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# Hanoi Demanded Rule In South, Kissinger Says

## 2 of Foe's 9 Points Blocked Settlement

By Carroll Kilpatrick

Washington Post Staff Writer

Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that 30 months of secret negotiations with North Vietnamese officials foundered on the demand that the United States cooperate in turning South Vietnam over to the Communists.

In a rare and lengthy news conference, the President's national security adviser gave\*

details of his efforts, told how he flew secretly to the Paris meetings with French government cooperation, and how his efforts finally ended in apparent failure.

Time after time, agreement seemed possible. Substantial agreement finally was reached on seven of the nine-point Hanoi plan. But two issues blocked a settlement, he said in a well-attended news conference at the White House.

The two "contentious" issues that continue to block agreement, he said, involve withdrawal of American forces and a political settlement.

With respect to withdrawal, he said Hanoi insisted that the United States get out of Vietnam "unilaterally" on a date certain regardless of whether the U.S. prisoners of war have been returned.

The Communists defined "withdrawal" as the removal of all American equipment, economic aid and all American arms held by the South Vietnamese army, Kissinger said, adding that this would mean the collapse of the Saigon government.

On the political question, Hanoi wanted the United States "to negotiate the terms of the turnover to them, regardless of what the people (of South Vietnam) may think," he argued.

"There has been no issue of greater concern" to the administration than ending the war, said Kissinger, speaking with considerable emotion. "Composing the domestic disharmony" caused by the war "is a very major objective of our entire policy," he said.

In approaching the North Vietnamese in secret in Paris, no effort was made to score debating points, he said. He told Hanoi that the United States wanted "to make a settlement that takes account of your sacrifices and of your concerns." He said this country had gone "to the limits of possible generosity" and has fully taken into account Hanoi's proposals.

But Kissinger said that Hanoi wanted the United States to cooperate in guaranteeing North Vietnam a military and political victory. "They want us to accomplish for them what they seem not confident of being able to achieve for themselves," he said.

Kissinger emphasized, as President Nixon did in his television address Tuesday, that the United States offered to get out within six months if

prisoners of war were released in the same period.

Last summer, while the administration was being denounced for not fixing a date

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*Kissinger gives some details about Paris trips. A22.*

### KISSINGER, From A1

certain for withdrawal, the United States offered a total withdrawal by Aug. 1, 1972, if an agreement on ending the war were reached by Nov. 1, 1971, Kissinger said.

In October, the President modified the proposal to agree to leave within six months after an agreement was signed.

Kissinger said that the President was willing to negotiate only a military settlement, but that Hanoi insisted on linking the military and political settlement.

Asked what could happen now, Kissinger said the United States is ready to resume secret or public negotiations, that the war must be settled some day by negotiations and that it is just possible the publicity generated by the President's disclosures may prompt Hanoi to bargain.

There was an "enormous step-up" in North Vietnamese infiltration of South Vietnam in December, Kissinger said.

"We believe that we can contain the offensive, and that it is even possible, maybe even probable, that the reason they make the offensive is as a prelude to a subsequent negotiation," he said. "This at least has been their pattern in 1954 and was their pattern in 1968."

The famous Tet offensive of 1968, which began Jan. 30, was followed by President Johnson's partial bombing halt and Hanoi's agreement to negotiate in Paris.

Tet starts Feb. 15 this year, and there have been repeated predictions of another Communist offensive at about that time, corresponding with the dry season.

When a reporter, noting Kissinger's secret trips to Paris and his secret trip last July to Peking, asked if he had been in Hanoi, he said that he had not been there during the Nixon administration. He went once during the Johnson administration as a peace-seeking emissary but not as an official.

Questioned about how he was able to slip in and out of Paris, he said he flew to American bases in Europe, then transferred "once or

twice," winding up at some "little-used air fields near Paris."

He said he did not want to give all the details "because we may want to do it again."

Kissinger said he had made 12 visits to Paris, not 13 as the President's remarks indicated. Six of these were last year.

On May 31, when the administration was under strong attack for not agreeing to a withdrawal of all American forces, he made the first such offer, he said, coupling it with the promise of an exchange of POW's.

But Hanoi rejected the plan, arguing that any proposal that did not include political elements could not be negotiated, he said.

"So our attempt to negotiate the military issue separately was simply rejected," Kissinger recounted. "It is the other side that has insisted that the only possible proposal is one that includes the political elements."

At the next private meeting, June 26, Hanoi put forward its nine-point plan, linking political and military issues. Four days later, the Vietcong published their seven-point peace plan.

While there are many similarities between the two plans there are also differences, he said, and Hanoi suggested he work from the nine-point secret plan.

The plan Mr. Nixon announced Tuesday contained eight points in reply to Hanoi's nine, he said, leaving out the Communist demand that the United States pay reparations. However, the President promised "a massive reconstruction program for all Indochina in which North Vietnam could share to the extent of several billion dollars," Kissinger reported.

He said the administration would not agree to pay reparations as part of a peace settlement.

"If you want to know why do we have eight points, why are they complex, why did we follow them in this sequence, it is our attempt not to be complicated but our attempt to be conciliatory," he said. "It is our attempt to go the extra mile."

In the Oct. 11 plan, which Mr. Nixon described Tuesday and which Hanoi has never commented on, the United States shortened the deadline for total troop withdrawal to six months, described how the political process would operate in South Vietnam and reported that President Nguyen Van Thieu and Vice President Tran Van Huong would resign a month before the elections, Kissinger said.

At his press conference, the national security adviser said that the electoral commission, which would be set up under the plan to supervise the elections, would include all political forces in South Vietnam, including the Communists.

The commission would have "sole responsibility" for organizing and supervising the elections and the government

would have no responsibility or power regarding the elections, he said.

Calling the North Vietnamese "masters in ambiguity," Kissinger said that in the months "we were negotiating the nine points . . . they were lacerating us (in public) for not responding to the seven points."

Kissinger said Americans were returning from Paris declaring that if the United States would make a simple proposal for a military settlement "this would unlock the door." But at the same time North Vietnamese negotiators were insisting privately upon a full political and military settlement, he said.

"We are prepared, in all conscience and in all seriousness to negotiate . . . Immediately any scheme that any rea-

sonable person can say leaves open the political future of South Vietnam to the people," Kissinger said.

"We are prepared to have political process in which (the Communists) can have a chance of winning."

Kissinger said it was apparent to those who have negotiated with the North Vietnamese that Le Duc Tho, a North Vietnamese politburo member, is the one person who has authority to negotiate. Xuan Thuy, the chief Hanoi delegate in the absence of Tho, does not, he said.

The President said in his address that Kissinger met seven times with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy and five times alone with Xuan Thuy. Hanoi canceled the Nov. 20 meeting on the grounds that Le Duc Tho was ill.