The Washington Post OUTLOOK
SUNDAY,

Who Turned the

By Robert E. Hunter

A Washington writer, Hunter is the author of "Security in Europe" and "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East."

IN THE PAST few months, we have had evidence of a basic change in the administration's view of the world, and particularly of Soviet-American relations. According to this view, the Russians are challenging U.S. naval superiority in the Mediterranean; they tried to test American will to resist new activity in Cuba; they are now dragging their feet in the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) while they rush ahead in the arms race, and they are stalling on Berlin while they are trying to divide the Western alliance.

This amounts to an effort to view the world with the outdated and discredited attitudes of the Cold War.

Since the Cuban missile crisis and the careful elaboration of second-strike nuclear forces by the United States and the Soviet Union, we have seen truly hopeful progress toward détente in several areas of our relationship. Unlike the short-lived "Spirit of Geneva" in 1955, this détente is based on firm ground.

Both Moscow and Washington have become fully aware that nuclear war would be mutual suicide, and both have learned to accept that their relations do not have to be dealt with as one package but can be understood and negotiated piece by piece. As a result, tensions have gone down in Europe; there is general agreement on the limits of superpower activity in the Middle East; Vietnam has been more or less isolated from U.S.-Soviet relations, and the SALT talks have got under way at long last.

Nor have various shocks to the growth of U.S.-Soviet understanding in any one part of the world had much effect in other parts. Détente continued in Europe despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia, although Western expectations of change in East Europe had to be lowered. And the SALT talks were virtually unaffected either by our invasion of Cambodia or Russian cheating in Egypt.

In short, Washington and Moscow have learned to split up their relations into separate pockets, each of which represents real conflicts of interest or, as in the case of the arms race or Middle East warfare, a real common interest to prevent disaster. This is what it means to end a cold war: no longer do contending powers have to see their relations as all-encompassing. Where negotiation or accommodation is possible, it takes place; where differences of view or interest are irreconcilable, they persist without detracting from those areas of possible understanding.

A Changed Situation

THIS IS THE situation that obtained until the early part of this year. It enshrined the most hopeful developments since World War II, and all was set for negotiations designed to strengthen understanding wherever possible and perhaps even to resolve political problems in one or more areas of the world.

This situation has now changed and, in the view of the administration, the Russians have been chiefly responsible because of new efforts to test American resolve or to exploit growing military power.

The case against the Russians is familiar to any newspaper reader. But what does he know of the case that has to be made against our government's handling of the same circumstances? It is tempting to say that

Cold War Back On?



"From all I've heard, the dove hasn't got this beauty contest locked up by any means!"

this handling of events has simply been amateurish, but it is worse than that. It is nothing less than the re-emergence of the attitudes and even much of the rhetoric that characterized the darkest days of the Cold War.

This autumn, the Soviet Union has been particularly dilatory in pursuing an agreement at Helsinki. Yet our role in making agreement difficult has also to be accounted for. We have to realize that the great spurt in nuclear weaponry since SALT began has taken place as much on the U.S. side as on the Soviet, with its mammoth arsenal of SS-9 rockets.

Two days after SALT began last April, we began installing Minuteman III missiles, and in June we began equipping them with multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Before discounting this move as simply another American bargaining counter, we should remember that Soviet *testing* of multiple warheads—mainly of the unguided "shotgun" warhead that our Polaris missiles have had for years—is among the principal factors causing us so much anguish about Russian intentions.

Even more damning, however, was the Defense Department's revelation July 9 that the Soviet Union had halted construction of SS-9s for six to nine months. It may be that the Russians were only experiencing difficulties in production of the SS-9 and its silos, but it could have been an effort to signal a de facto end to the land-based missile race in order to speed agreement at SALT.

This possibility was never tested by the administration; indeed, the fact of Soviet restraint was carefully concealed from the American public and, more particularly, from the Senate. The Senate thus debated both the

Brook resolution on a MIRV moratorium and the second phase of the ABM without knowing that the Soviet Union had made no new starts on SS-9 construction since before the SALT talks began. If the Russians were trying to signal something, therefore, they would have good reason to distrust the intentions of our government.

In any event, we have surely strengthened the hand of those people in the Kremlin who do not wish the arms race to come to an end—which, in turn, has strengthened the hand of their counterparts in this country. And now we are certain to see the arms race go on to higher levels, probably including MIRVs on both sides, even if we do eventually reach agreement.

The Linkage Theory

AT THE SAME time, the administration has revived the idea of "linkage"—the theory that the entire Soviet-American relationship must be seen as a "seamless web," and that progress at SALT must parallel progress in other areas of our relationship. This is an unfortunate view that undermines the basic learning experience of the 1960s: the compartmentalizing of problems so that some, at least, can be solved.

Ending the arms race is surely the easiest feat to accomplish among all those facing us, partly because it is so much in our mutual self-interest and partly because Moscow and Washington have most of the political cards in their hands alone. Linkage, therefore, is not only likely to have little or no effect on such problems as the Middle East or Berlin; it is also likely to reduce the chances that anything positive willl come out of SALT.

See COLD, Page B4, Column 1

COLD, From Page B1

SALT must be seen not as a bargaining process where the Russians' supposed greater interest in reaching an agreement can be used to settle other political problems. Either Washington and Moscow will work together to end the arms race, or it simply will not end.

This was always the basic weakness in arguments that the ABM would be a "bargaining chip" at SALT. We now have the chip, yet SALT has slowed down, the arms race continues and there is new worry about the influence of Soviet military opinion within the Kremlin.

Linkage has other dimensions, as well. There have been hints from the administration that Russian cheating in Egypt has called into question whether Moscow can be trusted to keep an arms agreement. But this line of reasoning entirely misses the point.

In the first place, the Russians (or Egypt) were caught cheating, and therefore would know that they would be caught if they cheated on a SALT agreement, where the stakes would be much higher. Second, there can be no comparison between missiles for the defense of Egypt, where there are complications involving Moscow's relations with its client states, and missiles in the central arms race. And third, in both instances we are talking about self-interest, not altruism.

Quite simply, if the Russians do not find it in their self-interest to stop the central arms race, then there won't be any agreement at SALT in any case. Indeed, one has to look no further than Soviet self-interest to explain both Moscow's failure to prevent cheating in Egypt and its likely good behavior in implementing a SALT agreement.

Finally, the most telling evidence of the administration's frame of mind on linkage came after the recent raids on North Vietnam. There were hints that the raids were in line with an argument put forward by the White House earlier this year: that being unpredictable has its value. But even more, the raids were interpreted as warnings to the Russians that agreements have to be lived up to, such as the Soviet-American agreement over Cuba.

This view paralleled the President's comments in July justifying the invasion of Cambodia on the grounds of protecting Soviet awareness of U.S. will. But to anyone who appreciates both the insignificant role the Soviet Union plays in the Vietnam war and the compartmentalizing of problems in the world generally, the logic of this view—not to say its politics—is beyond comprehension.

The Base in Cuba

IF THIS is the administration's attitude, should we be surprised that the Russians might try to be a bit "unpredictable" as well? This question may give meaning to the events, still not particularly clear, that took place in Cuba this autumn.

Needless to say, the stationing of a Soviet facility for servicing nuclear submarines in the Western Hemisphere would do little if anything to erode America's second-strike capability. It is true that if the Russians were able to increase their hunter-killer submarine capacity radically by having a base in Cuba, some of our Polaris submarines might be in jeopardy. But can anyone take seriously the prospect that, short of madness, the Russians will go for a true first-strike capability? As the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has emphasized, the idea of either side's ever getting such a capability is simply out of the question.

What happened in Cuba was important, if at all, in the realm of politics and what is referred to as "will." The latter is a curious subject, and one on which the United States is strangely lacking in self-confidence. Perhaps in the 1950s there was some



"I felt real good, got up and clicked my heels together — too vigorously, I guess."

reason to worry that the Russians might underestimate U.S. willingness to defend its vital interests, but the Cuban missile crisis surely dispelled that view.

Most importantly, we need to realize that the Russians will ape our behavior as a great power in every way they can. After the Cuban missile crisis, they increased the size and range of their fleet. So, too, the size of their Mediterranean squadron after the Six-Day War (a squadron that is still a military nonentity compared with the U.S. Sixth Fleet) indicated that we had had a capability to intervene in that conflict and Moscow did not.

In America, we have a peculiar aversion to looking at the other side of our concern with strength. We never want to negotiate from weakness, but, then, who does? But can we distinguish between strength and superiority? If we cannot, we surely cannot expect the Russians to do so, either.

To this end, cries of anguish about the Russians turning the Mediterranean into a Soviet lake, when this is a patent absurdity, will only reinforce those people in the Kremlin who wish to match our attitude toward the role of superiority. This is the stuff of which arms races are made.

This problem applies equally in the strategic nuclear field. The Russians may be ahead of us in land-based missiles, but they are still inferior in every other form of nuclear power. Our missiles are more accurate, we have more Polaris submarines, we are working on a better ABM and we are already deploying the MIRV. In fact, in terms of the number of deliverable nuclear warheads, we have taken the lead in the arms race in the last year, not the Russians, for all of their SS-9s.

The Berlin Issue

WE ARE ALSO now seeing the revival of the Berlin issue as a matter of symbolic importance. Years ago, this may have been a valid exercise, since there were few understandings between ourselves and the Russians on other problems. But now these understandings do exist, particularly on the arms race but also including the need to preserve the strategic status quo in Europe.

Unfortunately, we are again looking for symbols when there are matters of substance at hand. This latest round of concern over Berlin began as a problem of reassuring ourselves that Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik would not get out of hand. In addition, the West German electorate needed reassurance that the Soviet Union would have to pay a price in Berlin for the Soviet-West German treaty; and there was some value in letting the Russians know once again that the political undermining of the NATO alliance would not succeed.

But it is a long jump from these arguments to an effort to make the Berlin problem the sine qua non for considering not just Ostpolitik but also all other matters of European security and perhaps even SALT. Some linkage of issues directly germane to overall West European concerns (not just those of West Germany) may have been advisable. But by making Berlin the key—in particular, the key to the holding of a European security conference that could help legitimate East-West contacts—we are only making it more difficult to achieve progress anywhere. We have simply chosen the wrong link—the most intractable problem—to support our allies' interest in SALT and European detente.

The U.S. government also seems to be forgetting in part the simple lesson that the Communist world is no longer a monolith; linking events in Vietnam

to Soviet actions elsewhere is clear evidence of this forgetfulness. But we are also misleading ourselves in seeing disturbances on access routes to Berlin as evidence of Soviet intentions. If anything, these disturbances are evidence of East German efforts to thwart Soviet moves toward easing tensions with West Europe.

Perhaps the U.S. government wishes to control the pace and the character of these Soviet moves—the other side of Brandt's Ostpolitik. By choosing to ignore differences of opinion within the Warsaw Pact, however, we are merely tempting fate within the NATO alliance and failing to exploit differences in *their* alliance.

The administration is also fostering a simplistic view of Soviet activity in the Middle East. It appears, unfortunately, that Dr. Kissinger's "slip of the tongue" last July is a motivation of policy—i.e. to "expel" the Russians from Egypt. Like it or not, we have to accept that the Russians are in Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East, to stay.

We have been particularly remiss at analyzing carefully just what has happened militarily in the Middle East. The U.S. government and others were so quick to seize upon the symbolic importance, if any, of Russian activity that a realistic assessment has not even been attempted outside of the State Department.

As a matter of fact, there has been widespread cheating on both sides of the cease-fire, even though Egypt started the process; and Gen. Moshe Dayan was reportedly able to declare, even before we extended another $500 million line of credit to Israel, that Israel's military position vis-a-vis Egypt is better now than it was before the cease-fire began.

We may have good reasons for supporting Israel. But we should not interpret every cry of dismay from Jerusalem as actually changing the balance of military advantage (in which Israel, like the United States with respect to China, considers it vital to maintain the ability to launch a successful first strike). Nor should we accept every change as new evidence of a Soviet unwillingness to help prevent war.

In this particular case, Israel did not want to negotiate and Russian-Egyptian cheating provided a welcome diplomatic opportunity for Israel. Yet can anyone really believe that the extra SAM missiles west of the canal have made it any easier for Egypt to try launching an attack across it?

Not Really Cold

WHETHER VALID or not, this is a series of arguments about the Soviet-American relationship that gets little circulation in the United States at present. Of course, we are not really being faced with a return to the worst of the Cold War, however much administration rhetoric may reflect that possibility. The mold has been broken by the more or less immutable character of the strategic arms balance and the firm understandings that the superpowers have reached on Europe.

But there could be a period in which further diplomatic progress was ruled out not so much because of the character of individual differences between the United States and the Soviet Union as because of the administration's insistence on seeing all our problems as necessarily interrelated.

To a great extent, this development represents a failure of American imagination. It should be obvious, for example, that the Soviet Union is going to be a major sea power and will play a major role in the future of the Middle East. Yet by panicking in the face of these inevitable developments, we fail to see either the limited role that naval forces play in influencing the behavior of third countries in this multipolar, nuclear world or the positive role that the Russians could be led to play in stabilizing the volatile Middle East.

In addition, we are failing to take account of new facts of power. During the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, relative balances of military power did spell the possible outcome of conflicts and changes in frontiers or economic advantage. But the role of military force promises to be much lower in the future if only because the central actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, have an ability to deter basic threats to each other's interests and appreciate their inability to change the strategic status quo in Europe—the chief prize in their competition.

Slipping Economically

ALSO, THERE are economic factors supplementing more traditional military factors in expressing a great nation's usable power, and there the Soviet Union stands to be left far behind. It will soon be a second-class economic power, outranked by Japan and the European Community.

The movement of trade may not be as obvious, romantic or compelling as the movement of military forces. But in terms of the effects that policy has on other nations, trade and economic development can at times bring far more influence than direct intervention.

This does not mean that military power can be discounted; the United States has to remain vigilant and, particularly in sea power, show due regard for remaining aspects of psychological influence that weapons still confer. But we also need to realize that the growth of Soviet military reach is essentially a paradox: it comes at a time when it promises to express a fundamental weakness rather than of growing strength. At least this is the trend of developments.

A more fundamental failure of imagination is reflected in both the rhetoric and the actions of the administration in recent months. It is our failure to realize just how little we know about the outside world, and how much it is changing.

However much we have been involved in the world, we have retained many qualities of an isolated nation—or, better, a provincial nation. Perhaps this is the lot of every great country at the flood tide of its power. It is reflected in much news coverage and analysis; in the lack of interest most Americans take in the outside world, and in the efforts we make to translate the experience of others into terms that are familiar to us.

This, indeed, is why we are so often accused of being "imperialistic"; not so much because of any particular projection of power as because of our difficulty in making the adjustments necessary in dealing as equals with foreigners. It is not surprising that a President who is the epitome of Middle America should reflect its attitudes on the world beyond our borders.

Yet it is questionable that our general ignorance of others can long persist. We are experiencing what other great powers have experienced before us: that as our power declines relative to others, even as it increases absolutely, we can no longer isolate ourselves from the impact of other societies and cultures on us.

Ambiguity as a Virtue

WE ARE finally leaving the age of certainty; we are in an age in which power, to be effective, must understand the value of ambiguity. Americans have never cared for ambiguity (indeed, much of what we call "polarization" in our society is really a flight from situations that are by their very nature uncertain).

But whatever power we are able to exercise in the world will depend upon our making a virtue of the ambiguity that will necessarily exist in our relations with others. In the Middle East, for example, there would be some value in blurring the nature of our day-to-day relations with Israel—even if we have a firm commitment to its ultimate security—if we wish to have tolerable relations with the Arab states and to reduce Soviet influence.

The fundamental problem for us, therefore, is to discard the lingering attitudes of the Cold War with the Soviet Union and begin fostering a greater awareness of, and appreciation for, other nations and peoples. In the process, we need to learn more about the role that diplomacy and economics can play in place of military force—indeed, that the Nixon Doctrine cannot be primarily a military doctrine, as the President's recent aid message seemed to indicate. Rather, we need to cultivate a broad spectrum of relations and behavior that reflect the changed, uncertain circumstances of today's world.


U.S. MILITARISM
SOVIET MILITARISM
SCOTT LONG
THE MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE '70

Leapfrog.

Chou Is Leading China Out of Its

By William P. Bundy

A visiting professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Bundy is a former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

ABOUT A YEAR ago, some of the leaders in Peking, notably Chou En-lai, must have persuaded their colleagues to resume having a foreign policy and to give pragmatism a chance in guiding it. In the last few months, the new policy line has produced a flood of actions, and it is time to assess its fruits and above all its future implications.

The fruits are on the surface clear enough, the most recent and dramatic being the shift in the U.N. majority on the issue of Peking coming in even at the expense of Taipei. The Chinese actions that led to this shift in New York were timed for that purpose but far from limited to it.

The cultivation of "middle-level" powers—that is, those which in Chinese eyes clearly fall below the two superpowers in stature and are not under their thumb — has included a spate of recognition arrangements with nations as diverse as Ethiopia and Canada, together with trade gestures toward such countries as Britain. These moves are atmospheric in part, but also designed to build economic relations that can diversify China's very slowly expanding foreign trade and add to its capacity.

A second facet is the re-emergence of Peking in the affairs of Africa and Asia. The size of the new Chinese commitment to the Tanzania-Zambia railway ($400 million) is matched by an extremely low posture on the spot. Obviously, Chou has learned the lesson of 1964-5: that deeds come ahead of bold words about "second revolutions" in Africa. If there is to be trouble ahead in southern Africa, Peking will be quietly on the spot, but not for the moment providing strong backing for nebulous revolutionary forces as it once did.

In Asia, the old tie to Pakistan has been given a big new boost, not only in terms of red carpets but in terms of major aid offers as well. India must have taken note of this, and also of the slow spread of Chinese influence in Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. Not that China is stirring up trouble, but it is back.

The same seems to be true in Southeast Asia. Sihanouk's presence in Peking has been used to strengthen Peking's influence in Hanoi, which it seems to have done. In Thailand, the Chinese largely guide the diverse strands of insurgency, and in Laos, the Chinese-built road in the northwest is being expanded.

It is all quiet and sophisticated, more making a presence felt than anything more sinister—so far. The Chinese must have in mind making the American retraction in Southeast Asia as embarrassing and destabilizing as possible, but they seem also to be well aware that national and regional forces there have become significantly stronger since 1964-5.

Third, Peking is once again active in Eastern Europe. The large aid deal with Romania, again, picks up and refurbishes an old tie, seeking to worry the Soviets in their back yard. And in a reverse maneuver, Peking's new standing in North Vietnam and North Korea is aimed to keep Soviet influence down in the Asian Communist sphere.

So the catalogue of recent actions is a long and interesting one in itself, and the switchboard is lit up like a Christmas tree. Yet it must still be noted that each of these actions was an easy one, to decide on and to take. The style and substance seem clearly to be that of Chou. They prove that he has been given his head, up to a point. They do not necessarily tell us much about how he and his colleagues view their central problems with the Soviet Union, us and, increasingly, Japan—or where they will go from here.

To be sure, pragmatism and steady nerves have significantly eased the short-term danger of major conflict with the Russians on China's northern borders. The decision to get into serious negotiations with Moscow a year ago was not easy, and may well have been the turning point toward over-all

Mike Peters in The Dayton Daily News

"No room . . . no room . . ."

Diplomatic Cave

change. In the event, "Jaw-jaw" (in Churchill's phrase) seems to be holding the line, and Moscow and Peking have now gone on to exchange ambassadors and sign a new trade pact.

But these moves are no more than the most temporary easing of underlying tensions. Correct state-to-state relations are clearly separate, for both sides, from the vast gulf in ideological views and even the deep national sources of antagonism. Many of the recent Chinese moves are aimed squarely at the Soviets, and it was faintly comic when the Russians at the last minute asked to speak at the U.N. on the China issue. Plainly, they were just joining the bandwagon and not reflecting underlying sentiments.

Indeed, in any basic appraisal that Peking may be making, the first entry is almost certainly continued basic hostility to the Soviet Union, with the added element of a serious military threat. Even as the talking goes on about the frontiers, both sides are steadily building up their forces within reaching distance. Perhaps both nations are just keeping their generals happy, but any major confrontation of this sort carries its own perils.

The U.S. and Japan must be the other two major concerns in such a reappraisal. As of 1965, when Peking last had a true foreign policy, one would have said with confidence that it looked to the expulsion of the United States from East Asia and then to a modus vivendi with a Japan that would not be seriously threatening. Now, as the U.S. presence and influence are in process of reduction, Japan looms much larger than might have been foreseen and quite possibly, for understandable historic reasons, more menacing in the long run.

Even in the short run, the Chinese have learned in the last few months that Japan is more self-confident and less subject to pressure than in the past. When Peking tried to exclude Japanese firms from trade on political grounds, it was forced to drop the issue for the simple reason that it needed the trade far more than the Japanese did.

At the very least, Japan is moving rapidly out of the category of what Peking considers "middle-level" nations; it may not be as possible as many, including myself, had hoped, for Tokyo to show the way to a new formula for relations with Peking. In an idiom of American politics, Japan may have become too much part of the problem to be readily part of the solution.

This is speculation, which at its wilder shores could even suggest that Peking might re-evaluate the close ties between the United States and Japan. Hitherto anathema, these ties might come to seem to the Chinese an element tending to stabilize and moderate the behavior of both parties. At the beginning of 1970, Peking sought to use the United States as a makeweight against Soviet danger through the Warsaw talks. Is it out of the question that Peking should start to weigh the whole of the emerging four-great-power reality of East Asia and play all its cards in a very different way?