How C.I.A. Put'Instant Air Force' Into Congo

Intervention, Invasion, Spying All in a Day's Work

Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, April 25and 100 white mercenaries had been ambushed by a rebel force and was under heavy fire. Sud-ienly, three B-26's skimmed in byer the rain forest and bombed repel ranks for the forces supposted by the United States.

can-made planes were anti-Casto Cubans, veterans of the Bay supply the advice and support to apply the secret, or at least disto Cubans, veterans of the Bay supply the advice and support to creet, capacities of the C.I.A. number of Senators and Repre-to a seething contest among sentatives have urged that these 961, three years before. They give. ad been recruited by a purportedly private company in encing elections, from bridge-Riorida. Servicing their planes blowing to armed invasions, in bidden Americans even to meet Foreign Affairs Committees in London newspapers. Guiding become a vital instrument of officials in apparently civilian ment. positions.

It not only gathers informa-The sponsor, paymaster and tion but also rebuts an ad-information from all sources, of watchdog director of all of them, however, versary's information. It, not buying informants and disburs- resisted these suggestions, inwa the Central Intelligence only organizes its own far-Agency, with headquarters in flung operations but also re- Continued on Page 30, Column 1 Continued on Page 50, Column 6

Following is the second of Langley, Va. Its rapid and ef-sists an adversary's operation. five articles on the Central In-telligence Agency. The articles ar force" in the Congo was the alone, it performs not only cer-are by a team of New York c max of the agency's deep in-ting of Tom Wicker, John W. Finney, Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy and other members of The Times staff. five articles on the Central In- fictive provision of an "instant Against the Soviet Union the bid of the United ices performed by pro-Soviet thightened. States. It was these policy-makers world.

At the Ituri River, eight miles who chose to make the agency When the Communist and Armed Services Committee and south of Nia Nia in the north- the instrument of political and Wistern worlds began to the Appropriations subcommiteast Congo, a government col- military intervention in another wrestle for control of the vast, tee dealing with funds for the umn of 600 Congolese troops nation's affairs, for in five years undeveloped Congo in 1960 after armed services.

reation of a pro-Communist At the controls of the Ameri- regime, recruit the leaders for a the real United States Embassy tions and the secret funds of the pro-American government and and military attaches but to C.I.A.

many conflicting forces. From wire-tapping to influ-

were European mechanics so- the dark and in the light, the with Congolese officials, the so that the activities of the light during advertisements Central Intelligence Agency has CLA, dispersed its agents to agency would be subjected more in London newspapers. Guiding become a vital instrument of them into action were Ameri-can "diplomats" and other component of American govern-leaders and to finance their bids

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leaders and to finance their bids for power.

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Reins Weighed

By E. W. KENWORTHY Special to The New York Time

The bipartisan group is made up of ranking members of the

and strafed a path through the the peculiar combination of embassy and miniature war de- propriations Committees, have constituted the only "legislative, This was not to compete with oversight" of the secret opera-

> For many years also 'a large two groups be expanded to in-Starting almost from scratch, clude members of the Senate because the Belgians had for-Foreign Relations and House learn Congolese politics from closely to political considera-

Although Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Armed Capable of quickly gathering Services Committee and the

INTERVENTION"

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5 ng funds without the bureaucratic restraints imposed on other government agencies, the C.I.A. soon found Joseph Mobutu, Victor Nendaka and Albert Ndele, Their eventual emergence as President of the country, Minister of Transportation and head of the national bank, respectively, proved a tribute to the Americans' judgment and tactics.

So pervasive was the C.I.A. influence that the agency was widely accused of the assassination of Moscow's man, Premier Patrice Lumumba, Correspondents who were in the Congo are convinced the C.I.A. had nothing to do with the murder, though it did play a major role in establishing Cyrille Adoula as Mr. Lumumba's successor for a time.

Money and shiny American automobiles, furnished through the logistic wizardry of Langley, are said to have been the deciding factors in the vote that brought Mr. Adoula to power. Russian, Czechslovak, Egyptian and Ghanalan agents were simply outbid where they could

not be outmaneuvered. In one test after Mr. Adoula had been elected, rival agents of East and West almost stumbled over each other rushing in and out of parliamentary delegates' homes. On the day of the roll-call, American and Czech repre-sentatives sat one seat apart in the gallery with lists of mem-bers, winking at each other in triumph whenever a man pledged to the one turned out to have been picked off by the other. Ultimately Mr. Adoula won by four votes.

More Than Money

By the Congo period, how-ever, the men at Langley say they had learned that their earlier instincts to try to solve nasty political problems with money alone had been overtaken

money alone had been overtaken by the recognition of the need for far more sophisticated and enduring forms of influence. ""Purchase?"" one American commented. "You can't even rent these guys for the afternoon

noon." And so the C.I.A. kept grow-ing in size and scope. By the time Moise Tshombe had returned to power in the Congo — through American acquiescence, if not design — it became apparent that hastily supplied arms and planes, as well as dollars and cars, would be needed to protect the Ameri-can-sponsored government in Leopoldville. Leopoldville.

This, apparently, was a job

for the Defense Department, but for the Defense Department, but to avoid a too obvious American involvement, and in the inter-lests of speed and efficiency, the Government again turned to the C.I.A. The agency had the tools. It knew the Cubans in Miami and their solutions on plots It had

their abilities as pilots. It had the front organizations through which they could be recruited,

which they could be ferfulted, paid and serviced. It could engage 20 British mechanics without legal com-plications and furnish the tac-tical expertise from its own ranks or from Americans under contract.

contract. Moreover, some C.I.A. agents eventually felt compelled to fly some combat missions them-selves in support of South Arrican and Rhodesian mercenaries. The State Department denied this at first — then insisted the Americans be kept out of combat.

But it was pleased by the over-all success of the operation, in which no planes were lost and all civilian targets were avoided. Meanwhile, in Other Areas.

Meanwhile, in Other Areas... In the years of the Congo effort, the C.I.A. was also smug-gling Tibetans in and out of Communist China, drawing secrets from Col. Oleg Penkov-sky of Soviet military intelli-gence, spying on Soviet missile build-ups and withdrawals in Cuba, masterminding scores of lesser operations, analyzing the world's press and radio broad-casts, predicting the longevity world's press and tails broad casts, predicting the longevity of the world's major political leaders, keeping track of the world's arms traffic and of many arms manufacturing enterprises and supplying a staggering flow of information.

staggering flow of information, rumor, gossip and analysis to the President and all major de-partments of government. For all this, the C.I.A. employs about 15,000 persons and spends about a half billion dollars a year. Its headquarters, the brain and nerve center, the informa-tion repository of this sprawl-ing intelligence and operations system, is a modern, eight-story building of precast concrete and system, is a modern, eight-story building of precast concrete and inset windows — a somewhat superior example of the faceless Federal style — set in 140 acres of lawn and woodland over-looking the south bank of the Potomac eight miles from down-town Washington. In this sulvan setting some-

town Washington. In this sylvan setting, some-what resembling an English deer park, about 8,000 C.I.A. employes — the top managers, the planners and the analysts —live, if not a cloistered life, at least a kind of academic one with the materials they are

at least a kind of academic one with the materials they are studying or the plans they may be hatching. Formerly, the C.I.A. was scat-tered through many buildings in downtown Washington, which increased the problems and ex-pense of security. In the carly minateen fifties

In the early nineteen-fifties,

\$30-million appropriation for a. new, unitary headquarters was inserted without identifi-

was inserted without identifi-cation in the budget of another a ency—and promptly knocked ont by a Congressional com-nittee so befuddled by C.I.A. serecy that it did not know what the item was for. When Allen W. Dulles, then director of the C.I.A., came back in 1956 with more candor, he asked for \$50,-million, and Congress gave him \$46-million. He justified the bite that he proposed to take out of a 750-are Government reservation on the Potomac by saying the site with "its isola-tion, topography and heavy forestation" would provide the agency with the required secuagency with the required secu-

while the whitish-gray building is undoubtedly as secure as fences, guards, safes and elaborate electronic devices can elaborate electronic devices can make it, the location is hardly a secret. A large sign on the George Washington Parkway pointing to "Central In-telligence Agency" has been re-moved, but thousands of people know you can still get to the same building by turning off on the same road, now marked by the sign "BPR"—"Bureau of Public Roads." There, beyond the affable

Public Roads." There, beyond the affable guard at the gate, is the large, rectangular structure with four wings, the ground-level win-dows barred, which stands as the visible symbol of what is supposed to be an invisible operation.

For organizational purposes, CIA. headquarters is divided into four divisions, each under a deputy director — plans, in-telligence, science and technol-ogy, and support.

What the Divisions Do

The Division of Science and The Division of Science and Technology is responsible for keeping current on developing techniques in science and weapons, including nuclear weapons, and for analyzing photos taken by U-2 reconnais-sance planes and by space satel-

lites. The Division of Support is responsible for procuring equip-ment and for logistics, com-

ment and for logistics, com-munications and security, in-cluding the C.I.A. codes. The Division of Plans and the Division of Intelligence per-form the basic functions of the agency. They represent the alpha and omega, the hand and main the darger and the lamp. brain, the dagger and the lamp, the melodrama and the monthe meiorrana and use more pro-fession. Their presence under one roof has caused much of the controversy that has swirled about the C.I.A. since the Bay of Disc

about the other terms of Pigs. It is the responsibility of the Intelligence Division to as-semble, analyze and evaluate in-formation from all sources, and to produce daily and periodical intelligence reports on any country, person or situation for the President and the National Security Council, the President's

Security Council, the President's top advisory group on defense and foreign policy. All information — military, political, economic, scientific, industrial — is grist for this division's mill. Perhaps no more than one-fifth — by volume and not necessarily importance — comes from agents overseas under varying depths of cover. Most information is culled from foreign newspapers. sci-

from foreign newspapers, sci-entific journals, industry publi-cations, the reports of other Government departments and intelligence services and foreign broadcasts monitored by C.I.A. stations around the world.

All Sorts of Experts

The Intelligence Division is organized by geographical sec-tions that are served by resident specialists from almost every profession and discipline — lin-guists, chemists, physicists, biologists, geographers, engi-neers, psychiatrists and even agronomists, geologists and

foresters. Some of the achievements of these experts are prodigious, if reports filtering through the secrecy screen are even half

accurate. For instance: ¶From ordinarily available information, reliable actuarial and life-expectancy studies have been prepared on major foreign leaders.

¶In the case of one leader, from not-so-ordinarily available information, physicians gleaned important health data: They made a urinalysis from a specimen stolen from a hospital in Vienna where the great man was being treated. GC.I.A. shipping experts,

through sheer expertise, spot-ted the first shipment of Soviet arms to Cuba before the vessels

arms to Cuba before the vessels had cleared the Black Sea. ¶Some anthropologists at C.I.A. headquarters devote their time to helpful studies of such minor — but strategically cru-cial — societies as those of the

cial — societies as those of the hill tribes of Laos and Vietnam. QOne woman has spent her professional lifetime in the agency doing nothing but col-lecting, studying, collating, analyzing and reporting on everything that can be learned theat Bergident Sukarno of Inabout President Sukarno of In-donesia — "and I mean everything," one official reported.

Heavy With Ph.D.'s

It is the agency's boast that It is the agency's object from it could staff any college from its analysts, 50 per cent of whom have advanced degrees and 30 per cent of whom have destorates doctorates.

doctorates. Sixty per cent of the Intel-ligence Division personnel have served 10 years. Twenty-five per cent have been with the C.I.A. since 1947, when the

agency was established. The heaviest recruiting occurred during the Korean War — primarily, but by no means exclusively, among Ivy League graduate graduates.

The Division of Plans is a cover title for what is actually the division of secret opera-tions, or "dirty tricks." It is charged with all those stratagems and wiles - some as old as those of Rahab and some as new as satellites — associated with the black and despised arts of espionage and subversion. The operations of the C.I.A.

go far beyond the hiring and training of spies who seek out informers and defectors.

It was the Plans Division that set up clandestine "black" radio stations in the Middle East to counter the propagada and the open incitements to revolution and murder by President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Radio Cairo. It was the Plans Division that

A was the Plans Division that misterminded the ouster of the Arbenz government in Guate-nala in 1954, the overthrow of Flemier Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 (two notable successes) and the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 (a resounding failure).

Among the triumphs of the Plans Division are the develop-Plans Division are the develop-ment of the U-2 high-altitude plane, which, between 1956 and May, 1960, when Francis Gary Powers was shot down by a Soviet rocket, photographed much of the Soviet Union; the digging of a tunnel into East Berlin from which C.I.A. agents tapped telephone cables leading to Soviet military headquarters to Soviet military headquarters in the acquisition of a copy of Premier Khrushcev's secret speech to the 20th party con-gress in 1956 denouncing Stal-in's excesses and brutalities.

Liberals in the C.I.A.

The C.I.A. analysts of the Intelligence Division, in the opinion of many experts, are aware of the embedded antagonisms and frustrations of peoples just emerging into nationhood. Thus they are likely to be more tolerant than the activists in the Plans Division of the flamboyant nationalism and socialist orientation of the leaders in former colonies and more flex-ible than many of the State Department's cautious and Department's cautious and legalistic diplomats. In discussing the Portuguese

erritories of Angola of Mozam-bique, for example, the ana-tysts are said to take the attitude that change is inevitable, that the United States has to that the United States has to deal with a pluralistic world. The State Department, on the other hand, tends to be diverted by Portuguese sensitivities and the North Atlantic Treaty Or-manization base in the Azores, also a Portuguese territory. One State Department officer said that "there are more liberal intellectuals per square inch at C.I.A. than anywhere else in the government." The operators and agents of

The operators and agents of

the Plans Division, on the other hand, are described as more conservative in their economic outlook and more single-minded in their anti-Communism. This is particularly true of those engaged in deep-cover opera-tions, many of whom are exmilitary people or men formerly in the Office of Strategic Services of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. It has been said, however, that many of the agents who are essentially information gatherers and who work under transparent cover are as sophis-ticated as the analysts back

home, and like them are sympathetic to the "anti-Commu-nist left" in underdeveloped countries.

The C.I.A. agents abroad fall into two groups — both under the Plans Division.

First, there are those engaged in the really dirty business — the spies and counterspies, the saboteurs, the leaders of paramilitary operations, the suborn-ers of revolution. Such agents operate under deepest cover, and their activities become known only when they are unfortunate

only when they are unfortunate enough to be caught and "sur-faced" for political or prop-aganda purposes. While such operatives may be known to "the chief of sta-tion" — the top C.I.A. officer in any country — they are rarely known to the American Ambassador, although he may sometimes be aware of their mission. In fact, these deep agents are not known to the agents are not known to the C.I.A.'s Intelligence Division in Washington, and their reports are not identified to it by name.

Correspondents of The New York Times say they have never, with certainty, been able to identify one of these agents, although they have on occasion Tun across some unaccountable American of whom they have had their suspleions. Often un-known to each other, the deep agents masquerade as businessmen, tourists, scholars, stu-dents, missionaries or charity workers.

Second, there are those second, there are those agents, by far the larger num-ber, who operate under the looser cover of the official diplomatic mission. In the mis-sion register they are listed as political or economic officers, Treasury representatives, con-sular officers or employes of the Agency for International De-Agency for International De-velopment (the United States foreign aid agency) or United States Information Agency. The C.I.A. chief of station may be listed as a special assistant to the Akaraman Agency and Agency Agency Agency States Agency Agency Agency Agency Agency States Agency Agenc to the Ambassador or as the top political officer.

Not Very Secret This official cover is so thin

as to be meaningless except to avoid embarrassment for the host government. These agents usually are readily identifiable. The chief of station is recog-

The chief of station is recog-nized as the Ambassador's and a house that is sometimes — as in Lagos, Nigeria — better. In practically all the allied countries the C.I.A. agents identify themselves to host gov-ernments, and actually work in close cooperation with Cabinet officials, local intelligence and police police.

In some embassies the C.I.A. agents outnumber the regular political and economic officers.

political and economic officers. In a few they have made up as much as 75 per cent of the diplomatic mission. The chief of station often has more money than the Ambas-sador. Sometimes he has been in the country longer and is better informed than the Am-bassador.

For all these reasons the host government, especially in underdeveloped areas of the world, may prefer to deal with the child of station rather than the believed by believed by the Ambassador, believing him to have readier access to top policy-making Washington. officials in

Top Quality People

Obviously the number of agents abroad is a closely held secret, kept from even such close Presidential advisers in the past as the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. In his book "A Thousand Days," Mr. "A Thousand Days," Mr. Schlesinger states that those "under official cover overseas" number almost as many as State Department employes. This would be roughly 6,600. The actual number, however, is believed to be considerably less, probably around? 2,200. The secrecy of identification can lead to some amusing situa-tions Once when Allen Dulles.

can lead to some anusing stua-tions. Once when Allen Dulles, then C.I.A. director, visited New Delhi, every known "spook" (C.I.A. man) was lined up in an anteroom of the embassy to greet him. At that moment a newspaper correspondent who had been interviewing Mr. Dulles walked out of the inner office. A look of bewilderment crossed the faces of the C.I.A.

crossed the faces of the C.I.A. men, plainly asking, "Is this one we didn't know about! Mr. Schlesinger has written that "in some areas the C.I.A. had outstripped the State De-partment in the quality of its personnel."

Almost without exception,

correspondents of The New York Times reported that the men at the top overseas were men of "high competence and discipline," "extremely know-ing,", "imaginative," "sharp and scholarly" and "generally some-what better than those in State in work and dedication." But they also found that

But they also found that below the top many C.I.A. people were "a little thin" and did not compare so favorably with Foreign Service officers

The C.I.A. screens and re-screens applicants, because it is quite aware of the attraction that secrecy holds for the psy-chopath, the misfit and the im-

The greatest danger obvious-ly lies in the area of special operations. Although it is generally agreed that the agents — overt and covert — have been for the most part men of competence and character, the C.I.A. has also permitted some of limited intelligence and of emotional instability to get emotional instability to get through its screen and has even assigned them to sensitive tasks, with disastrous results. One example was the assign-ment of a man known as "Frank Bender's as contact with Cuban Excile leaders during the pre-liminaries of the Bay of Pigs operation. A German refugee with only a smattering of Span-The only a smattering of Span-ish and no understanding of Latin America or Latin Character, Bender antagonized whe more liberal of the leaders by his bullying and his obvious gartiality for the Cuban right.

Offices in This Country

The C.I.A. maintains field offices in 30 American cities. These offices are overt but discreet. Their telephone numbers are listed under "Central Intelli-gence Agency" or "United States Government," but no ad-

States Government," but no ad-dress is given. Anyone wanting the address must know the name of the office director, whose telephone number and ddress are listed. At one time these field of-ces sought out scholars, busi-essmen, students and even rdinary tourists whom they new to be planning a trip be-ind the Iron Curtain and asked hem to record their observahem to record their observa-ons and report to the C.I.A.

ons and report to the C.I.A. In their return. Very little of this assertedly is done any more, probably be-cause of some embarrassing ar-rests and imprisonment of tour-ists and students. While the C.I.A. deals frankly with busi-nessmen it remutadly does not nessmen, it reputedly does not compromise their traveling

compromise their traveling representatives. Most of the work of domestic field agents involves contacts with industry and universities. For example, an agent, on in-structions from headquarters, will seek evaluation of captured equipment, analysis of the color

of factory smoke as a clue to: production, an estimate of pro-duction capacity from the size of a factory, or critiques of articles in technical and scientific journals.

The Human Inadequacy


In greater secrecy, the C.I.A. subsidizes, in whole or in part, a wide range of enterprises — "private" foundations, book and magazine publishers, schools of international studies in univer-sities, law offices, "businesses" of various kinds and foreign broadcasting stations Some of broadcasting stations. Some of these perform real and valuable work for the C.I.A. Others ar not much more than "mail drops."

Yet all these human activi-ties, all the value received and the dangers surmounted, all the organization and secrecy, all the trouble averted and all the setbacks encountered, still do not describe the work of the C.I.A. For the most gifted of analysts, the most crafty of agents — like all human beings — have their limitations.

At the time when the Ameri-At the time when the Another cans were successfully keeping the Congo out of the Commu-nist orbit, it still took the same men several months to slip an African agent into Stanleyville in the Congo to check on the lives and fate of some arrested

Americans. Men are fallible and limited, and the demands on the C.I.A. are almost infinite; that is why today, some of the most valu-able spies are not human and some of the most omnipotent agents hum through the agents heavens, and above.

> Tomorrow: The C.I.A. in action.



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SENATORS WEIGH NEW C.I.A. REINS

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5

formed sources said he called today's meeting precisely to consider such an expansion.

These sources said also that two recent disclosures of C.I.A. activities had apparently brought the whole issue to a head in the Senate watchdog

The first of these watchaus group. The first of these was the revelation that at least five G.I.A. agents operated in South Vetnam during the late 1950's u der the cover of a multi-mil-lien dollar technical assistance program conducted for the goverament of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem by Michigan State University.

Intercedes in Suit

The second was the disclosure that the C.I.A. interceded in the slander trial of one of its agents, slander trial of one of its agents, Juri Raus, an Estonian refugee, who was being sued by Eerik Heine, another Estonian emi-gre. Mr. Heine charged that Mr. Raus had publicly called him an agent of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

In a public memorandum ad-dressed to the Federal Court in baltimore, the C.I.A. said it had ordered Mr. Raus to cease testifying in order to protect the United States foreign intel-ligence apparatus. Mr. Raus claimed immunity on the ground that the alleged slander had been committed in the course of his C.I.A. duties.

Several days ago Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the For-eign Relations Committee, wrote to Senator Russell suggesting that they discuss the possibility of having representatives from his committee on the watchdog group. It could not be learned whether Mr. Russell has replied to this letter.

whether Mr. Furshell has replied to this letter. Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, and a member of the Foreign Rela-tions Committee, has expressed concern that the C.L.A. "is mak-ing foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress." Mr. McCarthy has introduced a resolution calling for a "full and complete" study of the ef-fect of C.L.A. operations on policymaking by a special sub-committee of the Foreign Rela-tions Committee. He also favors expanding the present oversight expanding the present oversight group to include members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

Responsibility Cited

Today Mr. McCarthy said that, in view of the Michigan State

and Raus cases, Congress would be rejecting "a very basic con-stitutional responsibility" if it did not begin "to exercise some degree of jurisdiction beyond what it is exercising now." "Either the special group doesn't know about these things and it should, or it does know and tolerates them," Mr. McCarthy said. Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Majority Leader, said with a smile that the pro-

posal to widen the watchdog B committee was "not a bad committee

In 1954 Mr. Mansfield introdaced a resolution to create a 12man joint committee—six from each house—to maintain scutting on the C.I.A. The resolution had 34 co-

spensors. However, much of the support evaporated under the opposition of Senator Russell and Senator Leverett Salton-stall, Republican of Massachustat, republican of massault sets, who agreed with the then C.A. director, Allen W. Dulles, that the joint committee might jeopardize security. When the Mansfield resolu-tion finally come to a wate in

When the Mansfield resolu-tion finally came to a vote in 1956, 14 sponsors reversed themselves, and it was defeat-ed, 59 to 27. Besides Mr. Russell and Mr. Saltonstall, the present watch-dog committee is made up of Democrats John Stennis of Mis-sissippi, Carl Hayden of Ari-zona, Stuart Symington of Mis-souri, and Republicans Milton R. Young of North Dakota and Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

C.I.A. Is Child of Pearl Harbor and Cold War

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25 The Central Intelligence Agency traces its beginnings to the intelligence failure that made the

Gen. William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan to supplement the in-4Disregard laws that telligence-gathering of the mili-tary services. But the O.S.S., from the outset, also involved itself in such special operations as the parachuting of spies behind enemy lines.

hind enemy ines. Soon after V. J. Day, Presi-dent Truman abolished the gard to laws and regulations O.S.S. Four months later, in January, 1946, he created by with no other accounting than the director's vouchers. Make contracts and purtelligence Authority, composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and his personal mili-tary adviser, Adm. William D. Leahy. At the same time the President established a succes-sor to the O.S.S. under the intelligence authority. The new organization was called the Central Intelligence Group.

C.I.A. Created in 1947

Start - Problems With Soviet Made It Grow

As a consequence of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt in June, 1942, established the Of-fice of Strategic Services under Act, Congress allowed the

titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel , employed by the agency."

¶Make contracts and chases without advertising. purgTransfer funds to and from

other Government agencies. Contract for research outside the Government.

¶Provide special expense al-wances for staff abroad.

year.

Hillenkoetter Given Charge

intelligence" as the security council would direct. Congress also directed that the other intelligence agencies sponsibilities to Adm. William should remain in business, that the C.I.A. director should be re-sponsible for guarding secrets, and that the agency should have "no police, subpoena, law-en-"no police, subpoena, law-en-in the Director of the Director of the CI.A. In 1949, the agency's cloak

Japanese Attack Led to Its Central Intelligence, and as such he is responsible for the whole "intelligence community," which encompasses nine other departments and agencies.

Japanese sneak attack on realt Harbor possible. The agency owes its phenomenal growth to the cold war with the Soviet Union. A granitic states of congress. In the C.I.A. director. The C.I.A. is representative on the board is the Deputy Directhe Central Intelligence Agency Act, Congress allowed the agency to do the following: GDisregard laws that re-quired "disclosure of the organi-zation, functions, names, official disaster.

ency." The intelligence community are the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence

Agency. The National Security Agency which was established by Presi-dential directive in 1952, is charged chiefly with the con-struction of codes for the United States and the breaking of the States and the breaking of the codes of enemy, allied and neu-tral nations. Its headquarters at the Fort Meade, Md., is stuffed with electronic equipment and com-"Admit up to 100 aliens and puters, and it has radio inter-members of their families a cept stations throughout the world.

The operations, number of per-

C.I.A. Created in 1947
Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers
Warathe first head of the Central Intelligence Computer of the Co