

Dear John,

11/6/92

Instead of working this early morning despite the great clutter on my desk of what I expected to resume with I suddenly realize that I'd not taken the time to go over your data base and wanted to before you come next week. So I do not have it before me and hope I can remember all I thought in going over it.

I think that for one thing it makes possible a different kind of analysis of the work and intentions of the Commission. To a degree this can also be done with the counsels. For example, Specter had finished all his basic work with witnesses before the end of March and the few depositions he conducted after that were not in his area.

While I do not know how you intend to use this ultimately, I can think of another breakdown that you might find use for and I'm certain scholars of the future would, is by Commissioner, which sessions they attended, who the witnesses were and the nature of the testimony taken each time.

What you have done makes it clear, I think, that the Commission never intended to be a factfinding body and that it was interested only in putting a prosecution-type case together.

Otherwise could Liebeler have deposed a dozen people on one day? If he had had any other interest could he have even thought of scheduling that many for a single day? I think not.

What this kind of breakdown alone cannot reflect and I think is important is how Rankin controlled what was done and what each Commissioner was in a position to know/participate in. You may want to keep this in mind for any analysis you may make from this. In a sense I am also saying how he controlled what each Commissioner could know rather than from reading the transcripts. We do not know how diligent they were in that.

I think also that you can use this to show that they really had intended to complete their work and write and issue the Report in June. Likewise, if this is true, you can also use it to show how limited and shallow their report would have been in June.

Specter, for example, had the medical evidence in by the end of March.

But look at all the important Dallas witnesses not called until July and then see the haste in which they were disposed of. The latter indicates that the counsels knew what they wanted and they wanted nothing ~~and~~ else from those witnesses.

(Specter did have meeting with experts and witnesses after March but no depositions of them. He then seems to have been trying to perfect his single-bullet theory.)

In your 11/2/92, graf 2, you refer to the Commission's accumulation of information and then ⁿto two alternatives, "did they ^ppursue lines of questioning as a function of the information which was accumulating ~~or~~ ⁿdid they simply pursue questioning as a function of essentially idle curiosity." I am inclined to rule the latter out. You then add that "had they built the case from the foundation ¹up, they would have organized the WR and the 26 volumes of manure accordingly."

In their lines of questioning more than the information that was accumulating I think that particularly for the earlier days it was more the information they wanted to put together to make their prosecution-type case. Without now being certain I am not inclined to believe that was a function of the information that was accumulating. ^{It} ~~this~~ was essentially either to cover their asses or to protect the preconceptions formalized in the outline of their ~~my~~ work and in their Report. They used witnesses, mostly at least, because they had no real choice but they tried to limit these witnesses to the evidence they wanted from them, and they knew that before they called the witnesses.

Exceptions would be when they adduced what they did not expect to and then had to contend with that. Thus when Shires, who was in charge of Connally's case, testified to the fragment remaining in JBCU's chest, he was kept away from the Commission and that fragment was ignored in the evidence for and the language of the Report.

On the trend analysis of Commission numbered documents from the FBI, do not lose sight of the fact that with those larger volumes the FBI Dallas office was accumulating individual FD302 reports and that there was some delay in providing them to the WC. Or, what appears as April may have been of March.

I think you can use what you have done to argue that after it provided its first volume of data, which the FBI regarded as all the Commission needed (for the FBI's ~~own~~ purposes) it thereafter responded to requests for information or delivered not what it set ^u out to deliver but what it could not avoid.

As a simplified illustration, the FBI decided 11/22/63 there was no conspiracy. Yet when it got the reports it could not avoid on those three men as Odio's it had what really leads bearing on a conspiracy even in Oswald terms. This was not on the FBI's initiative. It was forced upon the FBI by Lucille Connell. The FBI gave the Commission its reports and then did nothing at all until asked, rather late, by the Commission. They then located Hall, Howard and Seymour in a hurry and passed that buck back to the WC.

With regard to grasping this, what should have appeared in December, 1963, appears instead in September, 1964. An example with a witness is FBI Spectrographer Gallagher. He was a September witness but should have been called before the end of March. And in September he was not asked anything about what he should have testified to in March. I am trying to indicate that the FBI's interviews after its first activity and the Commission's calling of witnesses was sometimes a function not of investigating and getting information but of covering ass, explaining away and avoiding best evidence.

I think that people like Wrono will be quite interested in what you are doing. However, I've marked my file confidential and have told him nothing about what you are doing. I think also he'd love what you have on your computer that you demonstrated when you were here with it. As a professional historian with a good knowledge of the fact he'll find what you have done to be quite valuable. In haste, and with thanks,

Harold

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Harold

5530 Eastbourne Drive
Springfield, VA 22151
2 November 1992 8:03am

Mr. Harold Weisberg
7627 Old Receiver Road
Frederick, MD 21702

Dear Mr. Weisberg:

Responding to yours of 10/29...RE CD1095e, it is the same document found at CE1024, 18H740...as to others who saw the body at Bethesda I am not cognizant of any beyond what you addressed in WW, Post Mortem, or Sibert/O'Neill's report.

Regarding my interest in the information flow...

1. I agree with you about the non-numbered documents but I'm not certain how to get a handle on that as it may be impossible to ever have cognizance of all of them.


2. Regarding the Commission's requests and the agencies response, I again agree. However, I feel that some insight may be obtained when the information, i.e., CDs, is juxtaposed with information acquired from testimony/depositions...that is to say, I am attempting to establish if there is any relationship between the information, as requested, and that delivered compared along the timeline represented by the witnesses. This interest goes back to the Hosty/Bookhout dichotomy with respect to Mexico City...as you pointed out, Hosty may have lied, Bookhout may have had faulty memory, or both. However, that isn't my actual interest. What intrigues me is the way, manner/order, information accumulated and how it and other testimony bore on how they treated/questioned witnesses. A simpler way of putting this is did they pursue lines of questioning as a function of the information which was accumulating or did they simply pursue questioning as a function of essentially idle curiosity. It occurs to me that had they built the case from the foundation up, they would have organized the WR and the 26 volumes of manure accordingly. The fact that they chose to publish it without a logical framework argues that they haphazardly constructed their supporting informational infrastructure and then pasted it together as a report. As most people are overwhelmed with the volume, as I'm sure was intended, little opportunity has ever existed for evaluation in this fashion. For example, analyzing the CDs as a function of volume and time reveals that only one agency's trend, amongst FBI, CIA, SS, and State, was upward along the linear timeline. Your point about the SS being froze out by the FBI is instructional in this sense. However, one would expect that the SS, having no real investigative function, after the murder, would provide the bulk of its material near the front end of the investigation. Trend analysis, which provides a straight line best fit to the data set, clearly shows this to be the case. Alternatively, one would expect the FBI, which, from the federal perspective and jurisdictional propriety aside, was largely

responsible for the investigation after the crime. Additionally, the WC requests for information all came after the crime. Accordingly, one would not be unreasonable to expect the FBI's trend to plot out as a rising line when viewed left to right along the timeline of 11/22/63 to 9/24/64. That it does not plot as a rising line, but in fact descends as a function of time, reinforces the concept of Hoover's having an information cut off date of 11/22/63 and the FBI standing around waiting for information to drop into their pockets. I've included a couple of the charts that demonstrate this phenomena.

3. Regarding the Navy and four documents...I've included a printout of what I have in my database...that there may be others I'll continue to search...but this is what I've accounted for to date.


Enough for now...as per our phonecon of this afternoon I hope to see you next week...regards to Mrs. Weisberg.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'JW', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.


John W. Masland

Warren Commission Numbered Documents State Dept Trend Analysis



* State

Warren Commission Numbered Documents FBI Trend Analysis



+ + FBI