

writing of history. The imagination that creates a world of its own need not be the one to illumine and revive a world that really existed. To say that Miss Mitford's unique, delightful touch is wasted here is not enough, it becomes an actual stumbling-block. Her gaiety, her mischief, her frivolous inconsequential wit, play on the factual with an air of superficiality and facetiousness: all too often we catch the sound of a girlish giggle.

It is difficult, too, to think for whom the book is intended. If for readers entirely new to French history, as much of it would suggest, the canvas is over-

crowded. If for readers familiar with the subject and with France, it seems unnecessary to inform them, for example, that a *château* is not a castle in our sense, that stocks and wallflowers are both called *giro-flées* and that the "grand Dauphin" was called so merely because of his build. We may wickedly surmise that it will not be attentively read at all, being one of those profusely, opulently illustrated books that are apt to lie about on drawing-room tables. Already, it will have gone down on scores of Christmas shopping-lists: cultured ladies everywhere will present it to, and receive it again from, their cultured friends.

timidated, blackmailed, and possibly destroyed?"

Twining feels that these views were never accorded a fair hearing by the State Department, "or for that matter, by the military establishment." (However, 30 pages later, in a list of four alternatives considered by the National Security Council in 1949, this approach is described as one of the two policies advocated most vigorously. And a preliminary ultimatum calling for an end to Soviet world subversion and enslavement was conceded to be window dressing to "establish the basic morality of our position" after which we would be not only "free" but "obligated" to act.)

General Twining has a taste for "initiative" and "pursuit." After asserting that we could knock out mainland China overnight, he warns that "the future we face will become increasingly dangerous as their nuclear power develops." He advocates a "very short fuse" in dealing with them and encourages us to "identify the issues" before China has developed a nuclear arsenal. China, he repeats later, will be a real problem if given a little more time and the Johnson Administration, he reports, has thus far given no assurance that it will face up to the Red Chinese leadership "at places and times which are most favorable to the destiny of free men."

After all this, it is anticlimatic to note: his reference to the 1958-1961 testing moratorium as a "plot" of the scientific world; his attack on efforts by "some scientists and the familiar pacifist group in government" to "slow the entry of United States military men into space"; his asking whether we are deliberately cutting down our bomber force to the size of the Soviet force on the basis of a "secret understanding"; and his suggestion that it would be logical to break diplomatic relations with the Russians. Most of Twining's objections to such terms as "limited-war," "damage limitation," "war termination capabilities," and "mutual deterrence" rest upon his view that such terms may give the enemy the wrong impression - one of weakness or indecision. But in addition, he is not above accusing the scientist and "moralist" of liking the term "limited war" because it means "someone else will be involved."

Incidentally, his definition of "damage-limitation" ("that US military

The General Faces "Reality"

by Jeremy J. Stone

In this book, General Twining offers his right flank only to the California Minutemen. On other fronts, however, he is hopelessly vulnerable in a confrontation with about everyone else. He has unqualified praise only for Edward Teller, John Foster Dulles, and two interesting generals - one of whom was shifted for suggesting in 1943 that Lend-Lease to Russia be halted in view

Neither Liberty Nor Safety
by General Nathan F. Twining
(Holt, Rinehart & Winston; \$5.95)

of the favorable turn the war had then already taken; the second was retired for advocating an ultimatum to the Soviets to be followed by an attack upon Russia's "power base."

Arrayed against Twining are: "anti-nuclear amateurs"; "anti-nuclear intellectuals"; "arm-chair strategists";

scientists ("who had wiggled their way in as advisors on national policy"); political scientists with "pacifistic tendencies"; the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (striving for "piecemeal unilateral disarmament of the United States"); the State Department ("tone-deafened by the music of appeasement and coexistence"); "transient non-professionals" (civilian officials in the Department of Defense); military men who succumbed to the siren song of "limited" war; Americans who want "to be loved instead of respected"; "defeatists" (characterized by their belief that "no one can win a nuclear war"); and, last but not least, "those who have no particular identifiable objective other than to 'contain communism'" (they should be seeking to "neutralize it").

General Twining says that he is not a proponent of "preventive war" (the quotes are his), but in this last business of "neutralizing" communism, he shows himself to be extraordinarily sympathetic to it. He quotes approvingly his "brilliant" officer, General Anderson, who put the problem this way (before 1950):

"Which is the greater immorality - preventive war as a means to keep the USSR from becoming a nuclear power; or, to allow a totalitarian dictatorial system to develop a means whereby the free world could be in-

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forces should apply power in such manner as to avoid unnecessary destruction of civilian life and property") illustrates his ignorance of the McNamara-vintage jargon - introduced after his retirement in 1960. The term refers not to US efforts to limit damage to Soviet life and property - e.g., avoiding attacks on Soviet cities if war occurred - but to US efforts to protect *our own* society through early attacks on Soviet weapons or through active and passive defense. Nor is "stable deterrence" a thesis holding that "war by accident is the greatest threat." Twining is no defense intellectual.

General Twining is no more accurate when he refers to recommendations of the Wiesner panel on Arms Control and Disarmament, made to the International Cooperation Year Symposium. It is noted parenthetically, presumably by a nervous publisher, that these recommendations were "(paraphrased for brevity)." But the white space in the table - all of it on the Wiesner recommendation side - shows this brevity to have been greater than necessary to accommodate the linotypist.

In any case, General Twining has no hesitation about stretching points. "... Self-imposed constraints" on US technological progress becomes "creeping disarmament"; "allowing the enemy time to consolidate his position" (i.e. not following a policy of preventive war) is referred to as "appeasement" - not once but twice, and with great emphasis.

The General berates Vanniver Bush for arguing in the late forties that the Russians might not get the bomb until 1960 and credits the military experts with predicting 1950 (only one year wrong). Later when he argues that Soviet espionage "reduced by many years" the time required by the Russians, he ventures to speculate that: "Military professionals took into account the probability of espionage which many scientists did not."

How does Air Force General Twining explain Navy and Army interest in "limited" war, otherwise advocated only by a motley collection of no-goodniks? In the best Madison Avenue tradition, he turns a liability into an asset by blaming it on insufficient defense expenditures. ("It was the shortage of resources, and how these limited resources were to be divided up, that

really caused service interest in the idle philosophy of limited war.") As Twining explains it, the philosophy of limited war offered a "convenient bandwagon" for those who wanted to get some of Strategic Air Command resources. But he feels constrained to say that his rival colleagues were "in bed with some very strange company." And he is shocked. ("It was not necessary for dedicated military men to become associated with the philosophy of weakness as represented by the six types of mentalities dissected previously in these pages.") However, he frankly concedes that the Air Force opposed the notion of limited war for self-serving reasons - because it feared the term meant crippling of the Strategic Air Command. Apropos the notion that a shortage of resources was responsible for this bit of interservice scholasticism, it is later asserted that \$50 billion a year could "easily" have been spent for air defense alone.

Toward the end of the book, Twining notes that the question of control of nuclear weapons was injected into the presidential campaign of 1964 by Goldwater and for reasons, he asserts mysteriously, which "will probably never be generally known." In the rambling discussion that follows, Twining seems to be hinting that President Johnson either would not be bothered with, or would not discuss, delegation of control over strategic weapons for such situations as those in which Washington (and Johnson) were destroyed in a sneak attack.


The book underscores, in every outraged and undisciplined paragraph, the achievement of Secretary McNamara in gaining effective control of the Department of Defense. General Twining and his associates possess rigidly oversimplified opinions that reflect decades of isolation from political life; they have a natural self-confidence and determination that is heightened by military training and protected by military deference; and their commitment to their views is no less total than the dangers they perceive. It is quite a feat to ride herd on men like this.

It is hard to avoid the impression that Twining's views are the product of cold war battle fatigue. Drafted by his early sense of patriotism, instilled with an overriding concern for his country, or-

dered to search the horizon for the enemy, surrounded by men similarly charged, frustrated by the inexplicable (if not ominous) opposition of civilians, alarmed by the unpredictable speed of technological change, and conscious of the irrevocable pace of any future total war, General Twining has come to believe that the Test Ban Treaty is unilateral disarmament and to defend the case for two preventive wars.

We have asked of him, not only that he think the unthinkable throughout his adult life, but that he take a deep personal responsibility for avoiding it. We have made him a watchdog, using his exaggerated fears to guard our society. In this important function, he served his country for 44 years in the most demanding offices. When he asserts defiantly that his ally Dr. Teller "lived, and still lives, in a real world - not a dream world," we ought to feel a measure of responsibility, and of compassion, for a man we asked to live apart in a terrible world that never was.


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