



Alfred Krupp
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The Arms of Krupp

1587-1968

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by William Manchester



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*D. J. McCloskey
Gift to
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The first week in August Krupp and his convicted *Direktorium* were transported to Landsberg, one of the loveliest cities in southern Bavaria, and locked up in War Crimes Prison Number One, a medieval stronghold overlooking the river below. It was here that Adolf Hitler had been confined during Alfred's youth after the unsuccessful Nazi putsch in Munich, here that the Führer had written *Mein Kampf*. For those who cherish legends, and millions of Volk do, it was an incomparable stage for the martyred Krupp.

Thus a whole mythology arose during his thirty months in Landsberg. Some stories are true. He did rise at 6:30 each morning, don red-and-white-striped dungarees, empty his urine bucket, and take his turn as a dishwasher like any ordinary prisoner. But the yarns of Alfred's volunteering to work in Landsberg's blacksmith shop, matching his great-grandfather's feet at the anvil, and turning out magnificent wrought-iron candlesticks for the altar where fellow prisoners prayed for National Socialists executed here by the Americans — those tales are sheer nonsense, and with his typical candor he once admitted it to me:

Striped garb, cells, chamber pots and KP were disagreeable, but he and those who shared his imprisonment agree now that it was unexpectedly pleasant. The warden and Krupp hit it off at once; ten years after Krupp's release they were still exchanging Christmas cards. No one in the fortress ate *Bunkersuppe*. Quite the contrary — the food was far better than the rations in the town. Apart from an occasional shift in the laundry or kitchen, Alfred's time was his own. For the first time since his arrest in Villa Hügel he could chain-smoke Camels all day long. The prison library was stocked with books and newspapers in several languages, paper and ink

Hoher Kommissar John J. McCloy



SECHSUNDZWANZIG

were available, and usually he read novels or wrote. "Landsberg," Fritz von Bülow was to recall, "was one long sunlit holiday."²

Krupp wrote his first letter in the medieval penitentiary on August 21, 1942, Berlin, it can only be described as a nine-page mistake. He repeated everything he had said at the trial. The House of Krupp had been tried as a symbol ("I suddenly came to take my father's place in the criminal proceedings"); convicting him of looting was unfair because the Hague rules were vague. It was arrogant: Clay was told that he needed but to reflect that Alfred's firm consisted of well over seventy companies, of which one alone — the Cusstahlfabrik — comprised nearly a hundred factories, and he would realize that these other matters "were trifles to the Krupp Konzern." The prosecution witnesses had lied. The Nazis in Berlin had been to blame for the mistreatment of foreign workers. However, if excesses had been committed by Kruppianer, "I simply cannot grasp the fact that my staff and I are to bear criminal responsibility for excesses committed by individual subordinate members of this large organization." The only explanation was a "biased and prejudiced" tribunal. Therefore Krupp demanded that Clay disavow the verdict, release him at once, and quash the "unlawful" confiscation of his property.³

It was not a plea likely to win the sympathy of a gray-eyed Georgian who had reservations even about American tycoons. Alfred's greatest error, however, was in writing it at all. Nuremberg apocrypha to the contrary, convicted defendants had recourse to an appellate body, and Krupp's letter, which no lawyer would have sanctioned, constituted an appeal by a prisoner acting as his own attorney. The general, taking it as such, turned it over to his review panel: Judge J. Warren Madden, Alvin Rockwell, and Colonel John Raymond, who subsequently became deputy legal adviser to the State Department. For seven months they pored over the transcript and documents, appraising the evidence against Alfred and Fritz von Bülow, who had sent a similar letter to APO 742. Acting on their recommendations, the military governor "in all respects confirmed" their jail sentences on April 1, 1949, and went out of his way to issue a statement declaring that in his opinion the full evidence of the trial would provide history with "an unparalleled record of how greed and avarice, in unscrupulous hands, bring destruction and misery to the world." The general modified the judgment in but one respect. Disposal of Krupp's various holdings was to be handled by the various American, British, French, and Russian zone commanders. General Clay later explained to this writer, "There was no other solution, as our courts had jurisdiction only in our zone of occupation."⁴

This exhausted Krupp's legal remedies. He had been tried and been convicted, had appealed and been rejected. The one recourse left was pardon, which seemed preposterous. Other Nazis had been hanged for

smaller crimes; even now twenty-eight of his fellow prisoners, including the SS officers who had permitted the shooting of seventy-one unarmed American POW's near Malmédy during the Battle of the Bulge, wore red jackets which marked them for the rope. In Washington Senator Joseph McCarthy was waging a one-man crusade for the Malmédy convicts, charging that they had been "treated brutally to extort confessions," but not even McCarthy spoke up for Krupp. Indeed, support for forfeiture of his property was strong in Congress; on February 28, 1949, a delegation of senators headed by James E. Murray of Montana presented Clay with a "Memorandum in Support of Affirmance of Property Confiscation Decree." Any U.S. proconsul who ignored his own appeals court and the Hill would have provoked a violent storm at home, and it is hard to see how he could have survived it.⁵

Yet nothing really happened. The Austrians had reclaimed the Bernsdorferwerk, the Russians had seized the Gussowwerk; but those shops would have changed hands had Alfred never been tried. Virtually all of Alfred's factories, mines, and ore fields lay in the British zone. General Clay had notified his British counterpart of the confiscation decree. There was no reply. French industry had irrefutable claims against Krupp. The French general also was silent. There was no way to touch Krupp assets in neutral countries, but certainly his shares in American corporations were available, and his legal staff today confirms that no one reached for them. This is not to suggest an international conspiracy of financiers in behalf of a humbled capitalist. A more sensible explanation is that the Konzern's affairs were so tangled, and so many vital records were missing, that the only feasible course seemed to be to leave everything under military trusteeship until the skein could be unraveled.

Once each month Berthold called at Landsberg with a fat briefcase. In theory the one Rühl firm entitled to a German management was the Guthehoffnungsgüte that Friedrich Krupp had gambled away a century and a half earlier. In practice the English devoted their energies to dismantling, and let Germans act as custodians. Essen's custodianship rapidly took on the character of a shadow management. With his elder brother's approval, Berthold headed a *Familienrat*. Each director in Landsberg had appointed a deputy before leaving Nuremberg; guided by the long arm in Landsberg, the deputies planned reconstruction and a renewal of production. Now and then there was a flare-up between them and the red tabs in the Essener Hof. Once Major General William A. Bishop discharged Paul Hansen for "fomenting anti-British feeling." Next day Hansen was back. As dismantlement mastermind he was indispensable to Bishop.⁶

Without Krupp, Kruppdom (*Krupp-Reich*) languished. Apprentice training and locomotive repair continued; the rest was busywork. Even with dismantling at its peak, a profitable line of peacetime production

could have been started. Though lacking machines, the firm retained its social capital — the skills of its workmen, the craftsmanship of its engineers, the organizational ability of its supervisors. But the Konzenhert was missing. At the time this seemed an ill wind. In the long run there was good in it for him. His martyrdom contributed to his stature as a full-fledged "real Krupp," the equal of Alfred, Fritz, and Gustav. Tilo von Wilmowsky's pamphlet, *Warum wurde Krupp verurteilt*, dashed off after his nephew's conviction, argued that Alfred's slaves actually owed their lives to him; if it hadn't been for Krupp, they would have perished in gas ovens. Karl Otto Saur was dismissed as an upstart with "boorish manners" (*Fuhrrechtmanieren*). The baron scathingly dismissed the prosecution's last witness as "This man, who truly embodied the 'slave labor program' of the men in power in Germany (*Dieser Mann, der das 'Sklavenerbeitsprogramm' der deutschen Machthaber wirklich verkörperte*), and who should have exchanged roles with the accused — this man again did his worst against his victims, just as he had done under Hitler."

How Saur, a technician with no responsibility for manpower, could have been held responsible for the Sauckel-Krupp *Menschenrigiden*, was ignored. Yet he may have come to regret his June 8, 1948, testimony in the Justizpalast. After a brief stab at setting up an office in Munich as consulting engineer, he dropped out of sight. Essen workmen whose evidence had damaged their *Chef* similarly vanished: even Gerhardt Marquardt, Kurt Schneider, and Fritz Niemann, the three men who had helped the escaping Roth sisters and their companions, disappeared. The baron was believed by every *Kruppbreue* German when he justified the shocking history of the Berthawerk by writing, "Gustav Krupp and his associates did not favor the plan, since they wished to maintain the Essen works as the principal center of production." It had been Alfred, of course, not his father, who had been responsible for carrying out plans for the Silesian factory. And the whole point of the construction had been to provide an *Ausweichbetrieb*, an evacuation plant, should RAF bombing completely destroy the Gusstahlabnk. Tilo ignored that. He even insisted that "during the whole time needed for the building and commissioning of the works, the Krupp firm was made to feel the weight of Hitler's order and the constant pressure of the Munitions Ministry."

Isolated at Marienthal, the baron could not have known that the Munitions Ministry had felt the full weight of Alfred Krupp, backed by the Führer — that he was writing black and calling it white. Blinded by grief over the humbling of his nephew, he insisted that "Refusal to employ foreign workers would have been a public demonstration of protest; it would have amounted to suicide" (*sie wäre einem Selbstmord gleichgekommen*) — this in the teeth of Nuremberg testimony about manufacturers who had declined drafts from Sauckel's pool and had gone un-

punished. To Tilo any rumor, however baseless, or any charge, however unsubstantiated, was welcome provided it helped him clear his wife's family name. Thus he didn't even attempt to cope with documents revealing Gustav's, and then Alfred's, participation in party leadership. To him they were merely two more victims of Nazism, and he adopted Alfred's explanation for the tribunal's miscarriage of justice: "The judges were obviously so influenced by the 'Krupp Legend' that it was inconceivable to them that this industrial concern, blessed as it was with the myth of omnipotence, could have been under the thumb of the National Socialist leaders (*der Gewalt der nationalsozialistischen Machthaber*), just as every other concern was."

At APO 742 Tilo's distortions were ignored. He had ended his pamphlet with a quotation from Lincoln: "Nothing is settled until it is justly settled." American occupation authorities agreed, and were now preparing a 1,339-page volume of trial excerpts, in German, to be deposited in the libraries of all three western zones. This would set the record straight, correct the baron's flagrant errors, and tell the *Volk* what had really happened and what Alfred's crimes had been. Unfortunately they miscalculated. The book might have contributed much to that, but it was never given a chance. Clay's successor, feeling that it would damage German-American friendship, suppressed it.⁸ Thus the only book-length version of Krupp's trial available in Germany has been, and at this writing still is, his uncle's expanded account.



"*Herr Krupp brütel Tag und Nacht über seine Geschäfte*," a fellow prisoner wrote home: "Herr Krupp broods day and night over his business." It was a minority opinion. "*Die Zeit schwindet ihm unter den Händen*," one closer to him recalled afterward: "Time passed swiftly." That seems closer to the truth. To be sure, Krupp was lonely. The visits of his mother, brother and uncle were infrequent, and prolonged confinement produces a spiritual malaise all its own. Still, the core of strength and pride was untouched. His letters to Anneliese Bahr, inquiring about their son, were polite but impersonal; when Anneliese came to Landsberg he received her courteously without attempting to renew closer ties. His correspondence with one of her friends was warmer. Unknown to Anneliese, a sophisticated, aggressive, kittenish blonde whom he had met as Vera Hossenfeldt during his youth had begun writing Alfred on her own. Something in her letters touched a chord in him, and he responded, but a convict under a twelve-year sentence, with highly uncertain prospects, has little to offer any woman. Though isolation was a hardship, he had resolved to endure it without dreaming idle dreams or deteriorating. Any sign of weakness would be capitulation. He must remain strong. He had refused to

beg in his letter to General Clay, and when offered a look at the world outside seventeen months later he spurned it.

The occasion was his father's death. On January 16, 1950, Gustav moved his head on the pillow for the last time; Bertha, holding his hand, felt it grow cold. The funeral presented extraordinary problems, for at first no one could think where to put the old man. The family plot at Kettwig Gate was now part of Essen's new Hauptbahnhof. Blübnbach was still in American hands; and Viennese officials who might have been helpful did not share Germany's awe of the dynasty. Clearly advice from the head of the House was needed. The family was still in disarray. Harald, now in a VIP prison outside Moscow, had been told four years earlier by a Red Army officer that Gustav was dead, and now, to his utter confusion, another officer gave him the same message. The baron heard the news from an anonymous telephoner. Berthold received a wire from his mother and immediately dispatched another wire to Alfred, who went to the warden.

It was true, the warden said. He expressed his condolences while the tall convict stood rigid; then Alfred asked whether he might be released to help his mother. The warden checked with superior authority. It was possible, he replied, provided Krupp was accompanied at all times by a tight security guard. Krupp spun about and departed the office. That left the distressing problem of burial with Berthold, who reached the coaching inn later in the day. Bertha, exhausted by over five years of bedside nursing, was in no condition to make decisions. Somehow the innkeeper who seemed inappropriate; Gustav, the nineteenth-century social climber who had reached the top rung, would have been indignant. Under pressure to do something, Berthold ordered cremation in Salzburg. "Really," he sighed afterward, "it was the only way." It was, yet in those years the family was spared nothing. As the crematorium's squat trolley was wheeled toward the flames, a *Life* magazine photographer darted up, snapping a frame which was to be reproduced around the world within a week.¹⁰

The widow and her son left with the filled urn. What to do with it? Berthold's temporary quarters in Essen? They didn't belong to him. A safe deposit box? No; rumors would spread, unfortunate conclusions might be drawn. Besides, Bertha insisted that there be a service. Suddenly Berthold smacked his forehead with the heel of his hand. *Verdammt! Idiot!* Why hadn't he thought of it before? There was Obergronbach, a small Bohemian estate in Baden. No one lived on it; the ashes could go there. Again Alfred was informed, again he asked permission to leave, and again, upon being told that he must submit to a plainclothes escort, he stalked away. The internment ceremony, therefore, was almost unattended. SS cremation excepted, it would be hard to conceive of a burial less like the state funeral the old man would have wanted. But then, he had died at a bad time.

Telford Taylor had predicted that Gustav's death would signal an attack on the confiscation verdict. Kranzbühler couldn't miss such an obvious

opportunity, and sure enough, within a week Bertha claimed the dynastic fortune, estimated by her and her attorneys at well over 500 million dollars. The German public, which had never heard of the Lex Krupp, now learned through a brief news broadcast that Hitler had apparently issued an unusual decree at Frau Krupp's request and that she was now asking the conquerors to set it aside. Perplexed, they heard that according to her the law

... which established her son Alfred as the sole heir and proprietor is unlawful since it was issued by the Führer in violation of the law of the land [. . . ihren Sohn Alfred als einzigen Erben und Eigentümer eingesetzt, sei ungültig, da der Führer sie in Verletzung des Gesetzes erlassen habe]. She petitioned the occupation authorities to disinherit her imprisoned son and to permit her and her other children to share the legacy. Alfred's brothers and sisters support the plea.¹¹

There was no reply. Krupp couldn't even be disowned by his own mother. Disgusted, he returned to his newspapers and his exquisite view of the river Lech. Both had become unexpectedly engrossing. By now he had been locked up for almost five years. The last time he had looked upon the Reich he had seen total ruin. Nine out of every ten German plants had been still. There had been no telephone wires, no mail, no drugs for the maimed soldiers and civilians jamming the hospitals. The mighty Rhine had been barred by 754 sunken barges in the American zone alone, the railway system crippled by 885 bombed railroad bridges, the roads made impassable by demolished highway bridges beyond number. Since then less than half a decade had passed, yet the fabulous Fatherland was roaring again. Peering down, Krupp could see brightly painted barges, sparking with brass fittings, plying the Lech. If they were here, they must be on the Rhine and the Ruhr, too. The road along the shore was thick with shiny new cars whose pictures he had seen, and not quite believed, in the prison library—Volkswagens, Opels, Kapitans, and Mercedes-Benzes darting past enormous triple-trailer-trucks bearing goods to market. Landsberg's men were smoking long Havana cigars, Landsberg's women were chic and nyloned, Landsberg's boys were sturdy and tough, roughhousing in gleaming *Lederhosen*.¹²

The Germany Krupp had left was gone forever, altered past recall by momentous events. Outside, his countrymen were talking of West Germany's "economic miracle" (*Wirtschaftswunder*) and of the country itself as an "economic wonderland" (*Wirtschaftswunderland*). Marvellous changes had been wrought everywhere. A few figures are revealing. In five years the nation's gross national product was up 70 percent, exports had multiplied sevenfold, and credits were higher than in any other European state. For every new house built in France, the Germans had built eight;

they were now putting up nearly a half-billion homes a year. In heavy industry the French were rapidly falling behind. German coal production had doubled, steel production had increased from 2,500,000 tons a year to 11,000,000 — and would have soared even higher if the Allies hadn't insisted upon that as a ceiling. Powered by the germ cell of the Ruhr, the truncated Reich had surpassed the economic peak of 1936, Hitler's best year, and the manufacture of radios, automobiles, and hardware was roughly twice as great as in that year. Unemployment was down to 3.5 percent and shrinking. In defeat the Volk were realizing all the promises the Führer had failed to redeem. Already Germany was neck and neck with the United Kingdom in the renewed race for economic supremacy. And all this, it must be remembered, was being accomplished with 30 percent of the old Deutsches Reich in Soviet hands.¹³

What was the explanation? *U.S. News and World Report* wrote that "In West Germany, under a system of free enterprise, fortunes are being made by many." Fortunes were being made — "The Mercedes," ran a popular slogan, "is the Volkswagen of the Ruhr" — but the Schlotbarone who drove them would have been annoyed by the suggestion that their new prosperity owed anything to what they scorned as "*Freie Wirtschaft*." Undoubtedly, Ludwig Erhardt had something to do with it. The Minister of Economics was no more a champion of *laissez-faire* than Schacht had been, however; his great contributions were government-backed credits and liberal tax concessions for manufacturers. And useful as his intervention was, Secretary of State Byrnes's successor dwarfed it when, on June 5, 1947, he mounted the commencement podium in Harvard Yard and invited western Europe to join the United States in a massive bootstrap operation. Through the Marshall Plan, the European Recovery Program, and other money-colored funnels, four billion dollars were to be infused into the parched economy of the Reich. Once the *Wirtschaftswunder* had been accomplished, most of its beneficiaries adopted the same attitude as Gustav Krupp's toward the Dawes Plan of the 1920's. That was understandable; they were proud, and they had been hurt. A young Speer protégé who briefly flourished in the Wonderland told Charles Thayer, "We in the Ruhr didn't see much of it. Perhaps you should have hired better public relations men to tell us about all your help." A steelmaker remarked to this writer, "Marshall had nothing to do with it. This was a German miracle." A chemical manufacturer said, "We got back on our feet because we worked hard. ERP had little to do with it."¹⁴

Although \$4,000,000,000 must have had something to do with it, the *Wirtschaftswunderland* wasn't created by the dollar alone. It sprang from many sources. One, beyond question, was the powerful Teutonic urge to dominate the continent. Germans had always been born toolers, and now they drove themselves harder than ever. Another source, though the Ruhr

barons hotly deny it, was the American breakup of cartels, which cleared the way for bright upstarts. At the same time, the Germans, disqualified from the Cold War, were freed from the dead weight of military budgets. The French contribution to NATO was several billions a year, British defense absorbed over 10 percent of the U.K. national product, but there wasn't a single German in uniform.

Paradoxically, the defeated industrialists had emerged from the smog of 1945 with one unnoticed but vital asset. Though their factories had been reduced to twisted steel and powdered masonry, their stocks of machine tools were intact. These heavy duty instruments, essential to peacetime production, had been augmented by the Führer's great aggressive thrusts. At the time of Munich, Germany had had 1,281,000 of them. When the Reich collapsed, the machine tool inventory in the U.S., British, and French zones had actually risen to 2,216,000. During six years of victories and defeats the potential productive strength of the Ruhr had, in other words, doubled. In Essen, Alfred's deputies hid his model of the *Prinz Eugen* from their British keepers on the roof of the Hauptverwaltunggebäude. To them it was a reminder of the glorious cruise of February 11-12, 1942, when Krupp's mighty warship sailed unmolested up the English Channel in broad daylight — "Nothing more mortifying to the pride of sea power has happened in home waters since the seventeenth century," *The Times* of London had written — and for some unreformed Kruppianer it suggested the possibility of even greater glory to come. But that was sheer bravado. Tools weren't exposed on the roof. They were housed in insulated vaults, greased lovingly twice a week, and hoarded against the day when *die Firma*, like other Ruhr concerns, would be allowed to use them.¹⁵

Though full tribute must be paid to Teuton vitality and Teuton craftsmanship, the economic wonder of the late 1950's was largely spawned by external forces. Some were economic. The Ruhrgebiet was indispensable to an exhausted continent struggling toward salvation. Britain feared German competition. But Englishmen were hungry, too, and London couldn't justify the export of food to Bremen and Hamburg because Germans were prohibited from earning their own keep. The Dutch were caught in a different bind. With the Reich prostrate, the port of Rotterdam was functioning at less than half of capacity. The same was true of Antwerp and Norwegian merchant ships, and Swedish mines and the Belgian pits which had provided casting sand for Kruppstahl were deserted. Even the Swiss were caught: without their largest German customer, vast electric power stations stood idle. Desperately trying to fend off protests from the Low Countries, Scandinavia, and the Alps, Allied experts attempted to develop light industries in the inner Ruhr. It was no use. Textile and consumer goods factories were unsuitable for the anvil. It was a forge, not a spindle.¹⁶

The barons knew this. They were fully aware of Europe's need for them. It entitled them to a place at the bargaining table, and the strength of their position grew as the Cold War temperature plunged. Byrnes's Stuttgart speech had been the first straw on the rising wind. The second appeared the following March, when Herbert Hoover's economic mission to Germany and Austria, reporting to President Truman, criticized disarming and the restriction of Ruhr production. In April the Moscow Conference ended in a dismaying uproar, revealing to the entire world the unbridgeable gulf between Stalin and his former allies. Then came the Berlin blockade, the airlift, the fascinating change in GI and Tommy attitudes toward the beaten Reich ("they" became "we") and the shift in international alliances which provided an outlet for pent-up energy and skills.¹⁷

The western powers did not end their state of war until 1951, the year Washington also reversed its attitude toward Krupp. But diplomatic rituals always lag far behind events. If one were to choose a single day which marked the beginning of the new Germany, it would be May 12, 1949. That morning the Russians, defeated by the airlift, ended their long blockade, and even as the first trucks and trains from the west entered the capital General Clay flew from there to a historic Frankfurt conference. Since September seventy Germans without Nazi pasts had been meeting in a commandeered girls' normal school in Bonn, drafting the constitution for a new nation. Clay worked out the final details, approved it, and then left for home and retirement. Three months later Bonn held elections; Konrad Adenauer became the first German chancellor since Adolf Hitler's suicide over four years before. As a gesture of faith in the new country, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom ended military government. In the future each victor would be represented by a high commissioner.¹⁸

"The tide," Fritz von Bülbow later said, "had turned." Though Krupp would remain in Landsberg Fortress for another year and a half, the momentum of events was building rapidly. Essen myth to the contrary, he had made no contribution to the *Wirtschaftswunder*, but the change in the continent's political and economic climate had altered his own prospects immensely. Later, talking to a writer about it, he observed,

In what is unfortunately called the miracle, there is really nothing miraculous. First, the Germans learned after the First World War that they could come back from defeat. This lesson inspired us constantly, until we too recovered again. Hard work was the chief factor [*Der Hauptfaktor war harte Arbeit*]. This time we had to start from the bottom, and we had to drive ourselves even more relentlessly. The Marshall Plan and other American aid gave us a shot in the arm. Another lift was political. We could rise again while the wartime anti-German coalition broke up and the united effort to persecute Germany was abandoned. But there was

another guide to lead us over the mountain. We had good luck — don't underestimate our good luck [*wir hatten viel Glück — unterschätzen Sie das Glück nicht!*]. Add all these things together and you have recovery — but not a miracle.¹⁹

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Luck revealed itself to him with *kolossal* impudence. In the hundred years since Alfred Krupp had nervously unveiled his glittering steel field gun in Hyde Park's Crystal Palace, only one weapon had crossed steel with *Waffenschmiede* products and hopelessly routed them — Russia's T-34. Guderian had credited it with stopping his drive on Tula and Moscow; in the ghastly crucible of the Kursk salient it had shattered Alfred's last great shield. Memories of it still haunted his dreams, though in the womb of American imprisonment he was gradually learning to forget it. Yet it still existed in large numbers, nursing itself from fuel nozzles in vast Siberian armor parks, and its low, menacing silhouette was about to reenter his life.²⁰

At eight o'clock German time Saturday evening, June 24, 1950 (he was playing skat at the time), the T-34 was the same tank — 32 tons, broad-treaded, protected by exceptionally thick steel plate and mounting an 85-mm. cannon and two 7.62-mm. machine guns. Eight p.m. in Landsberg was four o'clock the following morning in Korea. There the calendar read Sunday, June 25, though no one on the northern side of the thirty-eighth parallel could read it; a North Korean general named Chai Ung Jun had ordered total blackout. In darkness and scattered rain General Chai, having received a green light from Premier Kim Il Sung and his Soviet advisers, had just deployed 150 T-34's and 90,000 men across the parallel in a forty-mile arc. On the clocks of world capitals it was wartime again.²¹ Chai's tanks were headed for Seoul, and for the House of Krupp they had abruptly become the most auspicious weapons since Alfred's breech-loaders blew Louis Napoleon's Second Empire into oblivion at Sedan. Four generations of Kruppiener, describing that golden day on the Meuse, had told their apprentice sons, "*Wenn Deutschland blüht, blüht Krupp*" (whenever Germany flourishes, Krupp flourishes). Now Alfred's private economic miracle was about to appear, and all because of an ugly spread of squat-hulled Bolshevik monsters manned by Asian *Untermenschen* on the opposite side of the globe. That was insolent of luck, a crude joke. But of course the convict whose cell door swings wide doesn't inquire into the politics of the locksmith.

The one principal in the Krupp story who denies that the locksmith's name was Chai is John J. McCloy, who, by taking over as America's high commissioner exactly eleven months earlier, had inherited General Clay's powers. Short, brisk, and blunt, the New York banker insists that he turned the key. "There's not a goddamn word of truth in the charge that

Krupp's release was inspired by the outbreak of the Korean War," he snaps. "No lawyer told me what to do, and it wasn't political. It was a matter of my conscience." No sensible man differs lightly with John McCloy. He is, deservedly, among the most respected men in public life, and no one who knows him would challenge his integrity. It was slanderous to traduce him because he had favored a moderate demazification policy while in the War Department, or to hint that German businessmen were turning the new *Hoher Kommissar's* head with flattery.²²

McCloy was his own man. He was, moreover, a superb choice for the new post in Frankfurt. As a captain in World War I he had served with the AEF occupation forces at Coblenz. Though he had little courtroom experience, he held a law degree and was responsible for the Hague conviction, twenty years later, of Germany's Black Tom saboteurs of 1916. A world traveler, he knew Europe almost as well as any European; a skilled negotiator, he engineered the collaboration between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle in the spring of 1943, and he was certainly better qualified to administer the American zone than anyone in the State Department. His character was above reproach, his abilities matchless. He was not, however, infallible. As we shall presently see, the record suggests that he really hadn't much to do with the Krupp decision, and no man, not even a John J. McCloy, could remain untouched by the cyclone that blew out of Korea in the second half of 1950.²³

It was far graver than the Berlin confrontation. Less than five years after the capitulation of the Japanese Empire, the western powers, led by the United States, were once more fighting a major war. Washington was peering out across both oceans, for the bulk of western military strength was tied down in the occupation of Germany. That was the fulcrum, and everyone knew it. "There had to be a change in the U.S. attitude toward Nuremberg," Otto Kranzbühler said afterward, while Benjamin Ferencz, who had sat across the chilly Justizpalast room from Kranzbühler, said, "At that time there was a sense of panic about the Russians, a feeling that there was an urgent need for an understanding with the Germans. McCloy couldn't detach himself from that atmosphere." The *New York Times* pointed out that "reviving Ruhr industry and holding down the industrialists" were conflicting goals. Overnight a major gear of the Marshall Plan shifted into reverse. Its original drafters had specified that not a dollar from it could be spent on defense. Now Washington told European capitalists that the larger their military budgets, the greater their share in ERP would be. Above all loomed the urgent question of the partitioned Reich. The British high commissioner, General Sir Brian Robertson, declared privately, "We must get Germany committed."²⁴

"For the Germans," T. H. White later wrote, the Asian conflict "brought quick, complete and unconditional profit. . . . The post-Korea

boom drew German industry back into the world markets at such prices that it was able to re-equip huge sectors of its run-down plant." The Schlotbarone also brought new strength to the bargaining table, which may puzzle Americans since grown accustomed to seventy-billion-dollar defense budgets and a gigantic military establishment. It wasn't baffling then. It was a grim symptom of a grimmer reality. In June 1950 the three western allies held West Germany with seven undermanned divisions. Across the zonal frontier stood twenty-two Red Army divisions backed by Walter Ulbricht's new East German army. All Soviet satellites were under arms and equipped with artillery and T-34s. The Free World, as it was now known, was defended by a thin line of riflemen. The supplies which should have backed them had been sold as war surplus or steel scrap. It is a caustic fact that when NATO asked Paris for its order of battle, the embarrassed French replied that they could contribute but two weak divisions, one of whose regiments was armed with obsolete Krupp tanks — the same model which had been chewed into junk by Russian armor. But France couldn't even field her Tigers. They lacked spare parts.²⁵

Spare parts had once been available at the *Hauptverwaltungsbäude*. And the Germans, her former enemies in the West suddenly remembered, had almost defeated the Soviet Union single-handed. As 1950 waned and the seething Korean front disintegrated under the weight of Chinese manpower, Pentagon strategists grappled with the question of what to do with two rediscovered factors: Germany's martial prowess and the Prussian militaristic tradition. In war a symbol can be more effective than an army corps. To the Ruhr, Professor Pounds wrote, "Krupp became a legend. Essen owed its existence as an industrial city to him, and even in 1950 the legend had political significance." Thus the complex interweaving of Ruhr politics, NATO requirements, and shifting military fortunes eight time zones away combined in a plural theme which, though unnoticed at the time, seems startlingly clear in retrospect.²⁶

That summer the terror spread by North Korean armor was so great that, according to the U.S. Army's official historian, "prepared demolitions were not blown, roadblocks were erected but not manned, and obstacles were not covered by fire." In September, however, the United Nations command was holding the dreaded T-34's at bay on the Pusan perimeter by a desperate combination of arms — electrically operated 3.5-inch aluminum bazookas, Corsair strafers carrying napalm and 500-pound bombs, and a tank collection comprising M-26 Shermans, M-46 Pattons, and M-43 Shermans which provided a five-to-one superiority. Heartened, the U.N. commander made his end run at Inchon and then, disregarding warnings from India, advanced toward the Yalu. Late in October, Peking entered the war, attacking Australian and Scottish battalions on the western side of the Taeyong River. Britain, France, and the U.S. promptly tore up West Germany's 11,000,000-ton steel limit and urged the barons to go all out in

the fight against Communism. (At that time Allied engineers doubted that the Ruhr's old-fashioned methods could yield more than 13,500,000 tons a year at most. They didn't know Alfred Krupp and the new generation of smokestack barons. It is a tribute to their genius that within eleven months of Alfred's release the Germans would be pouring the full 13,500,000, that within two years they would add another million, and that the year after that they would hit 18,000,000 tons.)²⁷

On November 21, 1950, Douglas MacArthur sighted the Yalu. Ten days later Alfred held his first Direktorium meeting since the fall of the Third Reich. To be sure, he was still a convict. But four Chinese armies had just begun a full-scale offensive; suddenly MacArthur was in full retreat, and the Landsberg warden set aside a large room for Konzern business. Executives came down from Essen accompanied by representatives of the firm's legal staff. Conferences were held regularly in the prison from then on:

Herr Krupp would sit at the head of the table flanked by his directors [*Herr Krupp sass am Ende des Tisches, mit seinen Direktoren auf beiden Seiten*]. Some of them would smoke American cigars or peel oranges or bananas sent in from outside while they soberly discussed production figures and financial statements.²⁸

The evacuation of 205,000 U.N. personnel by sea from Hungnam was begun in December. Simultaneously, representatives of the western powers, meeting in Brussels, chose Dwight D. Eisenhower as supreme commander of the Western European Defense Force; the three high commissioners were instructed to raise a German army. Returning from Belgium, they summoned Chancellor Adenauer to the Petersberger Hof — the snow-white villa directly across the Rhine from Bonn where Chamberlain had betrayed Czechoslovakia to Hitler before the formalities in Munich — and pleaded with him to help them recruit a new German striking force. It was the first time they greeted the chancellor hat in hand, and the last time he was to be beckoned to the Petersberger Hof. Each three weeks for the past year and a half he had promptly reported and received his instructions. All that had been washed away by the blood in the Yalu. West Germany was essentially sovereign. The West's decision to rearm her had not been unanimous; both France and England had at first recoiled from it. But the United States had insisted, and since Americans were doing 58 percent of the dying in Korea, Whitehall and the Quai d'Orsay had submitted to Washington's steamroller, expertly driven by *Hoher Kommissar der Vereinigten Staaten* John J. McCloy.²⁹

On January 4, 1951, the week the Reds retook Seoul, the United States commissioner resolved upon another step. "It is better to abandon a whole

province than to divide an army," Schlieffen had written, and with abandonment of the Ruhr now unthinkable a united barony had become a matter of some urgency. The smaller manufacturers sorely missed the great Schlottharon. While it would be politically inexpedient for him to preside openly over the production of Pusan-bound steel — indeed, the Control Council's deconcentration decree forbade it — his expertise could be equally effective offstage, and the *Volk*, grasping the significance of the act, would cheer it and turn more firmly westward.

Krupp himself saw the design. It may even be said that he shared in it. Calling him a consultant would be going too far, but he certainly held one of the highest security clearances of any convict in penal history. The red-striped denim he donned each dawn had become a droll costume. The homburg, though invisible, was back on his head. He had known the outcome of the Brussels conference before it met; in November he had been quietly informed of Washington's determination to see a new German sword forged. His discharge, he was told in confidence, was "only a question of a short time." His brother Berthold and Otto Kranzbühler had also heard from privileged sources that a proclamation of clemency was being prepared. They hoped to have him out by Christmas, and though that proved impossible, he and his staff celebrated the imminent decree with a discreet Christmas feast. The diners dallied long at the table, rising at approximately the same hour that the last elements of the First Marine Division's rearguard were debarking from Hungnam.³⁰

McCloy's Frankfurt aides had decided to keep the clemency timetable from Alfred until forty hours before the fortress gates swung open. However, shortly after the New Year rumors, verification, and even details began to reach all the inmates. There was to be a general amnesty; twenty-one of the twenty-eight men in War Crimes Prison Number One who had been condemned to death, including all who had been convicted of the Malmédy murders, were to shed their red jackets. Krupp would not only regain his freedom; he would be rich again. To be sure, the British needed time to evacuate Villa Hügel, and occupation authorities counted on the reinstated Konzernherr to sell his coal and steel holdings to another German industrialist as part of the decartelization program. Meanwhile the hearths, mines, ore fields, and seventy-odd enterprises worth a half-billion dollars would once more be his.

In Washington Senator Joseph McCarthy nodded and smiled. "Extremely wise," he commented.³¹

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So sensitive to history are twentieth-century soldiers and statesmen that research can usually pinpoint the place, and frequently the exact time, when great decisions were reached. A culling of a translator's notes, for example, reveals that the Munich Pact was signed at a few minutes past

1 a.m., September 30, 1938, in the Führerhaus on the Bavarian capital's baroque Königsplatz. NATO was conceived on the evening of December 16, 1947, in the home of the United Kingdom's foreign minister at 22 Carlton Terrace, London, after Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov had spat Nyet a hundred times and flown off angrily. U.S. soldiers first collided with North Korean troops at precisely 8:16 a.m., July 5, 1950, just north of Osan. But there are exceptions to the rule of access. The public has never been told where or when the Truman administration resolved to unshelve German bayonets once again, or who recommended it, and no scholar has yet fixed responsibility — the who, when, where, why, and how — for John J. McCloy's momentous repudiation of a distinguished Nuremberg tribunal and General Lucius Clay. We have the version which was circulated by occupation authorities. It is worthless. Under scrutiny it proves to be fatally flawed, a fragile cover story that shatters the instant anyone leans upon it.³²

One of the first leaners was Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt. Disturbed by the reports from Landsberg, she wrote the high commissioner, "Why are we freeing so many Nazis?" In his reply McCloy explained that he had "inherited these cases from General Clay, who, for one reason or another, had been unable to dispose of them." He informed her he had received "many letters and petitions" asking him to set aside the Nuremberg rulings — in the light of the tribunal's blizzard of organized mail, this was probably an understatement — and that he considered it "a fundamental principle of American justice that accused persons shall have a final right to be heard. . . ." So it is. That was why the general had appointed his appellate board, which, after sifting the entire record, had advised him that there was no reason to show mercy. Later the commissioner told this writer that Clay, in transferring authority to him, referred to Landsberg and said, "This is a hell of a job." It was a reasonable remark; he was passing along responsibility for the lives of nearly thirty men whose death sentences could be changed to life imprisonment by a squiggle of the pen. State governors frequently spare the condemned. But they rarely pardon prisoners, and they never appoint an appellate court to review the decision of another appellate court. They can't; it is illegal. Yet that is what McCloy did. In police idiom he was "acting on information received." But it was information solicited by a Clemency Board he appointed because, he told Eleanor Roosevelt, "unlike criminal cases in the United States and England there was no provision for further court review of these cases for possible errors of law or of fact after the court of first instance passed upon them."

The commissioner's correspondence strongly suggests that he was unaware that precisely such a review had been conducted by Judge Madden, Mr. Rockwell, and Colonel Raymond.³³

General Clay's appellate board had convened in Germany. Commissioner McCloy's first met in Washington three months before the out-

break of Korean hostilities. The appointment of its members on March 20, 1950, is, as McCloy rightly points out, irrefutable evidence that his decision to pore over the verdicts was wholly unrelated to the new war. It does not attest that the war and its catastrophes had no effect on the judgment of the members, however; it does not even prove that some cases were not glossed over and new ones introduced. To be sure, that would have been unusual. Yet everything about this second review was unusual. The commissioner appointed three men with impeccable records: the Honorable David W. Peck, presiding justice of the New York Supreme Court's appellate division; Frederick A. Moran, chairman of the New York Board of Parole; and Brigadier General Conrad E. Snow, assistant legal adviser to the Department of State. He then gave them an impossible task. Clay's attorneys had had seven months to ponder one case. McCloy provided five months for a complete review of all twelve Nuremberg trials which had followed the IMT — that is, a thorough study of the cases against 104 defendants whose collective proceedings had required the equivalent of five judicial years and whose transcripts, exclusive of documents and briefs, were ten times the length of Webster's unabridged dictionary and covered 330,000 pages, a stack of paper 110 feet high.

In Munich the judge, the parole officer, and the brigadier sat for forty days. After reading the twelve verdicts (over 3,000 pages in themselves) they were introduced to "members of the German bar as the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals. This was quickly shored up to the Peck Panel, and under that name the trimvinate opened hearings. When the reviewers reported their findings to the high commissioner on August 28, 1950, they noted that they had examined the judgments, that Moran had interviewed each prisoner in Landsberg, and that fifty lawyers representing ninety defendants had stated their cases before the board. That sounded impressive, sensible, and reasonable. It wasn't. No court of appeals would dream of reversing any judge — and it must be borne in mind that Krupp had been found guilty by three eminent justices from appellate benches — without inviting briefs from both defense and prosecution. In the proceedings before the Peck Panel, counsel for convicted criminals were heard and permitted to file extensive comments. There was no rebuttal. As Telford Taylor pointed out in his own letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, "Even in a clemency proceeding before the governor of any of our states, the views of the district attorney and of the judge who tried the case are invariably obtained and considered. None of these elementary and established practices were observed by Mr. McCloy."³⁴

* With Eleanor Roosevelt's permission, the high commissioner published his letter to her in *Information Bulletin*, the official publication of the American occupation. On June 29, 1951, Taylor, having received the same courtesy from her, asked *Information Bulletin* to follow up by printing his answer to McCloy. The editor, H. Warner Ward, did not even acknowledge receipt of his request. After waiting eleven weeks, Taylor again wrote Ward (September 14), appealing for publication "to correct certain

By the summer of 1950 the prosecution team which had convicted Krupp in 1948 was scattered around the world. General Taylor was preparing to join the new war effort, most of those who had helped him had retired to private practice. The Peck Panel could have written them. It didn't. It could have solicited the views of the tribunal. The justices did not even know their verdict was being questioned. The slighting of fellow countrymen who had sacrificed two years to what they had hoped would become a new code of international law went beyond that, however. By coincidence, one of Nuremberg's senior prosecutors was on the spot during the Peck deliberations. As an army officer in 1945 Benjamin B. Ferencz had entered captured concentration camps while the crematorium ovens were still hot. He had become one of the first members of the War Crimes Commission, and now, five years later, he was still in Germany. His mission, ironically, was restitution of the property of murdered Jews to their heirs — an issue which, had the sanctity of private property been a burning issue in Frankfurt, should have evoked as much official zeal as respect for Krupp's holdings. Learning of the Peck review, Ferencz wrote each member of the triumvirate, explaining that he had been executive counsel to Telford Taylor during the trials and offering his services. He received a curt acknowledgment from the panel's secretary, informing him that the board would let him know if they wanted him. They didn't. Out of curiosity he dropped into the high commissioner's office from time to time during the Peck deliberations. On his first visit, at the very beginning of the new inquiry, he found the records of the Krupp trial. They were packed in crates six feet long and shaped curiously like coffins. Knowing the evidence that lay inside, he kept wondering when the lids would be removed. They never were. After McCloy had freed Alfred, Ferencz called for the last time and saw that not a screw had been turned.³⁵

This is not to suggest that the commissioner regarded his mandate lightly. Scanning the entire record was literally impossible; a top-notch speed reader, absorbing 1,200 words a minute, couldn't get through the Nuremberg transcripts in less than seventeen months. John McCloy was, among other things, responsible for the administration of a third of West Germany. He would have been justified in delegating the entire Landsberg issue to Peck, but he worried about the convicts. Ferencz thought him "generous and kindly, anxious to make a gesture toward the Germans." Whatever pressure he may have felt from Washington, however much he may have been influenced by the slaughter of American youth in Korea, McCloy was genuinely disturbed by the Krupp verdict. "We'd tried him reluctantly," he later told me, "and the confiscation troubled me. I con-

damaging inaccuracies in Mr. McCloy's letter to Mrs. Roosevelt, which you published in your May issue." Once more he was ignored. This gratuitous insult to a general officer of the United States, who had served both the Attorney General and the U.S. Senate as a legal expert, indicates how far the pendulum had swung in the U.S. zone since the rendering of justice at Nuremberg.

sulted my French and British colleagues, and they agreed with me. My feeling — it was a feeling — was that Alfred was a playboy, that he hadn't had much responsibility. I felt that he had expiated whatever he'd done by the time he'd already served in jail. Oh, I don't doubt that he'd supported the Nazis early; he was a weakling."³⁶

Brooding over the 104 convicted men, determined to touch every possible base in the little time he had, the *Hoher Kommissar* personally traveled to Landsberg and talked to many whose future, if any, lay in his hands. ("Some, particularly the generals, were arrogant; they deliberately turned their backs. But others were quite decent. They walked right up and shook hands with me.") For some reason he didn't see Krupp. ("Later we met socially, of course, at cocktail parties.") The confrontation would have been interesting. One cannot imagine a greater contrast in the world of commerce. While both were men with first-class minds, the American was humane, outgoing; the German almost unapproachable. Alfred probably wouldn't have turned his back. It would have been more like him to have stared right through McCloy. Though disappointing to historians, the lack of an encounter did strengthen the commissioner's objectivity. "I went both ways with the Peck Panel," he said years afterward. "Sometimes I was harder than they suggested, sometimes softer. But in Krupp's case their recommendation was unanimous."³⁷

Writing the author long after the event, Judge Peck was, in one letter, extremely hazy about the panel's advice on how to dispose of the Krupp question: "I cannot give you the information requested," he confessed, "because I have no recollection on the subject." This is hardly surprising. Over a hundred convicted war criminals, 3,000 pages of verdicts, pleas and briefs from fifty lawyers speaking a strange tongue, deliberations and the submission of a report in a whirlwind of sessions — it is a wonder that anything came of it, and had the Advisory Board on Clemency been obliged to weigh arguments from the Nuremberg prosecutors, confusing it and shading its convictions with doubt, quite possibly nothing would, in fact, have been achieved. Therefore it is rather marvelous that from that swarming, jabbering, forty-day night court Peck should, in another letter long after the event, have remembered that the name of Alfred Krupp's counsel was Earl J. Carroll.³⁸

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The pariah of Nuremberg, the "alleged attorney" from an "alleged law firm," had made a dazzling comeback. Krupp's legal staff had concluded that he had to have American counsel because the Americans had behaved so queerly since the verdict. Although the U.S. Supreme Court had declared itself incompetent to pass upon it, the threat of confiscation remained as vague as ever; the Konzern seemed destined to spend eternity in

suspended animation. Carroll exuded confidence, he spoke the Peck Panel's language, and he had been retained once more to prepare a writ of appeal and take it to Munich.

Here the waters become exceedingly muddy. According to Carroll's subsequent account, he had told Clay that the confiscation order would "further the Communist design"; now he "took up the matter" with McCloy. McCloy recalls no conference with Carroll, and it is improbable that any such meeting would have advanced his client's cause. To the commissioner the Californian remained unrehabilitated, an expatriate "in bad odor." Carroll dealt not with him, but with the Peck Panel. In the absence of refutation, his arguments doubtless sounded impressive. Passed up to the front office by the panel, they were to form the core of McCloy's public position. Three are typical: (1) Alfred had actually held "a rather junior position" in the firm; (2) under American law, assets may be forfeited only if they have been acquired through illegal acts, which wasn't true of Krupp's prewar capital; and (3) obviously Carroll's client was the victim of discrimination, since he was the only war criminal whose property had been confiscated; Flick and Farben, for example, had retained all their holdings.³⁸

An answering brief would have pointed out that (1) a 1943 intrafirm circular declared that Alfred Krupp had "the full responsibility and direction of the entire enterprise"; (2) the Nuremberg trials had been governed not by American statutes but by a law promulgated by the four-power coalition which had defeated the Third Reich, specifying "forfeiture of property" for men found guilty of war crimes; and (3) Krupp wasn't the only convicted industrialist upon whom this blow had fallen. In the Flick and Farben cases, moreover, the pattern had been different. Slave labor evidence had been far less shocking, and both firms were stock companies. Confiscation there would have been like declaring all General Motors stock void because of management crimes. In Krupp management and ownership had been vested in one man, which made forfeiture just. Here the prosecution might have introduced another question, unmentioned at the time. If the Peck Panel really believed that the Konzernherr hadn't had much to do with the running of his firm, why was it planning to free all his directors with him?³⁹

For five months the panel's recommendations lay on McCloy's desk. World news grew worse and worse. "American troops," a wire service reported, "are taking a terrible beating in Korea from the Chinese Communists, and the U.N. forces, mostly our men, are retreating south of Seoul." General MacArthur asked the Pentagon whether Washington had considered the possibility of being driven out of Korea altogether. On

Capitol Hill the "great debate" over Europe's vulnerability had opened; Senator Robert A. Taft said the President had already "usurped authority" in defending South Korea and had no right to increase American troop strength and arms on the continent. In the public discussion Herbert Hoover added that such an increase would be pointless anyhow; should the Russians plunge into West Germany, we could only harass them from aircraft carriers. On January 17 Peking rejected a new peace appeal from the United Nations and the high commissioner prepared his amnesty statement, to be announced two weeks later.

Krupp didn't know it, but his brother did. Reflecting how far the dynasty had come since the collapse, he felt "at the end of a long winter." Earl J. Carroll was jubilant. In the fall of 1946 he had fled home under the threat of a court-martial. Now he was rich. The size of his Krupp commission is a matter of some dispute, but it was certainly historic. In 1954 a magazine interviewed him and reported that "The terms of Carroll's employment were simple. He was to get Krupp out of prison and get his property restored. The fee was to be 5 percent of everything he could recover. Carroll got Krupp out and his fortune returned, receiving for his five-year job a fee of, roughly, \$25 million." Kurt Schürmann, Friedrich von Batoeki, and Gertrud Stahmer-Knoll, three members of the firm's permanent legal staff, concede that while the fee was "very high," it wasn't that high. They hint at a figure somewhere between two and three million. Foreign correspondents for the *Chicago Daily News* and the *New York Daily News* estimated that Carroll was paid two million and Colonel Robinson, who had joined him in preparing the brief, another two million. On one point there is general agreement: the lawyer wanted his commission in cash. After Alfred's negotiations over the details of restitution two years later, Carroll showed the Ruhr his heels. Some said he retired in Massachusetts; others reported him still in Germany, practicing German law and earning \$100,000 a year. In any event, his relationship with the House of Krupp had ended, though he had served it ably.⁴¹

On Wednesday, January 31, 1951, Radio Frankfurt was describing the plight of a U.S.-French regimental combat team trapped twelve miles north of Yonju when a newscaster broke in with the U.S. High Commissioner's official announcement of war criminal amnesties. McCloy had liquidated Alfred's case by signing two documents, one to release him and the other to restore his property. He said, "I can find no personal guilt in Defendant Krupp to distinguish him above all others sentenced by the Nuremberg courts." Alfred would, of course, remain subject to Allied High Commission Law 27 ("Reorganization of the German Coal, Iron, and Steel Industries"). But all his holdings would be restored to him because, the *Hoher Kommissar* declared, the confiscation of property was "repugnant to our American concepts of justice." Once General Thomas T. Handy, commander in chief of the U.S. European Command, had

* Much later Ravings Ragland commented mordantly, "I daresay that never before has the sole owner of a half-billion-dollar enterprise been described as occupying 'a rather junior position.'" (Ragland to WM 3/19/65.)

countersigned the necessary papers, 101 prisoners would be freed from Landsberg Fortress.⁴²

In Essen, at Wallotstrasse 16, Frau Ewald Löser listened intently as the names were read. Then she wept. Her husband hadn't been among them. Pardon had been withheld from the one anti-Nazi in the firm's management. For reasons no one can explain — McCloy calls it "a dreadful mistake" — the survivor of the Gestapo dungeon was to remain in his Landsberg cell for five more months. Ailing, he was released on June 1 to his wife's care and convalescence in a Recklinghausen hospital.⁴³

* * *

John McCloy had supposed that had he failed to act in the Krupp case, he would have been subjected to severe criticism — that, in his words, there would have been "a hell of a howl if I let the confiscation go through." Why he thought so is puzzling. The howlers had already been heard from. Now they were placated. "McCloy did the only fair and possible thing," Otto Kranzbühler said. Louis Lochner, a strong backer of German industrialists, believed the commissioner's reasoning "clear and cogent"; restitution, in his opinion, was "the moral and American thing to do." And one of the most respected leaders of the SPD thought that "If the Arnis really believe in the sanctity of private property, there was no choice."⁴⁴

He kept his reflections to himself, because leaders of his own party — the largest in Germany — were issuing a statement charging that western capitalists and the Bonn government were plotting to restore "the old managers to politics and economy." They added, "We have now arrived once more at the point where the German catastrophe began." Many of the Reich's recent enemies were in a towering rage. No single act of the occupation created a greater emotional shock than McCloy's rejection of the Krupp verdict. The clumsy way in which the matter had been handled sated the wound. Justice Wilkins, riffling through a Seattle newspaper in his superior court chambers, learned of it from a small wire service item. He wrote McCloy, "As you know, trial judges are very often reversed, but at least they have the opportunity to know the reasons by reading the advance sheets and the reports." In Washington Joseph W. Kaufman, who had served on the prosecution staff, called Alfred's release "appreciated" in confirming the sentences after giving the matter unusually protracted study and deliberation. "Max Mandelraub thought clemency under these circumstances was actually illegal, and in New York Cecelia Goetz bitterly reproached herself for persuading Kruppianer to take the stand against Krupp, believing that now they would be marked for reprisals.

* In August, seventy-eight-year-old Hermann Röckling's verdict of confiscation was reversed; the "Krupp of the Saar" went home to die (NYT 8/21/51).

Elizabeth Roth, whose legacy consisted of a cheap snapshot and the memory of her murdered family, wondered why the right to property should be more sacred than the right to life.⁴⁵

Representative Jacob J. Javits protested to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, requesting that the family be fined its entire fortune for "misdeeds against humanity." The Jewish War Veterans denounced "a disservice to justice." Drew Middleton wrote savagely in the *New York Times*, "Some day the Krupp family will be back in Villa Hügel and the Krupp works will be making all sorts of new weapons with which a new generation of Europeans can be killed. As they are fond of saying in the Ruhr, 'You have to look at these things realistically.'"⁴⁶

That was an American reaction. It was comparatively mild. As an editorial writer noted in the same day's issue of the *Times*, there was "a sharp difference between European and American attitudes toward people like Krupp." The British attitude was summed up in a Vicky cartoon in the *London News Chronicle*; Hitler and Göring were depicted staring at a newspaper headed *Krupp Freed* while the Führer asked, "Should we have hung on a little longer?" An anonymous Briton left a wreath "To the Dead from Krupp" on the Royal Artillery Memorial at Hyde Park Corner. Winston Churchill rose in Commons to remonstrate in behalf of the loyal opposition, and Prime Minister Attlee made a statement — a preposterous statement — that "There is no question of Krupp being allowed to assume either ownership or control of the former Krupp industrial empire." Undeceived, Fleet Street raged on. The *Observer* declared, "The American decision means that dangerous lunatics will again be at large." The *Sunday Pictorial* described Bertha Krupp as an old woman rubbing her hands "with glee" because her eldest son would soon be producing cannon again, and caricatures in the *Daily Express* and the *Sunday Express* represented Bertha and Alfred as loathsome creatures. Across the channel the Foreign Affairs Commission of the French National Assembly passed a resolution of displeasure and forwarded it to Frankfurt. *Paris l'Aube* advised Alfred, "Disappear! We have seen enough of you!" and the *Paris-Press* saw "all that the French detest in Germany — the Prussian spirit, pan-Germanism, militarism, industrial dumping — walking abroad again."⁴⁷

McCloy was baffled and angry. Outrage in Paris and London was incomprehensible to him. Unlike the British and French high commissioners, who never consulted him, he always solicited their views before making a major move. Both had been invited to submit appraisals of the Krupp situation; both had agreed with his decision. Moreover, while an American was now releasing Alfred, England and France had conveniently forgotten that he would never have been tried and sentenced if McCloy's predecessors hadn't insisted upon it. He was particularly indignant with the British. It was pure hypocrisy for Churchill and Attlee to shake their heads and roll their eyes. Alfred had been their responsibility. He had been arrested and

first imprisoned in the British zone, where most of his property was. They had turned him over to the United States because they weren't interested in evidence against him. And though two and a half years had passed since the Nuremberg tribunal had told Alfred that he must submit to "forfeiture of all your property," the English hadn't seized a single Krupp company.

In a letter to a friend at the Stanford Research Institute, McCloy expressed his anguish:

I am very much puzzled by the English reaction to the release of Krupp. In the first place, the English refused to try any industrialists, and rather criticized us for our vindictiveness in doing so. They could have tried Krupp if they had been willing to but they early indicated that they had no interest. . . . Now, when we let this man out after he has spent five years or more in prison, the English newspapers are making a great howl about it, implying that I took this action as a matter of expediency. Certainly if it had been expedient I would not have dealt in any way with anyone by the name of Krupp. But . . . I could see no reason to keep this man in jail merely because his name was Krupp. Of all the places from which I would least have expected criticism in this case England was first.⁴⁸

He ended by observing that "in a decision such as this, one can only follow one's conscience and not the likelihood of approbation or criticism." There can be no doubt that the American high commissioner was conscientious, dedicated, and determined to do the just thing. Sincerely illumines every line he writes. He was as detached as any man in that difficult position could have been: he had acted as no one's tool; he had done the right as he saw the right.

And yet . . .

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His vision was exceedingly limited. To Eleanor Roosevelt he wrote, "After detailed study of this case, I could not convince myself that Alfred [sic] Krupp deserved the sentence imposed upon him." It is singular that anyone completing a thorough study of Nuremberg proceedings could confuse Alfred Krupp with Alfred Krupp, and this lapse appears more than once in McCloy's 1951 correspondence. The truth seems to be that no one involved in the clemency decision had taken a really close look at the record. While the commissioner's reply to Justice Wilkins hinted tantalizingly at fresh disclosures ("The evidence, some of which was new, indicated a rather lesser responsibility on his part, if anything"), those revelations were not cited, as, to a member of the overruled tribunal at the very least, they should have been.⁴⁹

There are other anomalies in the commissioner's files for that year. He

assured Mrs. Roosevelt that "My finding has no effect on the status of the Krupp plants. The bulk of them have been dismantled . . . what remains is subject to deconcentration law." Yet that same month he suggested to Wilkins a justifiable doubt over the enforceability of that law in dealing with an exonerated defendant: "Krupp, I am told, does not intend to re-engage in the steel business, but whether or not this is merely a present worthy intention which may be altered upon the passage of time I cannot say." Over and over he repeated that he had "inherited these cases" from General Clay, that Krupp had had a right to appeal, that the review was needed for "possible errors of law or fact" — though he enumerated no errors which could have withstood a prosecutor's rebuttal. At times the explanations which went out over his signature verged on sophistry; the confiscation decree had "already been partly rescinded by General Clay" (Clay had merely pointed out that he couldn't enforce it outside the American zone), and in his references to foreign workers he merely mentioned Krupp's "use" of them, never Krupp's treatment of them, the hard rock upon which Telford Taylor had built his case.⁵⁰

Obviously the high commissioner was unfamiliar with Taylor's indictment. The story he heard was the tale Alfred had told the tribunal and retold in his appeal to Clay. His lawyers had offered a version of it to the Peck Panel. The panel accepted it — having heard no conflicting account — and passed it up to McCloy. Thus we find the commissioner using, in defense of clemency, the rejected arguments of a convicted defendant. A few examples:

Krupp

On prejudice against the family

" . . . the name of Krupp was on the list of war criminals . . . because of a notion which is as old as it is fallacious: Krupp wanted war and Krupp made war." (To the Nuremberg tribunal, June 30, 1948.)

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"As for the particular case of Alfred Krupp, I find it difficult to understand the reaction on any other basis than the effect of a notorious name." (To Javits, May 10, 1951.)

On bias against arms manufacturers

"Although we were not conscious of any war guilt, we were familiar with the old myth of the war guilt of the armament industry." (To General Clay, August 21, 1948.)

"It is true that the name of Krupp stands as a symbol of the German armaments industry. I was not concerned with a symbol." (To Javits.)

"It is true that the name of Krupp has become a symbol of evil: the

Krupp

On Alfred as a scapegoat
 "I consider myself my father's successor in this defendant dock . . . I am here in place of my father." (To the tribunal.)

"Due to the state of his health he [Gustav] was not indicted. Therefore my staff and I were put on trial." (To Clay.)

"I never understood how I suddenly came to take my father's place in the proceedings." (To Clay.)

On confiscation
 "I request you to quash the confiscation of my property . . . as unlawful." (To Clay.)

On crimes against humanity
 "It appears that the tribunal [believes] I approved of the government's 'slave labor program' and exploited it in favor of the firm. To me, the government recruitment and allocation of manpower to the armament industry was a measure of

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German armaments industry; I was concerned, not with a symbol, but with the guilt of an individual, Alfred [sic] Krupp." (To Mrs. Roosevelt.)

" . . . his father was on his deathbed when these trials took place and this [Alfred] Krupp was next in line." (To Mrs. Roosevelt.)

"I am inclined to think that the son took his father's place in the dock largely because his father was on his deathbed at the time." (To Javits.)

"This man, as you know, was not the real Krupp . . . but was a son who only came into the board late in the war and exerted very little if any influence in the management of the company." (To Karl Brandt at Stamford.)

"No other person has had his private property confiscated." (To Mrs. Roosevelt.)

" . . . in no other case was any individual's personal property confiscated." (To Brandt.)

"I also found it very doubtful that he had any responsibility for the use of slave labor in the Krupp plant." (To Javits.)

"Moreover, he was convicted on the slave labor charge. Every plant in the Ruhr of any size had forced

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war economy which we could no more evade than the numerous other government regulations during the war." (To Clay.)

labor, and it was assigned by the government and supervised by the SS and SD groups, the companies having very little if anything to do with the conditions under which they were employed." (To Brandt.)

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So close are these parallels that had the high commissioner known that Alfred had used such language his repetition of it would be inconceivable. Judge Peck and his two colleagues, also men of probity, must have shared his innocence. Inevitably some aspects of the clemency decision remain murky. Everyone was keeping at least one eye on the Korean peninsula. MacArthur's troops had just sustained a grave defeat. Under such circumstances embattled governments withdraw into themselves and make policy in private. The Americans in Germany were, after all, subordinates. We have no way of knowing whether key figures on lower levels received urgent advice from Washington and, believing that the security of the West was in peril, quietly stage-managed the summary reversal of Krupp's conviction. The commissioner and his Clemency Board never have seen the painted scenery, the stage props, the actors, the claque. Anyone sophisticated in the ways of great powers knows how easily these things are done once the right man is given the order. Thereafter the task is completed by cipher clerks, translators, special assistants, public relations men and, of course, lawyers. All this, to repeat, is speculation. If anything of the sort happened it is concealed by bureaucratic haze.

We only know the results. In throwing out the Nuremberg verdict the U.S. consul in Frankfurt had in effect reaffirmed Adolf Hitler's special grant, bestowed upon Alfred by a grateful Führer eight winters earlier, affirming that, Reich inheritance laws to the contrary, *die Firma* should be solely owned by Bertha's eldest son. While turning back the Ruhr clock to 1943 McCloy had also made a number of inaccurate statements which damaged General Taylor, General Clay, and the tribunal. In forty days his Clemency Board had made a travesty of years of interrogation and painstaking documentation, and now he cast doubt upon their capacities and even their integrity. One of them bitterly recalled Hitler's "Political Testament," written in his Berlin bunker less than twenty-four hours before he took his life. Predicting that the western democracies would one day beg Germany to join them against Russia, the Führer had dictated to one of his secretaries, Frau Gertrud Jung, ". . . the seed has been sown that will one day lead to the glorious rebirth of the National Socialist movement (*zur strahlenden Wiedergeburt der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung*) of a truly united nation."⁵¹

Though National Socialism remained discredited, the dream of a truly united nation one day seemed closer to many on that last January afternoon in 1951. But the powers of a superpower are limited. Its Frankfurter vicery could pardon Alfred Krupp. Its spokesmen could join German newspapers in scouting those who had condemned him. Yet it could not cancel half a line nor wash out a word of history. It could not even rewrite the report of the Peck Panel, which on page 17 of its introduction had declared that while clemency was its goal, "no law can be called upon to defend the murder of Jews and gypsies, the enslavement and accompanying cruel treatment of masses of people, and the wide program . . . which determined who would be resettled and who would be enslaved or destroyed." The report continued, "Murder, pillage and enslavement are against law everywhere and have been for at least the twentieth century."⁸²

Murder, pillage, enslavement, and the cruel treatment of masses of people had been practiced on a vast scale within the Konzernher's *Stadt im Staate* in the last mad effusion of National Socialism. The judgment reached at Nuremberg was sound. A large staff of Hauptverwaltungsgebäude publicity men — trained, now, on Madison Avenue — continues to cry out against it, but it cannot be shaken. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Jackson, "Krupp stood before the record of his trial as bloodstained Gloucester stood by the body of his slain king. Gloucester begged of the widow, as Krupp begged: 'Say I slew them not.' And the Queen replied, 'Then say they were not slain. But dead they are.' If you were to say that Krupp was not guilty, it would be as true to say that there had been no Auschwitz fuse factory, no company concentration camps, no Rothschild gassed, no basement torture cage, no infant corpses, no slain, no crime, no war."⁸³

The author handed John J. McCloy an audit of discrepancies between his 1951 statements about Alfred and the Nuremberg transcript. The retired commissioner read it carefully. Then, he handed it back, commenting, "That's ancient history." By then it was indeed history, though hardly ancient. The murder of thirteen-year-old King Edward V and his younger brother in the Tower of London is quite different, however. It goes back to the first weeks of August 1483, and like so many of history's legendary figures the victims' thirty-one-year-old uncle, who became King Richard III, has been distorted by the lens of time. Britain flourished during his brief reign, for he was the innovator of wise legislative measures and an energetic administrator. His fatal flaw, in the eyes of a contemporary, was his "innate ferocity." Another chronicler wrote, "He was not a monster, but a typical man in an age of strange contradictions of character, of culture combined with cruelty, and of an emotional temper that was capable of high ends, though unscrupulous of means."

His means were his undoing. Despite his personal heroism he died at

Bosworth Field because Englishmen were convinced that he had been responsible for the deaths of the two princes in the Tower, "for which cause," the *Chronicles of London* tell us, "King Richard lost the hearts of the people."

In this Gloucester differed from Krupp, who emerged from Landsberg's heavy doors at the stroke of 9 a.m. on the bitter morning of Saturday, February 3, 1951, and led the twenty-eight other freed prisoners, including four former generals, out through a thick smoke-colored fog. He heard a great shout, accompanied by the running of many feet, and discovered that he had become a national idol.⁸⁴

24. I AM THE OWNER OF THIS PROPERTY
- 1 NYT 4/10/45; Toland 391.
 - 2 WWM/recollections of various Hügel servants.
 - 3 NYT 4/11/45; 4/10/45; 3/27/45.
 - 4 WWM/Hardach, Alfried.
 - 5 Ibid.
 - 6 Closing in on Hügel pp. 597-599; Time 4/23/45; Young 74-5; Louis Arzel to WWM 9/17/64.
 - 7 Vigil in the Hauptverwaltungsgebäude pp. 599-600: WWM/Tub-Beising.
 - 8 Seizure of the Hauptverwaltungsgebäude pp. 601-603: WWM/Tub-Beising.
 - 9 DE-2275; Mühlhen 183.
 - 10 Mühlhen 182.
 - 11 Ibid. 185.
 - 12 Young 75.
 - 13 Arzel to WWM 9/17/64.
 - 14 Young 75.
 - 15 Arzel to WWM 9/17/64; WWM/Alfried; Sagnon to WWM 2/24/65; Mühlhen 182; Time 4/23/45.
 - 16 Arzel to WWM 9/17/64.
 - 17 Ibid.
 - 18 Krupp interrogation Time 4/23/45; Fortune 2/56.
 - 19 Fried. Krupp Essen 1811-1946; NYT 5/22/45.
 - 20 NYT 4/16/45; Time 4/23/45; NYT 1945; 4/16, 5/22, 6/22; BBC file 8/14/45.
 - 21 Nation 3/21/59; Krupp's statement to Tribunal 6/30/48 Nfr 13215-20.
 - 22 Mühlhen 211.
 - 23 WWM/Dohmann.
 - 24 NYT 2/18/51; WWM/Hardach.
 - 25 1015-B-PS TMCWC III 666-70; WWM/Hardach.
 - 26 DNB files 5/10/45.
 - 27 Ibid.
 - 28 Dönitz 472-3.
 - 29 Vilda Hügel.
 - 30 Life 8/27/45.
 - 31 WWM/Elizabeth Rohl.
 - 32 Toland 354.
 - 33 Toland 262-3; Smith in Saturday Evening Post 7/6/46.
 - 34 Toland 582.
 - 35 Wilmot 690.
 - 36 Ibid.; WWM/Berthold.
 - 37 Klass 465; NCA I 85; Davidson 5, 26.
 - 38
 - 39 Thayer-Dohlen confrontation pp. 614-16; WWM/Berthold and Thayer; Thayer 95-7.
 - 40 Nation 3/1/59; Pounds 253.
 - 41 Dönitz 472; Moorhead Eclipse viii; NYT 12/6/59.
 - 42 WWM/Heine; Pounds 254; Potsdam Agreement iii; B Clause 12.
 - 43 Clay 356; Life 8/27/45.
 - 44 NYT 9/24/45.
 - 45 White 135; 136, 141.
 - 46 NYT 11/17/45; Klass 439; WWM/Hobrecker; Mühlhen 186.
 - 47 Mühlhen 186.
 - 48 WWM/Tubbeising; NYT 4/18/50.
 - 49 Schröder Fdbrk in Berndorf; Home 115; Newsweek 1/4/54; Fortune 2/1956.
 - 50 NYT 10/21/48, 2/10/49; Business Week 5/8/48; Fortune 2/1956; NYT 3/29/59.
 - 51 White 143; Fortune 2/1956.
 - 52 Pounds 256; Stolper 149-52; Fortune 2/1956.
 - 53 TMCWC XVI 497-8.
 - 54 Text of Allied Control Council Law No. 10 Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany No. 3 1/1946 50-55; Clay 325-6.
 25. KRUPP . . . YOU HAVE BEEN CONVICTED
 - 1 WWM/Berthold, Sprenger.
 - 2 WWM/Wilmowsky; Nfr 5230; WWM/Babara Krupp.
 - 3 TWC IX 1; Klass 465.
 - 4 WWM/Berthold.
 - 5 WWM/Wilmowsky, Sprenger.
 - 6 White 134-7.
 - 7 Davidson 363n.
 - 8 Frankfurter Neue Zeitung 10/18/49.
 - 9 Davidson Life and Death of Germany many 105-6.
 - 10 Davidson 26.
 - 11 NYT 10/20 and 11/4/45; NCA I 85; 91-2.
 - 12 NCA I 84; NYT 11/9/45; Hoy-decker 87-8.
 - 13 TMCWC I 138; NYT 11/13/45; Thayer 97; NCA I 85; NYT 11/17/45; Heydecker 88; NYT 11/8/45; NYT 11/20/45; Taylor in Columbia Law Review 4/1955.
 - 14 Ibid. 582.
 - 15 Clay 251.
 - 16 Ibid.
 - 17 The distinction between war criminals and major war criminals is spelled out in Arendt Eichmann in Jerusalem 258; WWM/Taylor.
 - 18 WWM/Taylor, Sprecher, Coetz.
 - 19 Young 120-21; TWC IX 2.
 - 20 Trie 8/1954.
 - 21 Siemens 3/22/48 Nfr 4815; Schilf 3/22/48 Nfr 4761-74; Anderson/Schreiber exchange 5/27/48 Nfr 9083-10022.
 - 22 WWM/Kranzbühler, Alfried, Berthold.
 - 23 WWM/Alfried, Bülow; NYT picture 8/16/47.
 - 24 WWM/Berthold.
 - 25 Ibid.
 - 26 Davidson 21.
 - 27 WWM/Kranzbühler, Young 83; TWC IX 2; NYT 11/18/47. Indictment published in NYT 8/16/47.
 - 28 Tribunal judgment 7/31/48 Nfr 13233.
 - 29 Prosecutor's opening statement 12/8/47 Nfr 18-113.
 - 30 Ibid.
 - 31 Ibid.
 - 32 Class 454.
 - 33 Nfr 2307-47, 2465-74 (1/24, 27/48).
 - 34 Class 454, 444, 346.
 - 35 NYT 1947; 11/12, 12/12, 12/13, 12/16. Other stories dealt with matters apart from testimony and documents.
 - 36 Coetz to WWM 5/6/63.
 - 37 Buchham 45-55; History of U.N. War Crimes Commission 303; WWM/Taylor, Barr.
 - 38 Bross 211; Die grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette XV 4320.
 - 39 NIK-7248, -1178, -2065, etc.; Arendt in New Yorker 3/9/63; Klass 15.
 - 40 Concurring opinion on Dismissal of Aggressive War Charges 7/7/48 TWC IX 417.
 - 41 WWM/Kranzbühler.
 - 42 Shier Aufstieg und Fall I 265.
 - 43 NYT 9/7/46; Time 9/16/46.
 - 44 White 335-40.
 - 45 Flick testimony 4/2/48 Nfr 5409-24, 4/19/48 Nfr 5444-88, NYT 4/20/48; White 145; Mühlhen 209.
 - 46 WWM/Taylor.
 - 47 Kurt Biegl Test 4/29/48 Nfr 6251-92; TWC IX 625 (Dr. Gerhart Weiz and Judge Day).
 - 48 WWM/Kranzbühler; Wilmowsky Warum wurde Krupp 175.
 - 49 Taylor in International Conciliation 4/1949; WWM/Ragland.
 - 50 Wilmowsky Test Nfr 5201, Krupp Engineering 11, Review of Reviews 9/1927, Scientific American 9/1932; Krupp Past and Present 39, Lochner 201-2, Fortune 2/1956, Klass 429, Weekly Post 11/26/60, and Newsweek 1/4/54.
 - 51 Klass 456.
 - 52 NYT 1/18/48.
 - 53 Ibid.; Klass 455.
 - 54 Newsweek 4/15/46; NYT 9/5/46.
 - 55 NYT 5/6/47.
 - 56 NYT 12/20/47.
 - 57 NYT 12/23/47.
 - 58 Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany No. 3 1/1946 50-55; Federal Reporter 983.
 - 59 Löser and Krupp statements pp. 655-656 6/30/48 Nfr 13215-20; TWC IX 1012.
 - 60 Wilkins note on letter Clay to Lamdsberg Documentary 26-7.
 - 61 Klass 459-60.
 - 62 Tribunal judgment 7/31/48 Nfr 13331-13402.
 - 63 WWM/Ragland.
 - 64 NYT 8/2/48; Stars and Stripes 8/2/48.
 - 65 Klass 463.
 - 66 Ibid. 451.
 - 67
 26. HOHER KOMMISSAR JOHN J. McCLOY
 - 1 WWM/Alfried.
 - 2 WWM/Bülow.
 - 3 Krupp to Clay 8/21/48; stamped "Filed 21 August 1948 with Secretary General for Military Tribunals, Defense Center."
 - 4 Taylor in Columbia Law Review 2/1953; TWC IX 1487-8; Mühlhen 209; Clay to WWM 3/22/63.
 - 5 TWC IX 1485n (1).
 - 6 NYT 4/18/50.
 - 7 Quotations pp. 662-663 are from Wilmowsky Warum wurde Krupp 176-80.
 - 8 WWM/Barr.
 - 9 WWM/Wilmowsky, Berthold.
 - 10 WWM/Alfried, Berthold; Life 2/6/50.
 - 11 Mühlhen 210.
 - 12 White 140.
 - 13 White 157.
 - 14 U.S. News and World Report 2/27/59; Thayer 104.
 - 15 White 157; Shier 914n.

- 16 Pounds 256.
 17 Hoover Report introduction.
 18 White 146-8.
 19 W/M/Bilow; Mühlen 254.
 20 Cuderman 162, 233-8.
 21 Appleman 11-12, 19.
 22 NYT 7/25/49; W/M/McCloy.
 23 *Current Biography* 4/49.
 24 W/M/Kanzhöler; Ferencz; Young 104.
 25 White 250, 152, 275.
 26 Pounds 115.
 27 Appleman 31, 157, 381, 508; White 156.
 28 Young 103.
 29 White 151-2; Appleman 605.
 30 Young 105; W/M/Berthold; Kanzhöler.
 31 NYT 2/18/51.
 32 Shifter 415-17; White 287; Appleman 68-9.
 33 Eleanor Roosevelt to McCloy 2/15/51; McCloy to Eleanor Roosevelt 3/12/51; W/M/McCloy.
 34 Landsberg Documentary 13; Telford Taylor to Eleanor Roosevelt 6/19/51.
 35 W/M/Ferencz.
 36 W/M/McCloy.
 37 Ibid.
 38 Peek to W/M 8/14/63, 3/22/63.
 39 True 8/1954; Department of State Bulletin XXIV no. 623 6/11/51.
 40 NIK-9299; TWC VI, XIX.
 41 True 8/1954; W/M/Schumann, Batocki, Stahmer-Knoll.
 42 NYT 2/1/51; TWC XV 1173-4; Landsberg Documentary 10; Atlantic 10/1960.
 43 W/M/Frau Löser; NYT 6/2, 5/51.
 44 W/M/Kanzhöler; Lochner 250; W/M/Heine.
 45 NYT 8/20/52; Wilkins to McCloy 2/21/51; NYT 2/1/51.
 46 NYT 9/30/52; 2/18/51.
 47 *Newsweek* 2/12/51; *Home* 109; Young 108; *Sunday Pictorial* 2/8/51; NYT 3/10/51; *Time* 2/12/51.
 48 Quoted in *Klass* 477-8.
 49 McCloy to Mrs. Roosevelt 4/12/51; McCloy to Wilkins 4/19/51.
 50 McCloy to Mrs. Roosevelt 4/12/51; McCloy to Jarvis quoted in Department of State Bulletin XXIV 623 6/11/51.
 51 1387-PS; *Reichsgesetzblatt* 11/20/43; 3569-PS.
 52 Landsberg Documentary 17.
- 53 Taylor in *Columbia Law Review* 4/1955.
 54 NYT 2/4/51.
27. THE GERMANS ARE BEING TREATED LIKE NIGGERS
- 1 Alfred, Berthold, Bilow.
 2 NYT 2/11/51.
 3 Mühlen 217.
 4 Mühlen 217-18.
 5 W/M/Berthold.
 6 W/M/Berthold, Wilnowsky.
 7 W/M/Bilow; *Fortune* 2/1956.
 8 W/M/Alfried.
 9 Pounds 126.
 10 Benjamin Disraeli *Current History* 1858.
 11 TWC IX 669; W/M/Hundhausen.
 12 Scott 368, 260; quoted in Pounds 190.
 13 W/M/Harald, Heine.
 14 Williams, "An American at Krupp."
 15 Mühlen 226.
 16 Ibid. 227.
 17 White 250.
 18 Mühlen 228.
 19 W/M/Sabel.
 20 Young 109; personal information.
 21 Alfred's marriage pp. 698-699; W/M/Berthold.
 22 W/M/Sprenger.
 23 Mühlen 229.
 24 KFA; Young 128.
 25 "Catchwords about the Essener Hof" (unpublished ms 1963).
 26 W/M/Betz; Young 123-5.
 27 W/M/Betz; Mühlen 223-4.
 28 W/M/Betz; Berthold, Sprenger
 29 W/M/Schumann, Batocki, Stahmer-Knoll.
 30 Young 111.
 31 Ibid.; *Daily Mirror* 11/11/52.
 32 Mühlen 227.
 33 Young 113-14.
 34 *Fortune* 2/1956.
 35 *Klass* 479.
 36 Mühlen 272.
 37 Quoted in Davidson 13; Young 117.
 38 Young 117.
 39 W/M/Sprenger; *Fortune* 2/1956
 40 W/M/Wilmowsky.
 41 Events of 9/25/52 pp. 708-709; W/M/Alfried, Betz, Sprenger.
 42 *Der Spiegel* 3/13/67.
 43 Mühlen 223.
- 43 Krupp's return to Essen pp. 709-710; *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* 3/13/53.
 44 Young 108; Mühlen 219.
 45 TWC IX 264; *Reader's Digest* 9/1955.
 46 Personal information.
 47 KFA; W/M/Alfried; *Fortune* 2/1956; Mühlen 266.
 48 Young 129; Lance to W/M 4/15/63.
 49 KFA; *Abendzeitung* (Munich) files 1958.
 50 W/M/Betz.
 51 W/M/Sprenger; Mühlen 259.
 52 Personal information; W/M/Dohrmann.
 53 W/M/Hosmann.
 54 W/M/Sprenger; *Klass* 50.
 55 NYT 10/25/56.
 56 W/M/Menne; Mühlen 270.
 57 W/M/Zedtwitz-Armn.
 58 Thayer 97-9; W/M/Thayer, Alfred.
 59 *meine Zeitung* 11/14/53.
 60 Haile Selassie's visit pp. 719-722; *Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* 11/12/54; W/M/Alfried.
28. HEUTE DIE GANZE WELT
- 1 Picker, entry for 1/16-17/42.
 2 Young 137-8; NYT 10/25/56.
 3 Mühlen 258; Young 137.
 4 Los Angeles *Times* 6/22/67.
 5 Mühlen 260.
 6 *Time* 8/19/57.
 7 W/M/Lauritz.
 8 Mühlen 236.
 9 Stahl und Eisen 6/15/10.
 10 W/M/Hansen.
 11 *Krupp Engineering* 41.
 12 KFA.
 13 NYT 3/28/55.
 14 Roukela pp. 730-732; Roukela passim.
 15 Young 127.
 16 NYT 1/9/60; Mühlen 236.
 17 NYT 4/4/54; *Business Week* 5/5/51.
 18 Young 125-6.
 19 Mühlen 232.
 20 Mandelbrot to W/M 8/28/64.
 21 *Time* 8/19/57.
 22 NYT 3/28/55.
 23 Ibid.; *Krupp Products*.
 24 *Réditès* 8/1959.
 25 NYT 4/16/60; Young 142.
 26 *Times* (London) 1/14/60.
 27 Menne 50.
- 28 AK to Pieper 11/27/1866.
 29 *Outlook* 1/25/02; *Time* 4/23/45; Lochner 245; Utley 169, 172, 177, 182, 169.
 30 *Reader's Digest* 9/1955; *Time* 9/15/52; *Newsweek* 4/18/63.
 31 Villa Hügel exhibit 1963.
 32 Zedtwitz-Armn 3.
 33 Mühlen 240; *Fortune* 2/1956; U.S. News and World Report 3/14/60.
 34 *Fortune* 2/1956; Mühlen 252; *Time* 9/18/57.
 35 *Klass* 419-20.
 36 The firm's leadership in arms is borne out: NIK-11625; -9091, -12294, -6577, -755, -6576, D-94, C-153, 1387-PS; Schröder memo 7/18/40; NIK-12315.
 37 Tuchman *Tower* 243; Mühlen 225.
 38 *Newsweek* 1/15/68.
 39 *Krupp Mitteilungen* 11/1957; *Krupp Past and Present* 45.
 40 Captivity and return of Harald pp. 745-748; W/M/Harald, Sabel, Dohrmann, Barbara Krupp; *Krupp Mitteilungen* 8/1957.
 41 W/M/Berthold.
 42 *Friedling* 29, 37; Wilnowsky 166.
 43 Wilnowsky 224.
 44 W/M/Betz.
 45 *Krupp Mitteilungen* 8/1957.
 46 NYT 9/22/57.
 47 *Krupp Mitteilungen* 11/1957.
 48 Ibid.
 49 *Revue de Paris* 154 (9-10/1929), 505-7; Napoleon III *Oeuves Posthumes* ed. Chappelle 43; Frossard 79.
29. NOT A STONE SHALL BE SOLD
- 1 AK to Gustav Jüst 9/6/1850.
 2 *Krupp Mitteilungen* 12/1957; NYT 9/18/57.
 3 *Krupp Mitteilungen* 12/1957; TWC IX 242.
 4 *Weekly Post* (England) 11/26/60; *Test* 4/27-29/48 *Nr* 6106-6249; *London Observer* 2/12/61.
 5 W/M/Betz; *Fortune* 2/1956.
 6 *London Observer* 2/12/61.
 7 *Klass* 108.
 8 Ibid. 161, 169-70.
 9 Ibid. 161; Young 123-4; W/M/Betz.
 10 W/M/Betz.
 11 AK *Generatregulativ* 41.
 12 Young 119-20.
 13 AK *Generatregulativ* passim.
 14 *Krupp Past and Present* 23; *Klass* 260.