

12/17/72 It is too early for the Sunday paper and with a wind-chill factor well below zero, at least 20 below, I'm not about to go until I'm sure, so I make this note about Kissinger's yesterday's statement on his "peace" failure without the full text before me. I caught part of it when he was delivering it. I'd turned the radio on for news. That he had to be lying I assume. What interest me may be a self-deception, but it struck me that he was using the name of the President more often than necessary to keep the President happy. It is almost as though he were really saying that he failed because the President made him fail by making it impossible for him not to fail, by insisting on getting at the conference table what he could not take by force of arms. K's inflection on referring to the President also seemed to me to be unusual, making allowance for his having learned to speak in another language (which still shows in his choice of words as much as in his accent). On later TV news there was reference to McGovern's campaign statement that the peace ploy was fraud, but atypically, no shots of McG saying it and no use of his voice that I saw or heard. I think, perhaps wrongly, that Henry got a bit twisted in his versions of October, different now than then, aside from his within-reach statement before the election. Also interesting is his acknowledgement that making any statement at all violated the negotiating agreement, which he pinned firmly on the President. He said Nixon felt not to would be a "charade". How is not clear when there are supposedly secret negotiations. I think the answer is that he'd promised a deal in one more meeting and Nixon may still have some concerns about public reactions. HW

Kissinger 12/16.72 statement on "negotiations", peace, etc. HW 12.17/72

Today's Post has two long and partly-duplicating front-page stories on the Kissinger act, the full stenographic transcript, and a feature or by-liner by Carroll Kilpatrick on "The Foru Four Years..." (which does not mention the extraordinary size given as more than 500 pp. by last night's TV news). I read the by-lined pieces but not the text of the statement. Clearly is ispredictable and says the predictable. We tried to hornswogle and couldn't, so we are pure and right. We couldn't win the war, so we try to steal it at the peace table, and those who won't give us what we can't take have no morals or ethics. We have shifted our position, of this there can be no doubt, so the others are wrong not to accept it. We can't establish the VNs by arms, so it is unprincipled not to permit it to be done by semantics, in agreements. What also seems clear is that the VN statements of 10/27 on the status of agreement seem to be fair. Agreement was reached. Nixon and his at-home gang did not like them, so they became non-agreements. With the election past, little can be done. With the press servile and with the structural changes in government, there will soon be even less chance. The impression I formed of Kissinger in the TV snatches is that he is uneasy, unce tain and unhappy, despite his confident words. His nervous cough again was out of control, his eyes were unhappy and uneasy. He probably conveyed the idea that he was on firm ground but his appearance made me believe he knew he wasn't and didn't like it. My impression in the earlier note is stronger: his repeated referencēs to El Lidēr's decisions, which might well be taken as proper genuflection by The oble One and his court, could easily have had double meaning and meant by Henry the way I took it: this ain't me. Because of the unstructured structure of my files, designed for possible use, which always changes, I've made a separate file of this under WG. I think that is the spirit of all that has ~~and~~ happened and will. It becomes more and more clear to me that all the Nixonians wanted is the prerequisite for authoritarianism, the largest vote for him and the hell with the Party. Besides, any proper authoritarian has to appear to be singularly devoted to principle and completely remotod from such crass considerations as those of political parties.





Associated Press

A little girl, the lonely survivor of an enemy rocket attack that killed six members of her family, stands amid ruins of her home near the Bienhoa Airbase.

# Thailand Approves U.S. Headquarters

BANGKOK, Dec. 16 (UPI)—Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn said today that he has given the United States approval to move its military headquarters from Saigon to a remote base in Thailand only 60 miles from North Vietnam when a cease-fire goes into effect in Vietnam.

Thanom confirmed the planned move to isolated Nakorn Phanom Airbase, 380 miles northeast of Bangkok. The base, which formerly served as a major center for close air support of government and CIA-sponsored troops in Laos, was the jumping-off point for the unsuccessful commando raid on North Vietnam's Son-tay POW camp in 1970.

It is the closest base to both Laos and North Vietnam, lying about 60 miles from North Vietnam at the closest point.

The field marshal said that some U.S. troops would be withdrawn following a cease-fire, but with new arrivals from Vietnam the number of American military personnel in Thailand would remain at about its present level. There are now approximately 45,000 U.S. troops here, according to U.S. spokesmen.

## Rockets Hit Bienhoa For 2d Day in a Row

SAIGON, Dec. 16 (AP)—For the second day in a row, Communist-fired rockets struck

the Bienhoa Airbase Saturday, killing two Vietnamese civilians and wounding one.

In an attack Friday, six civilians were killed and the base's power plant was temporarily knocked out.

Two squadrons of U.S. Marine fighter-bombers operate from Bienhoa, but an American spokesman said there were no U.S. casualties or damage to U.S. installations.

Three rocket attacks were aimed at the base Saturday.

In the air war, U.S. B-52s and fighter-bombers continued to strike at troops and supply concentrations in North and South Vietnam, hitting hard in and around the Demilitarized Zone, the U.S. command reported.



# Talks at Impasse,

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# Kissinger Says

## North Vietnamese Called Reneging On Earlier Accords

By George Lardner Jr. *12/17/72*  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that the Paris peace talks had failed to provide a cease-fire accord acceptable to President Nixon. He accused the North Vietnamese of reneging on earlier agreements.

Kissinger said the talks had deteriorated into "a charade" but one that Hanoi could easily untangle.

"The only thing lacking," Kissinger asserted at a White House press conference, "is one decision in Hanoi: to settle the remaining issues in terms that two weeks previously they had already agreed to."

Meeting with newsmen after a lengthy round of meetings with President Nixon and other top administration officials since his return from Paris Wednesday night, Kissinger accused North Vietnam of delaying tactics and "procedures that can only mock the hopes of humanity."

Despite the temptation of continuing the secret negotiations and thus implying great progress toward peace, Kissinger said, "the President decided that we could not engage in a charade with the

American people."

Kissinger declined to pinpoint the fundamental issue that remains unresolved, but he suggested several times that it boils down to the difference between a genuine peace settlement and a fuzzy cease-fire agreement that could easily erupt in renewed warfare.

In any event, he said, "we have not yet reached an agreement that the President considers just and fair."

Kissinger said he felt the talks would be resumed, but indicated that it was first essential to reestablish "an atmosphere that is worthy of the seriousness of the endeavor."

Meanwhile, he said, as his Hanoi counterpart in Paris, Le Duc Tho, stated Friday, "we will remain in contact through messages. We can then decide whether or when to meet again."

The press conference, which lasted nearly an hour, was Kissinger's first since Oct. 26 when he optimistically announced that "peace is at hand." More subdued this time, the President's adviser on national security devoted most of yesterday's session to a carefully generalized account of subsequent developments.

Complications, he said, set in over repeated differences between the English and North Vietnamese texts of the basic agreement and over the United States' submission of a series of "protocols" intended to guarantee prompt international supervision of the proposed cease-fire.

See KISSINGER, A6, Col. 1



## KISSINGER, From A1

When negotiations were resumed in Paris Nov. 20, Kissinger said, the North Vietnamese were accommodating at first, continuing "the spirit and the attitude" of three weeks of bargaining during October.

"We presented our proposals," he said. "Some were accepted; others were rejected." By the end of the third day, "all of us thought that we were within a day or two of completing the arrangements."

But then, he said, the mood changed, presumably on instructions from Hanoi. From then on, Kissinger said, the North Vietnamese kept raising new points and reopening old ones that had seemingly been settled.

"From that point on," Kissinger told newsmen, "the negotiations have had the character where a settlement was always just within our reach, and was always pulled just beyond our reach when we attempted to grasp it."

Kissinger publicly confirmed that the United States would not accept South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's demand for a withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops from the south. He said none of Mr. Nixon's cease-fire proposals of the past two years called for a North Vietnamese withdrawal. The United States, he said, will not attempt to add that condition now.

In emphasizing that point, Kissinger said, "We want to leave no doubt about the fact that if an agreement is reached that meets the stated conditions of the President, if an agreement is reached that we consider just, then no other party will have a veto over our actions."

Kissinger also said, however, that "we cannot accept the proposition that North Vietnam has a right of constant intervention in the South." When asked whether that might be the fundamental point still at issue, he said: "I will not go into the substance of the negotiations."

He added that he and Le Duc Tho had agreed at the conclusion of their talks in Paris a few days ago not to discuss substantive issues publicly.

Kissinger quipped that "what I am doing here goes to

the edge of that understanding." But, he said, Mr. Nixon felt that "we could not permit a situation to continue in which there was daily speculation as to something that was accomplished, while the record was so clearly to the contrary."

He said he had no doubt that Hanoi would come up with a different version shortly.

Detailing some of the difficulties, Kissinger said the U.S. and North Vietnamese concepts of international supervision of a cease-fire are "at drastic variance . . ."

He said American negotia-

tors felt that several thousand monitors, with freedom of movement, would be needed. The North Vietnamese, he said, want no more than 250, dependent for communications, logistics "and even physical necessities" on the forces in control of their particular area.

As a result, Kissinger said, the monitoring teams would have no Jeeps, no telephones of their own and would be able to make inspections only in the company of liaison officers of the forces to be investigated—if those forces were willing to give the monitors a ride.

Despite such disagreements, Kissinger said he and the other American negotiators felt on Dec. 4 that they had again narrowed the disputes to two or three issues. But meetings began again then, he said, "with Hanoi withdrawing every change that had been agreed to two weeks previously."

He said the U.S. team spent the rest of the week getting back "to where we had already been two weeks before," again managing to narrow the issues down by Dec. 9 to "one section."

With that in mind, Kissinger said, Mr. Nixon ordered Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., the No. 2 man on the U.S. negotiating team, back to Washington so he would be ready for a trip to Saigon to present the South Vietnamese with the expected agreement.

At that point, the linguistic experts convened again to make sure that English and Vietnamese texts coincided. Instead, Kissinger said, the

North Vietnamese came up "with 17 new changes in the guise of linguistic changes." In addition, the "one section" in substantive dispute had "grown to two."

Starting out again, the negotiators, by the last day of their meetings, had settled 15 of the 17 new "linguistic" points. The North Vietnamese, Kissinger said, then came up with 16 more, "including four substantive ones, some of which now still remain unsettled."

Looking back on it all, Kissinger suggested that "we are at a point where we are again perhaps closer to an agreement than we were at the end of October, if the other side is willing to deal with us in good faith and with good will.

"But it cannot do that if every day an issue is settled, a new one is raised; that when an issue is settled in an agreement, it is raised again as an understanding, and if it is settled in an understanding, it is raised again as a protocol.

"We will not be blackmailed into an agreement," Kissinger declared. "We will not be stampeded into an agreement. And, if I may say so, we will not be charmed into an agreement until its conditions are right."

Regarding the proposed protocols for international supervision, Kissinger called them simply "technical instruments . . . certainly intended to con-

form to normal practices" which the Americans submitted on Nov. 20.

He said the North Vietnamese refused to discuss them or even hand the U.S. team their own set until the last Tuesday evening, Dec. 12, "the night before I was supposed to leave Paris . . . (and) five weeks after the cease-fire was supposed to be signed, a cease-fire" which called for the (international) machinery to be set up immediately."

The North Vietnamese protocols, Kissinger added, were not technical instruments, but reopeners of "a whole list of issues that had been settled, or we thought had been settled, in the (October) agreement. They contained provisions that were not in the original agreement, and they excluded provisions that were in the original agreement."

Kissinger declined to specu-



late on Hanoi's motives for all this beyond suggesting that North Vietnam may be waiting "for a further accentuation of the divisions between us and Saigon" or for a buildup of public pressures on the Nixon administration. Still another reason, he suggested, might be that "they simply cannot make up their mind."

Stressing that the observation was pure guesswork on his part, Kissinger said he believed that "for a people that have fought for so long, it is paradoxically . . . perhaps easier to face the risks of war than the uncertainties of peace." A similar psychology, he said, may be making Saigon similarly apprehensive.

Whatever the motives, Kissinger said Hanoi's negotiating tactics stood in sharp contrast to its performance at the bargaining table in October. The North Vietnamese presented their proposal Oct. 8 which, Kissinger said, appeared at that time to reflect the principles that President Nixon has always enunciated.

Those principles, Kissinger recounted, were:

- An unconditional release of American prisoners throughout Indochina.

- A cease-fire in Indochina . . . "by various means suitable to the conditions of the countries involved."

- Withdrawal of American forces in a time period to be mutually agreed upon. (This turned out to be 60 days.)

- A U.S. pledge not to prejudge the political future of South Vietnam or impose a particular solution on that score.

The agreement developed during October, Kissinger said, "seemed to us to reflect those principles precisely." But he acknowledged that toward the end of that month, difficulties had cropped up, difficulties that Kissinger admittedly downplayed Oct. 26 when he made his election-eve forecast that peace was "within reach in a matter of weeks or less."

Kissinger said that "we mentioned" the difficulties at administration briefings, but did not elaborate on them

"because we wanted to maintain the atmosphere leading to a rapid settlement."

Summing up the end-of-October problems, Kissinger said yesterday that they included what he called preparations for "a massive Communist" attack throughout South Vietnam starting several days after declaration of the cease-fire and continuing for several weeks after the effective starting date of the cease-fire.

Other difficulties, he said, involved objections from Saigon and a Newsweek interview with North Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong which implied that the non-imposition of a political solution "was not as clear cut as our record of the negotiations indicated."

Those were the problems, Kissinger said, that led to the November-December round of secret talks. "It was our conviction," he said, "that if we were going to bring an end to 10 years of warfare, we should not do so with an armistice, but with a peace that had a chance of lasting."

That desire, Kissinger continued, led in turn to proposals to clarify "the so-called linguistic difficulties," to the protocols for international supervision, and finally to a U.S. attempt to incorporate in the peace agreement itself some reference, "however illusive," to make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other.

"These seemed to us modest requirements," he said, "relatively easily achievable." He insisted that they still were, if only Hanoi would reconsider its current stance.

"Great progress has been made, even in the talks," Kissinger said. A final settlement that is just to both sides, he maintained, requires only a decision by Hanoi "to maintain provisions that had already been accepted and an end to procedures that can only mock the hopes of humanity. . . . On that basis, as far as we are concerned, the settlement will be very rapid."

### **Hanoi, U.S. Continue Paris Technical Talks**

From News Dispatches

U.S. and North Vietnamese delegates met in Paris for three hours yesterday for a technical session connected with the Paris peace talks.

An American spokesman said there would be another meeting Monday, but did not disclose the location or who would participate.

Ambassador William J. Porter, chief delegate to the semi-public Paris peace talks, represented the United States. North Vietnam was represented by Xuan Thuy, Porter's opposite number at the peace talks.

The meeting was held in a villa in suburban Neuilly. The exact topics being discussed by Porter and Thuy were not revealed.

Meanwhile, Le Duc Tho, the chief Hanoi peace negotiator at the Paris Vietnam peace negotiations, left Moscow for Hanoi, the Soviet news agency reported.

The North Vietnamese official had talks yesterday with Soviet Politburo member Andrei Kirilenko on the results of his latest discussions with White House adviser Henry A. Kissinger.



# Administration Looks Good In Eyes of Nixon Publicists

By Carroll Kilpatrick

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration's public-affairs office has looked at the President's four-year record and found it good.

In a long document released yesterday entitled "Richard Nixon's First Four Years: Change that Works," the publicists contrast the dismal state of the country and the world four years ago with the situation today.

Events, however, overtook the report before it could reach the public.

Instead of optimism, the mood in Washington yesterday was one of black pessimism following Henry A. Kissinger's bleak assessment of the Paris negotiations on Vietnam.

The report, handed to reporters Thursday, reflected the euphoria that had prevailed in many quarters prior to Kissinger's press conference.

"The people of Vietnam may now anticipate an internationally supervised cease-fire and the reconstruction of their country," the report says.

The President's careful work has "virtually completed" the U.S. role in a Vietnam peace settlement, it declares.

On Oct. 8, the North Vietnamese representatives in Paris "abruptly backed away from what the President had called the one demand the United States would never accept," the report says.

That was the demand that this country join in overthrowing the Saigon government.

"From that point on progress toward a ceasefire was rapid," the report continues. "When the breakthrough became publicly known in late October, the President voiced optimism about a settlement but emphasized that the U.S. would not be



Photos By Frank Johnston—The Washington Post

Presidential assistant John Erlichman briefs newsmen on Mr. Nixon's first term.

'stampeded' into hasty approval of a flawed agreement."

On Thursday afternoon, John D. Ehrlichman, assistant to the President for domestic affairs, and Herbert G. Klein, the administration's communications director and whose office prepared the report, briefed newsmen on the document.

At one point, Ehrlichman said that while the administration had significantly improved the nation's trans-



portation system, no one would ever be able to stand up and say that all transportation problems had been solved.

A reporter then asked Klein whether anyone would ever be able to stand up and say that the Vietnam war was ended. Klein replied "yes," that he was confident a successful settlement would be reached.

Then, less than 48 hours later, came Kissinger's admission of failure so far in Paris.

In the Thursday briefing, Ehrlichman, exuding optimism about administration accomplishments in the domestic fields, was asked if any of the administration's policies had failed.

He acknowledged that the report had not gone out of its way to "emphasize" the mistakes that had been made.

When a reporter asked where in all the facts presented in the document he could find the total of the Nixon budget deficits, Ehrlichman, for once, was at a loss for words.

Someone obviously had forgotten to include that impressive table with its roughly \$100 billion in red ink, even though it constituted another historical first.

Describing progress toward worldwide peace, the report says that "this trans-

formation can be credited to President Nixon's foreign policy during the past four years a policy of patient diplomacy, bulldog persistence, and chesslike strategy."

The frustrated poet who wrote those lines continued with this less than prosaic account:

"Rejecting the idea that the United States should be either a global policeman coming from crisis to crisis or an introverted dropout from world leadership responsibilities, the President has moved instead to make this country the architect of a new structure of peace for the entire world community."

In contrasting the situation in 1969, when Mr. Nixon took office, and today, the report says that inflation was roaring at the rate of 6.1 per cent in 1969 compared with 3.2 per cent in the first 14 months of the President's new economic policy, inaugurated in August, 1971.

Federal income taxes have been reduced by 66 per cent for a family of four making \$5,000; 26 per cent for a family of four making \$10,000; 20 per cent for a family of four making \$15,000, the report said.

Income taxes on individuals have been cut by \$22 billion and on corporations by \$5 billion during the Nixon administration, it says.

The Cold War was raging in 1969 and the United States had more than a half million troops in Vietnam. But today, there are 25,200 troops in Vietnam and the cold war has "diminished, if not ended," it says.

There were 3.5 million men in uniform in 1969 compared with 2.4 million today, Draft calls have been cut from 299,000 in 1968 to 50,000 in 1972, the report says.

Four years ago, 45 per cent of the federal budget went for defense and 32 per cent for human resources, whereas today 45 per cent is for human resources and 32 per cent is for defense, it says.

In 1969, 68 per cent of black children in the South attended all-black schools where as only 8 per cent do today. The national figures show a decline from 40 per cent to 12.

There were 27 top women "appointments and promotions" during the Johnson administration compared to 118 so far in the Nixon administration, the report says.

It says that crime was increasing at a rate of 122 per cent in the 1960-68 period compared to 6 per cent in 1971.

"Change that works: these words sum up the accomplishments of the first four Nixon years—and the goals of the President's second term," the report says.



# Semantics Stall Talks In Vietnam

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and North Vietnam are locked in a "fundamental" impasse over whether they are negotiating an "armistice" or "peace." Henry A. Kissinger ruefully acknowledged yesterday.

None of the hopeful, counterbalancing statements by the weary presidential en-

## News Analysis

voy at his second extraordinary press conference in seven weeks could overcome the basic discord that he revealed.

"We have an agreement that is 99 per cent completed as far as the text of the agreement is concerned" and "we are one decision away from a settlement," said the upbeat Kissinger. The downbeat Kissinger, however, admitted, "But that alone is not the problem," because "the technical implementing instruments that they (North Vietnam) have presented" to bring the agreement into force "are totally unacceptable . . ." tr for add one

The barrier on which the negotiations have foundered, Kissinger indirectly acknowledged, is in fact the central issue in the war: whether there is one Vietnam or two.

Kissinger virtually con-

ceded that when he said, "We wanted some reference in the agreement, somehow, however illusive, however indirect, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force."

The President's national security adviser, speaking in circuitous language because of his agreement with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho not to discuss "the substance of the talks," said at another point, "We cannot accept the proposition that North Vietnam has a right of constant intervention in the south."

What Kissinger evidently was referring to there was what North Vietnam's position would be if the "peace settlement" is breached by South Vietnam.

Kissinger did not say what the American position would be if the agreement is breached on the Communist side, although President Nixon reportedly has given assurances to the Saigon government that American air power could support the agreement.

On Oct. 26 at the White House, when Kissinger buoyantly proclaimed on be-

See VIETNAM, A4, Col. 3



## VIETNAM, From A1

half of President Nixon, "We believe peace is at hand," Kissinger spoke glowingly of moving "from hostility to normalcy." North Vietnam, he said, had "dropped" or cut back various demands that would open the road to "peace."

But many experts concluded from studying the terms of the nine-point agreement, which still are available only in summary form, that they added up to a cease-fire accord, not peace.

These terms were ambiguous enough to produce a continuing military-political struggle in South Vietnam after a cease-fire. Experts, including the administration's own specialists, privately agreed that the agreement was certain to be breached; the only question was how grossly it would be violated.

What now appears to have occurred is that the United States, at least partially at the insistence of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, attempted to convert an ambiguous agreement into a hard and fast peace settlement that would assure the existence of a separate South Vietnamese nation.

As Kissinger said yesterday:

"I cannot consider it an extremely onerous demand to say that the parties of a peace settlement should live in peace with one another, and we cannot make a settlement which brings peace to North Vietnam and maintains the war in South Vietnam."

North Vietnam evidently has a considerably different view of what it is negotiating.

Last week, Hanoi's most authoritative theoretical journal, Hoc Tap, said, in "revolutionary struggle, there is a time for us to advance, but there is also a time for us to step backward temporarily in order to advance more steadily later." By "temporarily coming to an agreement with the enemy," the journal bluntly stated, North Vietnam was making a zig-zag in a contin-

uing battle.

North Vietnam's leaders undoubtedly assumed that Washington understood Hanoi's intentions. Kissinger, at the outset of the Nixon administration, often spoke in private—and the words became public—of the search for "a decent inter-

val" to protect American "honor" between the American exit from the war and whatever was to follow afterward.

What has always been in question, however, is whether President Nixon also accepted the "decent interval" concept. It has been charged, but also denied, that there were variations between the settlement price of the President and that of his national security adviser; Kissinger has always emphasized, as he did yesterday at the White House, that the test of any negotiating draft accord is whether the President, and he alone, concludes that it is "just."

The whole thrust of Kissinger's presentation yesterday was that North Vietnam has reneged on the "unsettled" portion of the agreement after previously giving its consent.

North Vietnam, however, has been charging that it is the United States that executed a turnabout, "by scheming to revise the basic principles of this agreement" which Hanoi expected would be signed on Oct. 31.

Hanoi's specific charge, echoed by the Vietcong yesterday, is that the United States has joined Saigon in seeking to perpetuate the division of South Vietnam.

A Hanoi Radio broadcast yesterday, prior to Kissinger's press conference reiterated that the United States is attempting to "sabotage" the Geneva agreements of 1954, which ended the French Indochina war.

"Everyone knows," the broadcast charged, "that according to the 1954 Geneva agreement, the demarcation line at the 17th Parallel was established only as a temporary dividing line between the two parts of Vietnam and could in no way be regarded either as the political or territorial border between the two Vietnams . . ."

The nine-point Hanoi-Washington draft agreement, as made public Oct. 27, states, "The United States respects the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements."

Kissinger's comments suggested that the United States, in his original negotiations with Le Duc Tho, hoped to circumvent endless debate over this question about the "sovereignty" of South Vietnam, but then found itself plunged into just that controversy.

South Vietnamese President Thieu had insisted that the agreement must show "clear demarcation between the south and the north," that the demilitarized zone at the 17th Parallel "must be confirmed and respected," and "that one part must not launch armed or political aggression against the other, or interfere in the other's internal affairs to disrupt them."

Kissinger's comments indicate that the United States attempted to gain that confirmation. Kissinger said, however, that the United States could not ac-

cept a more explicit demand by President Thieu for a pledge to withdraw all North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam.

Said Kissinger, "The United States has made three cease-fire proposals since October, 1970, all of them based on the de facto situation as it existed at the time of the cease-fire, all of them approved by the government of South Vietnam."

If the agreement now negotiated "is implemented in good faith," said Kissinger, "the problem of the (North Vietnam) forces will tend to lose its significance . . ."

The continuing problems that Kissinger said exist, however, indicate that as the United States pressed its points to achieve a "peace" agreement and not merely an "armistice," North Vietnam countered with blocking or offsetting demands on enforcing the agreement, in order to keep the agreement as loose as possible for its own interests.

This is a classic counterstrategy in any negotiation. As Kissinger said, at one point the American experts were "presented with 17 new changes in the guise of linguistic changes," and at another point "we were presented with 16 new changes, including four substantive ones, some of which now remain unsettled."

Kissinger said that disagreements that "tended to disappear from the agreement" would "reappear in understandings" which ac-



accompanied them, "then to disappear from understandings to reappear in protocols" for enforcing the cease-fire or regulating the exchange of prisoners or other issues.

The President's adviser revealed that a profound disagreement exists over the whole issue of enforcing a cease-fire. North Vietnam, he said, envisions an international supervisory force of "no more than 250" men, while the United States estimates that "several thousand" will be required. The United States has been operating on the premise that there would be a force of about 5,000 in the cease-fire supervision teams, with men from Canada, Poland, Indonesia and Hungary.

In addition, Kissinger wryly said, the cease-fire force that North Vietnam contemplates would have "no Jeeps, no telephone, no radio of its own," but would be entirely dependent for facilities "on the party in whose area it is located." This would mean that in the Communist-held areas of South Vietnam, the Vietcong would fully control where the inspectors could go — and as a consequence, what they could see.

These so-called "technical" problems indicate that the two sides are poles apart at this stage on the whole fabric and purpose of the agreement under negotiation.

The purpose of the loose cease-fire arrangements that North Vietnam seeks ap-

pears evident: to allow many northern troops to be kept in place in South Vietnam in order to support the anticipated political-military struggle ahead over who shall rule in Saigon.

North Vietnam and the Vietcong, for their part, have charged that the United States is also preparing to support South Vietnam in that coming struggle by supplying some 10,000 civilian advisers and technicians to support the Thieu regime, plus other personnel and material.

Kissinger said of the current North Vietnamese "technical" demands that, "I cannot really believe that they (Hanoi) are serious. He expressed the belief and hope that North Vietnam will abandon what Kissinger called its "frivolous" demands, and that the agreement on which such high hopes were built will materialize.

At the same time, however, Kissinger acknowledged his own uncertainty about what is ahead, saying: "The people of Vietnam, North and South, have fought for so long that the risks and perils of war, however difficult, seem sometimes more bearable to them than the uncertainties and the risks and perils of peace."

For Kissinger, unusually tense and uncomfortable yesterday, this was the most difficult, inconclusive, and gloomy foreign policy presentation in his distinguished White House career.



In South Vietnam, where helicopters often follow roads to get where they're going, a pilot and a cyclist take Highway 13 to Saigon.





# Text of Kissinger's Statement

Following is a transcript of a statement and press conference by Presidential Adviser Henry A. Kissinger on the Vietnam peace negotiations:

Ladies and gentlemen, as you know, I have been reporting to the President and meeting with the Secretary of State, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and other senior officials. I am meeting with you today because we wanted to give you an account of the negotiations as they stand today.

I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot go into the details of particular issues, but will give you as fair and honest a description of the general trend of the negotiations as I can.

First, let me do this in three parts: what led us to believe, at the end of October, that peace was imminent; second, what has happened since; third, where do we go from here?

At the end of October we had just concluded three weeks of negotiations with the North Vietnamese. As you all know, on Oct. 8 the North Vietnamese presented to us a proposal which, as it later became elaborated, appeared to us to reflect the main principles that the President has always enunciated as being part of the American position. These principles were that there had to be an unconditional release of American prisoners throughout Indochina; secondly, that there should be a cease-fire in Indochina brought into being by various means suitable to the conditions of the countries concerned; third, that we were prepared to withdraw our forces under these conditions in a time period to be mutually agreed upon; fourth, that we would not prejudge the political outcome of the future of South Vietnam, we would not impose a particular solu-

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## Presidential Adviser

## Explains

tion, we would not insist on our particular solution.

### Seemed Correct

The agreement, as it was developed during October, seemed to us to reflect these principles precisely. Then, toward the end of October, we encountered a number of difficulties. Now, at the time, because we wanted to maintain the atmosphere leading to a rapid settlement, we mentioned them at our briefings, but we did not elaborate on them.

Now let me sum up what the problems were at the end of October.

It became apparent that there was in preparation a massive Communist effort to launch an attack throughout South Vietnam to begin several days before the cease-fire would have been declared, and to continue for some weeks after the cease-fire came into being.

Second, there was an interview by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister which implied that the political solution that we had always insisted was part of our principles, namely, that we would not impose a coalition government, was not as clearcut as our record of the negotiations indicated.

Thirdly, as no one could miss, we encountered some specific objections from Saigon.

Under these conditions, we proposed to Hanoi that there should be one other round of negotiations to clear up these difficulties. We were convinced that with good will on both sides, these difficulties could be

relatively easily surmounted and that if we conducted ourselves on both sides in the spirit of the October negotiations, a settlement would be very rapid.

It was our conviction that if we were going to bring to an end 10 years of warfare, we should not do so with an armistice, but with a peace that had a chance of lasting. Therefore, we proposed three categories of clarifications in the agreement. First, we wanted the so-called linguistic difficulties cleared up so that they would not provide the seed for unending disputes and another eruption of the war. I will speak about those in a minute.

Secondly, the agreement also had provided that international machinery be put in place immediately after the cease-fire was declared. We wanted to spell out the operational meaning of the word "immediately" by developing the protocols that were required to bring the international machinery into being simultaneously with a cease-fire agreement. This, to us, seemed a largely technical matter.

Thirdly, we wanted some



reference in the agreement, somehow, however allusive, however, indirect, which would make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in peace with each other and that neither side would impose its solution on the other by force. These seemed to us modest requirements, relatively easily achievable.

Let me now tell you the sequence of events since that time. We all know of the disagreements that have existed between Saigon and Washington. These disagreements are, to some extent, understandable. It is inevitable that a people on whose territory the war has been fought and that for 25 years has been exposed to devastation and suffering and assassination, would look at the prospects of a settlement in a more detailed way, in a more anguished way, than we who are 10,000 miles away. Many of the provisions of the agreement inevitably were seen in a different context in Vietnam than in Washington.

I think it is safe to say that we face, with respect to both Vietnamese parties, this problem. The people of Vietnam, North and South, have fought for so long that the risks and perils of war, however difficult, seem sometimes more bearable to them than the uncertainties and the risks and perils of peace.

Now, it is no secret, either, that the United States has not agreed with all the objections that were raised by Saigon. In particular, the United States' position with respect to the cease-fire had been made clear in October, 1970. It had been reiterated in the President's proposal of Jan. 25, 1972. It was repeated again in the President's proposal of May 8, 1972. None of these proposals had asked for a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. Therefore, we could not agree with our allies in South Vietnam when they added conditions to the established positions after an agreement had been reached that reflected these established positions.

As was made clear in the press conference here on

Oct. 26, as the President has reiterated in his speeches, the United States will not continue the war one day longer than it believes is necessary to reach an agreement we consider just and fair.

So, we want to leave no doubt about the fact that if an agreement is reached that meets the stated conditions of the President, if an agreement is reached that we consider just, that no other party will have a veto over our actions.

#### Not Yet Reached

But I am also bound to tell you that today this question is moot because we have not yet reached an agreement that the President considers just and fair. Therefore, I want to explain to you the process of the negotiations since they resumed on Nov. 20 and where we are.

The three objectives that we were seeking in these negotiations were stated in the press conference of Oct. 26, in many speeches by the President afterwards, and in every communication to Hanoi since. They could not have been a surprise.

Now, let me say a word first about what were called "linguistic difficulties," which were called then in order not to inflame the situation. How did they arise? They arose because the North Vietnamese, presented us a document in English, which we then discussed with them. In many places throughout this document, the original wording was changed as the negotiations proceeded, and the phrases were frequently weakened compared to the original formulation. It was not until we received the Vietnamese text, after those negotiations were concluded, that we found that while the English terms had been changed, the Vietnamese terms had been left unchanged.

So, we suddenly found ourselves engaged in two negotiations, one about the English text, the other about the Vietnamese text. Having conducted many negotiations, I must say this was a novel procedure. It led to the view that perhaps these were not simply linguistic

difficulties, but substantive difficulties.

Now I must say that all of these, except one, have now been eliminated. The second category of problems concerned bringing into being the international machinery so that it could operate simultaneously with the cease-fire and so as to avoid a situation where the cease-fire, rather than bring peace, would unleash another frenzy of warfare.

So to that end we submitted on Nov. 20, the first day that the negotiations resumed, a list of what are called protocols, technical instruments to bring this machinery into being. These protocols — and I will not go into the details of these protocols — they are normally technical documents and ours were certainly intended to conform to normal practices, despite the fact that this occurred four weeks after we had made clear that this was our intention and three weeks af-



ter Hanoi had pressed us to sign a cease-fire agreement. The North Vietnamese refused to discuss our protocols and refused to give us their protocols, so that the question of bringing the international machinery into being could not be addressed.

The first time we saw the North Vietnamese protocols was on the evening of Dec. 12, the night before I was supposed to leave Paris, six weeks after we had stated what our aim was, five weeks after the cease-fire was supposed to be signed, a cease-fire which called for that machinery to be set up immediately.

These protocols were not technical instruments, but reopened a whole list of issues that had been settled, or we thought had been settled, in the agreement. They contained provisions that were not in the original agreement, and they excluded provisions that were in the original agreement. They are now in the process of being discussed by the technical experts in Paris, but some effort will be needed to remove the political provisions from them and to return them to a technical status.

#### At Drastic Variance

Secondly, I think it is safe to say that the North Vietnamese perception of international machinery and our perception of international machinery is at drastic variance, and that, ladies and gentlemen, is an understatement.

We had thought that an effective machinery required, in effect, some freedom of movement, and our estimate was that several thousand people were needed to monitor the many provisions of the agreement. The North Vietnamese perception is that the total force should be no more than 250, of which nearly half should be located at headquarters; that it would be dependent for its communication, logistics, and even physical necessities entirely on the party in whose area it was located.

So it would have no jeeps, no telephone, no radio or its own; that it could not move without being accompanied by liaison officers of the party that was to be investigated, if that party decided to give it the jeeps to get to where the violation was taking place and if that party would then let it communicate what it found.

It is our impression that the members of this commission will not exhaust themselves in frenzies of activity if this procedure were adopted.

Now, thirdly, the substance of the agreement. The negotiations since Nov. 20 really have taken place in two phases. The first phase, which lasted for three days, continued the spirit and the attitude of the meetings in October. We presented our proposals. Some were accepted; others were rejected.

But by the end of the third day we had made very substantial progress, and all of us thought that we were within a day or two of completing the arrangements. We do not know what decisions were made in Hanoi at that point, but from that point on, the negotiations have had the character where a settlement was always just within our reach, and was always pulled just beyond our reach when we attempted to grasp it.

I do not think it is proper for me to go into the details of the specific issues, but I think I should give you a general atmosphere and a general sense of the procedures that were followed.

When we returned on Dec. 4, we of the American team, we thought that the meetings could not last more than two or three days because there were only two or three issues left to be resolved. You all know that the meetings lasted nine days. They began with Hanoi withdrawing every change that had been agreed to two weeks previously.

We then spent the rest of the week getting back to where we had already been two weeks before. By Saturday, we thought we had narrowed the issues sufficiently where, if the other side had accepted again one section they already had agreed to two weeks previously, the agreement could have been completed.

At that point, the President ordered General Haig to return to Washington so that he would be available for the mission, that would then follow, of presenting the agreement to our allies. At that point, we thought we were sufficiently close so that experts could meet to conform the texts so that we would not again encounter the linguistic difficulties which we had experienced previously, and so that we could make sure that the changes that had been nego-

tiated in English would also be reflected in Vietnamese.

When the experts met, they were presented with 17 new changes in the guise of linguistic changes. When I met again with the special adviser, the one problem which we thought remained on Saturday had grown to two, and a new demand was presented. When we accepted that, it was withdrawn the next day and sharpened up. So we spent our time going through the 17 linguistic changes and reduced them again to two.

Then, on the last day of the meeting, we asked our experts to meet to compare whether the 15 changes that had been settled, of the 17 that had been proposed, now conformed in the two texts. At that point we were presented with 16 new changes, including four substantive ones, some of which now still remain unsettled.

Now, I will not go into details or into the merits of these changes. The major difficulty that we now face is that provisions that were settled in the agreement appear again in a different form in the protocols; that matters of technical implementation which were implicit in the agreement from the beginning have not been addressed and were not presented to us until the very last day of series of sessions that had been specifically designed to discuss them; and that as soon as one issue was settled, a new issue was raised.

It was very tempting for us to continue the process which is so close to everybody's heart, implicit in the many meetings, of indicating great progress, but the President decided that we could not engage in a charade with the American people.

We now are in this curious position: Great progress has been made, even in the talks. The only thing that is lacking is one decision in Hanoi, to settle the remaining issues in terms that two weeks previously they had already agreed to.

So, we are not talking of an issue of principle that is totally unacceptable.

Secondly, to complete the work that is required to bring the international machinery into being in the spirit that both sides have an interest of not ending the war in such a way that it is just the beginning of another round of conflict. So, we are in a position where peace can be near, but peace requires a decision. This is

why we wanted to restate once more what our basic attitude is.

With respect to Saigon, we have sympathy and compassion for the anguish of their people and for the concerns of their government. But if we can get an agreement that the President considers just, we will proceed with it.

With respect to Hanoi, our basic objective was stated in the press conference of Oct. 26. We want an end to the war that is justice. We want to move from thing more than an armistice to normalization and from normalization to cooperation. But we will not make a settlement which is a disguised form of continued warfare and which brings about, by indirection, what we have always said we would not tolerate.

We have always stated that a fair solution cannot possibly give either side everything that it wants. We are not continuing a war in order to give total victory to our allies. We want to give them a reasonable opportunity to participate in a political structure, but we also will not make a settlement which is a disguised form of victory for the other side.

#### Closer to Agreement?

Therefore, we are at a point where we are again perhaps closer to an agreement than we were at the side is willing to deal with us in good faith and with good will. But it cannot do that if every day an issue is end of October, if the other settled a new one is raised, that when an issue is settled in an agreement, it is raised again as an understanding and if it is settled in an understanding, it is raised again as a protocol. We will not be blackmailed into an agreement. We will not be stampeded into an agreement, and, if I may say so, we will not be charmed into an agreement until its conditions are right.

For the President and for all of us who have been engaged in these negotiations, nothing that we have done has meant more than attempting to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. Nothing that I have done since I have been in this position has made me feel more the trustee of so many hopes as the negotiations in which I have recently participated. It was painful at times to think of the hopes of millions and, indeed, of the hopes of many of you ladies and gentlemen who were



standing outside these various meeting places expecting momentous events to be occurring, while inside one frivolous issue after another was surfaced in the last three days.

So, what we are saying to Hanoi is, we are prepared to continue in the spirit of the negotiations that were started in October. We are prepared to maintain an agreement that provides for the unconditional release of all American and allied prisoners, that imposes no political solution on either side, that brings about an internationally supervised ceasefire and the withdrawal of all American forces within 60 days. It is a settlement that is just to both sides and that requires only a decision to maintain provisions that had already been accepted and an end to procedures that can only mock the hopes of humanity.

On that basis, we can have a peace that justifies the hopes of mankind and the sense of justice of all participants.

#### Questions Invited

Now, I will be glad to answer some of your questions.

**Q:** Dr. Kissinger, could you explain what in your mind you think Hanoi's motivation was in playing what you called a charade?

**A:** I don't want to speculate on Hanoi's motives. I have no doubt that before too long we will hear a version of events that does not exactly coincide with ours. I have attempted to give you as honest an account as I am capable of. I believe—and this is pure speculation—that for a people that have fought for so long, it is paradoxically, and perhaps easier to face the risks of war than the uncertainties of peace.

It may be that they are waiting for a further accentuation of the divisions between us and Saigon, for more public pressures on us, or perhaps they simply cannot make up their mind. But I really have no clue to what the policy decisions were.

**Q:** Dr. Kissinger, from your account one would conclude that the talks are now ended in terms of the series you completed. Is that true? Secondly, if it is not true, on

what basis will they be resumed?

**A:** We do not consider the talks completed. We believe that it would be a relatively simple matter to conclude the agreement, because many of the issues that I mentioned, in the press conference of Oct. 26, have either been settled or substantial progress toward settling them has been made.

Therefore, if there were a determination to reach an agreement, it could be reached relatively quickly. On the other hand, the possibilities of raising technical objections are endless.

So, as Le Duc Tho said yesterday, we will remain in contact through messages. We can then decide whether or when to meet again. I expect that we will meet again, but we have to meet in an atmosphere that is worthy of the seriousness of the endeavor. On that basis, as far as we are concerned, the settlement will be very rapid.

**Q:** Dr. Kissinger, you have not discussed at all the proposals that the United States made on behalf of Saigon which required changes in the existing agreement that was negotiated. Can you discuss what those were and what effect they had on stimulating Hanoi, if they did, to making counter-proposals of its own?

**A:** As I pointed out, there were two categories of objections on the part of Saigon, objections which we agreed with, and objections which we did not agree with. The objections that we agreed with are essentially contained in the list that I presented at the beginning and those were the ones we maintained. All of those, we believe, did not represent changes in the agreement, but either clarifications, removal of ambiguities, or spelling out the implementation of agreed positions.

In the first sequence of meetings between Nov. 20 and Nov. 26, most of those were, or many of those were taken care of. So that we have literally, as I have pointed out before, been in the position where every day we thought it could and indeed, had to be the last day.

The counter-proposals that Hanoi has made were

See TEXT, A10, Col. 1



## TEXT, From A9

again in two categories. One set of changes that would have totally destroyed the balance of the agreement and which, in effect, withdraw the most significant concessions they had made. I did not mention those in my statement, because in the process of negotiation they tended to disappear. They tended to disappear from the agreement to reappear in understandings and then to disappear from unprotocols. But I suspect that understandings to reappear in they will, in time, after the nervous exhaustion of our technical experts, disappear from the protocols as well. So, there were major counter-proposals which we believe can be handled.

But then there were a whole series of technical counter-proposals which were absolutely unending and which hinged on such profound questions as whether, if you state an obligation in the future tense, open the question of when open the question of when it would come into operation, and matters that reached the metaphysical at moments and which, as soon as one of them was settled, another one appeared, which made one believe that one was not engaged in an effort to settle fundamental issues but in a delaying action for whatever reason.

Now, those issues can be settled any day that somebody decides to be serious. Now it is clear that the interplay between Saigon and Hanoi is one of the complicating features of this negotiation, but the basic point that we want to make here is this:

We have had our difficulties in Saigon, but the obstacle to an agreement at this moment is not Saigon, because we do not have, as yet, an agreement that we can present to them. When that point is reached, the President has made clear that he will act on the basis of what he considers just; but he has also made clear that he does not want to end such a long war by bringing about a very short peace.

Q: Can a useful agreement be made operative without Saigon's signature?

A: Well, this is a question

that has not yet had to be faced and which we hope will not have to be faced.

Q: For the agreement to be just, according to the President's terms, must there be substantial withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South?

A: The question of North Vietnamese forces in the South has three elements: the presence of the forces now there, their future, and

the general claim that North Vietnam may make with respect to its right to intervene constantly in the South.

With respect to the last question, we cannot accept the proposition that North Vietnam has a right of constant intervention in the South.

With respect to the first question, of the forces now in the South, the United States has made three cease-fire proposals since October 1970, all of them based on the de facto situation as it existed at the time of the cease-fire, all of them approved by the government of South Vietnam. Therefore, we did not add that condition of withdrawal to our present proposal, which reflected exactly the positions we had taken on Jan. 25 and on May 8 of this year, both of which had been agreed to by the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

We believe, however, that if the agreement that has been negotiated is implemented in good faith, that the problem of the forces will tend to lose its significance, or at least reduce significance, partly because of de facto withdrawals that could occur, and partly because if the provisions with respect to Laos, Cambodia, and no infiltration are maintained, the consequences in attrition will have to be obvious.

Q: Are we back to Square 1 now, Dr. Kissinger, would you say?

A: No. We have an agreement that is 99 per cent completed as far as the text of the agreement is concerned. We also have an agreement whose associated implementations are very simple to conclude if one takes the basic provisions of international supervision

that are in the text of the agreement, provisions that happened to be spelled out in greater detail in the agreement than any other aspect, and, therefore, we are one decision away from a settlement.

Hanoi can settle this any day by an exchange of messages, after which there would be required a certain amount of work on the agreement, which is not very much, and some work in bringing the implementing instruments into being.

Q: Would you tell what that one per cent is?

A: Well, you know, I have found I get into trouble when I give figures, so let me not insist on one per cent. It is an agreement that is substantially completed, but I cannot go into that. But that alone is not the problem. The problem is as I have described it in my presentation.

Q: I am a little confused, Dr. Kissinger, as to whether what remains you would describe as fundamental or one of these technical problems, because you have ranged between the two and I am little lost as to what is left.

A: The technical implementing instruments that they have presented are totally unacceptable for the reasons which I gave. On the other hand, I cannot really believe they are serious. What remains on the agreement itself is a fundamental point. It is, however, a point that had been accepted two weeks previously and later withdrawn. So we are not raising a new, fundamental point. We are raising the acceptance of something that had once been accepted.

Q: Is it a political issue?

A: I really don't want to go into it.

Q: What is the future of the Paris peace talks?

A: I think that the sort of discussions that have been going on in the Paris peace talks are not affected by such temporary ups and downs as the private peace talks, so I am sure that Minister Xuan Thuy and Ambassador Porter will find many subjects for mutual recrimination.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, isn't the fundamental point the one



you raised about the right of North Vietnamese forces to intervene in the future in South Vietnam?

substance of the negotiations.  
A: I will not go into the

Q: Dr. Kissinger, you already mentioned a fundamental disagreement in which you say it is the U.S. insistence that the two parts of Vietnam should live in peace with each other. Is that not the fundamental disagreement here?

A: As I said, I will not go into the details. I cannot consider it an extremely onerous demand to say that the parties of a peace settlement should live in peace with one another, and we cannot make a settlement which brings peace to North Vietnam and maintains the war in South Vietnam.

Q: But isn't their position basically that Vietnam is one country, and that this peace agreement is supposed to ratify that point?

A: As I said, I will not go into the substance of the discussions, and I repeat: The issue that remained when we sent General Haig home is one that had already been agreed upon once, so it could not have been something that happened by oversight.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, was Hanoi messaged ahead of time that you would talk to us?

A: No. But I suspect you

will get that message to them very quickly.

Q: Was there any understanding in Paris before you left that each side would be free to express itself without damaging the possibility of future talks?

A: No. Le Duc Tho correctly stated our agreement at the airport: that we would not go into the substance of the talks. Now, I recognize that what I am doing here goes to the edge of that understanding but the President felt that we could not permit a situation to continue in which there was daily speculation as to something that was already accomplished, while the record was so clearly contrary; therefore, we owed you an explanation not of the particular issues, but of the progress of negotiations, and exactly where they stood.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, I am not quite clear on a technical point. You talked about an agreement, understandings and protocols. Are there in fact three different sets of documents under negotiation? What are these understandings?

A: There are agreements, understandings and protocols. It always happened in a negotiation that there is some discussion which is not part of the agreement which attempts to explain what specific provisions mean and how they are going to be interpreted. This is what I meant by understanding. The protocols are the instruments that bring into being the international machinery and prisoner release. Their function is usually, in fact always, a purely technical implementation of provisions of an agreement.

These protocols do not, as a general rule, raise new issues, but rather they say, for example, with respect to prisoners, if the prisoners are to be released in 60 days, they would spell out the staging, the point at which they are released, who can receive them, et cetera.

Similarly with respect to international machinery, they would say where the teams are located, what are their functions and so forth. Our concern is that the protocols, as we now have

them, raise both political issues, which are inappropriate to implementing protocols, and technical issues, which are inconsistent with international supervision.

We have other protocols that deal with prisoners and withdrawals and mining that also present problems, but which I don't mention here because those are normal technical discussions that you would expect in the course of an agreement.