Second, the hypothesis that he was coached to come very close to the expartriation line but not quite to expatriate himself, in order that he might eventually return to the United States, fails to explain why he was ever instructed to come close to the line in the first place. What possible gain would come from that? Certainly any propaganda value which could have been gained from his words and actions could have been fully obtained from all sorts of anti-American and "anti-capitalist" and pro-Russian and pro-Communist statements without his having to go so far along the road toward expatriation. That, after all, is a fairly technical matter which the general public is not aware of nearly so much as it is of statements bearing upon patriotism and loyalty. In fact, the way it actually worked out, Oswald's "on again, off again" actions in regard to renouncing his citizenship may have detracted from his propaganda impact. His vacillation on this issue was so obvious that it was observed by one of the newspaper reporters, Miss Priscella Johnson. (Whether she passed her impressions on to the public at the time is not known.)

In short, if Oswald was coached, he seems to have had a poor coach.

7. Nosenko's Statements.

The recent Soviet defector, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, has stated to the FBI that when Oswald arrived as a tourist in the Soviet Union the KGB had "no current interest" in Oswald and possessed no information that Oswald was a member of the Communist Party, U. S. A., or elsewhere. He also indicated that Oswald was discouraged from remaining

permenently in Russia, and said, "Oswald was not regarded by the KGB as being completely normal mentally nor was he considered to be very intelligent."

C. Special benefits granted to Oswald while he was in the Soviet Union: Do they show that he was being paid to receive training as a Soviet Agent?

Once he was accepted as a resident alien in the Soviet Union Oswald by no means lived "just like a Russian." On the contrary, he was given all sorts of special benefits which a Russian citizen in his position would not have obtained. The question is not whether he received special benefits, but whether his receiving them indicates that he was undergoing some sort of training as a future agent of the Soviet system, or at least that he was being indirectly bribed to become such an agent. We want to emphasize that the problem of interpretation here is not simply whether he was being "bribed," but whether he was being bribed for the specific purpose of setting him up as some sort of foreign agent. For there is no question but that the special treatment amounted to a bribe. Oswald recognized this fact himself in his Diary, and Marina and Nosenko both say that it is standard practice in the Soviet Union for Americans and other foreign defectors from countries with high standards of living to be

"subsidized" while they are in the Soviet Union. The Central Intelligence Agency has confirmed this fact. In other words, it is standard Soviet practice, once the decision has been made that it will serve the policies of the Soviet system to admit a foreign defector, to make his life easy and pleasant enough so that he will not become disillusioned and return to his native country, at least for materialistic reasons - i. e., to bribe him with subsidies and other special benefits. CE2721.

It should also be noted at the outset that if it were not for Oswald's Diary we would at this time have no knowledge that he had ever received a large initial grant and monthly subsidies thereafter from the "Red Cross." This strikes us as significant, because if there was something invidious about his receiving them, then it is unlikely that the Russians would have permitted the fact to be disclosed through the Diary. In other words, if Oswald was really a secret agent and the Diary is a fabrication drawn up by him at the behest of the KGB, and if his receiving the "Red Cross" subsidy and other special treatment is evidence of his being used as a secret agent, then it makes no sense to fabricate the Diary in such a way that it discloses such evidence. In any event, we will here outline the ways in which he apparently received special benefits from the Soviet State.

The Historic Diary cites that after Oswald was informed on January 4, 1960, that he could remain in the Soviet Union and was being sent to Minsk, he was given 5000 rubles by the "Red Cross," "for expenses."

He used 2200 rubles to pay his hotel bill, which by this time had added up to a considerable sum, and another 150 rubles to purchase a train ticket to Minsk. Withe the balance of slightly over 2500 rubles, Oswald felt, according to the Diary, like a rich man. When he arrived in Minsk he was met at the train station by two attractive, intelligent women who said they were from the Red Cross. He was taken to his hotel by them and there assigned to a guide and interpreter from Intourist, the official Soviet Agency for handling tourists. He then met the "Mayor" of the city, Comrade Sharapov, and was officially welcomed. Comrade Sharapov told Oswald that he would soon receive a "rent-free apartment" and warned him against "uncultured persons" who might not be sympathetic to foreigners. The promised rent-free apartment never materialized but eventually, about a month and a half later, Oswald did receive a very pleasant (by Soviet standards) apartment for which he was required to pay only 60 rubles a month, which it can be seen by comparison with his salary, which was 700 rubles a month, was only a nominal amount. The Diary refers to it as "almost rent-free."

Oswald was given a job in the "Beylo-russian Radio and Television Factory," a large plant employing about 5000 persons and manufacturing electronic parts and radio and television sets of all types and sizes. He worked in the "experimental shop." It is unclear exactly what he did there, but at various times he referred to his job as that of a "checker," "adjuster, first class," or "metalworker." After he had returned to the United States he told an FBI representative that he was "a metalworker" and that he spent his time reading blueprints and translating their

instructions into the finished product. The pay was approximately 700 rubles a month or slightly better; the rate of pay depended upon the amount of work he personally and/or his shop generally turned out (we are not sure which), so an exact figure cannot be quoted. This rate of pay is very good. Marina, who had received specialized training and who seems to have held a more responsible job, was employed as a pharmacist and received a salary of 450 rubles per month. Moreover, Marina has testified to the Commission that she knew of medical doctors in the Soviet Union who received less than 700 rubles per month. Finally, on top of all this, Oswald regularly received from the "Red Cross" an additional 700 rubles per month, "to help." The Diary states that the Red Cross subsidy was terminated as soon as the Soviets learned that he was no longer happy in Russia and wanted to return to the United States, i.e., presumably as soon as he wrote the American Embassy in Moscow in February 1961 asking that he be permitted to return. Marina's testimony confirms this in that she says she never knew of the "Red Cross" subsidy. Since she met and married Oswald in March and April of 1961, respectively, she would not have known of the subsidy unless Oswald had told her about it, which he apparently did not. The very well paying job, the monthly subsidy, and the "almost rent-free" apartment combined to give Oswald all the money he needed. The Historic Diary reflects this fact. The only complaint he has is that there was "no place to spend the money." Apparently, luxuries as we know them in America simply were not available to members of the working class in the Soviet Union, even if they had the money to purchase them.

Marina testifies that Oswald's salary was genuinely that. She is emphatic in denying that he received anything more for his work than did others in the factory doing similar work. She explains the relatively high monthly compensation by saying that piecework rates throughout the Soviet Union have generally grown way out of line with compensation for other jobs, and that in particular, certain professional groups are getting considerably less than their training and responsibilities would ordinarily entitle them to. She said that Premier Khrushev had promised reforms along these lines but that such reforms had not materialized by the time she and Oswald departed. Marina's testimony makes sense, because the Russians could easily have used the "Red Cross" subsidy to give Oswald all the money he needed and therefore would probably have avoided creating resentment among his fellow workers by openly paying him a higher salary than his work would justify.

The Diary reflects that Oswald himself, before he left the Soviet Union, recognized that the "Red Cross" was only a front. He says that it was really the MVD.

The fact that the "Red Cross" was used as a front for the monthly subsidies in Russia has significance in another connection. It is now fairly well established that Lee Oswald was the man who took a shot at General Edwin Walker in the spring of 1963, at the General's home in Dallas, Texas. Marina has testified to this effect, and other incriminating evidence, such as photographs of the Walker residence, has also been uncovered. There is an undated note (FBI Exhibit No. 32) which from internal evidence and from Marina's testimony we now believe to have been

left by Oswald for her at the time of the Walker assassination attempt, apparently in case he was apprehended or for some other reason unable to return directly from the scene of the shooting. The note advises her what steps to take in his absence. It is in Russian. Part of his advice to her, as translated, reads, "We have friends here (i.e., the United States). The Red Cross also will help you." Immediately after the second quoted sentence are the words, "Red Cross," written in English, presumably so that Marina could pronounce them and be understood by persons who did not speak Russian. When she was examined by the Commission on this point, Marina's only explanation was that her husband must have been telling her that the Red Cross had facilities for helping people in need, especially foreigners. She was unable to offer any suggestions on whether there was a connection, in Oswald's mind, between the American Red Cross and the "Red Cross" that subsidized his tenure in Russia and which he believed was the MVD.

D. Oswald's activities with his "hunting club" in Minsk: Were these a cover for some sort of secret training?

Oswald's writings about Russia, his statements to various persons after he returned to the United States, and Marina's testimony to the Commission all contain references to his being away from his apartment in Minsk occasionally for hunting trips or meetings with a "hunting club" or "gun club" allegedly sponsored by his factory "collective." Found among his effects after the assassination was a membership card in the gun club, a hunting license and a permit to own a shotgun. There have been allegations that this is a highly suspicious circumstance because no one in the Soviet

Union, it is alleged, is permitted to own a gun simply for pleasure. At least one Russian emigre', Ilya Mamantov, has so testified, and testimony from such a person is of course to be taken seriously. Marina has testified that she remembers her husband going hunting only on one occasion during the whole time of their marriage; however, Oswald apparently joined the gun club in the summer of 1960 and he did not marry Marina until April 30, 1961, so he could have been much more active while he was still a bachelor.

Oswald made no secret of his membership in the hunting club. He mentioned it on occasion to friends, has an entry on it in his Diary, discusses it at some length in his "Manifest," and kept his membership card, gun permit and hunting license with him until the day he was killed. It also formed one of the points of discussion in his speech to a Jesuit seminary in Alabama the summer after he returned to the United States. The subject of the hunting club came up there in connection with his remarks about peasant life in the Soviet Union, in which he said that the farm laborers lived extremely poorly and that they were in fact so destitute that he and his fellow hunters regularly left whatever game they were able to get, less what they ate during the trip, with them. He added that on one occasion he had even left with a poor farm family some of the food that he had brought with him from Minsk. In the same speech to the seminary students Oswald commented that pistols and rifles were forbidden to Soviet civilians but that shotguns were permitted.

It may be that Oswald's statement about shotguns being permitted by Soviet law is consistent with the statements of Russian emigre's to the effect that no guns of any kind were permitted to ordinary citizens, because the post-Stalin "thaw" involved, among other things, a loosening of this particular prohibition. The Russian emigre's who have testified on this point all left Russia many years ago. It is also possible that regulations of this type vary among regions in the Soviet Union. In the Ukraine, for example, where nationalistic anti-Communist groups have never been completely suppressed, it would seem natural that the restrictions on firearms might be extremely strict, whereas in other areas of less doubtful loyalty, shotguns might be permitted. In this connection it is our understanding that the Minsk area is one which is regarded by the Soviet Government as loyal; Oswald in his "Manifest" refers to it as one of the few areas in the U.S.S.R which is regarded as somewhat pro-Stalin even today, many years after the "cult of personality" has supposedly been stamped out.

Nosenko, the Soviet KGB defector, asserts that Oswald's hunting-club membership is reported in the KGB records and comments that some of the reports in Oswald's file are from fellow huntsmen, who observed that Oswald was such a poor shot that they often had to give him some of their game so that he would not return empty-handed.

CIA experts have gone over Oswald's gun permit and hunting license and given their opinion that they appear authentic. In other words, such things as whether the serial number of the gun is of the kind that would in fact refer to a shotgun, etc., check out.

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The fact remains that if Oswald was receiving any kind of instructions or training from the KGB or some other secret group while he was in Russia, the gun club might have been an effective means of covering such training. One possible way of checking on this would be to find out through Marina who the other members of the gun club were who took trips with her husband, and whether they had ever independently commented to her about what they did on their trips, etc. Unfortunately, her testimony shed no light in this connection and in fact, as has already been mentioned, she said that after their marriage he went on only a single trip. If Marina is telling the truth on this last point, however, it tends to rebut the hypothesis that the gun club was a "cover." For if it had been, it seems likely that the KGB would have used it more than once during the thirteen months between the time of Oswald's marriage and the time he left Russia.

E. Oswald's relationship with Marina: Might she have been chosen by the KGB to work with him as an agent, or could she even be an agent without Oswald's having known it?

Oswald met Marina on March 18, 1961, and married her six weeks later. Marina is reasonably well educated -- certainly more so than her husband -- and the uncle with whom she lived in Russia was a colonel or lieutenant colonel in the MVD, a prestigious position in the Soviet Union. Marina's aunt and uncle lived well by Soviet standards: they had a desirable apartment and a private telephone. Marina testified that they raised no objection to her marriage, saying that the decision was hers.

When Marina and Oswald were attempting to leave the Soviet Union, she was granted an interview at the MVD office in Minsk for the purpose of expediting their exit. She thinks the person she saw was a high MVD official, Colonel Nikola Asenov, and she believes that the interview was granted because she was the niece of MVD Colonel Ilya Prusakov. Oswald previously had tried to arrange such an interview for himself and had failed.

Marina was questioned by the Commission and by the press as to why she married Oswald. She told the Commission that she married him because she loved him and believed he would make a good family man, not because she wanted to come to the United States or because he had a high standard of living. She admits that she was impressed by his apartment in Russia, and some of the Russian emigre's in the United States who knew the Oswalds have testified that they think she was impressed by his privileges and relative prestige in Russia. However, her frankness in admitting her admiration for his apartment probably tends to diminish its importance as a real marriage motive. Russian emigre' friends of the Oswalds have described Marina's initial attraction to Oswald as a sort of "feeling sorry" for him, visiting him in the hospital, etc. Marina told the Commission that she was first attracted to Oswald because he was a foreigner and, as such, an interesting person. She admits dating someone else until the night before she agreed to marry Oswald. The Oswalds' relationship in the United States may not have been a happy one. Their friends' testimony conflicts on this, but some have said that Marina "drove," "goaded," or "brought out the worst" in her husband.

According to Oswald's Diary and Marina's testimony, soon after the two had met Oswald became sick with an ear infection and was confined to the hospital in Minsk for about a week. Marina, at his invitation, visited him there, and after the first visit came to see him every day. He proposed to her while he was still in the hospital, but she did not accept him until almost a month later. His Diary records that he married her to "get even" with Ella German, a fellow worker at the factory to whom he had proposed but who turned him down. The Diary goes on to say that after the marriage he grew to love Marina and to forget Ella, though he was still in love with Ella when he got married. It would seem that if Marina had been ordered by the KGB to marry Oswald if she could, that the illness would have presented an ideal opportunity. Anyone who is weak from disease is in an especially susceptible state.

There is no doubt that the fact that Oswald married a Russian created difficulties for him when he tried to return to the United States, at least from the point of view of the American Government. Marina's admission to the United States was as the wife of a citizen, under "non-quota immigrant" status. As such, she had to obtain a waiver of certain technical provisions in the immigration laws and, as it turned out, this took many extra months and was almost not obtained at all. It took special pleading by the State Department to convince the Immigration and Naturalization Service to reverse the initial decision of the latter to the effect that the provisions of the law would not be waived in Marina's case. Consequently, the hypothesis that the KGB or some other Russian group arranged the marriage

makes no sense if the intent was to facilitate Oswald's return to his native country. It does make sense, however, if Marina was so important to the contemplated use of Oswald that the additional difficulties in connection with repatriation which would be added by the marriage, were worthwhile. It also makes sense, of course, on the hypothesis that Marina herself, rather than Oswald, is the Russian agent. This latter conjecture, though perhaps somewhat startling at first, is probably at least as plausible as the conjecture that Marina and Oswald were agents together. All the questioning which Marina has undergone since the assassination has shown that she is an intelligent, coolheaded woman. [redacted]

Moreover, if the Russians were anxious to plant an agent in the United States, marrying her to a repatriating defector would be a comparatively easy means of transporting her there.

Facts tending against the speculations of the previous paragraph include the following: First, according to the statements of Marina herself and of her acquaintances, she learned practically no English as long as her husband was alive. This was supposed to be mainly because he was so jealous of her that he feared even this small degree of independence on her part, but also because she was so exclusively home and children oriented that she just did not care to make the effort to

learn the language. If, in fact, she is some kind of "dormant" agent who was to prepare herself for use at a later time, it would seem that one of her first orders of business would have been to learn the language and customs of her adopted country. Second, although Marina certainly is an intelligent woman, she has consistently maintained -- and the testimony of other witnesses seems to back this up -- that she is totally uninterested in politics and is amazingly ignorant of them, or at least was until after the assassination. Moreover, her entire character and conduct prior to the assassination seems to be that of a woman whose sole interest was her husband, herself, and her children.

Whether or not Marina is a "dormant" agent is by its nature a question almost impossible to answer. A dormant agent, by definition, does nothing whatever until he is contacted by his superiors, and such contacts may not occur until several years after the agent has been planted in the area of his future operations. In Marina's case, because of the publicity she has received, presumably the Russians would now have entirely written off any plans to use her in the future. Consequently, not only is there unlikely to be any evidence available at the present time that she is a dormant agent, if she in fact is, but probably no such evidence will ever be forthcoming.

F. The alleged ease with which Marina and her husband were able to leave Russia.

The charge could be made, and has been suggested already in the public press, that Lee Harvey Oswald's and Marina's departure from Russia and return to the United States was easier than it should have been, that

is, that if he (or she) were not agents of the Russian Communist conspiracy, they would have found it much more difficult to leave Russia and, in fact, might never have been granted permission to go. We have reviewed the available facts on how the Oswalds obtained permission to leave Russia and return to the United States in the light of these possible charges and find that there are four separate points which bear analysis. These are: first, a possibly suspicious coincidence involving a communication from Oswald's mother, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald; second, the fact that Lee Oswald travelled from Minsk to Moscow without first obtaining the approval of the Soviet authorities, despite his own statements that he could not do so; third, the fact that the Oswalds, when they came to Moscow to confer with the American Embassy, again stayed in the MVD-Controlled Hotel Berlin; and fourth, the possibility that the time which elapsed between the Oswalds applying for permission to leave and their receiving such permission from the Soviet Government was unusually short. In order that each of these points can be viewed in perspective, they will be treated in the order in which they occurred and in the context of the story of the Oswalds' efforts to depart from the Soviet Union and return to the United States.

1. The coincidence between the timing of the request by Mrs. Marguerite Oswald that her son be notified that she was worried about him and Lee Harvey Oswald's first communication to the American Embassy in Moscow asking for permission to return to the United States.

On February 13, 1961, the American Embassy in Moscow received a letter from Oswald postmarked Minsk, February 5, the first it had heard

from him since early November 1959, when it had received his undated letter from the Hotel Metropole asking that his renunciation of citizenship be accepted. The new letter from Oswald was dated February 1, 1961, and asked that he be readmitted to his native country. The breaking of Oswald's 16-month silence at this time coincided exactly with a request sent by the Department of State in Washington to its Moscow Embassy on February 1, 1961, informing the Embassy that Oswald's mother was worried about him, inquiring as to his whereabouts and asking that he get in touch with her if possible. We had wondered whether the coincidence of these two events was accidental or whether it represented Soviet interception of the request by Oswald's mother, interpretation of that request as a possible softening of the attitude of the American Government toward Lee Oswald and their -- the Soviets' -- suggestion to Oswald that he therefore act immediately to seek readmission to the United States. We have been informed by the CIA that the request from Marguerite Oswald went from Washington to Moscow by diplomatic pouch, and thus the Russians should have had no opportunity to intercept it. However, this does not preclude the possibility of a leak in the Washington office from which the request came or a leak in the American Embassy in Moscow, where it was received. In order to have given the Russians time to act upon the leak, however, it would seem that it would have had to occur in Washington rather than Moscow.

2. Lee Harvey Oswald's travel from Minsk to Moscow without prior approval of the Soviet authorities.

Oswald, once he had reopened his lines of communication with the American Embassy in Moscow by his February 1 letter, continued to correspond with them more or less regularly until May 1962, when he and Marina finally left Russia for the United States. It was only about a month and a half after he first made known his intentions to return to the United States, on March 18, that he met Marina, and he married her on April 30, 1961. According to the Historic Diary and according to Marina's testimony to the Commission, Oswald never told her that he had made up his mind to try to return to the United States until after they were married. In fact, he not only did not disclose his intent, he affirmatively denied to her that he ever could return to the United States when she asked him about it during their courtship. The Diary records that when he did inform her, after their marriage, she was startled but immediately acceded to his wishes.

The Embassy's response to Oswald's first letter was to invite him to come personally to the Embassy to discuss the matter, pointing out that some rather complex questions were involved and that his presence would be required for the effort to iron them out. Oswald objected to the invitation, stating that it was against Soviet law for him to travel from Minsk to Moscow without first obtaining permission from the "authorities" and that he had been informed that such permission, if granted, would be "a long-drawn affair" which the authorities were "reluctant even to start." He also was loathe to undertake the expense of the trip.

The question of his coming to Moscow in person was bound up with the related question of how his American passport, which he had turned in to the Embassy in a defiant manner on October 31, 1959 and which the Embassy agreed that he needed in order to facilitate the securing of Soviet permission to leave the country, could be returned to him. The Embassy was reluctant to send the document through the mails in Russia, but Oswald was reluctant to come to Moscow to get it. In addition, as the Embassy was at pains to point out to Oswald, the issue of whether he had lost his American citizenship and with it, his right to an American passport, had to be thrashed out and decided before he could be given back his passport, either in person or through the mails. From Oswald's first letter until late in June, he and the Department of State were at loggerheads on whether he should travel to Moscow or not. While the Department of State was clarifying its position on this matter (the position, once clarified, though never communicated to Oswald, was that the passport would under no conditions be mailed) Oswald became impatient with not receiving a prompt reply to one of his letters, and appeared at the Embassy without prior warning on Saturday, July 8, 1961.

How did he do it, despite the legal difficulties he himself had had anticipated? The Historic Diary simply records that he went, without getting permission. We have asked the State Department to comment upon this. Its answers, along with our specific questions, are as follows:

B. Could resident foreigners normally travel in this manner without first obtaining such permission?

ANSWER - There are only a few Western nationals now living in the Soviet Union. They include an American Roman Catholic priest, an American Protestant minister, a number of correspondents, some students and technical advisers to Soviet businesses. We know that the priest, the minister, the correspondents and the students must obtain permission from Soviet authorities before taking any trips. The technical advisers notify officials of their project before they travel and these officials personally inform the militia.

C. If travel of this type was not freely permitted, do you believe that Oswald normally would have been apprehended during the attempt or punished after the fact for traveling without permission?

ANSWER - Based on the information we have, we believe that if Oswald went to Moscow without permission, and this was known to the Soviet authorities, he would have been fined or reprimanded. Oswald was not, of course, an average foreign resident. He was a defector from a foreign country and the bearer of a Soviet internal "stateless" passport (vid na zhitelstvo dlya litza bez grazhdanstva) during the time when he was contemplating the visit to Moscow to come to the Embassy. (On January 4, 1962 he was issued a passport for foreigners -- vid na zhitelstvo dlya Inostrantsa.)

The Soviet authorities probably knew about Oswald's trip even if he did not obtain advance permission, since in most instances the Soviet militia guards at the Embassy ask for the documents of unidentified persons entering the Embassy grounds. By Oswald's own statement, the foremen at his wife's place of employment were notified that they had visited the Embassy while they were still in Moscow. The usual "enemy of the people" meetings were held, his wife condemned for her action and friends warned against speaking to her.

An American citizen who, with her American citizen husband, went to the Soviet Union to live permanently and is now trying to obtain permission to leave, informed the Embassy that she had been fined for not getting permission to go from Odessa to Moscow on a recent trip to visit the Embassy.

D. Even if such travel did not have to be authorized, do you have any information or observations regarding the practicality of such travel by Soviet citizens or persons in Oswald's status?

ANSWER - It is impossible to generalize in this area. We understand from interrogations of former residents in the Soviet Union who were considered "stateless" by Soviet authorities that they were not permitted to leave the town where they resided without permission of the police. In requesting such permission they were required to fill out a questionnaire giving the reason for travel, length of stay, addresses of individuals to be visited, etc.

Notwithstanding these requirements, we know that at least one "stateless" person often traveled without permission of the authorities and stated that police stationed at railroad stations usually spotchecked the identification papers of every tenth traveler, but that it was an easy matter to avoid such checks. Finally, she stated that persons who were caught evading the registration requirements were returned to their home towns by the police and sentenced to short jail terms and fined. These sentences were more severe for repeated violations.

Soviet Passport Regulations

Citizens arriving for permanent or temporary sojourn or changing their place of living in localities where the passport system has been introduced must within 24 hours produce their passports for the house administration, directors of hostels, or other persons responsible for registration in order to register them with militia authorities. A citizen who has received a new passport must also produce it for the house administration or call in person at the passport bureau for registration. After that the new passport must be produced at the place of work for the cadre department or personnel office, where it will be stamped to show that its owner has been accepted for work.

When receiving a new passport one must see that the information about the bearer and his children below 16 years of age has been properly entered, as well as the marriage data and stamp. It should be borne in mind that all citizens from 16 to 40 years of age receive passports valid for a limited period of time. When the validity of the passport expires, the citizen should apply to the passport office for a new passport. It should be born in mind that living without a passport or registration book, an invalid passport, or acceptance for work without a passport or registration book, constitutes violation of passport regulations. Persons guilty of such violations of the passport regulations are liable to prosecution.

When asked to comment on the point by representatives of the FBI, Nosenko simply replied that there was no law in the Soviet Union which would have prohibited Oswald's travel.

We now have reason to believe that while there are no laws in the Soviet Union prohibiting an ordinary citizen from traveling, resident foreigners, such as Oswald, are at least theoretically so prohibited. Anyway, we have also posed this question to the CIA, and its response is as follows:

1. OSWALD'S travel from Minsk to Moscow and return in July 1961 would normally have required prior authorization. Bearers of a Soviet "passport for foreigners" (vid na zhitelstvo v SSSR dlya innostrantsa) are required to obtain travel authorization from the Visa and Registration Department (OVIR) (or Passport Registration Department (PRO) in smaller towns) if they desire to leave the city (or oblast) where they are domiciled. This same requirement is believed to apply to persons, such as OSWALD, holding Soviet "stateless passports" (vid na zhitelstvo v SSR dlya lits bez grazhdanstva).



Oswald's arrival at the American Embassy was on a Saturday, according to the Historic Diary, the place was closed for business but after some inquiry he was able to reach Mr. Richard E. Snyder, the Consul, on the telephone. Oswald notes in the Diary that the consular officials lived in the same building as they worked, so presumably he and Snyder spoke over some sort of house telephone. Again according to the Diary, Snyder came down immediately, shook his hand, and spoke briefly with him. The upshot of the conversation was that Oswald should return on Monday, July 10. This he did, but in the meantime, apparently because of something said by Snyder, although we have no clear evidence that this was the case, Oswald telephoned Marina long distance and asked her to fly to Moscow the next day, Sunday, which she did.

3. The Oswalds staying at the Hotel Berlin

While they were in Moscow, Oswald and Marina stayed at the Hotel Berlin, the same place Oswald stayed when he entered the country in 1959. The CIA has informed us that the Hotel Berlin and its "sister

hotel," the Metropole (where Oswald also stayed in 1959), which are under the same administration, are the regular foreign-tourist hotels in Moscow. Presumably, therefore, they are heavily infiltrated, if not controlled, by the MVD.

Marina says that she and Oswald got a room at the Hotel Berlin because rooms in Moscow were at a premium, there being a film festival going on at the time, and Oswald was remembered at the Berlin and therefore able to get a room despite the difficulties. The CIA has confirmed that an international film festival was in fact occuring in Moscow during July 1961.

4. The alleged unusual rapidity with which the Oswalds were able to obtain permission from the Soviet Goverrment to leave Russia.

Despite the fact that Marina had come to Moscow, when Oswald appeared at the Embassy on Monday she waited outside instead of coming in with him. However, on Tuesday she had a conference with John McVickar on her aspects of the contemplated return to the United States, i.e., the problems and procedures connected with her entry into the United States as a "nonquota immigrant." It is interesting, and apparently purely coincidental, that the same two men who dealt with Oswald when he defected to Russia were the ones who dealt with him and Marina when he sought to reenter the United States.

Primarily on the basis of the Monday interview, the American Embassy concluded that Oswald had not expatriated himself despite his attempts to do so in the fall of 1959 and his actions thereafter, and wrote a memorandum to this effect to the Washington Department of State.

On the basis of this tentative decision, but on the warning expressly given that the decision was only tentative, Oswald was given back his passport. By its own terms the document was due to expire in September 1961, and he was informed that whether it could be renewed would depend upon the ultimate decision on his expatriation.

The ultimate decision on the expatriation issue was favorable to Oswald. His new passport was not issued in September, however, because he did not need it then, but was issued instead in May 1962, just before he and his family departed for the United States. Essentially, although there were some serious problems ahead for Marina's application to be admitted as a nonquota immigrant, the big American hurdle, the expatriation issue, was for all practical purposes overcome on July 10, 1961. From then on, it was up to the Soviet authorities.

The greatest difficulty with the Russian authorities was probably whether Marina could accompany her husband, although we can only guess that this was so. As it actually worked out, Marina was called to the Soviet passport office in Minsk on December 25, 1961, and told that authority had been received to issue both her and her husband's exit visas. Thus, permission for both of them came down at exactly the same time, so we have no way of actually knowing that it was Marina, more than her husband, whose departure troubled the Soviet Government. The Historic Diary and correspondence with the American Embassy at this time reflects that the Oswalds did not pick up their exit visas immediately, despite having been told that they could do so. Their thinking was that since

Oswald's visa would be good for only 45 days once it had been issued, he would not ask that it be issued until he had cleared away every other obstacle to his return to the United States and was ready to leave. Marina, being a Soviet national, however, would get an exit visa of longer than 45 days' duration. Consequently, on January 12, 1962, she picked up her exit visa. It was marked valid until December 1, 1962.

Obtaining the permission of the Soviet Government to leave may have been facilitated by a conference which Marina had, at her own request, with a high MVD official, probably a Colonel Asenov, sometime in late 1961. She has testified that she applied for the conference and believes that it was granted her because her uncle with whom she had lived in Minsk before her marriage, Colonel Prusakov, was a high MVD official. She has commented also that Oswald tried to arrange such a conference himself and was turned down.

The Oswalds did not finally leave Russia until May 1962. The six-month delay was caused primarily by two facts. First, Marina's application for an American visa ran into difficulties when the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) at first refused to waive the provisions of Section 243(g) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act in her case. Ultimately, at the behest of the Department of State, the INS reversed its decision on this point and consented to waive the provisions. Second, the Oswalds' child, June Lee, was born on February 15, and the Oswalds wanted to wait until the baby had gained a little weight before taking it on such a long trip. There was also some difficulty about obtaining an affidavit from a propertied person in the United States to

the effect that Marina, if admitted, would not become a ward of the state, and some additional difficulties in obtaining financing for the Oswalds' travels. The financing was ultimately provided by a repatriation loan of slightly under $500 from the Department of State.

Two questions are raised by the foregoing narrative. First, it can be argued that the Soviet permission for both Marina and her husband to leave was granted in a suspiciously short time. Second, it can be argued that the fact that Marina was ever permitted to leave the Soviet Union simply because she had married an American national, is extraordinary and therefore suspicious. The questions raised are obviously interrelated: if it is extraordinary for a wife ever to be given permission to accompany her husband out of the country, then any time at all within which this permission is granted is "suspiciously short." Nosenko in commenting on this point said that Soviet law since the death of Stalin has permitted a wife to emigrate freely with her husband, provided only that she has not had access to information which would endanger the security of the State. Oswald told the FBI in July 1962, just after he returned to the United States, that he had been interviewed by the MVD only twice, once when he first came to Russia and once just before he departed. If true, this tends to confirm what Nosenko states; the outgoing interview may have been part of the attempt to ascertain whether Marina had had any kind of access to "classified" information. We have asked the CIA to comment upon this point, and its response is as follows:

"6. So far as we are able to determine, there is no Soviet law which would prevent a Soviet citizen married to a foreign national from accompanying his or her spouse from the USSR. This situation is also believed to have existed at the time of the OSWALDS' departure from the Soviet Union in 1962. In practice, however, permission for a Soviet wife to accompany her foreign national husband abroad is rarely given. In almost every case available for our review, the foreign national was obliged to depart the USSR alone and either return to escort his wife out, or arrange for her exit while he was still abroad. In some cases, the wife was never granted permission to leave. The majority of cases reviewed involve foreign students, exchange teachers, and other relatively transient persons, and while a number of cases have certain points in common, they bear little similarity to the OSWALD case; none involved a defector who married prior to repatriating. CE2762

"7. The time lapse involved in Soviet processing of the OSWALDs' departure documentation appears to be normal. Marina began assembling the documents necessary for an exit visa in May 1961, and both OSWALDs actually applied on 20 August 1961, according to Marina's statement and OSWALS's diary. Marina's exit visa was issued at the time her new passport was issued, 11 January 1962, although she had been informed by Soviet authorities about 1 January 1962 that the visa would be issued. Lee OSWALD's exit visa was not issued until 22 May 1962, although he, too, apparently had been told in early January 1962 that the visa would be granted. The time lapse between actual application and notice of approval was over four months. By way of comparison, some Soviet wives have been held in the USSR for years, while in two specific cases involving Swedish national husbands, the Soviet wives were processed out in less than four months. CE2762

The Department of State's comments on this issue are:

A. At the time that Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald left Russia for the United States was it legal and normal under Soviet law and practice for a Russian national married to an American to be able to accompany him back to his homeland?

ANSWER - The Department knows of many marriages in the Soviet Union between American citizens and Soviet citizens. Most of these involved an American citizen husband and a Soviet citizen wife. Such marriages since World War II have mostly involved American newspaper correspondents, American businessmen and tourists, and, in a few instances, employees of the American Government. In practically all of these cases the husband remained in the Soviet Union until his Soviet wife was given permission to accompany him to the United States.

In the immediate post-war period there were about fifteen marriages in which the wife had been waiting for many years for a Soviet exit permit. After the death of Stalin the Soviet Government showed a disposition to settle these cases. In the summer of 1953 permission was given for all of this group of Soviet citizen wives to accompany their American citizen husbands to the United States

Since this group was given permission to leave the Soviet Union, there have been from time to time marriages in the Soviet Union of American citizens and Soviet citizens. With one exception, it is our understanding that all of the Soviet citizens involved have been given permission to emigrate to the United States after waiting periods which were, in some cases, from three to six months and in others much longer.

B. Was the rapidity with which Lee Harvey Oswald was able to accomplish his return and Marina's return to the United States in any way unusual?

ANSWER - It does not appear to us that Mrs. Oswald's Soviet exit visa application was acted upon with unusual rapidity. On July 15, 1961 Oswald and his wife applied for Soviet exit visas. On October 4, 1961 Oswald informed the Embassy that he still had not gotten exit visas and requested Ambassador Thompson's intervention on his behalf. He related that there had been continuing attempts to intimidate his wife, apparently with the idea of forcing her to give up her plans to go to the United States. On November 1, 1961 Oswald told the Embassy that he had gone repeatedly to the Minsk officials but still had not been granted exit visas for himself and his wife. In January 1962, practically six months after the date of application (July 15, 1961), Oswald and his wife were granted Soviet exit visas.

It is difficult to generalize on the length of time required for Soviet action in such cases. There is no discernible pattern which we can find in the Soviet Government's handling of exit visa cases. The issuance of such visas is apparently subject to rather arbitrary official action. In some periods it has seemed related to the political climate between the Soviet Union and the foreign spouse's country, although this has not always been the case. In our view, for example, the issuance of exit visas in 1953 to the group of wives of American citizens mentioned above was undoubtedly part of an effort by the Soviet Government to create a favorable atmosphere between our two governments.

In the most recent case of this type a Soviet woman married an American citizen in December 1963 and received an exit visa about two months later. Such marriages cannot take place in the Soviet Union without permission of the Soviet Government. It seems probable that permission to marry in such cases is almost always tantamount to a favorable future decision to grant an exit visa since the American citizen is required to state his intention to bring his Soviet spouse back to the United States.

Since Oswald came to the Soviet Union as a defector, however, he was in a somewhat different situation. It is our judgment that the Soviet Government's granting of permission to his wife to leave the country was not considered a routine matter. We do have detailed information concerning another American defector, [redacted]. His case is somewhat different since he actually obtained Soviet citizenship and was not, therefore, classified as "stateless."

CE910

[redacted] was an employee of [redacted] assigned to work as a plastics engineer at the American National Exhibit in Moscow in the summer of 1959. He informed the Embassy on September 30, 1959, that he had decided to stay in the USSR and work. When interviewed in the presence of a Soviet official on October 17, 1959 he said he had applied for Soviet citizenship about July, 1959 and had been notified officially that Soviet citizenship had been granted by Decree of the Supreme Soviet. He received a Soviet internal citizen's passport on September 21, 1959 and the Embassy submitted to the Department a Certificate of Loss of Citizenship covering [redacted] status.

On March 3, 1960 [redacted] informed his father he would like to return home and that he had written to the Embassy about this but has received no reply. [redacted] called at the Embassy on May 4, 1960 and thereafter returned to his residence in Leningrad. He applied for an exit visa on August 5, 1960 and was informed on October 24, 1960 that his application had been refused, but that he could reapply after one year.

On March 9, 1962 the Embassy received a Soviet foreign passport (i.e., Soviet citizen's passport for travel abroad) together with an exit visa for [redacted]. A delay ensued while [redacted] U. S. visa application was being processed. He was in communication with the Embassy by telephone but after the visit on May 4, 1960 he did not visit the Embassy until May 8, 1962, when he came to get his final papers. He told the Embassy during the interview that "he was not left alone" after he had informed his family by letter about his desire to return home. He left the Soviet Union May 15, 1962.

In comparison to Oswald, it took [redacted] a year and nine months to get permission to leave the Soviet Union. His case differs in that he had been granted Soviet citizenship and was employed in an industry, plastics, for which his skills were particularly desired by the Soviet authorities. His case was also complicated by the fact that he had deserted his American wife and two children to live with a divorced Soviet woman who bore his child before his return to the U. S.

C. If possible we would appreciate a memorandum from you on the normal Soviet procedures in similar cases and the usual time periods involved, covering both emigration from Russia to the United States and emigration from Russia generally.

ANSWER - The Soviet Government is generally opposed to emigration of its citizens to foreign countries. Apparently the Soviet Government gives consideration to granting exit permits for the purpose of emigration to the United States only when the applicants wish to join members of their family.

For many years it has been extremely difficult for Soviet citizens to obtain permission to leave the Soviet Union to join relatives in the United States. In the 1930's a few such cases received favorable consideration, but it was only in the latter part of 1959 that the Soviet Union began issuing a number of exit visas in such cases. Since 1959 approximately 800 Soviet relatives of American citizens have received exit visas. This number, of course, is quite small compared to the number of those Soviet citizens who wish to come to the United States to join their relatives here.

Those who have been successful in obtaining exit visas were usually subjected to long delays before any action was taken on their applications, unlike those cases of American citizens who marry Soviet citizens while temporarily residing in the USSR.

In regard to emigration from Russia to other countries, we know that Soviet exit visas have been issued to persons desiring to join relatives in France, England, and other European countries, but we have very little information concerning the details of such emigration.

G. The Oswalds' contacts with the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., after they took up residence in the United States.

Soon after the Oswalds reached the United States in June 1962 they made contact with the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Soviet law required Marina, as a Soviet citizen living abroad, to contact her nation's Embassy and file with it certain forms. Later, the contact was continued when the Oswalds sought permission to return to the Soviet Union. The first such request was a letter written by Marina on February 17, 1963. She wrote that she wished to return to Russia, but that her husband would stay because "He is an American by nationality." She was informed on March 8, 1963 that it would take from 5 to 6 months to process the application. Later, Oswald made application to return with her.

On April 10, 1963, somebody fired a rifle at General Edwin B. Walker in his home in Dallas. We now have fairly good evidence that the man who fired the rifle was Lee Harvey Oswald. An undated note was found after the assassination which, according to Marina, was left for her by her husband at the time he shot at Walker. A translation of that note has been attached to this memorandum. The purpose of the note seems to have been to serve as a guide to Marina as to what to do and where to look for help if Oswald was caught in the assassination attempt. The second paragraph of the note mentions the "Embassy," and since this presumably means that the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., that paragraph is here quoted:

"Send the information as to what has happened to me to the Embassy and include newspaper clippings (should there be anything about me in the newspapers). I believe that the Embassy will come quickly to your assistance on learning everything."

The Soviet Union has made available to us what purports to be all of the communications between the Oswalds and the Russian Embassy in the United States. This material has been checked for codes and none has been detected. Except for the last letter which Oswald wrote to the Soviet Embassy, which will be discussed below, there is no material which gives any reason for suspicion. On April 13, 1963, the Soviet Union did ask Marina for her reason for wanting to return to the Soviet Union and suggested she visit the Embassy in Washington to discuss the matter. It is arguable that this request was strange, since she was a Soviet citizen and her passport was limited in time; however, there were certainly some reasonable grounds for requesting a face-to-face discussion, for example, whether her husband and children would be permitted to accompany her.

As will be discussed in more detail later, Oswald was in Mexico from September 26, 1963 until October 3, 1963, and while in Mexico City he made several visits to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies. Marina has testified that Oswald told her that the purpose of the trip was to try to reach Cuba by way of Mexico, thereby evading the American legal prohibitions against such travel. He was very concerned that both the trip itself and his purpose in going be kept strictly secret and cautioned Marina accordingly. Marina never admitted she had prior knowledge of the trip until almost three months after the assassination,

He seems to have written it in the hope that by inferring that he had somehow been "in on" some secret and mysterious dealings involving the Soviet Embassy in Mexico, some benefit, however small, could be salvaged from the otherwise total failure of that trip.

H. Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko

In February 1964, Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko asked for asylum in the United States. His position in the Soviet Union was that of a high official with the KGB, and he was attending a conference in Geneva at the time of his escape. In the course of his interrogation by the CIA, it turned out that he had knowledge of Oswald. His testimony in respect to Oswald was given to representatives of the FBI and passed on by the Bureau to us. A copy of the Bureau's final report on Nosenko is attached to this memorandum. Nosenko's reference to Oswald's Intourist guide and "his" impressions and evaluations of Oswald should probably be to "her" impressions and evaluations, since we know from other sources that the guide was probably a woman, Rima Shirokova.

The FBI summary of the statements of Nosenko, if true, would certainly go a long way towards showing that the Soviet Union had no part in the assassination.

I. Documentation furnished by the Soviet Government at our request

In the latter part of March the Department of State, at our request, handed Ambassador Dobrynin a letter from Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren to Secretary of State Dean Rusk requesting that the Soviet Union furnish the Commission with "further details of his /Oswald's/ activities during his residence in the Soviet Union, including copies of any official records which the Soviet authorities may find it possible to supply." The letter went on to describe seven areas of particular interest to the Commission. A copy of the letter has been attached to this memorandum so that the description of the areas of particular interest can be read in detail if this is felt to be desirable.

The response of the Soviet Government has been received. It is difficult to assess the extent to which it has complied in good faith. Some records which might have been given to us have not been, but in some cases this could very well be because they are no longer in existence. For example, no application for a tourist visa made in Helsinki, Finland, on or about October 14, 1959 was forwarded to us despite the fact that we specifically requested documents of this type; but it is entirely possible that in the more than four years which elapsed between the time when Oswald filled out this very routine document and the time of the assassination, it was destroyed in the ordinary course. There are other deficiencies in the Soviet response which are not so easily explained. The very last paragraph of the letter from Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren asks for copies of any statements, before or since the assassination of President Kennedy, volunteered by Soviet citizens who knew Lee Harvey Oswald during his

residency in the Soviet Union which related to one of the aforementioned seven areas of particular interest or which "might otherwise be of interest to the Commission." No such volunteer statements were forwarded to us by the Soviet Government. A second possibly suspicious circumstance we have observed is that a very high percentage of the signatures other than Oswald's on the documents are stated by our translators to be illegible or missing.

This kind of verification has been rendered impossible, either accidentally or on purpose, in the documents given to us. We have asked the CIA's opinion on this point, but so far have not received it.

J. An Overall Assessment of the Likelihood of Soviet Involvement

The Commission has been able to gather an impressively large amount of material on Lee Harvey Oswald's life in Russia and in the United States after he returned from Russia, and a considerable amount of material on Marina as well. Much of this has been examined in this memorandum, and over the last few months virtually all of it has been analyzed in detail by members of the staff of the Commission or by one or more of the various investigatory or intelligence agencies of the

Federal government. Our conclusion, as already stated, is that all the "Russian" evidence is consistent with Lee Harvey Oswald's having been substantially what he purported to be and no more, that is, it is consistent with his not being an agent of the Russian government.

The fact that the evidence on Oswald's life in Russia is consistent with the conclusion just stated is of course highly important; however, this alone is not sufficient reason to conclude that Oswald was in fact not a Russian agent. A high proportion of all the evidence on Lee Harvey Oswald which relates to his travel to and life in Russia derives from sources that could have been fabricated or otherwise falsified. The main sources of such evidence are his own statements after he returned to the United States, the letters he wrote from Russia to members of his family, Marina's statements to friends after she came to America and her testimony to the Commission, and all sorts of writings and documents dating from the Russian period or shortly thereafter. All of these sources could have been put together by the KGB or be the result of its careful "coaching."

The question therefore rises, How are we to access whether or not what we know as Oswald's "real life" is not just a "legend" designed by the KGB and consistently lived out by Oswald thereafter?

[redacted]

We are therefore forced to fall back upon Oswald himself, and ask, from all we have learned about him -- literally from his infancy until the day of his death -- whether he was

the kind of man who could successfully have lived out such a legend. Our conclusion is that in all probability he could not.

The picture of Oswald that emerges from all of the evidence the staff has gathered is that of a man of average or possibly better than average intelligence, but with a mind that was confused, dogmatic, and unused to the discipline of logical thought. For example, his political writings, when read closely, are seen to be little more than a series of vague assertions that something or other "must" be done in this way or that way. The spelling and grammar are uniformly bad. Some of Oswald's employers found him to be an adequate worker; these seem to have been those who used him for very unskilled work. On more responsible jobs he did not fare as well. When he worked for the William B. Reilly Company as a mechanic he was very unsatisfactory. The instructions he wrote out for his own guidance on the job are almost totally un-understandable, and the employer has stated that Oswald's reports were just as bad. He seems to have been overly resentful of orders or corrections given him by his supervisors on the job. This last characteristic also manifested itself during his service in the Marine Corps. (On one relatively skilled job, however, he seems to have performed reasonably well. In the early part of 1963 he worked in the photographic Department for the Jaguars-Childs-Stovall Company and got along relatively well. He was discharged after a few months because the company found it necessary to let some of its workers go and chose Oswald rather than other men they had taken on at about the same time because he did not get along with his fellow workers very well.)

His sense of the practical seems to have been deficient. For example, he always fashioned himself a potential leader and resented the fact that circumstances compelled him to do menial work. Yet he never took the necessary steps to complete his high school education and obtain a diploma, so that he might be hired for a better job and utilize the normal skills possessed by a high school graduate. Likewise, he never made any serious attempts to acquire any kind of post-high school education. He made one or two tries at setting himself up as a Russian interpreter or translator but apparently never pursued the matter very far. So far as we know he never earned a penny in either capacity. For several weeks in the late summer of 1963 he occupied himself with an elaborate scheme for hijacking an airplane to Cuba, and at one time he was trying to work Marina and the baby into the plan as well. Some time during 1963 he told Marina he would one day be the "Premier" of Cuba and became angry when she chided him for such an impractical ambition.

In sum, we believe that Oswald did not have any subtleness of mind, that he lacked a good understanding of human nature and that he had an unstable and neurotic character. We do not believe that such a man could have lived out a "legend" so successfully that the combined resources of the Commission, the Secret Service, CIA and the FBI could not have uncovered major discrepancies in it.

III. Involvement by Cuba.

Our Suspicion that the Cuban government might have been involved in the assassination is based upon four facts. First, Lee harvey Oswald publicly identified himself with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee and was an avowed admirer of the Castro government. Second, shortly before the

assassination, between September 26 and October 3, 1963, he travelled to Mexico City and while there made frequent contact with the Cuban Consulate. Third, the Cuban government had ample reason to dislike and distrust the government of the United States and the late President in particular. Fourth, the Commission itself and the various Federal investigatory agencies which have assisted it in its work have received many letters and been approached by several persons who claim to have seen or heard acts which directly or indirectly link the assassination to the Castro government. We will touch upon all but the third of these four factors in this section of the memorandum. The antipathy of the Cuban government needs no elaboration.

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba Committee activities and his contacts with Mr. Vincent T. Lee, the former head of that Committee, have been thoroughly investigated. The results of these investigations are that Oswald's so-called "organizational activities" on behalf of the Committee in and around New Orleans were almost entirely a fiction, which he himself created. He carried a card which showed him to be a member of the New Orleans chapter of the Fair Play For Cuba Committee, the President of which was "A. J. Hidell." No such man as "A. J. Hidell" has been located nor is there any evidence that he exists. Marina testifies that the name was made up by her husband and that he probably chose it because it rhymed with his hero, "Fidel" (Castro). The little bit of correspondence between Oswald and the national headquarters for the Fair Play For Cuba Committee in New York City, headed by Vincent T. Lee, discloses that Oswald applied for membership, was welcomed, later informed Lee that he

intended to create an active organization in New Orleans and asked for advice in doing so, Lee replied with cautious encouragement, pointing out the difficulties, Oswald wrote another letter saying he was going to go ahead anyway, and that was about all. We have no evidence that any money ever went from New York or anywhere else to Oswald for his use in these activities nor was any representative of national headquarters or any place else ever sent down to guide him. Further, he apparently never created an organization and was never even given a charter authorizing him to do so.

Marina testifies that much of Oswald's Fair Play For Cuba Committee activities, at least late in the summer of 1963, seemed to have been performed with the intent of proving to the Cuban government that he /Oswald/ was "a friend of Cuba," in the belief that he would thereby further his chances of reaching that country and being accepted by it. In other words, Lee Oswald was probably trying to reenact the defection to and acceptance by Russia which he had so successfully accomplished in 1959, only this time shifting the scene of action to Cuba.

The trip to Mexico is not so easily disposed of. Oswald departed New Orleans, in great secrecy, probably about noon on September 25 and perhaps a day earlier, and he crossed the Mexican border at Nuevo Laredo on September 26. His bus arrived in Mexico City at about 10:00 a. m. on September 27. We have rather firm information that he set out immediately on a series of visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in that city, spending almost his entire first 2 days at one or another of these two places or in making arrangements to visit one or the other.

(One arrangement he made, for example, was to have passport photographs taken, for use in his application for a Cuban visa.) By late Saturday afternoon, September 28, however, he had pretty much hit a blank wall at both embassies.

The Cuban Embassy had even more firmly informed him that he could not get an "in-transit" visa to visit Cuba unless he could first show them a visa to visit Russia, so he was left with very little to do with either Embassy

At the Cuban Embassy he even got into a fight with the Consul, Eusebio Asque, because he insisted so strongly that as a "friend of Cuba's," he ought to be given a visa. So from Sunday through Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mexico City on a bus bound for the United States, apparently about all he did -- or all that we know about what he did -- was to make his travel arrangements, see the sights of the city and

Our evidence that the events set out in the foregoing paragraph occurred is solid. It is obtained from several sources, the most important being the direct testimony of Senora Silvia Duran, the Mexican clerk at the Cuban Embassy who dealt with Oswald,

The question is not whether

these events occurred, but whether they were perhaps only a cover-up for other, more sinister activities going on at the same time. This is where the various rumors and claims of conspiracy come into consideration. Some of them will be considered in detail later, but at this point it is enough to say that they almost all boil down to some sort of allegation that the Cubans passed money to Oswald while he was in Mexico City, as payment for assassinating the President. We have been informed by the Central Intelligence Agency that rumors focusing around a large amount of money having been handed to Oswald while he was in Mexico City (the most commonly mentioned sum was $5,000) were current in Mexico City almost immediately after the assassination. The fact that these rumors were current should be kept in mind in assessing the information which follows.

In order that the Commission may directly assess some of the important bits of evidence bearing upon Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and Russian Embassies, we have attached hereto two documents.

We have also recopied the essentials of the statement made by Silvia Duran, the Mexican employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City who dealt with Oswald, when she was questioned by the Mexican police shortly after the assassination.

Her statement, as forwarded to us by the Mexican government, is as follows:

"That as the speaker has already stated, she has been a sympathizer of socialism and Marsist doctrine for several years, having studied philosophy and existentialism, and particularly she has sympathized since its inception and sympahtizes with the Cuban Revolution. That approximately three months ago she began to occupy the position of Secretary to the Cuban Consul in this city, Mr. EUSEBIO ASCUE... having had under her responsibility the administrative operation and preparing the visas which are issued, as well as handling the applications for such visas which invariably are sent to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Government of Cuba, for its approval, ... That the speaker does not belong to any political party and never has attended manifestations or meetings, nor has she given lectures or speeches, which her husband has done, since he has written several articles for the newspaper 'El Dia' (The Day) (pro-communist Spanish language newspaper published in Mexico City); that she has never been arrested for any reason, not even on the occasion of the vist to Mexico of Mr. JOHN F. KENNEDY, which caused her a great deal of personal satisfaction because of the benefits which it would represent to the country...

"...its having been only that night that they/she and her husband/ read in the extra (edition) the news relating thereto, and subsequently on the radio at her residence she heared the name of LEE HARVEY OSWALD, which caused her to remember that this name refers to a North American who in the last days of September or the first days of the month of October of the present year appeared at the Cuban Consulate and applied for a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia and based his application on his presentation of his passport in which it was recorded that he had been living in the latter country for a period of three years, his work permit from that same country written in the Russian language and letters in the same language, as well as proof of his being married to a woman of Russian nationality and being the apparent Director in the city of New Orleans of the organization called 'Fair Play for Cuba' with the desire that he should be accepted as a 'friend' of the Cuban Revolution, as a result of which the speaker, in compliance with her duties, received all of his data and filled out the appropriate application, and he left to return in the afternoon, this time with his photographs, and the speaker, recognizing that she exceeded her duties, semiofficially called the

"Russian Consulate by telephone because of her interest in facilitating the handling of the Russian visa for LEE HARVEY OSWALD, but from there they answered her that the operation would require approximately four months, which annoyed the applicant, since as he affirmed he was in a great hurry to obtain the visas which would permit him to travel to Russia, insisting that he was entitled to them because of his background and his partisanship and personal activities in favor of the Cuban movement, the declarant's not being able to specify because she does not remember whether or not he said that he was a member of the Communist Party, but that his wife, of Russian nationality, was at that time in the city of New York from where she would follow him, although his place of origin was the aforementioned city of New Orleans; that as soon as OSWALD understood that it was not possible to give him a Cuban visa without his previously obtaining a Russian one, because the former was for transit, he became highly agitated and angry, as a result of which the speaker called Consul ASCUE, who, at that time, was in his private office in company of his ultimate replacement, MIRAVAL, but came out and began to argue in English with OSWALD in a very angry manner and ASCUE concluded by saying to him that, 'As far as he was concerned, he would not give him a visa,' and that 'A person like him, in place of aiding the Cuban Revolution, was doing it harm,' its being noted that in their discussion they had been referring to the Russian socialist revolution and not the Cuban, its being stated by OSWALD that he had two reasons to request the visa with urgency, which were, one, that his permit to be in Mexico was expiring and the other that he had urgent necessity of reaching Russia; that in spite of the argument the speaker handed to OSWALD a piece of paper similar to that which she writes at this time in which she recorded her name, 'SILVIA DURAN,' and the telephone number of the Consulate, which is '11-28-47,' and, at any rate, she initiated the handling of his visa application by sending it to the Cuban Ministry of (Foreign) Affairs, from which a reply was received in the normal manner some fifteen to thirty days later approving the issuance of a visa, but conditioning it on his previously obtaining the Russian (one), although she does not recall whether OSWALD subsequently called her or not on the telephone for the Consulate which she had given him; that all of the conversation which the speaker had with OSWALD, as well as that of Consul

"ASCUE with him, was in the English language since he did not speak any Spanish, and that upon seeing his photograph which appears in today's newspapers, specifically in the newspaper 'El Dia,' she immediately recognized and identified it as being the same person that she has been referring to as LEE HARVEY OSWALD. . ."

It should be noted that Senora Duran testified that Oswald made formal application for a visa, that he furnished her with photographs taken of himself in Mexico City, that she filled out the visa application on the basis of documents Oswald had in his possession, and that authorization to issue a visa, conditional upon his first obtaining a Russian visa, was in fact obtained by her office sometime late in October. We have forwarded a request to the Cuban government to document Senora Duran's claims. If the Cuban government does furnish us with documents purporting to fulfill Senora Duran's claims, we have excellent means at our disposal for authenticating them. For example, Oswald's handwriting and his photographs are two obvious methods of authentication. In addition, we have what we believe are some of the documents he had in his possession when he was in Mexico City, presumably the documents from which Senora Duran took the information to fill out his visa application, so this too should constitute an excellent method of authentication.

For about a month and one-half prior to the assassination Lee Harvey Oswald had a room of his own in a rooming house at 1026 North Beckley Street in Dallas. He ordinarily stayed there during the week and visited Marina on weekends at the home of Mr. and Mr. Michael Paine in Irving, Texas, where she was staying with the children. The resident manager of the rooming house at North Beckley Street, Mrs. Earline Roberts, has testified to representatives of the FBI that on one or two occasions Oswald ended

telephone conversations with the word, "Adios." Mrs. Roberts' statements on this subject infer that these conversations were carried on in some foreign language described by her as "German or Russian." From this it in turn can be inferred that the conversations alluded to were with Marina, because they would have been in Russian, and we have other evidence, which is quite firm, that he telephoned Marina almost every night. If this is the case, then the fact that he signed off with the word "Adios" has no particular significance. When Marina testified to the Commission she said that she does remember her husband occasionally using that term. If, however, the word "Adios" was used during an English-language conversation, we have, perhaps, an important unexplained piece of evidence. Mrs. Roberts is scheduled to be requestioned on this point.



[redacted]. Unfortunately, however, although the means of investigation at our disposal in Mexico have in our opinion been stretched to the utmost, there still remain gaps in our knowledge of what Oswald did while he was there. Essentially, for Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, September 29 through October 2, we can fill in only about five or six hours of his time, plus whatever time he slept. The final answer to the meaning of the Mexican trip, therefore, will probably never be given.

Finally, before ending our discussion of possible Cuban involvement, we would like to set forth in summary fashion some of the rumors and allegations of Cuban conspiracies which have come to our attention. In our opinion, only two are sufficiently serious to merit a detailed statement. These are summarized below. The other rumors are very briefly summarized, and references to the basic FBI [redacted] sources dealing with them are given, in an appendix hereto.

1. Statement of Pedro Gutierrez Valencia.

On December 2, 1963 Senor Pedro Gutierrez Valencia wrote a letter to President Johnson, in Spanish, in which he stated that in the course of his duties as a credit investigator for a large department store in Mexico City he was in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on September 30, 1963 or October 1, 1963 for the purpose of conducting an investigation of one of its employees. The letter went on to say that as he was leaving the embassy he overheard a heated discussion in English between two men, one a Cuban and the other an American, in which he could understand only the words, "Castro," "Cuba," and "Kennedy." The Cuban was counting out

American dollars, which he eventually passed to the American, and both men stepped into an automobile which, from the fact that the Cuban opened the door with a key extracted from his own pocket and himself got into the driver's seat, Gutierrez concluded belonged to the Cuban. Gutierrez' suspicions were aroused, so he doubled back around the corner to get into his own automobile to follow the two men. However, by the time he was able to do this they had driven off and he lost sight of them. After the assassination, from observing pictures in the Mexico City newspapers of Lee Harvey Oswald, Gutierrez claimed that he recognized the American as being Oswald.

The FBI in Mexico City has taken the primary responsibility for investigating this situation. Senor Gutierrez has been thoroughly checked, and all the evidence points to his being sincere, trustworthy and disinterested. He has favorably impressed all the FBI men who have worked with him, and he has devoted much time to trying to help our investigation of what he saw and has never asked for any kind of compensation. The representatives of the FBI are convinced that he is sincere. However, his identification of the American he allegedly saw as Lee Harvey Oswald has not stood up well under intensive analysis. All the usual methods for confirming an identification have been gone through, detailed physical description, identification of photographs of Oswald's from among photographs of other men, description of the manner in which he saw what he claims to have seen, etc. It now appears that Gutierrez saw the "American" distinctly only from the rear and once, very fleetingly, face-to-face. He never observed him in profile. What happened was this:

Gutierrez came around a corner of a wall and bumped into the Cuban who was talking with the American, thereby seeing them both for a split second face-to-face. He apologized, the Cuban graciously accepted the apology, and all three men immediately continued walking in their respective directions. When he overheard their conversation, however, which must have been resumed almost instantaneously, Gutierrez turned around to get another look. Thus, he got a good look only of the backs of both men. Likewise, when he followed them to their automobile, he saw them only from a distance and again only their backs. The conclusion of the FBI representatives assigned to this case is that Gutierrez probably did see money being passed to a man who appeared to be an American, but that whether that man was Lee Harvey Oswald is by no means certain.

[redacted]

The Cuban and Russian Consulates in Mexico City are located very close to one another, only