

346. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation
Mongoose (Lansdale)

Washington, June 14, 1962.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Edwin Martin, State
General Craig, Defense
William Harvey, CIA
Donald Wilson, USIA

SUBJECT

Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning

This confirms the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency planning.

The Defense operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open, widespread revolt in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being activated for mid-June 1962. U.S. actions are seen as including the use of U.S. military force.

The State operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open revolt in one or a few localities in Cuba. This contingency is seen as a non-U.S.-initiated situation where the people in one Cuban locality (or several neighboring localities) openly defy the Communist regime, are being suppressed with force, and U.S. help is requested (by the Cuban revolt-ers or Latin American opinion).

All U.S. Departments and Agencies participating in Operation Mongoose will assist in the preparation of these plans, as required. Plans should include a description of the assumed contingency situation, specific actions to be taken and by whom, timing required, and an indication of post-action requirements.

Although current operations take priority, it is expected that working drafts of these contingency plans will be ready by 16 July. A working meeting of operational representatives will then ready these plans for submission to the Special Group (Augmented).

EG Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF

Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study, Top Secret; Notorn; Special Handling. A copy was sent to General Taylor.

347. Memorandum From the Chief of Operations, Operation
Mongoose (Lansdale) to the Special Group (Augmented)

Washington, June 14, 1962.

SUBJECT

Progress, Operation Mongoose

Political Actions. At its 7 June meeting,¹ the Group desired that my 17 May list of suggested priority actions² be re-issued, to include agreed-upon tasks for State. Completion of this is awaiting the appointment of a representative for the Department of State who can devote full time to Operation Mongoose, as agreed upon. When the appointment is announced to the Special Group, it is my plan to hold a meeting promptly with him and other representatives to work on the schedule of special effort activities. Meanwhile, we are working on the accepted tasks. State reports that briefing papers have been given to Secretary Rusk on Cuban-European trade, for his forthcoming trip to West Europe and that the Directing Council of the Pan-American Institute of History and Geography has voted to exclude Cuban delegates from meetings.

Cuban Recruits in U.S. Armed Forces. Concept approved and directive issued by the Secretary of Defense.³

Outstanding Studies (including Blockade). My 8 June memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented)⁴ reported on the current status of all outstanding studies. The desired Defense and CIA papers on the means required for and possible effects of a blockade of Cuba were transmitted with this memorandum.

Also transmitted by my 8 June memorandum was a Defense reminder of the Attorney General's question about U.S. actions in case the Soviets established bases in Cuba. Mongoose representatives were alerted to the last paragraph of the Defense paper, which asked for comments by the 14 June Group meeting.

Possible Contingency. The rumored uprising of the Cuban people in mid-June continues to be watched closely. The CIA coverage inside Cuba has not confirmed this uprising from resistance organizations there, and

Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations, Top Secret; Sensitive; Notorn; Special Handling. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatrick, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

¹ See Document 343.

² Document 338.

³ Not found.

⁴ Document 345.

	<p>Crisis, everything was extremely tense, and suddenly, uh, it was discovered that Harvey had sent a team of people into -- into Cuba, and the Kennedys were very concerned that this crisis might explode into nuclear war.</p>	
	<p>HALPERN: Uh, so Bill was working under two directives, basically. One was a directive from the Special Group Augmented, which was more and more sabotage. And even during the Missile Crisis, the Kennedy Administration kept on pushing sabotage, and wanting more and more sabotage. Most of us thought that was crazy, but anyway, that was the orders, and that we -- so Bill was trying to push that, and so were the people down in Miami.</p> <p>But secondly, and this is something the -- the Kennedys didn't know, is that CIA in those days, I don't know what it is today, had an agreement with the Defense Department, with the military, that in times of hostilities, either declared war, or undeclared war, or what have you, when there was fighting going on, and the US military involved, that CIA people in the area, the stations and the bases, and everybody else, report through the theater -- US theater commander to Washington. We become in effect a thir -- a fourth force.</p>	
X	<p>BOBBY KENNEDY: The people CIA had originally were not very good... Well, we had, uh, I mean we had a terrible experience with the ones that were handling it at the time of the missile crisis. They were going to send sixty people into Cuba right during the missile crisis. Nobody knew what they were doing; they never told, explained... I just heard about it because one of the fellows who was going to go wrote me—or got in touch with me—and said, “I don't mind going but we want to make sure we're going because you think it's worthwhile.” And I check into it, and nobody knew about it.”</p>	
	<p>MARTIN: Who?</p>	
X	<p>BOBBY KENNEDY: And then the CIA didn't and the top officials didn't, and I, we pinned it down to the fellow who was supposed to—he was supposed to be in charge, and he said we planned it because the military wanted it done. And I asked the military, and they never heard of it.</p>	

	MARTIN: Oh, my God.	
	<p>HALPERN: Well, if Bobby Kennedy has asked the question -- right questions, or he had listened, or he had thought about it, he would have known that CIA does not own any submarines, for Christ sakes. And you have to go to something called the US Navy. And the -- and the US Navy doesn't do something because a guy called Bill Harvey says I need a submarine. And the idea was, as I say, to send about 50, um, Cubans in small teams, uh, probably five-man teams, and we needed to use submarines to get them in. And that's what Bill was working on.</p> <p>And Bobby Kennedy didn't know the -- the arrangement with the military. One of the Cubans that we were talking to down in the Miami area to go in on this infiltration as a -- as a Pathfinder, was in touch with Bobby Kennedy because he had been a former Bay of Pigs survivor. And Bobby was working with the Bay of Pigs survivors reg -- regularly. I think, again, it could have been conscience.</p> <p>And so, this guy picks up the phone and calls Bobby, and says, is this for real, should I go. And this is the first time apparently Bobby heard that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were involved in fighting a war. And so he took it out on -- on Bill, saying he was sending teams in on his own authority, in violation of everything under the sun.</p> <p>Well, that caused the uproar, and Bill had to be in effect removed from working on any of the -- anything to do with what was Mongoose or the Bay of Pigs -- I mean, or the, uh, Missile Crisis. Um, and in short order he was removed from having anything to do with Cuba, and he ended up going off to Rome, uh, kind of as a consolation prize, I guess.</p> <p>But, uh, Bo -- Bobby was quite upset...</p>	
X	BOBBY KENNEDY: Of course, I was furious because I said you were dealing with people's lives and the best of the Cubans, and they're the ones that volunteer, and then you're going to go off with a half-assed operation such as this. We had a meeting at the Pentagon on it. And I never saw, I've never seen him since."	
	HALPERN: So, for God sakes, you know, poor	

	<p>Bill gets chewed out for something he didn't do, and that's the way the history books are written. And I couldn't convince our friend, uh, Arthur Goldberg, uh, down in, what was it, Musgrove. Remember when we got into that?</p> <p>QUESTION ASKED:</p> <p>MR. HALPERN: Schlesinger, I'm sorry. Not Goldberg. Yeah. I couldn't convince him that he was dead wrong because he was using minutes and notes that Bobby had. Well, Bobby was dead wrong, that's all. He didn't know the facts, and he didn't ask. So, poor Bill got chewed out.</p>	
	<p>SCHLESIGNER: Harvey regarded, uh, all foreigners as prospective CIA agents and slaves, and he wanted something which he could completely control. And, uh, they never, they did not get along, the whole thing was a mess... Uh, Bill Harvey, in the CIA fashion, instead of being retired, as he should have been, uh, was sent as station chief in Rome where I believe he drank himself to death, or at least into -- into retirement.</p>	

Kornbluh: For many years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, uh, there was a theory in this country that Kennedy had signed a secret deal with Khrushchev,

FONZI (02-13-48). (Greg: see if you can make this read: The anti-Castro Cubans thought that...) Kennedy made a deal with Khrushchev that he would stop the anti-Castro activities, he would shut down JM Wave, if in fact the missiles were removed. The anti-Castro Cubans here couldn't believe it. It was traitorous behavior...pamphlets, newsletters. Some even thought he was a Communist, a mole at the highest level.

Kornbluh: My organization, the National Security Archive aggressively using the Freedom of Information Act, finally got in the early 1990's, the secret letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev declassified.

And quite the contrary, these letters show that there was no secret deal signed.

This is the type of thinking that was going on at the time. A tremendous hatred of