

The Coming Crisis With Europe

By Murrey Marder

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President Nixon's frontal attack on Europeans who dispute his Atlantic Alliance policy will thrust the United States into simultaneous crisis-style bargaining with both allies and adversaries, at an acute period in American history.

His blunt warning to Western Europe on Friday that U.S. security support cannot be separated from allied political and economic cooperation, predictably infuriated Europeans. To many in Europe, the President is putting a higher price on pursuit of American-Soviet detente than on the preservation of allied unity. Administration officials deny that.

The President also may

have opened the congressional floodgates to what his administration in the past has vigorously fought: cuts in the level of American troops committed to the defense of Europe.

One of President Nixon's apparent objectives is to demonstrate that he is not hamstrung globally by

News Analysis

Watergate. Officials privately concede that this is an underlying preoccupation of the administration.

The President may be gambling as well that he can checkmate the impeachment threat that hangs over him by rallying the nation around an embattled chief executive faced with global challenges. Mr. Nixon often

has reached for audacious moves in foreign policy when he appears most encircled.

In either case, President Nixon suddenly has set the public stage for a spring and summer of diplomatic ferment among the Western allies, at the same time that the United States is engaged in high-stakes diplomacy with the Soviet Union and with the nations of the Middle East.

Some key ingredients in the administration's moves can now be pieced together from recent behind-the-scenes developments:

• President Nixon was offered more options by his advisers than the one he mentioned Friday of "papering over" the U.S. dispute with the European

Common Market. He was given the option of a low-key handling of the disagreement. This implicitly would have acknowledged serious American miscalculation of European attitudes, which did occur, while leaving a path open for quieter future bargaining.

• By publicly polarizing the dispute with the unusual charge that the internally divided Europeans are trying to "gang up against the United States," the President undercut European gibes, deeply resented in the White House, that he would go to Europe to sign anything to compete with Watergate-impeachment headlines.

• Secretary of State

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
Europe-U.S. Crisis Is Impending

EUROPE, From A1

Henry A. Kissinger privately expressed concern to key members of Congress last week that the Soviet Union may be tempted, by the impeachment threat to President Nixon, to shift from detente to an adventurist global policy. Kissinger goes to Moscow next weekend to prepare for a projected trip there by President Nixon in June.

• Kissinger discussed possible signs of future Soviet chill at a lengthy closed meeting Thursday with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he also cited the strains in the Atlantic Alliance. Afterward, some senators privately discussed whether Kissinger might be "poor-mouthing" prospects for further U.S.-Soviet detente in order to claim unexpected success afterward. But these Senators concluded that Kissinger was genuinely uneasy.

• Some members of Congress question President



United Press International

President Nixon during Friday's hard-line speech on European relationships.

Nixon's broadside assault Friday on "the Europeans," instead of singling out France as the chief anti-cooperative villain in American eyes. Congress is in a belligerent mood about France. The administration's objective is to arouse West Germany and Britain, especially, to stand up against France. However, some American diplomats, as well as Europeans, fear that the blunderbuss approach could backfire.

Kissinger's own high diplomatic prestige has been damaged among professionals by his handling of the allied clash, although his phenomenal stock on Capitol Hill seems undiminished. Kissinger vented his wrath on aides, especially loyalist chief assistant Lawrence S. Eagleburger, for allowing newsmen into Monday's meeting with congressional wives. That required a Kissinger apology Thursday on his gaffe about the "legitimacy" of European governments. Others blame the strain of Kissinger's aerial "shuttle diplomacy", and worry about his durability without rest.

There are long roots in the history of the post-World-War II decades, inflamed by developments since the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli war, and the accompanying world oil squeeze, that help account for the present crisis in the Atlantic Alliance. Then and now, the interaction of Soviet policy on allied policy has cause-and-effect consequences.

Before entering the White House, and achieving what is now a larger-than-life role of a Secretary of State who often eclipses a Watergate-crippled President, Kissinger was a recognized expert on the causes of allied disunity.

Paradoxically, both the President and Kissinger, independently, were admirers of the global style and strategy of the late French President Charles de Gaulle, which is now colliding with Nixon administration strategy as practiced by De Gaulle's political heirs.

Kissinger cautioned, in the 1960s, as the influential French newspaper *Le Monde* pointedly advised readers last week, that the American-supported goal of

European unity inescapably would bring conflict with the United States.

In his 1965 book, "The Troubled Partnerships" Kissinger questioned American assumptions about the benefits of European unity. He wrote:

"A separate identity has usually been established by opposition to a dominant power: the European sense of identity is unlikely to be an exception to this general rule—its motive could well be to insist on a specifically European view of the world."

Kissinger said that would become especially likely when Western unity could "no longer be nourished by fear of the U.S.S.R."

De Gaulle tried in vain, starting in 1958, to induce the United States to agree to a global directorate for

coordinating Western policy that would be made up of the United States, Great Britain and France.

First the Eisenhower administration, then the Kennedy administration, spurned the request, on grounds that what De Gaulle sought amounted to a veto of U.S. policy. The United States said it could not speak with one or two European nations at the expense of others. It wanted to cooperate with a united Europe as a partner inside the Atlantic Alliance. France, then and now, saw this as an American recipe for hegemony over Europe.

Kissinger reopened the current version of the debate under changed international circumstances last April 223 in New York in a major speech entitled "The Year of Europe."

U.S.-Soviet detente had been launched the preceeding/spring at the Moscow summit. The United States had overcome a generation of hostility with China. The six-nation European Common Market (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) was expanding to a more powerful nine-nation club with the addition of Britain, Denmark and Ireland, and a fundamental transition was under way in power relationships.

"We are in a period of relaxation of tensions," said

Kissinger, but, with new problems, "new assertions of national identity and national rivalry," and new pressures in the United States, born of the frustrations of the Vietnam war, for greater sharing of global burdens.

President Nixon, Kissinger said, after discussions with the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and other European nations, intended "to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West." He sought "a new Atlantic Charter" to "deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively."

The American approach, said Kissinger, would be that "the political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other."

What the United States proposes, Kissinger said, is that "by the time the President travels to Europe toward the end of the year" the new charter would be ready for signing, and, "We ask our friends in Europe, Canada and ultimately Japan to join us in this effort."

At the time Kissinger was launching this initiative, the Watergate scandals were breaking over the Nixon administration. Kissinger cautioned that an "orgy of re-primination" at home could undermine America's great world objectives.

His new "Atlantic Charter" overture received a decidedly mixed welcome in Europe, ranging from lukewarm to open hostility.

The most caustic European critics saw the venture as a device to counter adverse Watergate publicity

with the drama of presidential statesmanship. But the most vigorous opposition centered on the linkage cited by Kissinger.

To many Europeans, and indeed to many Americans as well, the United States unquestionably was out to "trade off" the nuclear shield and the American troop commitments it provided to Western Europe for greater sharing of the allied security burden and freer American access through the trade walls of the pros-

perous Common Market.

President Nixon, in Chicago on Friday, said what America seeks is "a fair break for our producers, just as we try to give a fair break to their [Europe's] producers."

European opposition, led by France, first split the ambitious Atlantic Charter initiative into two parts, to break or soften the American linkage between military security and political-economic cooperation.

The defense portion of the U.S. plan was sent to the 15-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The political-economic segment was routed to the European Economic Community (Common Markets). A third link between the Common Market, the United States, Canada and Japan, which many Europeans oppose in its American-initiated framework, still dangles in limbo.

Maneuvering over these documents was still under way when the Arab-Israeli war broke out last October, demolishing the "Year of Europe" in bitter allied divisions over Middle East policy. The Common Market nations, stunned by the threat of a paralyzing loss of oil for their economies, which are overwhelmingly dependent on Arab supplies, unlike the United States, leaped to adopt a pro-Arab stance, disdaining support backing of Israel, for fear of the United States in its being tainted by it.

In private words that found their way back to European ears, Kissinger deplored the European attitude as "craven" and "contemptible."

By early January of this year, Kissinger was prepared to begin acknowledging in public that he had seriously miscalculated the European readiness to join in a "creative" new act of alliance policy coordination.

"I think it is fair to say," he told a press conference at San Clemente, "that we did not expect that we were raising a controversial issue." He reiterated that presidential-level talks had raised U.S. expectations that its initiative "would be greeted with some enthusiasm . . ." Instead, said Kissinger, "the European reaction surprised us and, I am frank to say,

disappointed us."

Privately, Europeans expressed amazement that the German-born Kissinger miscalculated so widely.

Kissinger and President Nixon by then had shifted their main emphasis to a larger initiative, launched by Kissinger in London last Dec. 12, international coop-

eration on energy to cope with the world oil crisis.

The common danger to the world's economies and to the entire postwar structure of international cooperation, Kissinger said, compelled the world to join to face the energy challenge.

France, Britain, Italy, Japan and other nations were scrambling furiously to try to assure independent supplies of Arab oil. France was especially bitter that for years it had been squeezed out of the Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf oil lodes by American and British, but primarily American-dominated, giant multinational oil firms. In addition, France particularly resented being eliminated from participation in the diplomacy of a Middle East settlement, marked out by the United States and the Soviet Union as their own privileged domain.

The old Gaullist passions were reawakened by what France saw as new evidence of an American-Soviet "condominium," now escalating its reach in the name of détente. At the NATO Council of Ministers last December, combative French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert, who is a match for Kissinger in shrewdness and articulateness, both men respectfully agree, raised open challenge. Jobert, on that occasion, attacked the American-Soviet declaration of the previous summer on the prevention of nuclear war as evidence of U.S.-Soviet "condominium" strategy.

Kissinger vigorously denied that the nuclear declaration was a division of world power at the expense of allies. On the contrary, Kissinger insisted, all nations would benefit by measures to avoid U.S.-Soviet nuclear conflict.

The U.S.-French collision was repeated more bruisingly at the 13-nation Washington Energy Conference in

February. This time, France ended on the losing side of an open split with its Common Market partners, as the United States, with the vigorous support of West Germany, swept the field with a 12-to-1 vote in favor of the U.S. energy approach to international cooperation.

On March 4, however, France struck back through its Common Market partnership, gaining a unanimous vote to proceed with a Common Market initiative for political-economic cooperation with 20 Arab nations. French Prime Minister Pierre Messmer exulted in "the affirmation of an authentic European personality, independent of its world partners."

On Friday in Chicago, President Nixon mounted his frontal assault, declaring that "the day of the one-way street is gone" for Europe to benefit from American security protection while rejecting the American version of political-economic cooperation.

The European allies as a whole now face in wholesale fashion what they always have dreaded most, a compulsion to choose between the United States and their own cohesion.

Europe Reacts With Hostility to Nixon Charges

From News Dispatches
European officials reacted sharply yesterday to President Nixon's charges that the nine countries of the European Economic Community are refusing to cooperate politically and economically with the United States.

Common Market sources in Brussels termed the President's remarks in Chicago "insulting," "threatening," "counterproductive" and "hypocritical."

Meanwhile, in Washington, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger met with West German Ambassador Berndt von Staden in a hurriedly ar-

ranged session concerning the recent harsh American statements about relations with Europe.

Mr. Nixon said Friday his proposed trip to Brussels next month would be pointless because there had been insufficient progress on a joint declaration of principles which he was scheduled to sign there.

The President also raised the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe unless the Europeans begin to cooperate with the United States on the political and economic fronts.

The nine member govern-

ments were communicating with each other about the conflict with the United States, Common Market sources in Europe said.

In London, British diplomats reacted with a shock and dismay. One said he feared Mr. Nixon's comments could have "the most serious consequences" for Europe and the Atlantic alliance.

In Bonn, government sources said West German Chancellor Willy Brandt would stick with his decision to remain silent on the dispute between the United States and Europe.

Observers in Bonn, however, said they viewed Nixon's statement as a major escalation in the transatlantic war of words that flared when European countries decided to find an answer to their energy problems by dealing directly with Arab oil producers.

French government officials said Foreign Minister Michel Jobert would make a major foreign policy statement at a Gaullist party convention Sunday that may constitute a reply to Mr. Nixon.

The French newspaper *Le Monde* called Mr. Nixon's "table pounding" a dangerous

"poker bluff." It added that the President appeared "not to be in control of himself."

The Dutch Foreign Ministry showed a conciliatory attitude saying: "We resolutely oppose a European identity at the cost of Atlantic cooperation."

In the Middle East, some Arab newspapers reacted strongly to Mr. Nixon's demand that the oil embargo be lifted without conditions.

The normally pro-Western *L'Orient Le Jour* in Beirut characterized the speech as having been "in the purest cowboy style that would have suited his Texan predecessor, Lyndon Johnson."

Questions Arise on NATO

By Dan Morgan

By linking America's military protection of the Europeans with their obligation to cooperate politically and economically, President Nixon on Friday raised fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of the Atlantic security alliance.

For all of the 25-year existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it has been an article of faith of U.S. administrations that American forces are in Europe to deter Soviet military aggression.

Officials have consistently argued against Congressional advocates of substantial cuts in the size of these forces that they (troops) are in Europe to defend vital security interests of the United States.

The Europeans, including the French, have always known that their security depends on the 309,000 troops, 7,000 nuclear weapons, hundreds of tactical aircraft and assorted equipment that the United States keeps in NATO countries.

This fact has given the United States vast leverage in its dealings with its allies. But until Friday the leverage inherent in American power was one of the unmentionables of the Atlantic relationship—a reality that was always implied rather than stated.

By insisting in the strongest terms he has ever used that security and political cooperation are indivisible, President Nixon was making a blunt demand that is sure to be controversial on both sides of the Atlantic.

The argument against this concept was made sharply last week in testimony before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee by Paul Warnke, a former assistant secretary of defense.

To tie security to a com-



SEN. CLIFFORD P. CASE MORTON H. HALPERIN
... two give views on maintaining U.S. troops in Europe

mon approach on all other issues "overloads the circuits of the alliance," Warnke contended, in arguing that NATO is primarily a defense alliance.

NATO is "too expensive and too dangerous to retain as a tool for the exaction of economic concession," he asserted, adding:

"Were we to seek to coerce compliance with our political and economic views by threatening the withdrawal of our defense support, our allies might well conclude that the support isn't worth very much."

Only eight days ago, in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said: "We don't have troops in Europe in order to do a favor for the Europeans."

At a committee hearing a few days later, Sen. Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.) said: "We are defending Western Europe not because we are defending democracy there, but because we are defending ourselves."

These arguments, President Nixon said in Chicago Friday, will not hold political water in Congress. Many senators already have reacted angrily to recent

shows of independence by the nine European Common Market countries.

He said it would be "almost impossible" to get Congress to support a continued American military presence at current levels if the Europeans show "hostility" to the United States.

On the other hand, some congressional sources said yesterday that President Nixon's threat to withdraw some defense support might strengthen the large bloc in the Senate which favors a sharp reduction in American force levels.

Critics of the President's position also contend that Mr. Nixon was adding a formal political rationale for NATO that is historically new.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established in April, 1949, in response to an apparent Soviet threat to Western Europe. The 1948 Berlin Block-

ade, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia the same year, the subsequent development by the Soviets of the atomic bomb, and the Korean War all gave impetus to the creation of a strong Western deterrent to Soviet aggression.

As East-West relations evolved, NATO also deterred the Soviets from effectively using a threat against Europe to blackmail the United States in other parts of the world.

Policy makers also assert that, by giving war-torn West Germany a sense of security, NATO also kept in check German fears that otherwise might have resulted in that country's seeking to become a military powerhouse in its own right.

Although the European governments now differ

with the United States on a number of issues, European diplomats and officials assert that even now they are cooperating extensively with the United States on fundamental issues.

For instance, West Germans say that between 1969 and 1973 their central bank suffered a net loss of 14 billion marks (about \$5 billion) in monetary reserves, as a result of the devaluation of the dollar and a German pledge to Washington not to convert dollar reserves into gold.

German, British, Belgian and Dutch officials also complain that many American politicians consistently underestimate their contribution to NATO defense.

Some observers believe that President Nixon's remarks in Chicago Friday will inevitably contribute to re-

newed fears in Europe about the sincerity of the American commitment to European defense.

At another congressional hearing last week, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton H. Halperin asserted that "German confidence could not survive a total American withdrawal from Europe."

From the standpoint of East-West negotiations on strategic arms and balanced force reductions in Europe, the President's remarks came at a delicate time.

One principal aim of East-West force reduction talks in Vienna is to enable the United States to cut its forces in Europe without causing a psychological crisis among the allies.

Many American experts feel that the United States could indeed mount a credible deterrent to Soviet aggression with a substantially reduced European force.

Among other things, some of these experts feel that Washington could drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons in Europe.

In testimony on Capitol Hill last week, some witnesses argued that the American arsenal of "atomic mines" should be brought home, and a new doctrine formulated for the allegedly "vulnerable" nuclear-armed American aircraft on "quick reaction alert."

The problem as they see it is that in the present sour Atlantic climate, Europeans might see these reductions as a sign of American political retribution.