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SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA  
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS  
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS  
(AMENDMENT TO THE FISCAL YEAR 1966 DEFENSE BUDGET)  
AUGUST 4, 1965

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

Last Wednesday President Johnson informed the Nation of the mounting Communist aggression in South Vietnam and the additional measures which we plan to take to assist the people of that country in defending their freedom and independence. We are here today to report on that situation, to review with you the additional military actions involved, and to request the funds required to finance these actions pending the submission of a detailed FY 1966 supplemental request to the Congress when it convenes in January.

Although Vietnam is now the focus of attention, we are not overlooking the possibility that trouble may arise in other areas of the world, perhaps as a reaction to our increased effort in that country or for other reasons. Accordingly, in planning for the increased deployment of U.S. forces to Southeast Asia, we have also taken into account the forces which may be needed to meet contingencies elsewhere. Although we have no basis to assume at this time that the Soviet Union or Communist China would deliberately provoke new crises in other areas, prudence dictates that we be prepared for such emergencies.

The issue in Vietnam is essentially the same as it was in 1954 when President Eisenhower said:

"I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a long argument or exposition to show the importance to the United States of Indochina and of the struggle going on there. No matter how the struggle may have started, it has long since become one of the testing places between a free form of government and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a long time into the future.

"We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the bottle being the great area that includes Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, all of the surrounding areas of Asia with its hundreds of millions of people . . ."

What is at stake there is the ability of the free world to block Communist armed aggression and prevent the loss of all of Southeast Asia, a loss which in its ultimate consequences could drastically alter the strategic situation in Asia and the Pacific to the grave detriment of our own security and that of our Allies. While fifteen years ago, in Korea, Communist aggression took the form of an overt armed attack, today in South Vietnam, it has taken the form of a large scale intensive guerrilla operation. The covert nature of this aggression, which characterized the earlier years of the struggle in South Vietnam, has now all but been stripped away. The control of the Viet Cong effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and incited by Communist China, has become increasingly apparent.

The struggle there has enormous implications for the security of the United States and the free world, and for that matter, the Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists have chosen to make South Vietnam the test case for their particular version of the so-called "wars of national liberation." The extent to which violence should be used in overthrowing non-Communist governments has been one of the most bitterly contested issues between the Chinese and the Soviet Communists. Although the former Chairman, Mr. Khrushchev, fully endorsed wars of national liberation as the preferred means of extending the sway of Communism, he cautioned that "this does not necessarily mean that the transition to Socialism will everywhere and in all cases be linked with armed uprising and civil war. . . . Revolution by peaceful means accords with the interests of the working class and the masses."

The Chinese Communists, however, insist that:

"Peaceful co-existence cannot replace the revolutionary struggles of the people. The transition from capitalism to socialism in any country can only be brought about through proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country. . . . The vanguard of the proletariat will remain unconquerable in all circumstances only if it masters all forms of struggle -- peaceful and armed, open and secret, legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle and mass struggle, and so forth."

(Letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 14, 1963)

Their preference for violence was even more emphatically expressed in an article in The Peking Peoples Daily of March 31, 1964:

"It is advantageous from the point of view of tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition, but it would

be inappropriate to emphasize the possibility of peaceful transition. . . . the proletarian party must never substitute parliamentary struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the illusion that the transition to socialism can be achieved through the parliamentary road. Violent revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolution. To realize the transition to socialism, the proletariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old state machine and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . . "

"Political power," the article quotes Mao Tse-Tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel of a gun."

Throughout the world we see the fruits of these policies and in Vietnam, particularly, we see the effects of the Chinese Communists' more militant stance and their hatred of the free world. They make no secret of the fact that Vietnam is the test case, and neither does the regime in Hanoi. General Giap, head of the North Vietnamese Army, recently said that "South Vietnam is the model of the national liberation movement of our time. . . . If the special warfare that the U.S. imperialists are testing in South Vietnam is overcome, then it can be defeated everywhere in the world." And, Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, pointed out that "The experience of our compatriots in South Vietnam attracts the attention of the world, especially the peoples of South America."

It is clear, therefore, that a Communist success in South Vietnam would be taken as positive proof that the Chinese Communists' position is correct and they will have made a giant step forward in their efforts to seize control of the world Communist movement. Furthermore, such a success would greatly increase the prestige of Communist China among the non-aligned nations and strengthen the position of their followers everywhere. In that event we would then have to be prepared to cope with the same kind of aggression in other parts of the world wherever the existing governments are weak and the social structures fragmented. If Communist armed aggression is not stopped in Vietnam, as it was in Korea, the confidence of small nations in America's pledge of support will be weakened and many of them, in widely separated areas of the world, will feel unsafe.

Thus, the stakes in South Vietnam are far greater than the loss of one small country to Communism. Its loss would be a most serious set back to the cause of freedom and would greatly complicate the task of preventing the further spread of militant Asian Communism. And, if that spread is not halted, our strategic position in the world will be weakened and our national security directly endangered.

It was in recognition of this fundamental issue that the United States, under three Presidents, firmly committed itself to help the people of South Vietnam defend their freedom. That is why President Eisenhower warned at the time of the Geneva Conference in July 1954 ". . . that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern." That is why President Johnson in his statement last Wednesday made it clear to all the world that we are determined to stand by our commitment and provide whatever help is required to fulfill it.

#### Conditions Leading to the Present Situation in South Vietnam

Essential to a proper understanding of the present situation in South Vietnam is a recognition of the fact that the so-called insurgency there is planned, directed, controlled and supported from Hanoi. True, there is a small dissident minority in South Vietnam, but the Government could cope with it if it were not directed and supplied from the outside. As early as 1960, at the Third Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap, the commander-in-chief of the North Vietnamese armed forces, spoke of the need to "step up" the "revolution in the South." In March 1963 the party organ Hoc Tap stated that the authorities in South Vietnam "are well aware that North Vietnam is the firm base for the southern revolution and the point on which it leans, and that our party is the steady and experienced vanguard unit of the working class and people and is the brain and factor that decides all victories of the revolution."

Yet through most of these years the North Vietnamese government denied and went to great efforts to conceal the scale of its personnel and materiel support, in addition to direction and encouragement, to the Viet Cong. It had strong reasons to do so.

First of all, in 1954 the authorities in Hanoi had pledged to "respect the territory under the military control of the other party" - - South Vietnam -- "and engage in no hostile act against the other party." In 1962 those same authorities pledged that they would "not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries."

The North Vietnamese regime had no wish to force upon the attention of the world its massive and persistent violations of those pledges. Nor was it anxious for its own citizens to dwell upon the ultimate risks of committing, unequivocally, aggression across international boundaries. Nor could the Viet Cong cause be anything but harmed if it were to be recognized openly in the South as an instrument of the North Vietnamese regime.

However, in building up the Viet Cong forces for a decisive challenge, the authorities in North Vietnam have increasingly dropped the disguises that gave their earlier support a clandestine character.

Through 1963, the bulk of the arms infiltrated from the North were old French and American models acquired prior to 1954 in Indochina and Korea. Now, the flow of weapons from North Vietnam consists almost entirely of the latest arms acquired from Communist China; and the flow is large enough to have entirely re-equipped the Main Force units, despite the capture this year by government forces of thousands of these weapons and millions of rounds of the new ammunition.

Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the personnel infiltrating through Laos, trained and equipped in the North and ordered South, were former Southerners. But in the last eighteen months, the great majority of the infiltrators -- more than 10,000 of them -- have been ethnic Northerners, mostly draftees ordered into the People's Army of Vietnam for duty in the South. And it now appears that, starting their journey through Laos last December, from one to three regiments of a North Vietnamese regular division, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army, have deployed into the Central Highlands of South Vietnam for combat alongside the Viet Cong.

Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy, Hanoi's desire for decisive results this summer has forced it to reveal its hand even more openly.

The United States during the last four years has steadily increased its help to the people of South Vietnam in an effort to counter this ever increasing scale of Communist aggression. These efforts achieved some measure of success during 1962. The South Vietnamese forces in that year made good progress in suppressing the Viet Cong insurrection. Although combat deaths suffered by these forces in 1962 rose by 11 percent over the 1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,450), Viet Cong combat deaths increased by 72 percent (from about 12,000 to 21,000). Weapons lost by the South Vietnamese fell from 5,900 in 1961 to 5,200 in 1962, while the number lost by the Viet Cong rose from 2,750 to 4,050. The Government's new Strategic Hamlet program was just getting underway and was showing promise. The economy was growing and the Government seemed firmly in control. Therefore, when I appeared before this Committee in early 1963, I was able to say:

" . . . victory over the Viet Cong will most likely take many years. But now, as a result of the operations of the last year, there is a new feeling of confidence, not only on the part of the Government of South Vietnam but also among the populace, that victory is possible."

But at the same time I also cautioned:

"We are not unmindful of the fact that the pressures on South Vietnam may well continue through infiltration via the Laos corridor. Nor are we unmindful of the possibility that the Communists, sensing defeat in their covert efforts, might resort to overt aggression from North Vietnam. Obviously, this latter contingency could require a greater direct participation by the United States. The survival of an independent government in South Vietnam is so important to the security of all of Southeast Asia and to the Free World that we must be prepared to take all necessary measures within our capability to prevent a Communist victory."

Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early 1963 proved to be well founded. Late in 1963, the Communists stepped up their efforts and the military situation began to deteriorate. The Diem Government came under increasing internal pressure and in November it was overthrown. A year ago last February, I had to tell this Committee that:

"The Viet Cong was quick to take advantage of the growing opposition to the Diem Government and the period of uncertainty following its overthrow. Viet Cong activities were already increasing in September and continued to increase at an accelerated rate in October and November, particularly in the Delta area. And I must report that they have made considerable progress since the coup."

Following the coup, the lack of stability in the central Government and the rapid turnover of key personnel, particularly senior military commanders, began to be reflected in combat operations and throughout the entire fabric of the political and economic structure. And, in 1964, the Communists greatly increased the scope and tempo of their subversive efforts. Larger scale attacks became more frequent and the flow of men and supplies from the North expanded. The incidence of terrorism and sabotage rose rapidly and the pressure on the civilian population was intensified. The deteriorating military situation was clearly reflected in the statistics. South Vietnamese combat deaths rose from 5,650 in 1963 to 7,450 in 1964 and the number of weapons lost from 8,250 to 14,100. In contrast, Viet Cong combat deaths dropped from 20,600 to 16,800 and, considering the stepped-up tempo of activity, they experienced only a very modest rise in the rate of weapons lost (from 5,400 to 5,900).

At various times in recent months, I have called attention to the continued buildup of Communist forces in South Vietnam. I pointed out

that although these forces had not been committed to combat in any significant degree, they probably would be after the start of the monsoon season. It is now clear that these forces are being committed in increasing numbers and that the Communists have decided to make an all-out attempt to bring down the Government of South Vietnam. The entire economic and social structure is under attack. Bridges, railroads and highways are being destroyed and interdicted. Agricultural products are being barred from the cities. Electric power plants and communication lines are being sabotaged. Whole villages are being burned and their population driven away, increasing the refugee burden on the South Vietnamese Government.

As I mentioned, in addition to the continued infiltration of increasing numbers of individuals and the acceleration of the flow of modern equipment and supplies, organized units of the North Vietnamese army have been identified in South Vietnam. We now estimate the hard core Viet Cong strength at some 70,000 men, including a recently reported increase in the number of combat battalions. In addition, they have some 90,000 to 100,000 irregulars and some 30,000 in their political cadres, i.e., tax collectors, propagandists, etc. We have also identified at least three battalions of the regular North Vietnamese Army, and there are probably considerably more. At the same time the Government of South Vietnam has found it increasingly difficult to make a commensurate increase in the size of its own forces, which now stand at about 545,000 men, including the regional and local defense forces but excluding the national police.

Combat deaths on both sides have been mounting -- for the South Vietnamese from an average of 143 men a week in 1964 to about 270 a week for the four week period ending July 24 this year. Viet Cong losses have gone from 322 a week last year to about 680 a week for the four week period ending July 24. Most important, the ratio of South Vietnamese to Viet Cong strength has seriously declined in the last six or seven months from about five to one to about three or three-and-a-half to one; the ratio of combat battalions is substantially less. This is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war even though the greater mobility and firepower provided to the South Vietnamese forces by the United States help to offset that disadvantage. The South Vietnamese forces have to defend hundreds of cities, towns and hamlets while the Viet Cong are free to choose the time and place of their attack. As a result, the South Vietnamese forces are stretched thin in defensive positions, leaving only a small central reserve for offensive action against the Viet Cong, while the latter are left free to concentrate their forces and throw them against selected targets. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Viet Cong retains most of the initiative.

Even so, we may not as yet have seen the full weight of the Communist attack. Presently, the situation is particularly acute in the northern part of the country where the Communists have mobilized large military forces which pose a threat to the entire region and its major cities and towns. Our air attacks may have helped to keep these forces off balance but the threat remains and it is very real.

Clearly, the time has come when the people of South Vietnam need more help from us and other nations if they are to retain their freedom and independence. We have already responded to that need with some 75,000 U.S. military personnel, including some combat units. This number will be raised to 125,000 almost immediately with the deployment of the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces. But, more help will be needed in the months ahead and additional U.S. combat forces will be required to back up the hard pressed Army of South Vietnam. Two other nations have provided combat forces - Australia and New Zealand. We hope that by the end of this year others will join them.

#### Role of U.S. Combat Forces in South Vietnam

As I noted earlier, the central reserve of the South Vietnamese Army has been seriously depleted in recent months. The principal role of U.S. ground combat forces will be to supplement this reserve in support of the front line forces of the South Vietnamese Army. The indigenous paramilitary forces will deal with the pacification of areas cleared of organized Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units, a role more appropriate for them than for our forces.

The Government of South Vietnam's strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve the initiative, to expand gradually its area of control by breaking up major concentrations of enemy forces, using to the maximum our preponderance of air power, both land and sea-based. The number of "fixed-wing" attack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South Vietnam will increase many fold by the end of the year. Armed helicopter sorties will also increase dramatically over the same period, and extensive use will be made of heavy artillery, both land-based and sea-based. At the same time our Air and Naval forces will continue to interdict the Viet Cong supply lines from North Vietnam, both land and sea.

Although our tactics have changed, our objective remains the same. We have no desire to widen the war. We have no desire to overthrow the North Vietnamese regime, seize its territory or achieve the unification of North and South Vietnam by force of arms. We have no need for permanent military bases in South Vietnam or for special privileges of any kind. What we are seeking through the planned military buildup is to block the



Viet Cong offensive, to give the people of South Vietnam and their armed forces some relief from the unrelenting Communist pressures - to give them time to strengthen their government, to re-establish law and order, and to revive their economic life which has been seriously disrupted by Viet Cong harassment and attack in recent months. We have no illusions that success will be achieved quickly, but we are confident that it will be achieved much more surely by the plan I have outlined.

#### Increases in United States Military Forces Since 1961

Fortunately, we have greatly increased the strength and readiness of our military establishment since 1961, particularly in the kinds of forces which we now require in Southeast Asia. The active Army has been expanded from 11 to 16 combat-ready divisions. Twenty thousand men have been added to the Marine Corps to allow them to fill out their combat structure and at the same time facilitate the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve. The tactical fighter squadrons of the Air Force have been increased by 51 percent. Our airlift capability has more than doubled. Special Forces trained to deal with insurgency threats have been multiplied eleven-fold. General ship construction and conversion has been doubled.

During this same period, procurement for the expanded force has been increased greatly: Air Force tactical aircraft from \$360 million in 1961 to about \$1.1 billion in the original fiscal year 1966 budget; Navy aircraft -- from \$1.8 billion to \$2.2 billion; Army helicopters -- from 286 aircraft to over 1,000. Procurement of ordnance, vehicles and related equipment was increased about 150 percent in the FY 1962-1964 period, compared with the preceding three years. The tonnage of modern non-nuclear air-to-ground ordnance in stock tripled between FY 1961 and FY 1965. In brief, the military establishment of the United States, today, is in far better shape than it ever has been in peacetime to face whatever tasks may lie ahead.

Nevertheless, some further increases in forces, military personnel, production and construction will be required if we are to deploy additional forces to Southeast Asia and provide for combat consumption while, at the same time, maintaining our capabilities to deal with crises elsewhere in the world.

#### Further Increases in the Force Structure and Military Personnel

To offset the deployments now planned to Southeast Asia, and provide some additional forces for possible new deployments, we propose to increase the presently authorized force levels. These increases will be of three types: (1) additional units for the active forces, over and above those

reflected in the January Budget; (2) military personnel augmentations for presently authorized units in the active forces to man new bases, to handle the larger logistics workload, etc.; and (3) additional personnel and extra training for selected reserve components units to increase their readiness for quick deployment. We believe we can achieve this buildup without calling up the reserves or ordering the involuntary extension of tours, except as already authorized by law for the Department of the Navy. Even here the extension of officer tours will be on a selective basis and extensions for enlisted men will be limited, in general, to not more than four months.

Our present estimate of the numbers of military personnel involved are shown on the Table attached to this statement.

1. Increase in Army Forces

For the Army, we plan to activate one division force, three brigade forces, a large number of helicopter companies, and their combat service support units. In addition, we plan to replace the military personnel drawn from the Strategic Army Forces to provide logistic support in Vietnam. The buildup of these forces will require a substantial expansion of the Army training establishment. The larger deployments to South Vietnam and the increase in Army military personnel generally will result in a higher number of men in transit and other support activities. A military personnel strength increase in the Army of 235,000 is provided for these purposes.

2. Augmentation of the Three Marine Corps Division/Aircraft Wings

Some 30,000 additional military personnel have been provided for the Marine Corps to augment existing units and to activate certain new units, such as helicopter squadrons, and communication, engineer and military police battalions, and to provide for the increased training and manpower pipeline requirements.

3. Strengthening the Naval Forces

The increased tempo of attack carrier operations and the intensified coastal patrol off Vietnam will require a small increase in the number of active ships in the Navy as well as an increase in the manning of the ships deployed to that area. These ships are required to operate at close to wartime tempos and therefore require higher manning levels than normally provided other fleet units. Furthermore, additional Navy personnel are needed to operate the new ports now being built in South Vietnam and to support the heavier logistics load at other bases. Other support activities

including pipeline, account for the balance of 35,000 additional personnel provided for the Navy.

#### 4. Augmentation of the Air Force Strike and Airlift Capabilities

In addition to the increased number of tactical attack sorties, we are also planning more B-52 sorties from Guam. To support the B-52 aircraft to be utilized for this mission, additional personnel will be needed at Guam, to handle ammunition, increased maintenance, and so forth. Support of the additional tactical fighter and troop carrier squadrons deployed to Southeast Asia will require more men.

With the greatly increased flow of traffic to South Vietnam, a further early increase in our airlift capability is indicated. We plan to approximately double our existing capability for sustained operations through higher rates of utilization of present airlift aircraft. The more modern MATS aircraft, which now have a planned utilization rate of five hours per day, will be raised and held at eight hours per day. The C-130E troop carrier aircraft in Tactical Air Command and in the Pacific, which now have a planned operating rate of one and one-half hours per day, will be raised and held at five hours per day. More personnel will be needed.

The increase in the number of Air Force military personnel will require an expansion of the training establishment, which together with other support activities, principally the logistics base, will require a total increase in the Air Force end FY 1966 military personnel strength of 40,000.

In total, 340,000 military personnel will be added to the active forces. To provide this additional strength, the current draft call rate of about 17,000 per month will be approximately doubled.

#### 5. Increased Readiness for the Reserve Components

As I noted earlier, we must be prepared to deploy additional forces to Southeast Asia over and above those now planned. Furthermore, we must also be prepared to deal with crises elsewhere in the world. Accordingly, steps should be taken now to raise still further the readiness of selected reserve component forces so that they could be quickly deployed if the need should arise.

There are a number of steps which could be taken towards this end. The units could be manned at full strength, the number and duration of the paid drills could be increased, additional tours of active duty for training could be provided, the equipment required for movement could be identified and earmarked, etc.

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Shown on the Table are the selected reserve component forces whose readiness we believe should be raised over the next few months. The Army forces (3 divisions and 6 brigades) will require additional personnel to raise their manning to the desired levels. These personnel can be obtained by enlisting additional men from civilian life or by reassigning men from reserve units for which there is no military requirement.

The required increase in reserve force readiness could be greatly facilitated by the realignment of reserve forces which we proposed in the FY 1966 budget. The realignment would permit us to concentrate men, equipment and civilian technicians in the units we need for our contingency plans, instead of spreading them over a large number of units for which there is no military requirement. This was the primary objective of our realignment proposal and the events of the last few months have demonstrated the soundness of that objective. In my judgment, the realignment should go forward without further delay.

For the Marine Corps Reserve, we propose to add 2,500 paid drill training spaces to raise the manning of the Fourth Division/Aircraft Wing (9 battalions - 9 attack/fighter squadrons).

About four thousand additional paid drill spaces will be provided to the Air Force reserve components to raise the manning of nine fighter squadrons, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons and 11 airlift squadrons to full authorized strength. We expect that all of these units will be ready to deploy on 24-hour notice by the end of this calendar year.

#### 6. Other Military Personnel and Operation and Maintenance Costs

Over and above the costs of the additional military personnel, there will also be increased costs for the operation of installations and facilities in Southeast Asia; the increases in flying and steaming hours; the consumption of spares and repair parts; and the transportation of supplies and equipment to Southeast Asia. An increase of almost 36,000 "direct hire" civilian employees, raising the total at end FY 1966 to just short of one million, will also be required.

None of these personnel and operation and maintenance costs can be estimated with any degree of precision at the present time. We have yet to work out detailed personnel plans and to calculate, on a phased basis, the increases in activity rates, movements of troops and materiel and other operation and maintenance costs associated with the buildup in Southeast Asia. However, by the time we appear here next January with the FY 1967 budget estimates, we will have completed this work and we will have a much more precise estimate of all of these additional costs

and our financial requirements for the balance of FY 1966. Accordingly, we propose that these additional military personnel and operation and maintenance costs be financed during the interim under Section 512 of the FY 1966 Defense Appropriations Bill, as approved by the House (H.R. 9221).

Subsection 512(a) of the Bill provides that:

During the current fiscal year, the President may exempt appropriations, funds, and contract authorizations, available for military functions under the Department of Defense, from the provisions of subsection (c) of section 3679 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, whenever he deems such action to be necessary in the interests of national defense.

Subsection 512(c) provides that:

Upon determination by the President that it is necessary to increase the number of military personnel on active duty beyond the number for which funds are provided in this Act, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to provide for the cost of such increased military personnel, as an excepted expense in accordance with the provisions of Revised Statutes 3732 (41 U.S.C. 11).

#### Procurement and Construction

As in the case of personnel and operation and maintenance costs, we have not as yet had sufficient time to develop detailed requirements and production and construction plans for the additional materiel and facilities needed for the support of the expanding operations in Southeast Asia. And again, we will be in a much better position next January to provide these details and to state our additional requirements for the balance of FY 1966. The \$1.7 billion amendment to the Bill now before the Committee which we are proposing at this time will provide the additional financing needed through January to gear up the production machine -- to accelerate the delivery of essential items already in production and to initiate the production of new items required for the support of our forces in Southeast Asia, as well as the construction of the most urgently needed facilities. We suggest that this amendment take the form of a new appropriation account -- "Emergency Fund, Southeast Asia" -- and that the language be similar, except for the amount, to the \$700 million FY 1965 Supplemental for Southeast Asia.

As you know, we have planned in our FY 1966 and prior year budgets a substantial buildup of war consumable stocks, particularly modern ordnance

and ammunition. If we are to fulfill these plans, we must replace what we are drawing from these stocks for consumption in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, we must provide replacements for the aircraft being lost there in combat. And finally, we must buy some additional helicopters for the new Army and Marine Corps aviation units which we now plan to activate.

The higher activity rates planned for our forces in Southeast Asia will increase considerably the consumption of spares and repair parts for many types of equipment. Stocks of these items must be restored through increased production. We will also need to replace in our inventories the additional quantities of equipment for the new bases being established or expanded in Southeast Asia. Funds for these purposes are included in the \$1.7 billion supplemental.

Finally, the increased deployments of U.S. forces to Southeast Asia will require an extensive program of construction in South Vietnam and along the lines of communication back to the United States. Included in this program are airfields, ports and troop support and logistics facilities.

#### Summary

Last Wednesday in his statement on Vietnam, President Johnson said:

"I have asked the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs."

The program I have outlined here today and the \$1.7 billion Amendment to the FY 1966 Defense Appropriation Bill now before the Committee will, in the collective judgment of my principal military and civilian advisors and myself, provide the men, materiel and facilities required to fulfill this pledge, while at the same time maintaining the forces required to meet commitments elsewhere in the world. I earnestly solicit the full support of this Committee and the Congress for this program and budget request.

SUMMARY BY PROGRAM OF PROPOSED PERSONNEL INCREASES

1. Increase in Army Forces
  - a. 1 Division Force
  - b. 3 Brigade Forces
  - c. Aviation Companies
  - d. Combat Service Support
  - e. STRAF Support Forces
  - f. Expand training
  - g. Transients and other support

Total Army 235,000
  
2. Augmentation of the Three Marine Corps Division/Aircraft Wings
  - a. Bring units to be deployed in Vietnam up to full strength
  - b. Activate new units to augment the forces to be deployed
  - c. Expand training
  - d. Provide increased pipeline

Total Marine Corps 30,000
  
3. Strengthening the Naval Forces
  - a. Retain ships
  - b. Activate ships
  - c. Increase manning for deployed ships and bases in Southeast Asia
  - d. Other support (pipeline, Marine Corps, etc.)

Total Navy 35,000
  
4. Augmentation of the Air Force Strike and Airlift Capabilities
  - a. B-52 aircraft deployed to Guam
  - b. Tac. Ftr. and Troop Carrier Squadrons deployed to Southeast Asia
  - c. Retain one reconnaissance squadron scheduled to be phased out in FY 1966
  - d. Raise airlift aircraft utilization rates:  
MATS  
PAC-TAC
  - e. Expand training
  - f. Other support (logistical base)

Total Air Force 40,000



5. Increased Readiness for the Reserve Components

Army:	
a. 3 Division Forces	a/
b. 6 Brigade Forces	a/
Marine Corps:	
c. Fourth Division/Aircraft Wing	2,500
Air Force:	
d. 9 F-100 Squadrons	1,667
e. 4 RF-84 Squadrons	697
f. 11 C-124 Squadrons	2,205
Total Air Force	<u>4,569</u>

6. Recapitulation of Personnel Increases

a. Active duty military personnel	
Army	235,000
Navy	35,000
Marine Corps	30,000
Air Force	40,000
Total	<u>340,000</u>
b. Reserve component paid drill spaces	
Army	a/
Marine Corps	2,500
Air Force	<u>4,569</u>
Total	a/
c. Direct hire civilian personnel - Total	35,762

a/ Army numbers still to be determined