How C.I.A. Put 'Instant Air Force' Into Congo

Intervention, Invasion, Spying All in a Day's Work

By E. W. KENWORTHY

WASHINGTON, April 25—

A small group of Senators responsible for monitoring the Central Intelligence Agency met today to discuss whether their "watchdog" committee should be enlarged and its surveillance thinned.

The bipartisan group is made up of ranking members of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations subcommittee dealing with funds for the armed services.

For many years the Senate group and a comparable group in the House, also drawn from the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, have been the only "legislative oversight" of the secret operations and the secret funds of the C.I.A.

For many years also a large number of Senators and Representatives have urged that these two groups be expanded to include members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees so that the activities of the agency would be subjected more closely to political considerations.

Although Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the watchdog committee, has resisted these suggestions, in

Continued on Page 30, naming

Continued on Page 30, Column 1
Continued From Page 1, Col. 5

...funds without the bureaucratic restraints imposed on other government agencies, the C.I.A. soon found Joseph Mobutu, Victor Mendeal and Albert Ndele. Their eventual emergence as President of the country, Minister of Transportation and head of the national bank, respectively, proved a tribute to the Americans' judgment and tactics.

Perspective was the C.I.A.'s influence that the agency was widely accused of the assassination of Moscow's man, Premier Patrice Lumumba. Correspondents who were in the Congo are convinced the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the murder, though it did play a major role in establishing Cyrille Adoula as Mr. Lumumba's successor for a time.

Money and shiny American automobiles, furnished through the logistic wizardry of Langley, are said to have been the deciding factors in the vote that brought Mr. Adoula to power. Russian, Czechoslovak, Egyptian and Ghanaian agents were simply outbid where they could not be outmaneuvered.

Monsieur Formulaire has been elected, rival agents of East and West almost stumbled for far more sophisticated and elegant presentation of Moscow's man, Premier Patrice Lumumba. Correspondents who were in the Congo period, however, the men at Langley say they had learned that their earlier instincts to try to solve nasty political problems with happy diplomatic endings had been mistaken by the recognition of the need for far more sophisticated and enduring forms of influence.

"Purchased?" one American commented. "You can't even rent these guys for the afternoon."

And so the C.I.A. kept growing in size and scope.

By the time Moise Tshombe had returned to power in the Congo — through American acquiescence, if not design — it became apparent that hastily supplied arms and planes, as well as dollars and cars, would be needed to protect the American-sponsored government in Léopoldville.

This, apparently, was a job for the Defense Department, but to avoid a too obvious American involvement, and in the interests of speed and efficiency, the Government again turned to the C.I.A.

The agency had the tools. It knew the Cubans in Miami and their abilities as pilots. It had the front organizations through which they could be recruited, paid and serviced.

It could engage 20 British mechanics about legal complications and furnish the technical expertise from its own ranks or from Americans under contract.

Moreover, some C.I.A. agents had returned to power in the Congo with "its isolation, topograde as plane, forestation" would provide the agency with the required security.

While the whitish-gray building is undoubtedly as secure as fences, guards, safe and elaborate electronic devices can make it, the location is hardly a secret. A large sign on the George Washington Parkway pointing to "the Intelligency Agency" has been removed, but thousands of people know you can still find the same building by turning off on the same road, now marked by the sign "H.P. — Headquarters of Public Roads."

There, beyond the affable guard at the gate, is the large, rectangular structure with four wings, the ground-floor window barred, which stands as the visible symbol of what is supposed to be an invisible operation.

For organizational purposes, C.I.A. headquarters is divided into four divisions, each under a deputy director as planners, intelligence, science and technology, and support.

What the Divisions Do

A $30-million appropriation for a new, unitary headquarters was inserted without identification in the budget of another agency — and promptly knocked out by a Congressional committee so befuddled by C.I.A. secrecy that it did not know what the item was for.

When Allen W. Dulles, then director of the C.I.A., came back in 1956 with more candor, he asked for $59 million, and Congress gave him $46 million. He justified the bite that he proposed to take out of a 175-acre Government reservation on the Potomac by saying the site with "its isolation, topograde as plane, forestation" would provide the agency with the required security.

While the whitish-gray building is undoubtedly as secure as fences, guards, safe and elaborate electronic devices can make it, the location is hardly a secret. A large sign on the George Washington Parkway pointing to "the Intelligency Agency" has been removed, but thousands of people know you can still find the same building by turning off on the same road, now marked by the sign "H.P. — Headquarters of Public Roads."

There, beyond the affable guard at the gate, is the large, rectangular structure with four wings, the ground-floor window barred, which stands as the visible symbol of what is supposed to be an invisible operation.

For organizational purposes, C.I.A. headquarters is divided into four divisions, each under a deputy director as planners, intelligence, science and technology, and support.

What the Divisions Do

The Division of Science and Technology is responsible for keeping current on developing techniques in research. Weapons, including nuclear weapons, and for analyzing photos taken by U-2 reconnaissance planes and by space satellites.

The Division of Support is responsible for procuring equipment and for logistics, communications and security, including the C.I.A. codex.

The Division of Plans and the Division of Intelligence perform the basic functions of the agency. They represent the alpha and omega, the hand and brain, the dagger and the lamp, the melodrama and the monograph of the intelligence profession. Their presence under that roof has caused much of the controversy that has swirled about the C.I.A. since the Bay of Pigs.

It is the responsibility of the Intelligence Division to assemble, analyze and evaluate information from all sources and to produce daily and periodical
intelligence report of any country, person or situation for the President and the National Security Council, the President's top advisory group on defense and foreign policy.

All information — military, political, economic, scientific, industrial — is gathered for this division's mill. Perhaps no more than one-fifth — by volume and not necessarily importance — comes from agents overseas under varying depths of cover.

Most information is culled from foreign newspapers, scientific journals, industry publications, the reports of other government departments and intelligence services and foreign broadcasts monitored by C.I.A. stations around the world.

All Sorts of Experts

The Intelligence Division is organized by geographical sections that are served by resident specialists from almost every profession and discipline — linguists, chemists, physicians, biologists, geographers, engineers, psychiatrists and even agronomists, geologists and foresters.

Some of the achievements of these experts are prodigious, if reports filtering through the secrecy screen are even half accurate. For instance:

1. From ordinarily available information, physicians gleaned important health data: They made a diagnosis from a specimen stolen from a hospital in Vienna where the great man was being treated. C.I.A. shipping experts, through sheer expertise, spoiled the first shipment of Soviet arms to Cuba before the vessels had cleared the Black Sea.

2. Some anthropologists at C.I.A. headquarters devote their time to helpful studies of such primitive peoples as those of the hill tribes of Laos and Vietnam. The government, they observe, tends to be bureaucratic, one-dimensioned, and more single-minded in its anti-Communism. This is particularly true of those engaged in deep-cover operations, many of whom are ex-military people or men formerly in the Office of Strategic Services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

It has been said, however, that many of these agents who are essentially information gatherers and who work under Western outfits of the Shanghai Daily News, were once Communists.

The C.I.A. agents abroad fall into two groups — those in the Plans Division and those of the Front Office. Some are the spies and counterspies, the saboteurs, the leaders of paramilitary operations, the suborners of revolution. Such agents operate under deepest cover, and their activities become known only when they are unfortunate to be caught and "surfaced" for political or propaganda purposes.

While such operatives may be known to "the chief of station" — the top C.I.A. officer in any country — they are rarely known to the American Ambassador, although he may sometimes be aware of their mission. In fact, these deep agents are not known to the C.I.A.'s Intelligence Division in Washington, and their reports are not identified to it by name. Correspondents of The New York Times say they have never, with certainty, been able to identify one of these agents, although they've had occasion run across some unaccountable American of whom they have had their suspicions. Often unknown to each other, the deep agents masquerade as businessmen, tourists, scholars, students, missionaries, or charity workers.

Second, there are those agents, by far the larger number, who operate under the lesser cover of the official diplomatic mission. In the mission register they are listed as political or economic officers, Treasury representatives, consular officers or employees of the Agency for International Development (the United States agency), the office of the C.I.A. chief of station may be listed as a special assistant to the Ambassador or as the top political officer.

Not Very Secret

This official cover is not thin...
as to be meaningless, except to avoid embarrassment for the government. These agents, usually readily identifiable, are often the man with a car as big as the Ambassador's and a house that is sometimes— as in Lagos, Nigeria— better.

In practically all the allied countries the C.I.A. agents identify themselves to host government, and actually work in close cooperation with Cabinet officials, local intelligence and police.

In some embassies the C.I.A. agents outnumber the regular political and economic officers. In a few they have made up as much as 75 per cent of the diplomatic mission.

The chief of station often has more money than the Ambassador. Sometimes he has been in the country longer and is better informed than the envoy.

For all these reasons the host government, especially in undeveloped areas of the world, may prefer to deal with the chief of station rather than the Ambassador, believing him to have a real influence on top policy-making officials in Washington.

Top Quality People

Obviously the number of agents abroad is a closely held secret, kept from even such close Presidential advisers in the past as the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. In his book "A Thousand Days," Mr. Schlesinger states that those "under official cover overseas" number almost as many as State Department employees.

This would be roughly 6,600. The actual number, however, is believed to be considerably less, probably around 2,500.

The secrecy of identification can lead to some amusing situations. Once when Allen Dulles, then C.I.A. director, visited New Delhi, every one known "spook" (C.I.A. man) was lined up in an anteroom of the embassy to greet him. At that moment a newspaper correspondent who had been interviewing Mr. Dulles walked out of the inner office. A look of bewilderment crossed the faces of the C.I.A. men, plainly asking, "Is this one we didn't know about?"

Mr. Schlesinger has written that "in some areas the C.I.A. had outstripped the State Department in the quality of its personnel."

Almost without exception, correspondents of The New York Times reported that the men at the top overseas were of "high competence and discipline," "extremely knowing," "imaginative," "sharp and scholarly" and "generally somewhat better than those in State in work and dedication."

But they also found that below the top many C.I.A. people were "a little thin" and did not compare so favorably with Foreign Service officers on the same level.

The C.I.A. screens and re-screens applicants, because it is quite aware of the attraction that secrecy holds for the psychopath, the misfit and the immature person.

The greatest danger obviously lies in the area of special operations. Although it is generally agreed that the agents— covert and overt — have been for the most part men of competence and character, the C.I.A. has also permitted some of limited intelligence and of emotional instability to get through its screening and had even assigned them to sensitive tasks, with disastrous results.

One example was the assignment of a man known as "Frank Bendix," as contact with Cuban exile leaders during the preliminaries of the Bay of Pigs operation. He was a German refugee with only a smattering of Spanish and no understanding of Latin America or Latin character. Bendix antagonized the most liberal of the leaders by his bullying and his obvious partiality for the Cuban right.

Offices in This Country

The C.I.A. maintains field offices in American cities. These offices are overt but discreet. Their telephone numbers are listed under "Central Intelligence Agency" or "United States Government," but no address is given. Anyone wanting the address must know the name of the office director, whose telephone number and address are listed.

At times these field offices sought out scholars, businessmen, tourists and even ordinary tourists whom they knew to be planning a trip behind the Iron Curtain and asked them to record their observations and report to the C.I.A. in their return.

Very little of this assertedly is done any more, probably because of some embarrassing arrests, and imprisonment, of tourists and students. While the C.I.A. deals frankly with businessmen, it reputedly does not compromise their traveling representatives.

Most of the work of domestic field agents involves contacts with industry and universities. For example, an agent, on instructions from headquarters, will seek evaluation of captured equipment, analysis of the color of factory smoke as a clue to production, an estimate of production capacity from the size of a factory, or critiques of articles in technical and scientific journals.

The Human Inadequacy

In greater secrecy, the C.I.A. subsidizes, in whole or in part, a wide range of enterprises — "private" foundations, book and magazine publishers, schools of international studies in universities, law offices, "businesses" of various kinds and foreign broadcasting stations. Some of these perform real and valuable work for the C.I.A. Others are not much more than "mail drops."

Yet all these human activities, all the value received and the dangers incurred, all the organization and secrecy, all the trouble averted and all the setbacks encountered, still do not describe the work of the C.I.A. For the most gifted of analysts, the most crafty of agents — like all human beings — have their limitations.

At the time when the Americans were successfully keeping the Congo out of the Communist orbit, it still took the same men several months to slip an African agent into Stanleyville in the Congo to check on the lives and fate of some arrested Americans.

Men are fallible and limited, and the demands on the C.I.A. are almost infinite; that is why, today, some of the most valuable spies are not human and some of the most omnipotent agents harm through the heavens, and above.

Tomorrow: The C.I.A. in action.
HOME OF THE C.I.A.: Central Intelligence Agency has its headquarters at Langley, Va., near the Potomac River
SENATORS WEIGH NEW C.I.A. REINS

Continued from Page 1, Col. 5

formed sources said he called today's meeting precisely to consider such an expansion.

These sources said also that two recent disclosures of C.I.A. activities had apparently brought the whole issue to a head in the Senate watchdog group.

The first of these was the revelation that at least five C.I.A. agents operated in South Vietnam during the late 1950's under the cover of a multi-million dollar technical assistance program conducted for the government of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem by Michigan State University.

Intercedes in Suit.

The second was the disclosure that the C.I.A. interceded in the slander trial of one of its agents, Yuri Raus, an Estonian refugee, who was being sued by Erik Heine, another Estonian emigre. Mr. Heine charged that Mr. Raus had publicly called him, an agent of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

In a public memorandum addressed to the Federal Court in Baltimore, the C.I.A. said it had ordered Mr. Raus to cease testifying in order to protect the United States foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr. Raus claimed immunity on the ground that the alleged slander had been committed in the course of his C.I.A. duties.

Several days ago Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Senator Russell suggesting that they discuss the possibility of having representatives from his committee on the watchdog group. It could not be learned whether Mr. Russell has replied to this letter.

Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has expressed concern that the C.I.A. "is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress."

Mr. McCarthy has introduced a resolution calling for a "full and complete" study of the effect of C.I.A. operations on policymaking by a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. He also favors expanding the present oversight group to include members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Responsibility Cited.

Today Mr. McCarthy said that in view of the Michigan State
C.I.A. Is Child of Pearl Harbor and Cold War

WASHINGTON, April 25 — The Central Intelligence Agency traces its beginnings to the intelligence failure that made the Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor possible. The agency owes its phenomenal growth to the cold war with the Soviet Union.

As a consequence of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt in June, 1942, established the Office of Strategic Services under Gen. William J. Donovan to supplement the intelligence-gathering of the military services. But the O.S.S., from the outset, also involved its National Security Operations, as the parachuting of spies behind enemy lines.

Soon after V. J. Day, President Truman abolished the O.S.S. Four months later, in January, 1946, he created by executive order the National Intelligence Authority, composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and his personal military adviser, Gen. D. Leahy. At the same time the President established a successor to the O.S.S. under the intelligence authority. The new organization was called the Central Intelligence Group.

C.I.A. Created in 1947

Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers was the first head of the Central Intelligence Group. He remained only five months. He was succeeded by Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, an Air Force officer who gave way in May, 1947, to Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter.

The C.I.A. was established by the Armed Forces Act of 1947, which placed the armed services under a new Department of Defense and created the National Security Council. The act gave the C.I.A. the following five duties:

1. To advise the National Security Council on intelligence matters.
2. To make recommendations for the development of intelligence programs.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence and disseminate it within the Government.
4. To perform for the existing intelligence agencies “such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines will be more efficiently accomplished centrally.”
5. To perform “such other functions and duties related to intelligence” as the security council would direct.

Congress also directed that the other intelligence agencies should remain in business, that the C.I.A. director should be responsible for security secrets, and that the agency should have “no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions.”

In 1949, the agency’s cloak of secrecy was firmly buttoned up against inquiry by the standing committees of Congress. In the Central Intelligence Agency Act, Congress allowed the agency to do the following:

1. Disregard laws that required “disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official positions, salaries or numbers of personnel, employed by the agency.”
2. Transfer funds to and from the executive branch.
3. Declare itself in such special operations as the parachuting of spies behind enemy lines.

Hillenkoetter Given Charge

However, the specifics of the 1947 and 1949 legislation are not the only basis for the agency’s operations. Under that legislation, the National Security Council is permitted to issue directives to the C.I.A. Director, and it is under such secret directives—often proposed by the Director himself—that the agency engages in many of its activities.

Admiral Hillenkoetter was director of the new agency for its first three years. His successor was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, World War II Chief of Staff to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. General Smith served until Feb. 10, 1953, when Allen W. Dulles was made director. Mr. Dulles remained until September, 1961.

Mr. Kennedy selected as his successor John A. McCone, who had been Under Secretary of the Air Force during the first two years of the Korean War and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission during the last three years of the Eisenhower Administration.

Central Intelligence, and as such he is responsible for the whole “intelligence community,” which encompasses nine other departments and agencies.

Representatives of these agencies sit on a United States Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the C.I.A. director. The C.I.A.’s representative on this board is the Deputy Director, now Richard M. Helms, who was an O.S.S. officer during World War II, stayed on in the C.I.A., and succeeded Richard M. Bissell as Deputy Director of Plans after the Bay of Pigs disaster.

Next to the C.I.A., the largest and most important member of the intelligence community are the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The National Security Agency, which was established by Presidential directive in 1952, is charged chiefly with the construction of codes for the United States and the breaking of the codes of enemy, allied and neutral nations. Its headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., is stuffed with electronic equipment and computers, and it has radio intercept stations throughout the world.

The operations, number of personnel and budget of the National Security Agency are secrets even more closely held than those of the C.I.A. But the code agency’s annual expenditures, because of its code equipment, have been estimated at twice that of C.I.A., or roughly $1 billion a year.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, set up in October, 1961, is responsible for coordinating conflicting intelligence of three services—Army G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence and Air Forces A-2. The Defense Intelligence Agency also produces for the (United States Intelligence Board) the official intelligence estimate of the Department of Defense.

Representatives of the services sit on the Intelligence Board. Also represented on the Board is the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. This is an analysis, and not a collecting agency, and is principally concerned that foreign policy considerations are given due weight. The State Department bureau has about $30 million in budget.

The Atomic Energy Commission, which is responsible for the various devices, including air and atomic instruments, for detecting nuclear tests by other nations, is also on the Intelligence Board.

The final member of the community is the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose Division 9 is responsible for catching domestic spies.