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In 1974 a transcript of an executive session of the Warren Commission was released after a prolonged legal battle by a private researcher.<sup>35</sup> Classified as Top Secret until its release, it contains a reference by Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin to the Commission's efforts, "to find out what he [Oswald] studied at the Monterey School of the Army in the way of languages."<sup>36</sup> There is no known official record of Oswald having studied there. The Monterey School (the Defense Language Institute), located in California, was operational in 1959. It was, and still is, the linguistic West Point for U.S. military and intelligence personnel who need to learn a language thoroughly and quickly. If Oswald studied there, it would explain his phenomenal progress.

The Monterey School is not a self-improvement institution offering courses to anyone who is <sup>t</sup>interested. In 1959 it was a school for serious training relating to government work, not to the academic whims of military or intelligence personnel. Only those with a certain level of aptitude were admitted, and training was in a language selected for the student by the government, according to needs or assignments.<sup>37</sup> If Oswald went there, it would also explain why he was not seen as a threat to

statistics to indicate that attaining Russian fluency requires more than twice as many hours as did Spanish or French—1,100 hours or more, including instruction. Weeks opined that the kind of progress described in Oswald's case would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to attain in such a short time by using only the radio and self-study props. Such progress would require instructors, Weeks asserted, or, at a minimum, persons proficient in the language who would be willing to converse extensively with the student. Oswald supposedly had no access to either formal or informal tutors.

In 1974 a transcript of an executive session of the Warren Commission was released after a prolonged legal battle by researcher-author Harold Weisberg.<sup>35</sup> Classified as "Top Secret" until its release, it contains a reference by Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin to the Commission's efforts "to find out what he [Oswald] studied at the Monterey School of the Army in the way of languages."<sup>36</sup> There is no known official record of Oswald having studied there. The Monterey School (the Defense Language Institute), located in California, was operational in 1959. It was and still is the linguistic West Point for U.S. military and intelligence personnel who need to learn a language thoroughly and quickly. If Oswald studied there, it would explain his phenomenal progress.

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In September 1959 Oswald left the Marine Corps—three months ahead of his scheduled discharge.<sup>38</sup> In the first of what was to be a long series of quick and favorable treatment by various government agencies, he was given a dependency discharge because of an injury to his mother.<sup>39</sup> The speed of his release surprised his Marine peers.<sup>40</sup> But the Marine Corps was duped, or so it appears; the discharge was obtained on false grounds. Oswald's mother's injury consisted of a jar falling on her toe while at work. She stayed home for a week, but when she returned she did not mention the injury at all, much less describe it as a continuing problem. This incident took place the year before Oswald's dependency discharge.<sup>41</sup>

Perhaps Oswald was in a hurry to get out of the Marines because he had other things to do. In October 1959—one month after his early

discharge—he was on his way to Moscow to defect. As with much of his defection and his return, his journey to Russia is enigmatic. First, there is the problem of financing. The trip cost at least

The Warren Commission decided that Oswald, being frugal, money out of his Marine Corps pay.<sup>42</sup> Before his departure for his bank account contained only \$203. He could have squinted \$1,300 in cash and carried it around with him to pay for his trip but by no means impossible; alternatively, his trip could have been subsidized by someone. Friends and relatives claim not to have him any money during this period, but perhaps someone else

Second, there is the problem of Oswald's itinerary. He stamped at the London airport.<sup>43</sup> His next destination was He route to Moscow. He arrived there on October 11. But the available commercial flight that would have gotten him there. Either his nest egg of cash was bigger than anyone imagined to hire private air transport—or he was flown to Helsinki by commercial aircraft, private or military.

After arriving in Moscow in October 1959, he told Soviet his desire for Soviet citizenship. The officials were unimpressed, probably more than a bit suspicious. They rejected his request for citizenship and ordered him to leave Moscow within two hours.<sup>44</sup> He was to a hospital by a Soviet Intourist guide who found him bleeding from a hotel room. He was then confined to a psychiatric hospital. Soviets decided his fate. Certainly they must have debated whether Oswald was an authentic defector or a spy. This was an era in which the United States and the Soviet Union were playing extensive games with ostensible defectors.<sup>45</sup>

After waiting several days for the Soviets to make up their mind decided to take action. He went to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow he denounced the United States, praised the Soviet Union, and that he wanted to renounce his U.S. citizenship.<sup>47</sup> He also made very dramatic announcement: he stated that he had offered to Soviets radar secrets that he had learned in the Marines. He also intimated that he "might know something of special interest," at reference to the U-2.<sup>48</sup>

This action seems counterproductive on Oswald's part. To threaten to the U.S. Embassy might cause officials to panic, to extraordinary means to stop the young Marine from spilling secrets to the U.S. Embassy did not previously know of Oswald's



am Anson, *"They've Killed the President"* (New York: Bantam,

re Session Transcript, January 27, 1964.

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of Oswald's experience, as described here, are taken from J. Ed-  
 legend (New York: Bantam, 1966), unless otherwise specified.

<sup>25</sup> "Events Incident to the Summit Conference," p. 124, Senate Select Committee on the Assassinations, 96th Congress, 2nd Session. Testimony by Secretary Thomas S. Gates, June 2, 1960.

and/or Henry Hurt interviewed several of the men who worked in the Ahsugi radar bubble (Epstein, *Legend*).

<sup>1</sup> Report, p. 609.

document MI 62-1178, DL 89-43. November 30, 1963 interview Powers, Oswald's Atsugi squadron leader, p. 3.

1. 298.

1, *Legend*, p. 280.

p. 69.

Reasonable Doubt, p. 200.

"They've Killed the President," p. 157.

ny Summers, *Conspiracy* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970)

1. "They've Killed the President," p. 157.

1. They've lifted the tentacles, p. 122.

p. 11.

am R. Corson, *The Armies of Ignorance* (New York: Dial Press, 1944).

Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence, *Investigation into the Assassination of*

President John F. Kennedy, *DOUBT: A READER'S GUIDE* —  
ing Office, 1976), pp. 58–59.  
—, *The President's Government*, pp. 122–24.

20. Wise and Ross, *Invisible Government*, pp. 122-23.
21. HSCA Report, p. 220.

21. HSCA Report, p. 220.

15; HSCA XIX, p. 601.

23. Summers too notes this possibility, commenting that his own research confirmed the use of such a play by British intelligence, as far back as World War I. 270

24. HSCA Report, p. 220.

25. VIII, p. 298.

26. VIII, p. 232.

27. HSCA XI, p. 84.

28. XXIII, p. 796.

29. Warren Report

30. Ibid., p. 611.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 611.  
31. *Ibid.*, p. 612. According to the Commission, Oswald manifested some interest in Marxism in high school and occasionally extolled Communism and debunked capitalism (*Report*, pp. 362, 381, 383, 385-86, 690; XXII, p. 812). Yet he became possessed by an urgent desire to join the Marines at age sixteen. As will be described in Chapter 4, he was a member of the Civil Air Patrol squadron in New Orleans headed by anti-Communist zealot David Ferrite, who encouraged the youths to join the Marines. Implicitly, the Commission seemed to view Oswald's Marxism as a linear development from his high school days. But this alleged high school interest may have been rechannelled in the Civil Air Patrol toward the Marine Corps and from there, toward a life of intrigue. Moreover, the assertions of Oswald's high school Marxism were described by his former school friend Edward Voebel as "baloney." (See Summers, *Conspiracy* p. 143. Says Summers, Voebel's statement "recalls the plethora of incidents which have somehow rung false [about Oswald].")

32. Epstein, *Legend*, pp. 86–89.

33. Ibid.

33. *Ibid.*
34. Interview with Professor James Weeks, Department of Modern Languages, Southeastern Massachusetts University, February 18, 1981.

35 Summers, *Conspiracy*, p. 155.

36. Transcript, Warren Commission Executive Session, January 21, 1964.

37. Telephone inquiry, Public in

hule, Monterey, CA, Feb. 18, 1901.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 614.

40. VIII, p. 257.

41. XVI, p. 337; CD 107, p. 37.

42. Warren Report, p. 367.

43. XVIII, p. 162. See Sylvia Magni, *Illesorine*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (1967), p. 331. Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), p. 331.