The battle over the tapes was made complicated when it is simple. What Nixon did Civild was a reasonable interpreted as a sign that he was not in firm control of his own mind.

An alternative and a reasonable one is that he was guilty.

If the tapes establish his innocence and that of his close associates, there was neither legal nor reasonable cause for not releasing them. He never claimed there was an injunction against it. Rather he claimed that he owed it to Presidents of the <u>future</u> not to set a precedent. No precedent would have **been** involved. Presidents had in the past provided evidence and made personal appearances before Congressional committees.

That Nixon messed up his counterattack is as typical as that he picked the weakest defense point from which to counterattack. It is also typical that he swung wildly and illugically and irrationally, as he had in his Checkers crisms, perhaps because he had pulled it off then.

In response to the Senate's request for the few tapes it specified, Nixon made a claim that at least had the possibility of support by the courts, particularly because he had already packed the Supreme Court. "e claimed that under the "doctrine" of separation of powers between the three brnaches of government, he did not have to produce the tapes.

However, he was not content with this. He then added the self-destroying, that he had personally listened to some of the tapes and that they "contained comments that persons with different perspectives and motives [the paranoid in him!] would inevitably interpret in different ways."

If these tapes could be "interpreted" as other than establishing innocence, they were evidence of guilt. So, he was saying these tapes can convict, therefore, whatever I really say, I am withholdstham keeping them secret because they are proof of my guilt and that of mt staff. "

Whatever the legal outcome, over the weeks before that it came he would be hearing this over and over and over and people would be thinking it. hunguilty and gailty of bitruiting justice.

If he wanted to make the fight tougher because he fights best when he can abandon himself to the fight, this was a good way of steeling himself because, if reason were visible to prevail, he had indicted and convicted himself. Fighting there is a tough fight, even for an old dirty fighter like Wixon, who had done it before.—and won.

Re the special prosecutor took a variation of this position.

This special prosecutor and his entire staff were part of the Department of Justice.

The Department of Justice is an executive agency. Nixon, as President, controlled all executive agencies.

Therefore, there could be no issue of "separation of powers" because the special prosecutor was part of the "power" making the claim, the executive power.

Nimon then claimed that if Cox, the special prosecutor was under his control, he could simply deny him the tapes because he was boss of all executive agencies!

To this disengenuous argument, which also amounted to a confession of guilt because there was no reason not to voluntarily give the prosecutor the evidence and the only reasonable interpretation of resusal to was guilt, Nizon added another. Cox, he claimed, as a prosecutor, had a responsibility to the grand jury and through it to the court, which were part of the third "power", the judiciary. In this hoked-up way, he argued that the "dosctrine" of spearation of powers applied to Cox also.

If it was a transparently spurious argument and, as reasonably interpreted, was an admission of guilt in both instances, it had two purposes not immediately interpreted in the reporting: to make Nixon appear to be the victim, not the criminal, a pose he was always effected when in a fight; and to shift the focus from the crimes to the irrelevant, contrived legalism, a basis where, with the court appointments he had made with such care, he had a better chance of prevailing, regardless of right and wrong.

It was according to the "game plan" of the American "achiavelli, Murray
Chotiner, for perfect moment for attack, the basis of his way that means the end
of any kind of representative society and inevitably means an authoritarianism.

of the

This was not only because, with revelation that Mixon had every word of incriminating Mixon

evidence on tape. That in itself meant has now had his back to the wall. It was also

the precise moment for attack because the perfect instfument for attack was, at that ly perfect

exquisite/moment, of khas perfections in the trenches. It was the time

pre-set for John Ehrlichman's appearance before the Ervin committee.

NAMERICANAL MATRICES Nixon, the neophyte of 1946, had become the master of Chotnerism by the time he became President. Ehrlichman was a living, vividly articulate true columnist believer in the corrupt True Way of Nixon's Chotnerism. He was, as/Nicholas von Hoffman is was to call him, a sociopath. But he was more, much more. He is a man or remarkable ability. He was well known to the press and to politicians as an arrogant man. But to consider him merely arrogant and blood-lusting from limitless power imposed in him by Nixon is to seriously underestime this unusual man and the unusual combinations of endowments, aktika developed skill and sincere belief that with which he was equipped to launch the attack against the "enemy." He is also a fearless man, a man incapable of being embarrassed or of embarrassing himself, a man who exercised and made virtuouso display of self-dontrol during the first week of the hearings at which he testified beginning July 24.

If anyone could pull it off, ohn Ehrlichman was that man. The heartland of the enemy was the most daring best place. And nationwide TV and radio live and recorded woverage, guaranteed the best situation and the largest possible audience. In fact, ABC so correctly anticipated the high drama of Ehrlichman's appearance that it departed from the rotating network schedule for airing the hearings and on the two days on which it was not obligated to carry them, it pre-empted all its commercial shows and telecast them anyway.

The staging of this public-relations ploy was not as careful as it might have been. Having long gotten away with such tricks, Nixon and his staff had grown careless. They wanted pictures that showed him, the girls and the Camp David sign only. So, there was another shot, used by TIMEN magazine. It was taken from the other side of the entrance. In it the sign is almost illegible, it is so small. Wixon was in the same relative position, inside the line of his retreat with the girls outside, the same symbolism. Rather awkwardly, he had his left hand on the head of a girl (white). And he was smiling and looking over the top of the head of the tallest.

Nixon is ever the boaster. As he had made a great point out of publicity that had him working as usual in the hospital, for all the world as though a national leader can or should even try to make decisions with a fever of 102°, so also did he feel compelled to pretend that there is something superior in his body. In his White House statement, he read a letter from a little boy in California who had had pneumonia. The Nixon of 60 actually boasted that he left the hospital sooner than had the youngster. He has to be better at everything than anybody else.

However, his doctors had wik concerns with other than their patient's self-concept.

With him when he went to Camp David were two doctors and two medical technicians. Their presence was avoided in the White House publicity.