
Our four-star military mess

The blunt fact is that we are about to become No. 2

by GEORGE P. HUNT

George Hunt, Managing Editor of LAFE from 1961 to 1569, is the author of Coral Comes High, an account of his experiences as a marine company commander in the Pacific during World War II. For two years during the Korean War, he was military affairs editor of LAFE. He is a retired Marine Coros lieutenant colonel.



In past weeks, several developments have freshened hopes for international disarmament. After months of deadlock, the U.S. and Russia agreed in Vienna on an agenda for future Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Then, quite unexpectedly, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev opened up the possibility that mutual troop and weapons reductions might be negotiated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations. Against this background, we should take a hard look at the present state and future prospects of our armed forces.

The truth is that the U.S. military establishment is in ragged shape—lagging in technology, undermined by inflation, by worn-outstrategies, by entrenched old ways of top direction and allocating budget money. The Vietnam war has ravaged it—gnawing at morale and discipline. The war has bred a disturbing dislike for the politician in the career officer, who believes the politician let him down over there and kept him from a victory. Into the civilian world has seeped the poison of suspicion—even scorn—for military men, who in turn resent the attitude bitterly; and in the wake of public revulsion to PX scandals and atrocities, there has lately surged the turmoil over the Calley trial.

The world saw the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 as a victory for John F. Kennedy; and Nikita Khrushchev never forgot it. The Soviet leader was confronted by two-to-one superiority in nuclear missiles and by an overwhelming naval majority on the high seas. Indeed, the fantastic spurt in growth of both Russia's missilery and her fleet dates from that humiliating experience.


Khrushchev probably had no intention of using the missiles in Cuba but rather of waving the threat of them at us—90 miles from our coast; the missile beachhead would have given him powerful new negotiating stance. But when his challenge was met, Khrushchev could hardly go to war about it, since no major Soviet national interest was at stake; indeed, in retrospect, the political situation was not so nightmarish that a genuine nuclear confrontation was plausible. More, the U.S. could—and did—mass from all directions a convincingly superior force at the strategic spot. Khrushchev had to back down.

Q: Could we still mass a convincingly superior force off Cuba today?

A: No. In some eight years Russia has caught up and is now going ahead of us in many categories of missile strength. She could today concentrate off Cuba a powerful surface fleet, newer, faster than ours and equipped with weapons we do not have and an underwater fleet outnumbering ours by many times. It will surprise most Americans that today, as opposed to 1962, we are the ones who could find ourselves at a military disadvantage.

It will take fast and skillful work to put the military back in shape. The Pentagon's budget for the fiscal year beginning this month calls for \$76 billion, of which roughly \$10 billion is CONTINUED.





The defense budget is monstrously big and still inadequate

CONTINUE

directly attributable to the Vietnam war. By this time next year, as the war diminishes, our commitment in Southeast Asia should cost one-half as much—\$5 billion—for the next fiscal stretch. However, the non-Vietnam cost, \$66 billion, will inexorably increase by about 10% because of climbing service-pay scales and the effect of inflation off the price of materiel and new technology. Thus, the price of materiel and new technology. Thus, the price of maintaining our defenses as they now stand is bound to balloon, without even taking into account the cost of the sizable amount of modernization they need. Right there, if the Pentagon gets its way, we dash the hopes of Americans that all the money saved by ending the Vietnam war—the "peace dividend"—will be available for the troubles of the home front.

What kind of military establishment we have, how strong and how effective it should be and how much it should cost are major problems that concern all of us. The military, of course, is primarily a supporting arm of our foreign policies which, as they shift in purpose or method, naturally affect the shape and posture of our defenses. Perhaps, in the years to come, changes will occur in international affairs—intelligent steps taken, new ground rules established, agreements signed—which will ease or even sharply cut military demands and stresses. But until such things happen, if they ever do, we are faced with some stern realities: a monstrously big, yet apparently

inadequate, defense budget, and a military which, in large part, is in a mess.

Obviously, bold and fundamental changes must be made in the military—in its strategies, in its overall structure and in the way it spends its money. This is one reporter's investigative assessment of the condition of each of our military services, of what must be done, and how to do it in such a way as to achieve an efficient modern defense and at the same time save money desperately needed for domestic problems.

NUCLEAR POWER

A review of our military status must begin with a look at our nuclear arsenal—our most powerful and most dangerous weapons. In the intercontinental nuclear competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union the balance has shifted to Russian superiority in sheer weight of numbers: 1,900 Soviet ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles. Furthermore, while the U.S. is superior in long-range bomber strength (552 to 175 planes), the Russians also have about 1,200 intermediate-range bombers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, it has been assumed, some of them could make one-way bombing runs, landing in Cuba.

The U.S. defines its nuclear force as "secondstrike" or "retaliatory," effective enough to deter through the threat of powerful response: 1,710, missiles now being improved. We calculate that if only 200 of our warheads or bombs can penetrate the Soviet defenses and hit the mark, the destruction of major cities and the deaths of so many Russians would make the Russians hesitate to attack us.

On both sides the competition is in the vari-


eties of ICBM delivery sites—land, sea, air; in the accuracy of guidance; and in two sharply diverging technologies: the defense against missiles (ABM), and a new form of missile attack (MIRV —the Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle). MIRV is a missile-launched package which, on approaching the enemy's defenses, aims and fires its many warheads at preselected targets. It not only multiplies firepower and the chances of penetration, but it carries the surprise of unpredictable numbers.

The overall U.S. nuclear force is called "the Triad" since it is composed of three delivery systems, each capable of large-scale thermonuclear destruction: the air force's land-based Minuteman (ICBM) and its manned bombers (Strategic Air Command or SAC), and the navy's underwater Polaris system. The Minuteman II force now in place throughout the U.S. is being augmented by Minuteman III, which fires the MIRV warhead. The Polaris submarines are also being converted to carry a MIRVed missile called the Poseidon.

The concept of the Triad is itself becoming controversial. As the navy perfects its missile systems, its advocates ask: why not move all U.S. ICBMs out to sea, on ships and in submarines, where sites are less vulnerable—mobile or hidden or hoth—and where survivability. is. more assured? The air force argues that technologies of surveillance, detection and guidance may develop to the point where missiles at sea would become as vulnerable to attack as on land, that concentrating on only one system is dangerous.

For the navy, Rear Adm. George H. Miller:
"Instant retaliation is not credible unless weapCONTINUED

An Exclusive Collector's Piece in a Limited Edition Inspired by the Academy Award Nominee Movie "Love Story" MAGNIFICENT IMPORTED



Plays the Hauntingly Beautiful "Love Story" Theme Song While Exquisite Figurine Lovers Revolve in Gentle Embrace Atop Finely Crafted Music Box

From the heartwarming movie that brings back a sentimental era, comes a classic music box. And when you gaze at the lovers and listen to the hauntingly beautiful theme song, you'll remember and relive every emotion packed scene of this moving story. As the lovers revolve, they literally seem to come to life in rollicking snow games, high-spirited adventure and warm tender love.

person, and only then, will you fully appreciate its lovely and exquisite charm.

OFFER WILL NOT BE
REPARTED THIS BEASON
We believe this lovely music box is an exceptional value for only \$4.98. Supply is limited and to avoid disappointment, we urge you to order yours right now. Each hard-painted, lustrous finish music box is Thigh x 4" wide. We of course, send you

ŗ	PALM CO., Dept. 5485, 4500 N.W. 135th St., Miami, Fla. 33054
ì	Please send the following on 10-day money back guarantee if not delighted, Enclosed is check or mo, for S. Name.
ļ	#10729 Love Story Music Boxes @ \$4.98 (add 65c postage)
I I	Sand C.O.D. I enclose \$1 goodwill deposit per Music Box and will pay postman belance plus all postage charges.
į.	Check here for #10238 "Raindrops Keep Falling on My Head" Music Box (not shown) #6 54-38 (Add 65¢ postage)
i L	SAVE \$1.30. Order any 2 Music Boxes for only \$9.96 and we pay post. Make wonderful gifts! [Canadian orders, add \$1.30 extra.]

'What technology is all about is getting ahead uniquely and surely

DR. JOHN S. FOSTER



CONTINUED

ons can survive relatively intact. If they can't do that, you don't have a deterrent. If most of our missiles are deployed at sea, then we're forcing the enemy to invest in countermeasures other than ICBMs aimed at the U.S.A. What you're doing is trying to preserve your country by keeping it out of the line of

For the air force, Maj. Gen. Leslie W. Bray: "We need landbased as well as sea-based systems. The manned bomber, for instance, can be launched on warning, is subject to recall and can be reused. Our mix of weapons actually beefs up our deterrent threat because it compounds the enemy's defense task. It also complicates his offensive problems. With three systems to cope with, he may catch us with a technological surprise in one of them, but not in all three."

Of course, both countries also have thousands of small nuclear warheads, designed for tactical combat, which might be tempting to an embattled field commander. But the decision to use such weapons is the President's, and he would have to be ready for eye-for-an-eye retaliation; the succeeding exchanges could become hideous. It would take an insanely provocative act to compel a Soviet premier or an American President to pull any nuclear trigger-tactical or strategic-and cause mutual near annihilation.

A nuclear square-off deters both sides. It has created in effect a nuclear umbrella, sometimes described as a shield, under which daily life nonnuclear-style goes on as before. Peace can flourish, yet wars can too-nonnuclear or comparatively "safe" wars fought with conventional arms.

Since 1946 there have been 57 "conventional" armed con-flicts on this earth. In the U.S. those charged with conventional fighting are called the "general purpose forces"—the elements of the military services not involved in the Triad.

THE ARMY

Condition: Because of Vietnam, the most criticized, even vilified, of the services; morale recling but beginning to steady itself as withdrawal from Vietnam proceeds, seeking new definitions and fulfillment. Mission: All-out emphasis on support of NATO and on other troop commitments on foreign soil; military aid to treaty countries; counterinsurgency; defense of the Minuteman system and of selected U.S. targets through the "Safeguard" Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) program; continental defense against attack. Budget: \$21.5 billion for fiscal 1972 as against \$22 billion in 1971, \$24 billion in 1970 and the decade high of \$25 billion in 1968. Strength: 1.1 million men, but reducing to 900,000 by the end of 1972. Most Urgent Needs: Rebuilding purpose, morale and discipline; faster, heavier tanks, improved aircraft for front-line support of infantry, new battlefield technology, antitank inventions to counter massive numbers of Russian tanks.

Lt. Gen. William E. DePuy is assistant vice chief of staff of the army, a job which involves, among other far-reaching matters, the dilemma of the budget. Slim, articulate, he has the alert, im-



'Last year was bad for the army, one of the worst since before World War II'

LT. GEN. WILLIAM DEPUY, USA

patient manner of an officer inundated with piles

work to do.

of paper and compelled to get to the point fast. He swings around in his desk chair and says with brisk gloom: "1970 was a bad year for the army, one of the worst since before World War II. Aside from Vietnam we can't put a fullstrength corps in the field. We're so short of money we have hundreds of trucks on blocks because we can't afford to keep them running. In

NATO we are supposed to have four and onethird divisions, but some of the rifle squads and

tank crews are at zero strength." Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, deputy chief of staff for operations, tough, but punctiliously courteous, fixes blue eyes on his guest and says: "Yes sir, NATO is our first mission. The President and Mr. Laird have instructed us to bring those divisions up to strength and modernize them. This is a political decision as much as a military one, but vital either way. We have a lot of

It is current doctrine that the possibility of conventional war with Russia or its satellites or both on the plains of Europe must be assumed. To prepare for such a war, says the army, is to help p vent it. After the implausible confusions of Vietnam, the army is pointing with a sigh of relief toward the renascence of its NATO role, where its charge is clear. (There is blunt disagreement about this role in the other services. Snorts a ma-"The army is streaking out for that big NATO thing like a goosed cavalry horse with blinders on.

The army envisions an "automated battlefield" which would use some of the equipment being employed in Vietnam: combat helicopters and, to detect approaching enemy, hidden radio reconnaissance sensors whose antennas can be disguised to look like hay, weeds or anything indigenous to the countryside. The sensors signal back to mortar, artillery or air headquarters, which quickly calculate the range to the sensors' known locations. Another device recently being used in Vietnam is a laser range f nder for artillery; it is unerringly accurate at pinpointing distances to known enemy positions

What the army imagines ultimately is almost here technologically: a battlefield reconnoitered by hundreds of disguised sensors chattering silently to mobile computers which-in seconds -would calculate ranges, then aim and fire automatically sighted artillery. Front-line troops would be protected by mobile air-defense units firing surface-to-air missiles. Wary of Soviet armor, the army intends to use swarms of little helicopters, unmanned and remote-controlled, firing a new antitank missile.

Close air support is as crucial for the infantry as mortars and artillery. Since 1946 the air force has had this supportive role, but elements within the army are increasingly dissatisfied. An impassioned exchange of memoranda has exploded in the Pentagon. The air force wants to build a new close-support plane (the A-X); but the army has already built the prototype of an armored 250mph helicopter, the Cheyenne. Given the classic battlefield confrontation, the army wants to draw a line 300 yards beyond the front and say to the air force, "You interdict the battlefield from that point on, give us air cover. But we'll take care of the action inside that line." The air force flatly refuses such a plan: "close air support" is its assigned job in the formal roles and missions of the services.

Traditionally, it is a "citizens' army," but the citizenry is fed up with the draft; so the President promised an all-volunteer army. But will 900,000 Americans eventually volunteer? General Stilwell says, "It's a long chance, but we're going to do our damnedest to make it work."

The air force and navy are perturbed by the whole idea. Their volunteers mostly sign up to escape being drafted into the army. Since the draft has recently been extended, their fears for the moment have been alleviated, but should it ever be dropped, the temptation to join their services is likely to disappear too.

omment on the army-by a young lieutenant colonel in charge of a Pentagon group assigned to study army problems and suggest solutions to the top command. He is a tank officer, veteran of Vietnam, graduate of West Point and a former professor there. He is both loyal and irreverent, and here prefers to remain anonymous.

'As an institution the army is confused," he "It doesn't really know where it's going. Bright individuals in the army do, but it's hard to swing the whole thing around. Our basic problem is people. Things have happened outside this building which affect these people, and we have to figure out how to do what's right. The volunteer army is a big question mark and it's not the final answer anyway. Even if we were to have a volunteer force, we would still have many problems concerning how we organize, train and

motivate people. It's up to us to seize on new standards of command that will give us the discipline to form up the new divisions. The talk about 'Mickey Mouse' regulations is on the surface. The trouble is deeper and we have to be deeper too.

THE AIR FORCE

Condition: Morale good to lively; firm direction in its missions; seriously weak in certain tactical missiles; key planes obsolescent; badgered by interservice rows with army and navy. Mission: Strategic nuclear deterrence-ICBMs and intercontinental bombers (SAC); continental defense in the air; in tactical combat, interdiction of battlefield, close air support, airlift for the army. Budget: \$22.8 billion for fiscal 1972 as against \$22.9 billion in 1971, \$24 billion in 1970 and \$25 billion in 1968. Strength: 757,000 right now, to be reduced to 747,000 by 1973; 54 Titan IIs (liquid-fueled ICBMs, the largest weapon in our nuclear arsenal); 1,000 Minutemen (solid-fueled); 552 strategic bombers; 2,600 fighter and attack planes; 17 cargo and troop-lift squadrons. Most Urgent Needs: New sophisticated tactical bombs and missiles to penetrate Russian antiaircraft defenses from points out of range of Soviet AA projectiles; more airlift capacity for troops (C5As); two new planes: a strategic bomber to replace the aging B-52, and a fighter to replace the old F4E. (The new B-1 bomber, supersonic, operational in 1978, will be smaller, faster than the B-52 with twice the arsenal; the new F-15 fighter, operational in 1973, will be an air-superiority plane. faster, more maneuverable than the F4E, with updated close-in guns and rockets.)

The air force is young, uninstitutionalized, and it does not suffer from great brooding self-examinations. It has relatively few people problems. Its membership has always thought itself special. Rich in budget money over the years, it has provided comfortable living quarters which are the envy of the other services. Conditions are relaxed, discipline nonformat.

The man who presides over this service as chief of staff is a direct-talking, broad-shouldered, 55year-old officer who grew up in SAC. In the tradition of his office, Gen. John D. Ryan offers his visitor a cigar. Then, committing a heresy that would make his cigar-smoking predecessors wince, he proceeds to light up a cigarette and puff on it as though it were, in fact, a cigar. He responds succinctly to the question: what does the air force need most?

'Modernization.'

Down along Pentagon corridor "E" is the office of the director of defense research and engineering, Dr. John S. Foster, physicist, craftsman in nuclear configurations. He is wiry, 4s years old, and a shock of light brown hair is carefully smoothed back from the top of his forehead. In his shirt sleeves he sits down at the head of a conference table, leans back in a CONTINUED

Doctors' Tests Show How You Can Actually Help Shrink **Swelling of Hemorrhoidal Tissues**

...Due to Inflammation and Infection.

Also Get Prompt, Temporary Relief in Many Cases
from Rectal Itching and Pain in Such Tissues.

When inflammation, infection and swelling exist in hemorrhoidal tissues-it can be very painful for the sufferer. But there's an exclusive formulation which in many cases gives hours of relief from the burning itch and pain in hemor-rhoidal tissues. It also helps shrink the swelling of such tissues. Suf-ferers are delighted at the way it acts so gently and is so soothing to sensitive tissues.

Tests by doctors on hundreds of patients reported similar successful results in many cases. And it was all done without the use of narcotics, anesthetics or stinging, smarting astringents of any kind.

You can obtain this same medication used in these tests at any drug counter. Its name is Preparation Ho. Preparation H also lubricates to protect the inflamed, irritated surface area to help make bowel movements more comfortable. Be sure and try Preparation H. In ointment or sup-

ROTO-ROOTER

ROTO-ROOTER CORPORATION West Des Moines, Iowa *Sec. U.S. Pal. 84.





'What does the air force need most? Modernization'

GEN. JOHN D. RYAN, USAF

straight-back chair and talks, his face wrinkling and contort-

ing as he makes his points.
"It seems to me that we'll have to have strategic bombers in our inventory for the foreseeable future. The B-52s are about 17 years old and they'll be more than 25 years old before we can replace them with the B-1."

The strategic missile picture?

Foster walks to the other end of the table where missile models stand like a forest. He starts pushing them around like chessmen. As he moves each Soviet missile, he places the U.S. equivalent beside it.

"Here is the SS-13. It's their first solid-propulsion ICBM and about the size of our Minuteman. These here are the Russian intermediate missiles-shorter ranges. And this big one [meticulously painted green with thin red stripe and hammer and sickle] is the SS-9, the largest ICBM in existence. It's like our Titan. They have less than 300 of them. If they were to de-ploy, say, another 125 of them, and the whole force were MIRVed with three warheads apiece, they'd have the capability of taking out almost every one of our Minutemen."

Prowling around the end of the table, Foster reaches to push

a black-and-white ICBM model into place. "But now we're putting in Minuteman III, and that's a MIRVed missile."

The tactical picture?

'Do you know that we haven't built a really new fighter plane since 1955? The Russians turn one out every year. They've just shown a family of six new planes that have more maneuver-ability and acceleration than anything we have. But we're taking action to get two first-class fighters-the F-14 for the navy and the F-15 for the air force."

Foster doodles on a white scratch pad, drawing arrows from one side to the other. "We've got to arm our air force planes with 'smart' bombs and air-to-ground missiles. We have to be able to penetrate the Russians' air defenses. We certainly don't want to have to resort to throwing our aircraft and pilots against all that fire. I think a far better tactic is to stand off at a safe distance and fire missiles which will home in on their defenses and knock them out. We don't have any such missile in operation now.

A go-ahead for SAC's new B-1 bomber would be controversial: opponents argue that it is redundant with Minuteman. However, a human crew has the initiative and judgment a missile does not have. SAC is an elite command, and normally it keeps a 40% ground alert: within 15 minutes of warning, 200 nuclear-armed bombers and airborne tankers would be off the ground. When real trouble is imminent, SAC goes on a 40% air alert: 200 planes airborne, the remaining 300 ready on the

One cannot be as sure as that about the Minutemen emplaced inland in the U.S. The missile cannot be tested in the silo from which it is meant to be fired, for fear that a down-range mishap would kill people and damage property.

CONTINUED

INSECT BITES - SUNBURN

Scientific tannic-acid treatment stops itch, dries up blisters. Gentle and safe. A family favorite for over 20 years. At leading drug counters.

New fighter aircraft

U.S. U.S.S.R.

FLIGGER FOXBAT

FAITHLESS

FLAGON

F-111

F-111

FIDDLER

FIREBAR

FISHPOT

In the past decade the U.S. has introduced only four fighters while Russia has averaged a new operational fighter almost every year.

CONTINUED

"This is a serious matter," says Dr. Foster. "Let's face it, since we haven't done it yet, we can't be sure the Minuteman will fire from its operational silo. We test it every other way. It should fire. But we haven't proved it. The navy," he adds, "doesn't have the problem because it can test-fire Polaris and Poseidon at sea."

Several years ago the air force tried to test Minuteman publicly. It figured out a way to test-fire a Minuteman in North Dakota so that, only seven seconds after launch, it would drop harmlessly into a nearby field. VIPs were invited out to watch, as the event promised to be an occasion. The great silo cover rolled back; the switch was turned on. Flame and smoke spewed from the silo; there was a rumble of noise. The missile didn't budge. Two more times at other sites the air force tried again and, to its embarrassment, the same thing happened. Official explanation: unique conditions; the launching mechanism had to be disconnected from the established nationwide hookup and specially wired for the test. Says a colonel, pained by the memory, "Oh, those seven-second tests! We should never have done the damn things. The system isn't designed for them."

Since the air force cannot test-fire Minutemen from operational sites, it does so from two silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, where they are shot out to sea. The exercise works in lottery style. At any moment, without warning, a Minuteman crew at any silo anywhere in the country receives the order to take its missile to Vandenberg. By truck trailer and cargo plane they fly it to the coast where they themselves do the firing in the Vandenberg silo. There, the firing record has been good.

But the doubt continues that the unused inland silos are precisely the same as the proven ones at Vandenberg. Though it firmly believes they are precisely the same, the air force has a plan to stake out a firing range from the north midland states (where numerous Minutemen are emplaced) into the Rocky Mountains. Carrying it out would entail moving people, cattle and sheep away from the line of fire and would cost \$30 mil-



More bridal pictures are taken with Blue Dot flash than with all other brands combined.

Remember, Blue Dots for sure shots.

Blue Dot Magicubes Blue Dot Flashcubes Blue Dot Flashbulbs



GIE SYLVANIA

What happens if one of our subs is missing? And then another—and another?

CONTINUED

lion, an expense the air force says it cannot now afford.

The air force is dueling with the army on one flank and tilting with the navy on the other. There are several high-ranking officers in charge of repelling hostile boarders, and one of them is Maj. Gen. Leslie Bray, the enthusiastic and voluble 50-year-old spokesman for air force doctrine. Two of his current worries:

"The army wants its own helicopters for close air support. Okay in a benign environment like Vietnam, where the enemy has no air power, but even there they're losing a hell of a lot of choppers. Against a modern army with artillery and planes, the army's Cheyenne is a duck on the pond. An air force plane can loiter over the battleground and still have the speed and power to fight off air attack.

"As you know, the navy is pushing to take the ICBMs out of the silos and out to sea. I've even heard it suggested that our Minutemen be transferred to freighters roaming forever around the

oceans. Certainly the navy, with its underwater missiles, should play a big role in our overall strategy. Submarines are hidden and mobile and, I agree, have good survivability. But a sizable share of our missile strength has to stay on terra firma."

Why?

Bray shrugs. "If we move all or most of our force to sea, we could face a protracted war at sea, a nonnuclear war of slow attrition. One of our subs is suddenly reported missing. How do we react? A week later another mysteriously disappears, and two weeks later a third fails to return home. Stop and dwell on this. It raises all sorts of possibilities, none of them good."

THE NAVY

Condition: Morale fair to very good; vulnerable; without more money and congressional-civilian support, potential disaster ahead; only military service confronting—day by day, ship against ship—the power of the Soviet Union. Mission: Responsible for Polaris system; for attack by sea, for sea-lane control, for world "presence."

Budget: \$21.5 billion for fiscal 1972 as against \$19.6 billion in 1971, \$20 billion in 1970, and \$18.3 billion in 1968; 1972 figure up from this year's, but notenough to regain strength and decisive superiority. Strength: Challenged by Soviet navy in numbers, technology and fleet profile; outnumbered three-to-one underwater, but in nuclear subs about even; superior in carriers (the Russians have none); seriously weak in missiles to at-

tack enemy ships; many surface ships too old and too slow; 11 aging air wings, but Russians have no shipborne naval air. Most Urgent Needs: Crash development of sophisticated missiles and bombs to attack enemy ships; vastly improved techniques in antisubmarine warfare; electronic interception systems to protect surface ships against Soviet missiles; development of high-speed surface ships; new fighter to replace the Phantom (the F-14, faster with more range and firepower, will be operational in 1973).

Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, chief of naval operations, is forward-looking, dynamic, strikingly handsome. He has shaken up naval rigidity about beards and sideburns (his are long and flecked with gray); he is trying to make the navy an inviting place to work.

Sitting in his office, leaning forward with his elbows on his knees, chin slightly jutting, he deals with his implicit constant worry: that on some hideous day in the onrush of history his navy will not be able to concentrate the superiority it needs in a confrontation with Admiral Gorshkov's navy. In the last two years the U.S. fleet has been cut from 900 to 700 ships, and Zumwalt has personally presided over the liquidation of 108 of them—most of them, fortunately, obsolescent.

"Our ship construction has declined. The downward trend was accelerated by Vietnam. Go out and look at our ships, old tin cans and cruisers built in World War II. See for yourself how patched up they are. We should have been spend-

CONTINUE

If you have an allergy-stuffed nose, you need an allergy specialist.

If your nose gets stuffed-up by hayfever, pollen, dust—or any of the little things that can bring on allergy-congestion, you need a special kind of help.

That's what new Allerest*
Nasal Spray is all about.

It's specifically made for allergy-congestion. From Allerest, the Allergy Specialist.

To help relieve the stuffed, tight feeling in your nose Allerest Nasal Spray uses two medically effective ingredients. An antihistamine plus a decongestant often prescribed by doctors especially for the relief of allergy-congestion.

Allerest Nasal Spray works immediately...right where the stuffiness is. In your nose. Without introducing a lot of medicine that you don't need.

New Allerest Nasal Spray. Quick, effective relief for an allergy-stuffed nose.

From Allerest, The Allergy Specialist.

New Allerest Nasal Spray Guaranteed to work or your money back.

PRIMILE E PHARMACRAFT



FlatLine is a registered trademark of America Esna Corporation.

The Russian navy has grown from a coastal fleet to a worldwide presence

CONTINUE

ing at least \$3 billion a year on new construction just to replace our obsolete ships. Instead, because of Vietnam, we averaged less than two-thirds of that amount from '64 through '71."

He speaks of the navy's role as a four-part assignment: first, "Strategic Force"—putting our missile clout underwater, away from the homeland; second, "Sea Control"—keeping the shipping lanes open and getting the supplies through; third, "Projection"—attacking across the cleared oceans, carrying planes, marines, soldiers, cargo; and fourth, in peace orwar, "Presence"—showing the flag.

Presence. Here is the suggestive arm of diplomacy—gesture of friendship, note of assurance, implication of threat, glimpse of power. The Soviet navy has learned about presence. Its fleet already is in the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, along the coasts of Africa and, in time; prebebly will be in Chile setopping at ports, stablishing bases, offering its support and friendship. It is moving out into the world in a kind of neocolonialism, with people and equipment following along behind to firm up the arrangements made—to build the bases from which they can operate ships, submarines, planes, and from which the expansion continues.

"The President and Secretary Laird believe in the navy. They're cooperative. But it's up to the Congress. Last year it cut us back \$800 million and that was a serious blow. Now we've asked for \$1 billion more. Will they give it to us?" Zumwalt shrugs his shoulders, arms spread out. "The Congress represents the people, and when the Congress says no—as happened last year—that must be what the people want. And the people seem to be against what we're trying to do."

The Soviet navy began in World War II as a defensive coastal fleet with a strong emphasis on the submarine. In the late '50s the Russians started their nuclear underwater development, pouring billions into it. They erected huge construction yards which, on a one-shift basis, build at least one nuclear sub a month. (The U.S. production rate is about five a year.) They have now matched the U.S. fleet in two categories: nuclear attack submarines (each about 50) and the even more critical strategic subs (with long-range ballistic missiles). In 1968 they revealed their new Yankee (NATO designation) nuclear-powered sub, which is similar to the latest model of the Polaris and can fire a missile almost as far. At least 17 Yankee-class subs are now prowling the seas, some regularly patrolling both U.S. coasts, and more are being built at the rate of eight a year. These figures do not include some 250 diesel-powered subs of modern design, which were built in the '50s and '60s. Besides converting Polaris to Poseidon, the U.S. Navy is beginning to build 17 nuclear attack submarines, at \$170 million apiece, to start coming off the ways in 1974; final delivery in 1977.

Eyeing the U.S. surface fleet right after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Russian admirals noted that its primary striking power lay in the capabilities of the carrier task force. Instead of building carriers and planes to fight carriers and planes, they decided to build the world's most modern system of tactical guided missiles. Their ships now bristle with them.

The Russians, on defense, can fling up around their ships a deep, broad antiaircraft missile screen designed to hit attacking U.S. planes at a distance before they can get close enough to strike. On offense, one dangerous weapon of the Soviet tactical missile system is a stand-off, air-to-ship guided missile fired from big, land-based intermediate-range attack planes. Another more ominous weapon is its ship-to-ship "cruise missile"; there are at least six types with accurate ranges of up to 200 miles. They

CONTINUED

are launched from surface vessels but, most important, they can also be fired from submerged submarines.

The U.S. carrier, always vulnerable to underwater attack, is now wide open from this new direction and its power thereby blunted. Worse, our navy has no cruise missile of its own. If it did, it could wield the same offensive threat the Russians now have, plus the thrust of an air arm the Russians do not have. ..

It will be two to three years before the navy gets its first true cruise missile, to be called the Harpoon. The navy is now testing an interim cruise weapon, the Standard, which is a short-range antiaircraft missile fired from an antisubmarine rocketlauncher. It will be operational by the end of this year.

Vice Adm. Gerald Miller, newly named commander of the Mediterranean's Sixth Fleet, sits in a deep sofa in the living room of his Norfolk home. He wears brown slacks and a tan jacket. At 51, he is one of the youngest and most junior of his rank. Ebullient, impulsive, words alternately flow and burst out of him.

What about the Soviet navy?

"They've become good seamen. They handle their ships well and seem to be pretty nice people, at least from signal distance. They're cooperative about our keeping track of them around Cuba. The other day a new Soviet destroyer appeared there for the first time, and the skipper of one of our destroyers flashed a blinker message in Russian asking him to report his position every day. The Soviet skipper answered back in amiable English, agreeing and congratulating my man on his Russian.

"Gorshkov! I don't know how he did it. He must be a genius. He is a genius. He started 14 years ago and now he's got a first-class fleet. And his ships make us drool-new, beautifully equipped, fast. He's a man I'd certainly like to meet."

ixty days on patrol, 30 at home, then the cycle repeats -way of life of a Polariscrew. Eugene Parks Wilkinson, vice admiral and commander of the Atlantic submarine fleet, was the first naval officer to skipper a nuclear sub and take her to sea. In the tradition of his service, he tells little of what goes on under the sea. But he says enough to let one know that it is an evolving mutual search for the other side's subs, an eerie game of watch and be watched, of trail and be trailed, of hiding and listening in the valleys of the ocean floor. "Yes, we think we know where the Russian subs are, but can you ever be sure?" The accelerations of a smartly handled nuclear submarine are swift and elusive.

Our Polaris submarines navigate for 60 days without surfacing -by charts of the sea bottom, by inertial guidance, by loran C, by fathometer, by satellite. All calculations pour into computers which, in seconds, tabulate the position. At any given moment a patrol must know where it is within 200 yards. Should it have to fire its missiles, accuracy of aim depends on knowing the precise position of the firing.

It is reliable scuttlebutt around the Atlantic fleet that on maneuvers Wilkinson's submarines regularly penetrate our own "antisubmarine warfare" defenses. The navy has sub-killer teams of destroyers and helicopters, antisub projectiles, sonar,

and detection buoys dropped from planes or helicopters.
But the trouble is, the technology of the submarine has outdistanced the technology of defense. The nuclear submarine is faster than most surface ships; it is more silent, more maneuverable, more accurate with its sonar, more deadly in its armament. New antisubmarine destroyers are being built, but even these have stirred a controversy about whether they are already outdated. At the moment, and probably for some time to come the best antisubmarine weapon is another submarine. The final answer may be a surface ship so fast that a sub cannot catch it. The hydrofoil is under increased study; so is the hovercraft.

Dr. John Foster gazes at the ceiling of his office overlooking the Potomac, and dreams. His new U.S. fleet would travel on foils and on a cushion of jet-produced air to lift it above the



It all starts with the manufacturer. He wants his product to be safe for you to use.

So he comes to UL Voluntarily -knowing that UL will put the product through a series of demanding safety tests designed by our engineers.

If the product passes, it earns the right to wear the symbol. But only if it passes, since there is no compromise with the standards we have developed

Underwriters' Laboratories has

been testing for product safety since 1894. Currently, over 15,000 manufacturers bring us their products for testing.

Once a product earns the right to wear our symbol, we keep checking. With periodic, unannounced in-plant inspections. Conducted by over 500 of our

So look for our symbol on the products you buy. It means that the manufacturer and UL are concerned about your safety.



CHICAGO & NORTHBROOK, ILLINOIS • MELVILLE, LL, NEW YOR SANTA CLARA, CALFFORNIA • WESTWOOD, NEW JEISEY



The state of the s

I know pretty much where I want to go in life. And I'm going to try to get there, my way. Guess you'd call me the independent type. But believe me, when it comes to my monthly period, this girl is com-pletely dependent on Tampax tampons. There's nothing better for me. After all, internally worn Tampax tampons were developed by a doctor.

No matter what I want to wear, what sport activity I want to get into, there's no problem with Tampax tampons. They give me complete protection. Never tell my secret. And they're so easy to use right from the start.

Tampax tampons come in a silken-smooth container-applicator to help place them in the proper position. There's no discomfort. No disposal problems. The applicator, like the tampon, can be flushed away. And only Nosco Tampax tampons offer 3 absorb-ency-sizes: Regular, Super and

Wherever you're going, make sure you take along Tampax tampons. You'll get the protection and freedom you want.





TAMPAX[®] TAMPONS ARE MADE ONLY BY TAMPAX INCORPORATED, PALMER, MASS.



'The people seem to be against what we're trying to do'

ADM. ELMO ZUMWALT, USN

sea, be propelled by equally powerful air jets in its stern. "It is," he says, "what technology is all about-getting ahead uniquely and surely. If we can make this work, it will keep us a jump ahead of the Russians. Imagine a 70-knot navy; 50 knots in heavy seas; big ships. Carriers. A fleet transformed!"

MARINES

Condition: Excellent; roles limited and sharply directed: traditional stress on professionalism; morale high and down-to-business. Mission: Readiness for anything that comes along, planned or unplanned, including full-scale amphibious assault; autonomous yet allied to the navy. Budget: \$1.8 billion in fiscal 1972, down from \$2.2 billion in 1971, \$2.7 billion in 1970; most fighting efficiency for dollars spent. Strength: 220,000, but coming down to 206,000 by the end of 1971 or three divisions and three wings. Most Urgent Needs: A vertical-take-off close air-support jet fighter, a new landing vehicle, a new navy-pro-vided ship to deliver a 2,000-man amphibious force, complete with helicopters and landing craft. All three are in the works.

'General Chaisson's quarters?'

'Please get out, sir, and wait for your escort." From the darkness emerges a six-foot-six captain with white cap and belt, dress sword, dark-blue heavy coat, gold hilt, buckle and buttons gleaming even in the dim light. The officer of the day, he marches along the concrete walk with such an erect and contagious military swing that anyone next to him, even with civilian coat flopping around below the knees, must fall into step.

Hup, two, three, four . . .

"Like this duty?"

"It's great."

Hup, two, three, four . . .

"Where were you stationed before?" "Vietnam; been here six months."

Hup, two, three, four . . .

"Here's the general's quarters. Have a good

evening, sir."

"Thank you."

Lt. Gen. John R. Chaisson is deputy chief of staff of the Marine Corps. Son of a New England boat builder, graduate of Harvard, he has fought in three wars and is the rising intellect in the corps, a brilliant and blunt man. He feels 'good" about the corps. "We're amphibious shock troops, emissaries, police, whatever comes up. We are prepared to move elements of a division from either coast in a matter of hours, with the whole force following within a few days."

Chaisson is wearing gray flannels and a tweed jacket. Highball next to him, feet up on a stool, he launches forth on today's kids.

They'll listen if they get facts, not pap. I'm called on a lot to give speeches in colleges. There might be 700 kids in the hall wondering what this jerk from the military is going to say. I start out this way; 'If I were to tell you that the Russians have as many intercontinental missiles as we have, or maybe more, you wouldn't be surprised. If I were to tell you that the Russians have a bigger army than we have, you still wouldn't be surprised. But if I were to tell you that the Russians have a navy which is almost as powerful as our navy in some ways and more powerful in others, you would be damn well surprised. Well, that's what I'm telling you.'

"It grabs them."

Until recently Ray Davis, general USMC, wore three stars on his shoulders and was in command of Marine Corps Schools and the Development Center in Quantico, Va. He has been promoted to the second job in the corps, assistant commandant. A slim man with a gentle southern intonation in his voice, he does not at first reveal the tough fibers within him. The ribbons on his chest reveal some of it: two Silver Stars, the Navy Cross, the Congressional Medal of Honor won in Korea during the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir (Ray Davis, a general said, "brought the 7th Regiment out on his back").

Davis: "I gave a talk the other day to the class of second lieutenants. I told them, 'If you gen-tlemen are interested in the length of your hair, or your sideburns, beards or mustaches, you're in the wrong service.'

The corps reflects the personality of its commandant. Gen. Leonard F. Chapman is a 57-yearold southerner, an erect, somewhat aloof officer who demands elegance of detail in performance. Since taking over as commandant in 1968, he has carried the corps through a potentially disruptive time and brought it out ahead. Ugly rivalries between the marines and the army, accusations about diverging tactical choices and different fighting styles in Vietnam boiled, but stopped short of erupting. Chapman publicly ignored them, privately muffled them and kept the corps about its business. While the army and the navy eased their disciplines, Chapman told his marines to toughen up. The military haircut is very much in evidence around his headquarters, and some of his officers are reviving the Sam Browne belt, though he himself is not yet wearing his.

Toughening up reflects Chapman's personal

belief. But it is also aimed at recruiting. Chapman is counting on a backlash civilian sentiment against permissiveness in an elite fighting force.

Junior.



'I'm determined to preserve our manners and our bearing'

GEN. LEONARD CHAPMAN, USMC

CONTINUED

So far it is working. The marines need 35,000 emisted volunteers and 2,000 officers a year, and they are meeting recruiting quotas in every U.S. city except New York.

The commandant: "I'm determined to preserve our manners and bearing. I've just gotten the okay from defense to make our blue uniform regular issue for enlisted men. I want to see a whole division parading in 'blues.' What a sight!"

PROPOSAL

The money we are spending for military defense—\$66 billion a year exclusive of Vietnam—is not enough even to maintain parity with the Soviet Union, let alone regain the superiority we are losing or have already lost in critical military categories. That's a lot to spend—to the detriment of domestic problems which demand the same money and more—only to lose out. If we are serious about defense vis-à-vis Russia (and, in a decade or so, China), we must either go on paying more and more, or figure something else out.

The following proposal is an effort to figure something else out.

There is hope that the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) between U.S. and Soviet representatives will save the day and cut the costs for everyone. If that happens, everybody will gain. If it doesn't happen, what are we to do?

This proposal is based on new strategies, tech-

nologies and strengths, all to be completed and in operation (except for SAC requirements) by June 1974. It is based, too, on a change in the way the military has for years divided up the money. Each of the four services has its own money bin. As strategy is made and money allocated each year, these bins rise and fall proportionately. If an economy drive is on, all bins dwindle proportionately; if spending is in the air, they increase proportionately. Only occasionally does one bin swell above the proportionate allocations to the others. Bin-leveling has become practically institutionalized since its start in the late '40s. We should change the relative sizes of the bins and reshape the strategy whose demands fill them.

The Triad, for the most part, should be let alone. Its role as a deterrent, a retaliatory system, is essential. But there is danger in relying entirely on the technology of missilery, so it would be a mistake to let SAC and the manned bomber fade away into obsolescence with the B-52. The new B-1 bomber must be built and should begin, as already planned, to take over in 1978. With the completion of the MIRVed Minuteman III program, the U.S. will have enough sophisticated land-based ICBMs. After that, any new ICBM weaponry should go to sea. The navy's Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS), future successor to Poseidon, promises to be such a weapon. The decision on whether or not to press ahead with it awaits results of the SALT talks. We should press ahead with research and development anyway. If SALT turns up with good news, we can cancel ULMS

Safeguard is a limited ABM system to protect Minuteman and a few other prime targets. It should be canceled. The U.S. figures Minuteman can penetrate the Soviet ABM network with adequate megatonnage, and it is logical that the reverse would be just as true. The key to deterrence is the threat of annihilating offense—not a defense against it.

The Army is already reducing from 1.3 million men to 900,000 (13 divisions), but it should reduce further—to 500,000 skilled men, furnishing six superbly equipped reinforced divisions. They would constitute a highly mobile force organized for air or sea lift and have the accouterments of the automated battlefield. Instead of supporting treaty countries with garrisoned troops, this army would provide support, as needed, through swift movement from the U.S.—and thereby preserve

its strategic options and eliminate the logistical costs, the human problems and the dangers of unnecessary involvement arising from being scattered permanently around the world. They would become elite divisions summoning up the spirit of the former army. Soon, we may hope, they would be genuine volunteer forces. Equipped with the Cheyenne helicopter, they would pilot and control their own close air support. They would be backed by a knuckled-down U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard.

Only one reinforced army division would continue to be deployed overseas—in NATO, whose countries exclusive of the U.S. can put into the field a force of more than a million men. The recent U.S. decision to maintain 4½ divisions in NATO is largely political and sets a base of troop strength from which to negotiate with the Russians. One division would be as much of a show-piece; underlining U.S. support, as the understrength, underequipped divisions now there.

The Air Force is spread over the world. It has a vast network of 50 bases, and it keeps many tactical squadrons watching for long periods of time where there may be nothing to watch. The air force should cut back its number of tactical wings from 21 to 14, a personnel cut of 40,000, an air-raft cut of 700. Excluding strategic air defense areas, it should shut down 43 bases in favor of the strategy of swift, long-range movement of its squadrons from U.S.-centered pools. The desert-dairfields should, by arrangement with the countries involved, be kept ready for potential use.


The air force is already working on long-range tactical movement. Known as the "Bare Base" operation, studies and exercises are going on at Langley Field under the command of Gen. William Momyer. Momyer is preparing to move entire tactical wings by in-flight refueling to any threatened location or combat zone within 48 hours at most. They arrive complete with meshed runways (if needed), water, fuel, food, ammunition and spare parts for the first two days of fighting, after which more logistics are flown in.


Capacity for troop lift is a key to this proposal because the success of the reduced army will depend on efficient and ready mobility. The air force should be able to lift in 48 hours one light armydivision to any foreign area, and in theaters as close as Europe in a day or less. It is a crucial demand and, aside from the technology and organization needed, it aucceeds or fails on the teamwork—or lack of it—between the two services.

CONTINUED

Comparative naval strengths

The Soviet fleet, expanding and modernizing almost twice as fast as the U.S. Navy, should match it in numbers in 1972; 37% of the United States fleet is over 20 years old.





The global arena where American and Soviet fleets operate is marked in bars of varying width to indicate ship activity-gray for the Russians, blue for

the U.S. The Soviet challenge is now particularly strong in the Mediterranean, Russia also has one of the world's fastest-growing merchant marine fleets.

A total reshaping would allow us to do a better job and save billions besides

In conjunction with the navy, the air force should develop the critical "smart" missile or bomb needed to cope with the screens the Soviets fling up around their land targets and ships. To provide close air support for treaty-country troops, something like the A-X-with firepower punch and loitering capability—should be built in limited numbers for "bare-base" operations.

So far, under this proposal, the money bins of the army and air force are reduced; but the navy's would be filled higher.

The Navy should proceed with what it is doing now, but faster:

- Press a crash program to develop Harpoon and other cruise missiles to match the Soviet cruise
- ▶ Press perfection of a compact missile defense system to protect carrier task forces against enemy cruise and air-to-air missiles.
- ▶ Build a fleet of fast, cheap sub-killers.
- ▶ Develop hydrofoil and surface-effect ships.
- ► Continue modernization of the carrier force for use in antisubmarine warfare and as a way of deploying ready, ocean-roaming airstrips.
- Keep building subs.

The Marines are on the right azimuth. But the

corps will be too big, even when it has reduced its strength from 300,000 to 195,000-three divisions and three wings. That size is the legal floor for the Marine Corps, set by act of Congress in 1953—a level the Congress should be willing to lower. Two divisions and two wings of that remarkable corps-about 150,000 men-are sufficient: one division on each coast, providing three seaborne battalions in the Atlantic, three in the

Strategically, a defense posture with naval emphasis is sensible for a country which, by geography and history, is a maritime nation, dependent on the seas for much of its protection, for most of its international trade, and in large part for the safety of its alliances and interests abroad. No one can control all the seas; but the power which is able to mass a convincing superiority at the point of confrontation can sway diplomatic decisions, the course of history-and do it without a fight.

Today the U.S. Navy is the service bearing the brunt of Soviet confrontation. It is challenged and vulnerable. The logical approach is not to cut the navy back, which is what has been happening, but to put a fast, sure and serious rebuilding effort into it.

The proposal for military redesign just described will save a total of \$9.5 billion a year. However, \$6 billion of this, through 1974, will have to be plowed back-mostly into the navy, some into the army and air force. Thus, we achieve a defense which gives us not only an effective strategy and a stronger defense in the critical areas but a net saving of \$3.5 billion to start with. Once new costs

have been funded and a start made in paying for them, the net savings, which are based on permanent manpower cuts, will begin to increase. And this does not include additional savings that are possible in another area where costs can and should be cut: the Pentagon itself, which is monstrously overstaffed and overorganized.

The treaty countries from whom we withdraw our forces would at first be distressed. But the withdrawals, to be completed by mid-1974, would take place gradually, giving the countries time to adjust to the fact that their own armed forces must bear the initial responsibility if trouble arises. The U.S. would have the strategic option to help: first, with its enlarged, faster navy, including carriers and marines, and second, with forces swiftly lifted and "bare-based" in from the U.S. To assure the treaty countries that U.S. support is as implicit in the new system as in the old garrison con-cept, we would be able to execute timely maneuvers in a given country or alliance, forcefully demonstrating the modern techniques.

For most of our history, our military stance has been inconsistent. Its size and shape have varied with the peaks and valleys of war and peace. As our involvement in Vietnam subsides, the temptation, as we look down into another welcoming valley, is to breathe another marvelous sigh of relief. That would be a mistake. Until the international realities change, we must keep ourselves militarily fit and progressive. But we should make a serious effort to do it with intelligence, imagination and efficiency. The old way is obsolete, wasteful and hopelessly expensive. Besides, it isn't working.