

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Reference is made to my letter dated February 26, 1964, which enclosed a memorandum of the same date containing information furnished by the recent Soviet defector, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko.

Enclosed is one copy of a memorandum dated March 4, 1964, which contains the results of a detailed interview with Nosenko on March 3, 1964, concerning Lee Harvey Oswald. Nosenko has read a copy of the enclosed memorandum, initialed each page, and has stated he has no additional information concerning Oswald.

Nosenko advised this Bureau that under no circumstances does he desire any publicity given to this information. He also advised that he is willing to testify before the President's Commission provided no publicity is given to his appearance before the Commission or to the information which he might furnish.

In the event you desire to have Nosenko appear before the Commission, it is suggested that you make arrangements with the Central Intelligence Agency, which Agency has custody of Nosenko.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure
LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CUBA

On March 3, 1964, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko advised that at the time of Oswald's arrival in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the Fall of 1959, he (Nosenko) held the position of Deputy Chief, First Section, Seventh Department, Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), KGB (Committee for State Security). This particular Section, of which he was then Deputy Chief, handled the KGB investigations of tourists from the United States and British Commonwealth countries.

The First Section, at that time, and at present, contains fifteen or sixteen officers, holding ranks of Junior Case Officers, Case Officers and Senior Case Officers. At the time of President John F. Kennedy's assassination, Nosenko stated he then held the position of Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, (Tourist Department), Second Chief Directorate, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. The Seventh Department, consisting of approximately ninety Case Officers, is responsible for KGB investigations of tourists from all non-communist countries.

Prior to Oswald's arrival in the USSR he was completely unknown to the KGB, according to Nosenko. In this connection he pointed out that immediately upon issuance of a visa to a person to visit the USSR, the Seventh Department (Tourist), Second Chief Directorate, KGB, is notified. At that time a preliminary evaluation is made of the individual and a determination made as to what action, if any, should be taken by the Tourist Department. Oswald's background was not of sufficient importance for the Tourist Department to have any advance interest in him and Nosenko stated that his first knowledge of the existence of Oswald arose in about October, 1959, when Kim Georgievich Krupnov, a Case Officer in his section, reported to him information which Krupnov had received from an Intourist interpreter. It was to the effect that Oswald, an American citizen who had
entered the USSR on a temporary visa, desired to remain permanently in the USSR and to become a Soviet citizen. Krupnov at this time displayed to Nosenko a memorandum prepared by Krupnov containing information which had been received by Krupnov from KGB informants at the Hotel Berlin (which administratively is part of the Hotel Metropole) concerning Oswald's behavior patterns, an Intourist itinerary for Oswald, and a two-page report prepared by the Intourist interpreter (a KGB informant) concerning his conversations with Oswald and his impressions and evaluations of Oswald. At that time a file was opened in Nosenko's section incorporating all of the information which Krupnov had collected.

Nosenko and Krupnov, on basis of this information, concluded that Oswald was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared somewhat abnormal. Nosenko could not specifically state what factors caused him to evaluate Oswald as being abnormal, but on basis of all information available to him at the time there was no doubt in his mind that Oswald was not "fully normal." At that time the KGB did not know of Oswald's prior military service and Nosenko stated that had such information been available to him, it would have been of no particular interest or significance to the KGB.

On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of Oswald he instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald, through the Intourist interpreter, that Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the USSR permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa and thereafter seek re-entry as a permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States. Nosenko's instructions were carried out and on the same date or the following day he learned that Oswald failed to appear for a scheduled tour arranged by his Intourist guide. This prompted Intourist to initiate efforts to locate him and after a couple of hours, inquiry at the Berlin Hotel established that Oswald's room key was missing, indicating that he was apparently in his room. Hotel employees then determined that Oswald's room was secured from the inside and when he failed to respond to their request for him to open the door, they forced it open. Oswald was found
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bleeding severely from self-inflicted wounds and was immediately taken by an ambulance to a hospital, believed by Nosenko to be the Botkinskaya Hospital in Moscow. Nosenko did not know specifically whether Oswald was bleeding from wounds in his left or right wrist or whether from both wrists and he did not know what instrument was used to cause the wound or wounds. The information regarding Oswald's wounds was received by Nosenko from Krupnov who in turn received it from Intourist sources. Nosenko did not know how long Oswald remained in the hospital but stated it was for several days. Oswald's attempted suicide was reported by Nosenko to the Chief of the Seventh Department; Colonel Konstantin Nikitovich Dubas, and Nosenko believed that Dubas then reported it to the Office of the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. Nosenko's original decision that the KGB would not become involved with Oswald was approved by the Chief of the Second Directorate, and it was further agreed that he should not be permitted to remain in the USSR.

A report from the hospital was received which gave the circumstances of Oswald's admittance to the hospital, treatment received including blood transfusion, and the report stated Oswald had attempted suicide because he was not granted permission to remain in the USSR. The hospital record also included an evaluation that Oswald's attempted suicide indicated mental instability. Nosenko did not know whether this evaluation was based on a psychiatric examination or was merely an observation of the hospital medical staff. Nosenko also learned that upon Oswald's discharge from the hospital he was again informed by Intourist that he could not reside in the USSR and Oswald stated he would commit suicide.

Nosenko did not know who made the decision to grant Oswald permission to reside temporarily in the USSR, but he is sure it was not a KGB decision and he added that upon learning of this decision the KGB instructed that Oswald not be permitted to reside in the Moscow area. Nosenko suggested that either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the decision to permit Oswald to reside in the USSR and also made the decision to assign him to Minsk. Nosenko attached no particular significance to the fact that Oswald was settled in Minsk but offered the opinion that since
Minsk is a capital city of one of the Republics and is an above-average Soviet city in cleanliness and modern facilities, it was selected in order to create a better impression on Oswald, a foreigner.

After the KGB was advised of the decision to authorize Oswald to reside in Minsk it was necessary for Krupnov to bring Oswald's file up to date for purpose of transferring it to the KGB Office in Minsk. This was done and the file was forwarded to Minsk by a cover letter prepared by Krupnov. That cover letter briefly summarized Oswald's case and specifically instructed that KGB, Minsk, take no action concerning Oswald except to "passively" observe his activities to make sure that he was not a United States intelligence agent temporarily dormant.

Krupnov's letter was read by Nosenko and signed by Dubas.

Nosenko stated that in view of instructions from KGB, Moscow, no active interest could be taken in Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB, Moscow. According to Nosenko no such approval was ever requested or granted and based on his experience, he opined that the only coverage of Oswald during his stay at Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors, associates and review of his mail.

The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in connection with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet re-entry visa. Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department by M. I. Turalin, Service Number 2, (counter-intelligence in foreign countries), First Chief Directorate. Nosenko recalled that Turalin had orally contacted Vladimir Kuznin Alekseev, Chief, Sixth Section of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect to Oswald. Nosenko's Department had no interest in Oswald and recommended that Oswald's request for a re-entry visa be denied. Nosenko could not recall when Oswald visited Mexico City in connection with his visa application.
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Nosenko's next knowledge of Oswald's activities arose as a result of President John F. Kennedy's assassination.

Nosenko recalled that about two hours after President Kennedy had been shot he was telephonically advised at his home by the KGB Center of this fact. A short time later he was telephonically advised of the President's death. About two hours later Nosenko was advised that Oswald had been arrested, and Nosenko and his staff were called to work for purpose of determining whether the KGB had any information concerning Oswald. After establishing Oswald's identity from KGB files and ascertaining that Oswald's file was still in Minsk, Nosenko, on instructions of General Oleg M. Gribanov, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB, telephonically contacted the KGB Office in Minsk and had them dictate a summary of the Oswald file. Nosenko did not personally accept this summary, but it was taken down by an employee of his department. As reported by Nosenko at the time of his interview on February 26, 1964, this summary concluded with a statement that the KGB at Minsk had endeavored "to influence Oswald in the right direction." As reported by Nosenko, this latter statement greatly disturbed Gribanov since the KGB Headquarters had instructed that no action be taken concerning Oswald except to passively observe his activities. Accordingly, Gribanov ordered all records at Minsk pertaining to Oswald be forwarded immediately to Moscow by military aircraft with an explanation concerning the meaning of the above-mentioned statement. Nosenko read the file summary telephonically furnished by Minsk, the explanation from Minsk concerning the meaning of the above-mentioned statement, and thoroughly reviewed Oswald's file prior to making same available to Sergei Mikhailovich Fedoseev, Chief of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, who prepared a two-page summary memorandum for Gribanov. That memorandum was furnished by Gribanov to Vladimir Semichastny, Chairman of KGB who in turn reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, USSR, and to Nikita S. Khrushchev. According to Nosenko, Oswald's file, as received from Minsk, contained no information to indicate that the KGB at Minsk had taken any action with respect to Oswald contrary to instructions from KGB Headquarters. It did contain information concerning Oswald's marriage to Marina Oswald, background data on Marina, including fact she had been a member of the Komsomol (Communist Party Youth Organization) but was dropped for nonpayment of dues and the fact that
the Oswalds had departed the USSR for the United States. His file also included a statement that Oswald had been a poor worker. Nosenko read Fedoseev's summary memorandum and he recalled that it contained the definite statement that from the date of Oswald's arrival in the USSR until his departure from the USSR, the KGB had no personal contact with Oswald and had not attempted to utilize him in any manner.

Nosenko was questioned as to whether Oswald could have been trained and furnished assignments by any other Soviet intelligence organization including the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) or the Thirteenth Department of the First Directorate of the KGB (which deals with sabotage, explosions, killings, terror). Nosenko stated that he is absolutely certain that Oswald received no such training or assignments. In this connection he explained that if any other department of KGB wanted to utilize Oswald, they would have to contact the department which originally opened up the file on Oswald (Nosenko's department) and ask permission to utilize him. Nosenko stated that this would also apply to GRU. Nosenko further explained that in view of their evaluation that Oswald appeared to be mentally unstable no Soviet Intelligence Agency, particularly the Thirteenth Department, would consider using him. Nosenko also advised that further evidence that Oswald was not of intelligence interest to the KGB is shown by the fact that the KGB Headquarters did not retain a control file concerning Oswald following his settlement in Minsk. He elaborated by stating that had Oswald been of any intelligence interest to KGB a control file would also have been maintained at KGB Headquarters. This file would have been assigned to a Case Officer at Headquarters with responsibility to direct supervision of the case, including the making of periodic visits to Minsk by the Case Officer.

In Oswald's case the only record maintained at KGB Headquarters in Moscow was an index card bearing Oswald's name and the identity of the department which originated the file concerning him.

Nosenko advised that he ascertained from reading Oswald's file that the Soviet Red Cross had made payments to Oswald. He stated, however, that it is a normal practice
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for the Soviet Red Cross to make payments to emigres and defectors in order to assist them in enjoying a better standard of living than Soviet citizens engaged in similar occupations. He learned that Oswald received the minimum payments from the Soviet Red Cross which he estimated to be approximately 90 rubles per month. He did not know when these payments began and did not know for how long they continued.

Nosenko stated that there are no Soviet regulations which would have prevented Oswald from traveling from Minsk to Moscow without police authority. He stated that Soviet citizens likewise are permitted to travel from place to place without having to receive special permission.

Following President Kennedy's assassination, Nosenko ascertained from Oswald's file that he had had access to a gun which he used to hunt game with fellow employees in the USSR. He could not describe the gun used by Oswald but did remember that it was used to shoot rabbits. Nosenko stated that Western newspaper reports describe Oswald as an expert shot; however, Oswald's file contained statements from fellow hunters that Oswald was an extremely poor shot and that it was necessary for persons who accompanied him on hunts to provide him with game.

Nosenko stated that there is no KGB and no GRU training school in the vicinity of Minsk.

According to Nosenko, no separate file was maintained by the KGB concerning Marina Oswald and all of KGB's information concerning her was kept in Oswald's file. He said that no information in that file indicated that the KGB had any interest in Marina Oswald either while she was in the Soviet Union or after she departed the Soviet Union. Nosenko also advised the KGB had no plans to contact either Oswald or Marina in the United States.

Nosenko opined that after Oswald departed the USSR he would not have been permitted to re-enter that country under any circumstances. He expressed the opinion that Marina and her children would have been granted permission to return alone had President Kennedy not been assassinated.
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Since the assassination of President Kennedy he does not know what decision would be made with respect to Marina Oswald and her children.

Nosenko had no information that the Soviet Government ever received any contact from the Cubans concerning Oswald, and he knew of no Cuban involvement in the assassination.

Nosenko stated that he had no knowledge that Oswald had made application to re-enter the Soviet Union other than through his contact with the Soviet Embassy at Mexico City. He pointed out in this connection, that had Oswald applied at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., or elsewhere, the KGB would not have ever been apprised of the visa request if the visa issuing officer at the Embassy decided on his own authority to reject the visa application.

Nosenko noted that all mail addressed to the American Embassy in Moscow, emanating abroad or from the USSR itself, is first reviewed by the KGB in Moscow. Nosenko added that on occasions mail from "significant" persons is not even permitted by KGB to reach the American Embassy. In the case of Oswald, Nosenko stated that since he was of no significance or particular interest to the KGB, correspondence from Oswald would be permitted to reach the Embassy, even though critical. However, Nosenko had no knowledge that Oswald ever directed a communication of any type to the American Embassy at Moscow.

Nosenko stated that no publicity appeared in the Soviet Press or over the radio regarding Oswald's arrival or departure from the USSR and no publicity resulted from his attempted suicide. Soviet newspapers and radio have carried numerous statements concerning President Kennedy's assassination which quoted from Western newspaper stories concerning Oswald's alleged involvement including the fact that Oswald had previously visited the USSR.
Nosenko advised he saw nothing unusual in the fact that Oswald was permitted to marry a Soviet citizen and later permitted to depart the USSR with her. He noted that Soviet law specifically provides that a Soviet citizen may marry a foreign national in the USSR and depart from the USSR with spouse provided, of course, the Soviet citizen had not had access to sensitive information.

It was his opinion that President Kennedy was held in high esteem by the Soviet Government and that President Kennedy had been evaluated by the Soviet Government as a person interested in maintaining peace. He stated that following the assassination, the Soviet guards were removed from around the American Embassy in Moscow and the Soviet people were permitted without interference to visit the American Embassy to express their condolences. According to Nosenko, this is the only occasion he can recall where such action had been taken. He said that the orders to remove the guards came from "above." He added that his department provided approximately 20 men who spoke the English language for assignment in the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy in Moscow to insure that no disrespect was shown during this period.
Two security classified attachments to this memorandum are withheld from
release under 5 U.S.C. 552(c)(1).