

**Some Fear for Alliance****Mann Reorganizes Latin Affairs Office For Single Control**By Dan Kurzman  
Staff Reporter

The State Department Bureau of Inter-American Affairs has been reorganized along traditional bureaucratic lines under what is essentially one-man control.

Thomas C. Mann, who at once is Assistant Secretary of State, Coordinator of Alliance for Progress,

and President Johnson's chief adviser, on Latin American affairs, will depend for policy advice mainly on ten office directors dealing with specific Latin countries or groups of countries.



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This system represents, in part, a reversion to the policy-making machinery for Latin America that existed before President Kennedy gave the Hemisphere priority attention under the Alliance for Progress.

**Concentration of Power**

The principal administrative difference between the new system and that which prevailed in pre-Kennedy days lies in the present concentration of authority in one man.

Nevertheless, career bureaucrats, who played a major role in Latin policy making in the Eisenhower Administration, will have far more to say under Mann's direction than was true in the Kennedy era.

President Kennedy, in launching the revolution-

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ary Alliance concept, depended largely on imaginative, nonspecialist political appointees for advice on Latin American policy.

He apparently felt that many career diplomats, while well-versed in Latin American history, politics and language, were too psychologically entrenched in status quo policy to lend the necessary crusading spirit and fresh outlook to the Alliance.

President Johnson, however, has decided to depend mainly on Mann for his advice, and Mann is depending mainly on his regional directors. This switch in administrative policy, Mann believes, will bring more "expertise" to the bureau in line with his effort to move toward greater "diplomatic professionalism."

And in order that this expertise may be funneled to him more efficiently, he has placed both the State Department and the Agency for International Development (AID) desks for each regional grouping under a single director. Previously, the two desks, lacking a coordinator, reached common decisions only after time-consuming negotiations among themselves and with

the top bureau leaders.

**Adams Replaces Cottrell**

To help implement his double-edged effort to streamline channels of authority on the one hand, and enhance the policy-making role of career bureaucrats on the other, Mann has studied his bureau with many trusted aides who had worked with him in Mexico, where he served as Ambassador until recently.

In his most important personnel move, he has

brought in Robert A. Adams, who had been his political officer in Mexico, to replace Sterling J. Cottrell as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs.

Unlike Cottrell, who took an active part in policy-making under former Assistant Secretary Edwin M. Martin, Adams, it is believed, will mainly direct operations in his field without exerting much influence on the nature of these operations.

Mann's new approach is generally regarded as advantageous insofar as it will speed up policy decisions and render the Inter-American Bureau more influential in Administration councils than when many diffuse voices were heard on Latin affairs.

But some aspects of this approach are causing concern among former Kennedy officials—to the extent that some holdovers are considering resigning. For one thing they say, Mann's heavy reliance on the opinions of career bureaucrats, however experienced in Latin American affairs, could produce policies reminiscent of pre-Alliance days.

Most of the regional office directors were, as was Mann himself, trained in Latin policy under the guidance of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who gave Latin America low-priority attention. At the same time, the influence on policy of AID officials, who tend to be less bureaucratic in outlook than the diplomats, has di-

minished substantially under the unified desk system.

For another thing, former Kennedy officials say, Mann's job has so many facets and his authority is so great that, even with the delegation of generous operational powers to his deputies, many things cannot get done simply because he is too busy to deal with them.

This is particularly disturbing to some officials in relation to the Alliance, one of the priority projects in U.S. world policy. President Kennedy had given the Alliance a special status under a highly publicized administrator of its own, Teodoro Moscoso. But now the Alliance, it is argued, has lost this special status and, as a result, some of its prestige.

Mann himself is often too preoccupied with such urgent problems as Panama or Cuba to concern himself with the less dramatic Alliance. And the Alliance's Deputy Coordinator, William D. Rogers, though delegated considerable power which he has used skillfully, does not have the authority or standing to serve as an Alliance symbol.

But despite such misgivings, even the most skeptical officials are prepared to wait and see just where Mann's new administrative and policy making efforts lead before deciding on their value.