15MORANDUM

August 22, 1964

Top J. Lee Somich

Front W. David Simson

Subject: Language in the Possible Foreign Conspiracy section of the Report relating to 'N"

You asked that I set forth the Lagrage which I propose to use in the Possible Foreign Conspiracy section of the laport which covers the use and non-use of information obtrined from "2". I do not propose to use any information from "F" which the Soviet Union would be able to trace to him rather than to Soviet defectors generally. Information supplied by "N" which bears on the general practices and procedures of the KCB and is, therefore, not troccable to him, will be used but attributed to the CIA and its "stable" of Soviet Defectors. This is a thoroughly bonest attribution; the defectors other than "N" are in most cases fully able to supply this information. |

The language of the sections

I propose to use is quoted below:

(Taken from page 3 of the Introduction.)

I

"In approaching the question of foreign involvement, the Commission has received valuable assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State and other federal agencies with special competence in the field of foreign investigation. The CIA has made on aspecially valuable contribution by supplying the Commission with information originating with defectors from the Soviet intelligence services and bearing on secret practices and procedures which would be applicable in the Soviet Union to a case like that of Oswald's during his stay there.

"Scale of the information furnished by the afore-mentioned σ agencies, and many of their sources for that information, are of a highly confidential nature. Nevertheless, because it believes that the fullest possible disclosure of all the facts relating

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UDSlausen/onh ce: Mr. Hankin Mr. villers New Saucenne to the assessingtion of President Kernedy is of the highest importance, the Completion has included in this Report all the information furnished by these spencies which it corresidered in coming to its conclusions, and, in addition, all the information which would have contradicted these conclusions if it had been considered, even though the Commission did not regard it as sufficiently reliable to be considered. This second category of information consists mostly of remore and speculations, how of these about whelly frivalens. The Constraint included it notwithstanding that fact, however, in order that the public could decide for itself the correctness of the conclusions in this Report, by theting them against all the evidence which tends to contradict thes.

"The only relevant information which has not been included in the Report is that which is consistent with the Constission's conclusions but highly confidential and derived from sources the reliability of which is so low or so uncertain that the Councilous. Thus, even if this information should later be wholly discredited, none of the conclusions is the Report would be affected; the relatively little advantage to be gained by including it, therefore, was not deemed sufficient to override the periods compromise of national security which disclosure would involve.

"Secret sources of information, as contrasted with the information itself, have in many instances been withheld. The continued use of such sources and, where secret informants are involved, the very lives of such informants would be placed in jeopardy if manas, positions or other identifying characteristics here to be disclosed."

n

(Taken from page 41 of the section dealing with Oswald's defection in the Fall of 1959. (Fortmote No. 135 is to the UIA; Footnote No. 136 is to Madzes Furthewa; footnote No. 137, as the peak states, is to the Historic Diary.)

"The Commission has information from confidential procees that the normal Soulet procedure for heading would-be defectors is to give the KTB the initial task of examination and assessment. <u>113</u>/ Presenably this was done with Sauld. His rejection on detabor 21,

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which triggered his suicide attempt, therefore, probably means that the KGS had conducted its excalastion between October 16 and October 22 and had concluded that Oswald was of limited value to the Soviet Union. The Countration has other information from a source of unknown reliability that when the news of Osmald's rejection and dramatic suicide attempt reached Hadame Furthers, a prominent Soviet official and a member of the 7 Praceiding, she personally intervened and saired that be be permitted to reside in the Soviet Union. 136/ If this information is correct, it explains the change is Oscald's fortunes which occurred after he was released from the Boykinskaya Hospital. The Countration can only speculate on What branch of the Soviet Government took charge of Oswald after Madame Furthewa's intervention, if it in fact occurred, or why she decided to intervene. Sympathy for what appeared to be 3 very appealing case certainly may have played a role. It may also have been of some significance that had a young imprican who had presented himself as a devout convert to the Communist cause been summarily rejected, the resulting publicity would have been unfavorable to the Soviet Union. In any event, it is interesting to note that the apparent shift of Oswald's case from the KGB to some other Ministry of the Soviet Government shortly after his release from the bospital is supported by the entries in his Bisry connenting that the officials he met after his hospital treatment were different from those with whom he had dealt before.

III

(The following is the first paragraph of the conclusion.)

"The Commission has thereagily investigated the possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald was a secret Soviet agent. The specific facts and circumstances, so far as they are known, relating to Oswald's defection to the USSR, his residence there in Mirsk, and his return to the United States in 1962 have been carefully avainated. The defectors from the Soviet intelligence service who are now working with the Central Intelligence Agency, some of whom were still working with Soviet intelligence Agency, some of whom were still working with Soviet intelligence when Gawald was in Enssia, have all failed to furnish any information indicating that Gawald wan a Soviet agent. The Commission concludes that there is no two that the facts that have been obtained strongly negate any conclusion that Oswald was an agent of the Soviet government."

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