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cover informers, helicopter surveillance teams and agents monitoring the protest organization's two-way radio system.

A basic decision was made: disperse the gathering crowd prematurely, a day before Mayday, thus fragmenting its numbers, then produce a strong po-lice-military show of force on Mayday to control those demonstrators remaining.

This decision-making process and the crucial surveillance that influenced it are described in government documents recently ordered disclosed by a federal judge here. The documents, de-tailed memoranda of six Justice Department strategy sessions prior to and during the Mayday demonstrations, provide a rare glimpse into the way the government gathered and evaluated intelligence and political reports in preparation for the massive protest action.

The documents were or-dered turned over last week by U.S. District Judge William B. Bryant to lawyers representing people ar-rested then who claim in a civil suit they were illegally arrested during Mayday and in other demonstrations about that time. Arrests during the demonstrations totaled 12,000.

The private government strategy meetings were attended by Wilson and his assistants plus top Pentagon military advisers, key Justice officials and White House aides, some of who are now familiar Watergate figures.

Generally, Justice officials led by Kleindienst and internal security division chief Robert Mardian took a more alarmist view, predicting widespread violence by unrestrained mobs. Wilson and Pentagon officials appeared less fearful and more confident that the violent elements within the crowd would be small and isolated.

In a 9:30 a.m. meeting Saturday, May 1, 1971, two days before the planned mass traffic disruptions, Mardian said his intelligence reports showed the demonstrators planned to cut and shoot tires of motorists to obstruct traffic, pour oil at intersections and set it afire, release balloons and kites to foul military helicopter operations and march against the

MAYDAY, From D1 CIA and South Vietnamese embassy, targets not publicly announced by protest organizers.

> Wilson countered that the demonstrators, with a few notable exceptions, were poorly organized, lacked leadership and were not interested in escalating their civil disobedience style traffic blockade to general vio-

> Lt. Gen. Hugh M. Exton, director of military support for the Department of the Army, echoed many of Wilson's sentiments and said he "did not visualize a riot situation unless it (the crowd) became stirred up."

> It was generally agreed, however, that early crowd estimates by the government had been low and some 20,000 to 40,000 youthful demonstrators were pouring into the city and camping in West Potomac Park in preparation for Mavday.

By late Saturday afternoon, May 1, the crowd had swollen to 50,000, according to an estimate based on photographs taken from a helicopter over the park, Klein-dienst said at a second meeting Saturday evening.

Mardian said government observers were monitoring a citizens band radio network operated by protest organiz-ers and "information as to the protesters' codes and communications" was known.

At another point, Mardian indicated that most groups within the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice, the loose umbrella organization of radicals, pacifists and others sponsoring the protest, were infiltrated by inform-

The demonstration plans and targets o fthe groups were generally known, he said, but "the only target that was not known was that Gay Liberation of the group."

With the sudden influx of 50,000 protesters on Saturday, officials at the Justice Department agreed on two basic moves, according to the memorandums:

- Dispersal of the 50,000 from their West Potomac Park encampment on Sunday, one day before Mayday, to fragment and weaken the demonstration.
- Preposition federal troops at key points in the city on Mayday to assist police and keep the streets open. ിരൂത്തിൽ കെടുത

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The idea of suspersing the crowd from West Poto-mac Park was first proposed by John Ehrlichman, former White House donestic atfairs adviser, at the Justice & especially marijuana smok-Department strategy meet ing ing Saturday merning, May En

1, according to the memoranda.

By late Saturday afternoon, it had become a firm decision of the strategy group and was made formal at dawn on Shinday, May 2, by the Justice and Interior departments' revoking the permit for the protest crowd to stay in the park. The crowd was ordered to disperse. 12 15

There were no legal diff,
culties with revoking the
depermit, Kleindlenst, noted,
because of "open, blatant
and notorious" violations of the permit by the protesters.

> Ehrlichman described the dispersal blan as a "psychological maneuver." and Wilson predicted it "would probably reduce by 75 per cent the number that would be here by Monday (Mayday)." 45.944.7

> Thus, at dawn on Sunday, May 2, bleary eyed from an all-night rock concert, the crowd in the park suddenly awoke to face a line of 1,200 helmeted D.C. policemen

nd were ordered out of the

While the police stood by nost of the 50,000 stumbled way and melted into the ity. About 300 remained ind were quietly arrested.

At a strategy meeting that ifternoon, Wilson estimated nly 3,000 to 5,000 demónitrators would remain for Mayday and only 2,000 of hem would try to disrupt he city. Gen. Exton of the Army

aid 10,000 federal troops were in and near the city.

oised for Mayday.
The presence of troops on he streets had been a sensiive issues at previous stratgy meetings, with some oficials wondering if a large

military presence would trigger hostile reaction by demonstrators and make containment more difficult. Exton suggested the troops be kept in buildings out of sight unless needed.

At a Saturday meeting,

Kleindienst "discounted the idea that the troops would be a trigger to the situa-tion," according to one

memorantum
"Mr. Mirdian," the memorandum continued "stated
that much mail is being received which is critical of the government position and that if volence erupts the public will expect appropriate action. He stated that in his opinion, prepositioning was nelessary and some-

thing should be done to counteract the demonstrators' planned activities."

Ehrlichman then said a "lot of questions were being raised as to why the government was permitting pot and violations of the law, adding that "the President was ready to go further than had been discussed up to now in this meeting."

Kleindienst and Ehrlich. man set the tone from then on, and the final decision was to pre-position the troops conspicuously at crucial bridges and intersections in the city.

By late Sunday, May 2, new intelligence reports coming into the Justice Department indicated more

demonstrators were staying in the city than originally estimated after the West Potomac Park dispersal.

At a 5 p.m. meeting, Wilson estimated 10,000 were still here with 4,000 at Georgetown University and 700 to 1,000 at American University.

Mardian estimated 15,000 were still in the city with 4,-000 at George Washington University, 3,000 at Georgetown University and 2,000 to 3,000 at American.

Monday morning, Mayday, came with 10,000 federal troops, 1,400 D.C. National Guardsmen and vitually the entire force of 6,000 D.C., park and capitol police at their stations.