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HW: Sending a separate copy of this to HR. Was going to send the tape, then decided I'd want it down on paper myself and made copies while I was at it. Sorry about the poor typing -- this was more bother than usual to transcribe since they were stumbling around quite a lot with words, but on the whole covered the subject pretty comprehensively, I thought.

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THE NAVY, THE ENERGY CRISIS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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Pacific
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Schurman -- Now that the Vietnam war is over -- presumably -- in somewhat spectacular fashion, all sorts of new directions in American foreign policy are beginning to develop, none of ~~the directions~~ which are completely, nevertheless some of the outlines are beginning to emerge. As our listeners know from the Bay Area Institute, and as readers of the Pacific News Service know, American foreign policy or American imperialism has been a particular concern of ours over the last number of years. Another more specific concern that we have developed is in the United States Navy. We have a number of research and educational activities -- movement-oriented activities -- concerned with the Navy. And as we've gotten deeper and deeper into this question of the U.S. Navy, one of the realizations that we have achieved is that by and large, the direction which Navy foreign policy takes is the direction which U.S. foreign policy as a whole takes. In other words, if you want to know what the foreign policy of the United States is going to be in the next years, the thing to do is to look at the Navy. It's not ~~an~~ absolutely true -- it certainly doesn't explain U.S. policy in regard to the monetary situation -- but as far as the non-Western European areas are concerned, the U.S. Navy is a pretty good criterion for judging what that policy is. Some of our listeners may have had the opportunity to see an important TV program last night on NBC at 10 o'clock, on a new -- a weapon system called the billion dollar weapon system, the carrier. A very interesting television broadcast -- which was not on there accidentally -- and which was designed to illustrate the problems of the carrier. Needless to say, some of the foreign policy questions were not gone into very deeply. ...Our broadcast today may help to shed further light, from a somewhat different perspective, on this question of the Navy.

Tom, as editor of Pacific News Service, which has published a number of articles on foreign policy and Asian and military subjects, and which has published articles on the Navy and is continuing to, recently went to the East, particularly Washington, and had a series of what I thought were remarkable interviews with Naval people in the Pentagon, and sources close to the Pentagon. I thought I might start, Tom, by asking you to comment on the nature of these interviews...and the impressions you gained. After all, you do come from a news service that's not exactly on the extreme right, nor in the center.

Englehart -- Without being too uncomplimentary to myself, I would say at this point it seemed to me that the Navy would speak to almost anyone. Although I saw people in Washington in January, before some of the Vietnam developments occurred, I think that reflects a post-Vietnam mood in the Navy -- and among those people who are Navy supporters and consultants and so on -- a post-Vietnam mood of incredible confidence. The Navy is riding high. I think you could say Vietnam weighed very heavily on the two other services. The Army was ground down ~~into~~ into, I would say, global insignificance in the wake of Vietnam. And two decades of Air Force dominance in the Pentagon were pretty much put to rest. So what was reflected in the various interviews I had was that Navy people know now that they are to be the dominant service for the next at least, I would say, decade or two. This is certainly reflected in the slice of the budget they got last year, and will be reflected again this year -- they got two billion dollars more than either of the other services, for the first time, I think, since 1946. It's rather extraordinary.

Schurman -- Perhaps you might say more on the nature of the people you talked to, because I think listeners might not assume that someone from PNS or the Bay Area Institute could get access to the kind of people that you did....

Englehart -- To give you an example, I talked to Capt. Stephen Delamater [phonetic sp] who was a special assistant to Adm. Zumwalt, the head of the Navy.... I talked to Norm Polmar [ph] who's the editor of the U.S. section of Janes' Fighting Ships, considered to be the bible of the seas; he's someone who's very close to Navy people -- that was the sort of person I talked to. To give you just a feeling for the way Navy people think things are going, I remember something that Polmar said to me. He was talking about the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, and he said, "You know, these less-developed nations, or whatever euphemism you want to use, if you want to influence one of them, you don't fly over it, you don't land on it, you put a ship off the coast." I think that's a hint of where U.S. foreign policy is going, under Nixon, and under a low-profile Nixon, in the next decade.

Schurman -- ...One of the things we talked about early was the sort of amazing global vision the Navy seems to have, that certainly is not true in the case of the Army. It's true to some extent in the case of the ~~highly specialized~~ Air Force -- obviously they've got the RAND Corporation, or had the RAND Corporation working for them. Perhaps we should give our listeners -- particularly those who saw the broadcast last night -- something of this new changing global vision that these people in the Navy have.

Englehart -- Well, all I can say is that of all the services ~~the Navy is, it has~~ has, I would say, the most imperial outlook. They talk about the world -- when I saw them ... I felt I was ~~sitting~~ sitting in the British Admiralty in 1887, or something of that sort. The terms they use are imperial terms. Britain was an island nation, and of course the United States is a continent, but according to Navy people, the U.S. also is an island nation. What they've done is to re-define an island. They say an island is not necessarily something surrounded by water, thus ~~the U.S.~~ the U.S. is an island nation. They talk about gunboat diplomacy -- of course this isn't putting a gunboat out there. It's putting a carrier with 5,000 men, it's like a gargantuan show of force. When they talk, ... the words are about oil, raw materials, finished products, controlling sea lanes, using oil to control other nations, particularly Japan -- it's an imperial vision of the world.

Schurman -- Why don't you expand on that oil-Japan thing. They seem to have been rather frank, and a couple of things in the broadcast last night indicated rather clearly one of the purposes of the Navy is to assure oil and raw material supply and control sea lanes.

Englehart -- In line with the Nixon doctrine, I think what they're doing is moving, not so much to grab land areas -- as perhaps happened in the past, to set up huge bases on land -- but to take over, to make sure that they have a firm hold on those areas of the sea through which key raw materials and key strategic minerals pass to areas that we're going to consider significant for the next two decades. I would say that the two areas we're most interested in are one, the European area, particularly Germany, and secondly, Japan.

Englehart --- ...Japan imports about 98 per cent of its oil, and most of it passes from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca or one of the various straits around Indonesia, and up to Japan. About 50 per cent of European oil goes ...around South Africa. So in essence the Indian Ocean, which is where the Navy is looking today, is a key area for both Japan and Europe -- for where they're going to get their oil -- and what the United States Navy is doing is moving to make sure that in the next decade we have control over the exits to the Indian Ocean -- South Africa, where I found out in Washington we already have certain secret agreements with the South African government. Of course, they're moving very quietly on this because of, as you might imagine, possible reaction at home to U.S. dealings with South Africa. But we already have agreements to exchange intelligence, information, particularly shipping going around the Cape, possible use of facilities. I'm not sure on this, but possibly the use of fine naval facilities at Simonstown [on False Bay, just south of Capetown] at the end of South Africa. We've also moved in Indonesia, which is the other entrance to the Indian Ocean, again, secretly; under the guise of commercial deals we're moving to upgrade Indonesian harbors so that we can begin to use -- so that the Navy can begin to use Indonesian harbors. Of course this seems like a commercial deal, and will seem so until the point where we actually begin to use the harbors, but the money is ...

Schurman -- These fellows said that.

Englehart -- That's right, this is no figment of my imagination. They talked about this, and in Navy publications today they're talking about things like Indonesia and the Straits of Indonesia as "Japan's jugular," and I read an interesting article recently in Naval Proceedings, which is very prestigious, within the Navy -- it's the most sophisticated of all the Naval writings [and] magazines -- and there the [writer] talked about: if Japan did not move very carefully, what the effect might be if ~~Indonesia had a strong power~~ Indonesia had a strong power -- i.e., the United States -- in back of it. In other words, those straits could be closed off. In essence, I think, the U.S. Navy is to be used not just to deal with third world countries as a force of prestige and influence and so on.... but also as a force of blackmail against key industrial areas of the world that we might worry would go in ~~another~~ other directions in, say, the 1980s.

Schurman -- I remember that during the Bangladesh crisis during the winter of 1971, the Enterprise was moved into the Indian Ocean, it went into the Bay of Bengal and then went out again. The propaganda at the time, as I remember it, obviously linked it to the Pakistani-Indian situation, and to the threat of the Soviet fleet. It's clear from what you've been saying and what has been written in some of these things that the move of the 7th Fleet and the U.S. Navy generally into the Indian Ocean has to do with much more than just playing a role in the Indo-Pakistani situation. I wonder if you'd say a couple of things on this thing that's now being touted so highly, and again was touted on the TV broadcast last night -- the Soviet Naval threat. You know, I've had sort of the feeling that maybe there are Russian cruisers and destroyers and missile-firing surface ships going back and forth across the Indian Ocean.

Engelhart -- I think the best thing I could do is to tell you what one fellow -- who told me he didn't want his name used at any time, but one fellow who was very close to the Navy told me -- he's a guy who wrote a series of scare articles about the Soviet Navy, saying they're into the Indian Ocean and various other places and the U.S. Navy is falling behind, and it was very melodramatic (as is the whole Navy case on the Soviet Navy), and what he told me privately was, he said, in essence,

"You know, I think it's great that the Soviet Navy is moving a few ships into the Indian Ocean. I don't know if they realize that they're doing us a favor, but they're helping our navy posture, and the reason is that for the U.S. Navy to get the enormous amounts of money that it needs to produce the force of the future that it wants, it has to do a real job of fundraising." And the U.S. Navy's greatest fundraiser is the Soviet Navy. The Soviet Navy is developing, I would say, a powerful defensive force and is beginning to move away from its home waters, but ~~xxxxxxsaxxtkatzinxalxxzixzxx~~ in almost all classes it doesn't really compare in punch or anything else with the U.S. Navy, and particularly in terms of the Third World. It has no aircraft carriers and basically no amphibious forces, so it can put nothing ~~xxx~~ ashore. It can't really act as a significant force in the third world, but it is a fantastic fundraiser for the U.S. Navy. I think the Soviet naval scare thing, like the missile gap of a decade or so ago, it started a few years back when U.S. construction funds for the Navy getting through Congress were, I think, 1.2 billion dollars -- that was '68. And within three years of the Soviet naval scare they were getting 3.6 or 3.7 billion dollars for construction ~~xxxx~~ of ships alone. So that's a good record that the Soviet Navy is running in the United States.

Schurman -- There's also another issue that ties in with the picture you sketch of the U.S. Navy reaching out beyond the Pacific and the Indian Ocean down to South Africa, and that relates to a term I think not too many people are familiar with -- homeporting. [It came up] ...when the Navy set up a home port in Greece at Piraeus, and there was a flap where the State Department presumably didn't want it in Greece but in Italy....

Englehart -- And at that point Zumwalt said, "No more home ports. This is a special instance."

Schurman -- He did say that ?

Englehart -- Yes. Something along those lines, I don't remember the exact quote, but he ...

Schurman -- Well, obviously things have changed...

Englehart -- Yes, things have changed...

Schurman -- and many people were surprised when a new home port was set up in Yokosuka, Japan. Maybe you could explain what homeporting is, why it's significant, and why so little publicity. I think you mentioned that the announcement of a new home port in Japan was away in a back page of the New York Times.

Englehart -- I'd like to backtrack. To understanding homeporting you have to understand the use of the aircraft carrier in Asia. The aircraft carrier, built to fight a war against Japan, today is a very ~~vulnerable~~ vulnerable weapon in wartime. One anti-ship missile can knock that thing -- millions of dollars of equipment and a city of men -- out of the sea. As a wartime weapon, I think it's nearly useless, myself. As a peacetime weapon, it's incredibly impressive. It's a weapon today, as someone said to me in Washington, "to put down non-white folks." I remember the guy from Janes' Fighting Ships saying -- I have the quote here -- "Five thousand people flating into a harbor tells you the U.S. is interested as hell in the area. It says power and interest. We have the power to help you or kill you, you bastard." He said that in a friendly chat, and I think it really sums up the use of the carrier in the Third World today.

But there is only a certain number of carriers the Navy can get its hands on. A lot of them in Vietnam, but the ones there that are with the 7th Fleet are going to go back to the Mediterranean. All Pacific carriers in the past have been homeported in the United States. In other words, for every one on duty, say, off the coast of China, or India or whatever, there were two more either, say, in San Diego, on their way to and from. So they can only put one out in the field for every two back in the United States or on the way to and from the United States. So it's a great help to them if they can put carriers in home ports a lot closer to where they're supposed to go on station. It helps up patrol time. In other words, if they have a carrier in Japan, it means in essence they've enormously upgraded the uses of the 7th Fleet as a political billy club against the Third World. That's one aspect of homeporting, that's part of why they're moving a carrier to Japan. The other part, which is totally undiscussed in the press or anywhere, and which is the real significance of homeporting to me, is that every time you put a ship, a carrier or destroyer or whatever, you're also making an enormous commitment to that country. It's one of those commitments that Congress doesn't have to deal with, that nobody notices, that the New York Times doesn't have to write about, but it's there. You put a carrier in Yokosuka harbor, which is what they're doing with the Midway, and you put 5,000 people -- 5,000 sailors -- plus I don't know how many -- 15,000? dependents, something like that. In other words you put a huge base on Japanese soil. Nobody talks about it, nobody thinks about it, that's exactly what it is. While homeporting upgrades technically the fleet, it helps the fleet, it also serves another use, and will in the next decade -- I think if you're to look at Asia over the next five to 10 years and look for homeporting, you'll see a lot of interesting things happen. Because we're going to slide into a lot of important areas by homeporting, and I would say those areas are: we're already into Japan, homeporting a carrier and destroyers in Japan; Singapore is probably the other key area. I would guess that within five to 10 years we'll have a carrier in Singapore. Today, nothing. Other places where plans are already being put through. Australia -- there are distance problems with Australia, the best bases are down on the bottom, but the Australian government is already building a base at Cockburn Sound on the southwest which will house patrol frigates and destroyers and subs and so on. So Singapore, Australia, the Philippines, an area where we enormous investments, two billion dollars where it's really important to us, where there's a lot of ~~turnover~~ political turmoil and where a further ~~political~~ commitment might be of great help to President Marcos; Guam, Micronesia, it's already our own territory, an extremely useful place right in the mid-Pacific. And there are other areas that are being talked about for the more distant future, but I won't go into those right now. In other words, the 7th Fleet's moving everywhere, and in the next decade if you follow the 7th Fleet you'll be able to follow, I think, the major commitments that the U.S. government is making throughout that area -- Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Japan -- those areas that we're worried about and want to control.

Schurman -- You would include southern Africa...

Engelhart -- I forgot. I would include southern Africa, although I think that's a difficult, touchy situation. When you get a carrier with 10 per cent blacks into Simonstown, you know exactly what's going to happen. The South African government obviously is going to have to make some concession, and they may well be willing to do that.

Schurman -- To fill out the picture a bit more, I gather there are lots of little islands in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia has been mentioned, I think you mentioned Cocos.

Englehart -- I wouldn't focus too much on the little islands. It's true they've called Diego Garcia a natural aircraft carrier -- it's a British island a couple of thousand miles ~~west~~ below India and we are using it today. It's being upgraded [for reconnaissance flights]. The Australians are taking care of the Cocos Islands. There are small islands that are being used, but I think the most important thing to talk about in that area is the fact that in line with the Nixon Doctrine if you put a carrier off a country, it's not like putting a base on a ~~small~~ country. You can [have] an incredible political situation, put a carrier off a country and let it ~~just~~ sit there for a month -- that's what Navy people are talking about. They said, put a carrier off a country, it's not really a political commitment, but it's there as a club, a low-profile thing, yet it's very evident. It's the same thing in the Indian Ocean. It's not the little ~~islands~~ islands that are of interest, but the fact that these little islands, controlled by Australia, Britain and other countries, are being used in a coordinated system directed ~~by~~ basically, I would say, by the United States. Australia, South Africa, Britain, Indonesia -- these four countries maybe at some point Malaysia, Singapore I don't know, all being put together in a reconnaissance network. And the islands are being used for planes to fly reconnaissance flights, but basically it's weaving these countries together into a network which basically is a network of control over the Indian Ocean. If you control the Indian Ocean you control an enormous reservoir of strategic materials for the world. So you control, in certain ways, the world, and the Navy thinks like that. I'm not saying today Diego Garcia, tomorrow the world. It's the Navy that's saying it.

Schurman -- As we move along... we might go on to a subject connected with that TV broadcast last night... the curious figure of Adm. Zumwalt, who hails from the Bay Area. The broadcast was definitely anti-carrier. It was entitled The One Billion Dollar Weapon System. And although it seemed for a while as though it might be an attempt to sell the carrier, the general thrust, particularly as it went on, was definitely anti-carrier. That became clear as one heard Adm. Zumwalt, in a very lame and not very convincing fashion saying that the Navy needs carriers. They mentioned that when he came in [to control of the Navy] the anti-carrier forces were quite delighted. Maybe you could say something about Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, the admiral who has played some sort of role on the racial incidents on the aircraft carriers.

Englehart -- Personally, I think that Zumwalt is a pretty smart guy. I'd say that the Navy divides up between -- just very grossly put -- between old imperialists and new imperialists, and your old imperialists are your sort of carrier imperialists. They want -- they're your old admirals, they wanted the old strike fleets of carriers and so forth. And they want these to go on indefinitely, and this billion dollar carrier, C-70 [uncertain] is, I think, the last of the vast carriers, in which enormous amounts of money are put. Now Zumwalt is looking ahead, toward the future, toward just the Navy role we've been talking about, projected into the future. And what he sees is not large carriers, but a sort of mini-fleet, a sort of a guerrilla Navy. I would say that the way he probably sees it is that that guerrilla Navy....

Schurman -- Is guerrilla Navy ~~xxxx~~ their term ?

Englehart -- No, I'd say that's my term. I think they call it a mini-fleet. But, what he sees is a lot of much cheaper ships that go much faster, tiny hydrofoil patrol boats, these surface effect boats that ride on huge air bubbles and can be built to almost any size -- ships that would go very fast, that would be a lot smaller, that ~~congregate quickly~~ would congregate quickly in an area, and what it would mean is, you would have your submarine fleet holding the nuclear hammer over -- whether it was the Soviet Union or anybody else -- being your nuclear devastation force. And then your Navy would be directed, ~~xxxx~~ even more than with your large carriers today, toward projection ashore, getting to places of trouble fast -- these small ships that got places fast, that didn't have enormous cost overruns like today. The Navy cannot continue to build billion dollar carriers -- and probably another billion dollars to build ships just to protect this billion dollar carrier that turns out to be a defensive weakling.

He sees a different type of Navy, and it's this mini-Navy, and it really makes sense for a sort of low-profile, ~~xxx~~ quick on the scene, Navy for the 1990s.

Schurman -- Along these lines I might ask you to go back briefly to a point at the very beginning. Last night in the broadcast it was quite remarkable to see Barry Goldwater on the same side as Morton Halperin, a critic of the Vietnam war, and William Proxmire, a critic of cost overruns, as opponents of the carriers. Goldwater is a retired Air Force general, a reserve general in the Air Force. But the earlier comment you made was about the dominance and confidence of the Navy, as opposed to the demoralization in the Army and the lesser role of the Air Force. After all, Zumwalt is one of the few top military figures one hears about, aside from Moorer, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also is Navy. Alexander Haig has now been appointed, but very few people know who the chief of staff of the Air Force is, and one barely remembers Creighton ~~Abrams~~ Abrams. Wonder if you'd just elaborate on that whole image of the Navy....

Englehart -- I'd say that today, in the wake of the Vietnam war, the Army is just of politically no significance, as far as these inter-service rivalries or intergovernmental rivalries are concerned. And the Air Force is ticked off. You could probably tell me better than I can tell you exactly what weaponry the Air Force has left that's pushing for them. There's the B-1, and if the B-1 doesn't go through I can't think of much else. Land missiles are out, and that means that they -- what the Navy has done, and what Zumwalt has helped them to do, is to subsume all the services, under the Navy. I mean, the Navy IS an air force, off its carriers. The Navy IS an army, with its Marines. Who was up in northern I Corps? It was the Marines up there, doing the heaviest and dirtiest fighting. That was the Navy. It wasn't the Army. And who was bombing? It was ^{at least} partially, at least toward the end of the war, basically the Navy. So again, they're everything, and they're not only everything, but they're at sea, which means you don't have to build enormous bases. They've just got it, in terms of the Nixon doctrine. Anybody who thinks about what Nixon's had to say about -- a sort of Teddy Roosevelt of the late 20th century, walk softly and carry a big stick or ~~xxxxxxx~~ a big billy club or whatever, the Navy fits it perfectly. And the Air Force doesn't like it, and the Army doesn't like it, and lot of Navy people don't like it either, because they don't like the direction in which Zumwalt's going, they don't like the idea of the mini-fleet, that means there's a real struggle going on. I think it's ~~as bitter~~ as bitter as ever happened -- between the various services. Zumwalt is on sort of a hot seat. The Air Force is mustering its forces against him in the government, and

so are people in the Navy who want a big carrier ~~fleet~~^{Navy} instead of a ~~mini~~ of a mini-fleet Navy of the future. That's how I'd sum it up.

Schurman -- To end this, one might mention a theme that was sounded very briefly last night and is certainly more than implied by what you came across, and that is the theme of the energy crisis. They said last night that one of the purposes of the Navy is to protect the sea lanes and sources of raw materials and oil. Adm. Moorer, in a speech to the Commonwealth Club, spoke rather prominently of the energy crisis.

Engelhart -- I think it's no coincidence that the Navy and the fuel crisis are surfacing as dominant issues at one and the same moment. Because, as I said earlier, the Navy is gearing itself up -- it's always been geared up in this direction, but I think it's really taking over totally this role -- of protecting American imperial interests, which means American energy interests, American fuel interests, American strategic mineral interests. And they say this. It's not Marxists saying this -- you know, they sound like -- without the revolutionary input, maybe, they sound like Marxists -- when you talk to a Navy person, if you closed your eyes and didn't look at the office, you could be talking to a Marxist about imperialism. Really. So the fuel crisis is really about who is going to control Middle Eastern oil. And the U.S. Navy says we're going to control it, and we're going to control the nations that need it, and so on. They do the mineral thing too. I'd say the energy crisis ~~is~~ and the Navy go hand in hand, and if you follow those two things, you'll be following a lot of U.S. interests and foreign policies over the next decade.
