

The Sit-In Movement of 1960. By Martin Oppenheimer. *Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Civil Rights Movement.* (Brooklyn, N. Y.: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1989. Pp. xviii, 222. \$50.00.)

Every historian of the civil rights movement worth his or her salt has made extensive use of Martin Oppenheimer's 1963 University of Pennsylvania dissertation on the student sit-in movement. This reviewer well remembers poring over a dog-eared xerox copy of Oppenheimer's study when beginning graduate research in the mid-1970s. It was a priceless source — a mine of information and, at that time, the only scholarly full-length treatment of the nonviolent protests that swept across the South at the dawn of the 1960s. It has now been published, concurrently with several other of the best doctoral dissertations on the civil rights movement, in the hope of making it more accessible to interested students.

Oppenheimer's study has not been revised for publication save for the addition of a useful index. It therefore lacks the perspective that, if used correctly, enables historians to mull over the events they analyze, placing them in the context of broader sweeps of time. Moreover, it is encumbered by the paraphernalia of the academic sociology of the time, making for a style that is sometimes ponderous and jargon-laden. Nevertheless, its appearance in book form is to be welcomed: this dissertation still bears study for its wide scope and depth of analysis. Furthermore, its contemporaneity with the events it treats gives it the quality of a primary source, particularly as the author spent time in the South interviewing participants. The overlay of sociological theory is fairly light: it is essentially a first-rate piece of contemporary history.

Oppenheimer describes the antecedents of the sit-in movement; the first sit-in, at Greensboro, North Carolina; the spread of the movement to other cities and states; the mobilization of outside support; the formation of SNCC; and the overall impact of the sit-ins. The study is by no means comprehensive: one must turn to August Meier and Elliott Rudwick's book on CORE, for example, to learn about the significant events that occurred in Baton Rouge. However, Oppenheimer provides detailed studies of ten cities that saw sit-in protests, linking them to a wider analysis of why the sit-ins occurred where they did and why some sit-ins succeeded while others failed. He also offers a state-by-state survey that furnishes basic details about every important sit-in protest.

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Spy Saga: Lee Harvey Oswald and U. S. Intelligence. By Philip H. Melanson. (New York, Westport, Conn., and London: Praeger, 1990. Pp. xviii, 201. \$21.95.)

Among the controversies surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy is the murky intelligence arena that looms large in the background of the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. In *Spy Saga* Philip H. Melanson argues that Oswald was an operative of the American intelligence community.

Oswald was born in New Orleans and spent much of his youth there and in

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Texas before enlisting in the Marines. *Spy Saga's* fundamental weaknesses first appear when Melanson discusses Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in October 1959. He asserts that covert spy Oswald passed on the secret of how high the U-2 spy plane flew in order for the CIA to establish his bona fides as a true turncoat. The Soviets then shot it down. Aside from the demands this makes on logic, the factual grounding of the chapter is either lacking or wrongly interpreted. That Oswald knew the range of the U-2 is without documentary foundation. The few works cited are largely from the same school of thought as that of the author, an always risky approach but in this subject fatal. Among the omitted pertinent studies is Michael R. Beschloss's impressive *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair* (New York and other cities, 1986). No question exists that the Soviets had already gotten the flying height of the U-2 and other information about it before the appearance of Oswald at the Finland Station.

After Oswald's return to America in July 1962 he lived in New Orleans and Dallas, where he was associated with incidents that seem to connect him with the foreign adventures of the United States. Chapter 3, on Oswald in New Orleans, fails to establish intelligence credentials for Oswald, accepts many dubious statements, omits much, and misinterprets several points. While the author mentions that Oswald's address book listed 117 Decatur Street as the address of Orest Pena, he neglects to inform the reader that it was Pena's bar where one of several incidents connected with the appearance of a false Oswald occurred, a fact a reader must have to judge Melanson's thesis. Other omitted French Quarter sites contain important information. In the LaFayette Square vicinity are many more key locations connected with Oswald than are mentioned in the text, e.g., Oswald's postal substation box was in the same building with federal military agencies linked to Caribbean activities. Melanson also accepts the legitimacy and quality of the Jim Garrison investigation, which is an act of faith, not history, as any candid and critical review of the charade would have revealed. He cites the number of CIA employees in New Orleans but then reveals an inability to access intelligence data by counting them all as "spooks," when in fact one must realize the agency had clerical staff, maintenance people, and public sector analysts of dock loadings, among others, to run the office.

In Melanson's Dallas chapters we find the same pattern repeating itself. One example will illustrate the unsatisfactory nature of the treatment. For six months ending in April 1963 Oswald worked at Jagers-Chiles-Stovall, a printing company, on Browder Street in Dallas. To Melanson this plant was a CIA secret contract facility that, among other things, "did U-2 photo analysis" (p. 82). In his address book Oswald had noted "micro dots" (p. 83), a classic device of espionage photography and further proof of spydom.

What credibility does this charge possess? Does the CIA hire workers at minimum wage to do highly technical processing of security classified materials? This is impossible to conceive. Did Oswald in fact have access to any classified areas at Jagers-Chiles-Stovall? There is no reason to believe he did and absolutely no evidence. (Keep in mind that the government can and does classify such things as city telephone books.) Did the world's most lavishly endowed intelligence agency with the world's finest photographic analysis system in its

National Photographic Intelligence Center really farm out secret data to a Dallas firm that printed advertising placards? Common sense says "no," and no evidence exists to the contrary. Does a spy really jot down the words "micro dots" in his address book? Why? It is absurd to assume an intelligence connection.

Further difficulties present themselves. On page 82 Melanson refers to the U-2 data as "available only to security-cleared workers" and cites Anthony Summers, *Conspiracy* (New York and other cities, 1980 [p. 231]), which so states. But Summers cites as his sole authority page 202 of the Warren Commission *Hearings*, Volume X, which does not contain this information. In the 1989 edition of *Conspiracy* (New York), the security reference is deleted. Melanson lists both editions.

Spy Saga was written in haste without the research the subject demands and cannot be recommended for an understanding of the unsolved murder of President John F. Kennedy.

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To End All Segregation: The Politics of the Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By Robert D. Loevy. (Lanham, Md., New York, and London: University Press of America, c. 1990. Pp. viii, 373. Paper, \$17.75; cloth, \$43.50.)

Robert D. Loevy thinks that John F. Kennedy was a genuine and consistent advocate of strong civil rights legislation, but one is left with the impression that without Birmingham police commissioner Eugene ("Bull") Connor's setting police dogs against civil rights demonstrators and other evidence of southern intransigence, Kennedy would not have been so forthright in calling for omnibus civil rights legislation in 1963. Indeed, the author concludes that while Kennedy's eloquence furnished considerable thrust for the legislation, a bill put through under his leadership would have been a compromise in view of Kennedy's lack of mastery of the Congress.

The death of Kennedy and the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson resulted in additional impetus for the civil rights bill. While civil rights legislation could, if narrowly framed, have secured a majority in both houses, the extraordinary power of southerners in key committee chairmanships made it essential that the bill be framed without the usual committee action. The road to approval was far more difficult in the Senate, where the cloture rule still required a two-thirds vote to cut off debate.

With southerners opposing the bill, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, manager of the bill in the Senate, sought the support of the Republican minority, led by Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois. Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield played a timid role, fearing that the civil rights bill would endanger the remainder of the Democratic program. Humphrey was aided by skillful and consistent support from President Johnson, whose strategy was to play upon Senator Dirksen's vanity by allowing him credit for the legislation and letting him amend the bill.