

Purported China Papers on Nixon Visit Are Released in Taiwan

By JOSEPH LELYVELD
Special to The New York Times

HONG KONG, April 9

Sources on Taiwan have released a set of documents, said to have been procured from Yunnan province in South China, in which Chairman Mao Tse-tung's decision to invite President Nixon to Peking is defended as a short-term accommodation with an "enemy."

The cover sheets on the documents say they were compiled a year ago by a propaganda unit of the political department of the Kunming military region, apparently as part of a political-education program for fairly low-ranking Communist Party members in the People's Liberation Army.

Analysts of Chinese affairs who have seen the documents find them plausible as part of a training program at that level. Even if the documents are accepted as authentic, the analysts point out, they cannot automatically be interpreted as an authoritative statement on China's foreign policy.

Mao's Tactics Cited

The most striking feature of the documents is the strained and defensive tone in which the explanation of the new relationship with the United States is made. "Some comrades" with a low level of political consciousness, the documents assert, have had difficulty seeing the difference between "United States-Soviet collusion" and Chinese-American negotiations.

The erring comrades think that Peking has embarked on a new policy, but this is said to be a basic mistake, reflecting their inability to understand the tactical situation of the moment. "Our invitation of Nixon to

visit China proceeds precisely from Chairman Mao's tactical thinking of 'exploiting contradictions, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and breaking them up one by one,' and this by no means indicates a change in our diplomatic line," asserts one of the documents in the English translation in which they were made available.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are enemies, the document goes on to say, but China can neither fight them both at the same time nor consider the possibility of allying herself with one against the other. "We act in light of changes in situation," it says, "flipping the scale diversely at different times."

Another of the documents—there are three in all, amounting to 36 typewritten pages—asserts that the Soviet Union is seeking "to complete major strategic encirclement of us"

and "waiting for an opportunity to wage large-scale aggressive war against our country."

The document on relations with the United States builds on that premise, arguing that the invitation to President Nixon not only assured China's admission to the United Nations but also "shattered the scheme of United States imperialism and Soviet revisionism to isolate and encircle our country."

A Question of Authenticity

In addition, it says that the invitation aggravated "the contradictions between United States imperialism and its lackeys," especially Japan. "The enemy camp is in chaos," it concludes, and "this state of affairs benefits our work and the people's revolution."

Each of the three documents ends on a pedagogic note with a "topic for discussion," for instance: "Why is it said that

Soviet revisionism is our country's most dangerous and important enemy?"

In the main, the documents seem to foreshadow with reasonable accuracy Chinese foreign policy formulations of recent months, which have been increasingly militant in tone. Some passages, however, raise questions about their authenticity—if for no other reason, because of their obvious advantage to Taiwan.

For instance, one of them asserts: "It is for making the people target of ours that we invited Nixon to China." Then, almost in the same terms as a television producer studying his Nielsen ratings, it dwells on the deep and sympathetic interest in China that the Nixon trip evoked.

"He was originally attempting to make a publicity of himself," it says, "without noticing that the true state of affairs in China was thus made known to all the peoples of the world." The document then suggests that this has advanced the cause of revolution in the United States.

Analysts said it was not genuine.

Impossible that this kind of argument could have been presented in Yunnan as a way of certifying the revolutionary credentials of policymakers in far-off Peking. It would also not be unprecedented, they noted, for a basically authentic document to be doctored to serve the purposes of those who make it available—in this case, either the Taiwan sources, or their sources.

In the last two years, a number of Chinese documents have made their way to the outside world through Taiwanese sources. Some of the most important initially struck many analysts as outlandish and obvious forgeries. In this category were an outline of Lin Piao's alleged plot to overthrow Chairman Mao and a letter Mr. Mao was supposed to have written to his wife, both of which have since been quoted in speeches or newspapers in Peking.

In this case, the very modesty of the attribution—to "a propaganda subdepartment" in Kunming—was considered by analysts as an indication that the documents were probably