

George Carver's defense of James J. Angleton guised as a review of Tom Mangold's "Cold Warrior," Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene, Vol. 10, No. 5, 1991.

This is worse than an unbalanced defense of Angleton and the havoc he wrought within the CIA. It is dishonest. It makes clear that Carver himself was an Angletonian, not only in personal support but in adhering to the same devastating beliefs and policies. There is no mention, for example, of Angleton's damage to US intelligence. Carver supports Angleton's tragic and paranoid mistakes, like allowing himself to be dominated by the obviously sick-in-the head Golitsyn. He seeks to cover these flaws in his conclusion, where he says that Angleton had his failings and faults and was overly influenced by Golitsyn but this does not cover Carver's flaws, biases and dishonesties, and all that precedes it is written without regard to the consequences of Golitsyn's insanity and its domination of Angleton and what he did and did not do as head of Counterintelligence.

Another major failing and a serious dishonesty is Carver's misrepresentation in his last sentence, that Mangold's sources "broke their oaths of secrecy." Had this been true they'd have been prosecuted. The book is an obvious defense of the CIA made possible by the CIA, which used Mangold to blame all its many errors on Angleton personally.

Basically and knowingly dishonest is Carver's statement (7) that "Nosenko (about whom he says nothing good and only evil, omitting all reference to what the CIA learned through him) was handled by the CIA's Soviet Division in a manner approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of Justice." John Lemon Hart's testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, official CIA testimony, is that what was done to Nosenko over a three-year period was not approved by anyone and was inhuman beyond belief. He omits also that Angleton dominated the CIA's Soviet Division and that some of its people were also forced into retirement and became sources for the Angleton/Carver view of Nosenko.

Mangold's book is excellent in its exposure of Angleton et al and the harm done to US intelligence under Golitsyn's domination but as Carver, of course, does not mention, obvious as it is, Mangold also exculpates the CIA for all its errors, some extraordinarily significant, even dangerous, and heaps them on Angleton only, thus exculpating the CIA.

I think Carver is wrong (but I'm not sure) in saying that Nosenko claimed to have had the KGB's Oswald file in his possession twice. My recollection is that he said that after Oswald was identified in 1963 this file, in Minsk, was flown to Moscow where Nosenko read it in haste and turned it over for bucking upward within the KGB.

Carver is so dishonest he refers to the incredible abuses of Nosenko as "arguably excessive." When this treatment, as described officially by the CIA to the HSCA, no detail in Carver's "review," ranged from driving Nosenko crazy to flying him over the ocean and dropping him into it, "arguably" is hardly the word!

Ja 11/16/91



FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE LITERARY SCENE

A BIMONTHLY NEWSLETTER/BOOK REVIEW

Volume 10, Number 5

National Intelligence Study Center, Publisher

1991

Reshaping American Intelligence

by Peter A. Lupsha

The end of the Cold War, the fracturing of the Warsaw Bloc, and changes in the Soviet Union underscore the need and opportunity to reshape American intelligence. The key is the necessity to redefine and broaden the concept of national security from one focused narrowly on defense and global military-strategic issues to include those wider traditional interests of earlier intelligence eras, economic markets, and regional political stability.

The importance of political and economic intelligence was recognized not only by George Pettee and Sherman Kent, two of the classic writers in the field, but more currently, by Walter Laqueur and Loch Johnson.¹ The latter defines the first mission of strategic intelligence to be "knowledge for...a world of competing and distrustful sovereign states."² This definition implicitly contains a balance of all three strategic perspectives, military, political, and economic.

One might assume that the

lessening of Cold War tensions and the demise of the Warsaw Pact would mean a lessening of threat and tensions, but actually the reverse is far more likely, and U.S. intelligence will increasingly have its mettle tested. The question is, can the present architecture of the American intelligence community meet that test? For example, Ted Shackley, former Associate Deputy Director of Operations, CIA, recently noted, "90 percent of the existing intelligence requirements for Eastern Europe are now obsolete."³

Bipolar to Unipolar World

U.S. intelligence has been driven by East-West conflict and the containment of Communism since before the signing of the National Security Act of 1947. This bipolar world view, now in flux, is likely to be replaced at some future point with a multipolar perspective. In the meantime, we live in a unipolar world with the strategic strength and resources

of the United States making it, for better or worse, the guardian of its and its allies' strategic interests.⁴

The earlier Cold War bipolarity was much easier for strategists and the intelligence community to understand and cope with. Between 1947 and 1990 a series of alliance regimes, containment strategies, deterrence systems, along with the Cold War education of the national will, had taken place. But with this ideological structure now washing away, historical patterns reminiscent of those of late nineteenth century Europe are reemerging in the East, and a fractious but economically powerful European Community is emerging in the West. These changes place new demands on the structure of U.S. intelligence there and elsewhere.

Cold War intelligence architecture essentially ignored the real issues facing the Third World Less Developed Countries (LDCs) unless they served as surrogate theaters in the East-West power plays. Today, these LDCs are the future stages of regional conflict and instability that cannot be ignored. The gangster politics of Saddam Hussein and Manuel Antonio Noriega does not fit neatly into our traditional intelligence world view. These and other "grey-area" political challenges on the horizon demand new

In This Issue

Reshaping American Intelligence	1	The Role of Police Intelligence	10
A Great Soviet--U.S. Face-Off	4	NISCINT	10
The Prosecution's Case	7	Periodicals and Documents	11

The Prosecution's Case

by George A. Carver, Jr.

Mangold, Tom. *Cold Warrior, James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's Master Spy Hunter*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991. 356 pp. \$24.95.

The legendary James Angleton, who headed the Counterintelligence Staff of the CIA's Operations Directorate from 1954 until 1974 and who died in May 1987, has been the subject of innumerable articles, several novels, and parts or all of several purportedly non-fictional books, the latest being by British investigative journalist Tom Mangold.

The counterintelligence trade exacts a severe psychic toll on its practitioners -- as I know from having been one -- since to be effective, a counterintelligence officer must harness two quite antithetical human traits and become, while operating professionally, a controlled paranoid. If either the control or the paranoia slips, a counterintelligence officer is asking for trouble -- putting that officer's service and country at risk.

Though by no means bereft of admirers, Angleton had, and still has, many critics, plus quite a few enemies. Mangold seems to have interviewed nearly every one of these critics and enemies in the course of writing what is much more an unrelenting prosecutor's brief than a balanced biography of a gifted and dedicated, but very complex, human being.

Golitsyn and Nosenko Cases

Angleton was at the heart of the many counterintelligence controversies that arose during his two decades as the West's leading counterintelligence officer, notably the still-divisive controversy over the motives and bona fides of two key Soviet defectors: Anatoli Golitsyn, a KGB major who defected (in Finland) in December 1961; and Yuri Nosenko, a KGB captain (who claimed to be a lieutenant colonel) who first contacted the CIA in

Switzerland in 1962, recontacted the Agency in January 1964, and came to the United States soon thereafter.

Golitsyn, for whom Angleton developed a high regard, came bearing tales of a Soviet and KGB "master plan" for unrelenting efforts, some of them already successful, to penetrate and manipulate various Western governments and intelligence services, including the CIA. Golitsyn also warned that he would be followed by "false defectors," dispatched by the KGB to undercut him and spread disinformation.

Nosenko claimed, among other things, to have twice seen the KGB's file on Lee Harvey Oswald and hence to know that the Soviets had had no hand in President John Kennedy's November 1963 assassination (two months before Nosenko recontacted the CIA in Geneva). This latter allegation made the CIA consider it imperative to establish or refute Nosenko's authenticity, by any means required. (Some of the means employed were harsh and arguably excessive; but Nosenko was handled by the CIA's Soviet Division in a manner approved by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of Justice -- *not*, as Mangold suggests, dictated or directed by James Angleton and the Counterintelligence Staff.)

After five years of wrangling, Nosenko was officially ruled to be bona fide, though the debate over his authenticity continued into the 1980s, and James Angleton believed until his dying day that Nosenko had been a KGB plant -- as Golitsyn had averred from the time of Nosenko's defection.

Sources: The Critics

Mangold takes a decidedly Manichean view of these complex controversies, and the people involved in them. On one side, in his eyes, were (and are) the forces of darkness -- "fundamentalists," of several nationalities, paranoid enough to

entertain Golitsyn's conspiracy and penetration theories -- whose prince and leading guru was James Jesus Angleton. Nobly arrayed against these forces of darkness were the forces of light -- i.e., Angleton's critics, and Mangold's sources -- whose defining hallmark was (and is) a conviction that Yuri Nosenko, despite any apparent evidence to the contrary, was purer than the driven snow. Mangold further seems to believe that in this legion of light, no one was nobler than Leonard McCoy -- a former Soviet Division reports officer who became Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff (in 1975) after Angleton's departure and appears to have been Mangold's principal source.

Mangold has clearly done a formidable amount of research, reflected in a host of endnotes, but virtually all of his most damaging and detailed charges against Angleton are based on highly classified, still-closely-held reports and documents (e.g., Angleton's deposition to the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which is still under seal), and on "confidential sources," not further identified, in a manner exemplified by note 4 to Chapter 22: "The non-attributable quotations in this chapter have been collected from friends and colleagues of the primary sources -- and have been carefully cross-checked." (p. 431)

Verification Impossible

In developing his case against Angleton, furthermore, Mangold makes frequent use of the "Bob Woodward gambit" -- attributing damaging details to remarks allegedly made by, or contained in reports and studies written by, people now safely dead and hence unable to contradict any of Mangold's assertions about their opinions (e.g., John Bross, Joe Burke, Jack Fieldhouse, and George Winters). The heart of Mangold's case, in short, is based on

detailed allegations that no reader can cross-check for accuracy or context.

In their determination to denigrate Angleton, neither Mangold nor his sources let themselves be deterred by accuracy. No indiscretion by Angleton was responsible for the fate of TOP HAT, a Soviet GRU officer run by the FBI, whom the Soviets tried for treason and executed in 1988. Mangold attributes TOP HAT's downfall to a February 1978 *New York* magazine article by Edward Jay Epstein, which Mangold contends must have been based on an unconscionable leak by some "fundamentalist."

By 1978, of course, Angleton had retired, and Epstein has always stoutly denied that Angleton was his source; "but, one must ask", counters Mangold, "is it possible that such an astonishing leak could have come from other dedicated Fundamentalists *without* their former chief's tacit approval?" Actually, as Mangold subsequently admits -- in an endnote -- the nail to TOP HAT's coffin was probably provided the Soviets by Edward Lee Howard, a renegade CIA Soviet Division officer who defected to Moscow in 1985.

Mangold and at least some of his sources are so obsessed with denigrating Angleton that they not only ignore reality but become seemingly oblivious to the damage they themselves are demonstrably doing in the process. According to Mangold, for example, one such source told him precisely how many human assets (i.e., agents) the CIA was running in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s -- something no intelligence officer with a shred of professional integrity should ever have divulged to *any* journalist, no matter *what* that officer may have thought of James Angleton.

Also, Mangold is very free with the adjective "unconscionable" when applying it to Angleton, but he apparently sees nothing wrong with *his* publicizing the long, close, and hitherto secret relationship that Angleton had with a leading American labor figure who died in 1990 and had spent years working quietly with Angleton and the CIA in a commendable common effort to slow or reverse the spread of Soviet influence in labor movements

throughout Western Europe and around the world.

Loginov Case

All the just-discussed traits of Mangold and his anti-Angleton sources come into sharp focus in Mangold's treatment of what he terms (in Chapter 14) "The Loginov Scandal." Yuriy Nikolayevich Loginov was a then-young KGB officer who defected in Helsinki in April 1961 and agreed to be a "double," whom the Soviets subsequently assigned to South Africa. The CIA's Soviet Division, along with Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff, became convinced that Loginov was a provocation working under KGB direction. Loginov was hence identified as a *Soviet* illegal, but *not* as a CIA asset, to the South Africans, who imprisoned Loginov, interrogated him, and then, in 1969, turned him over to the West Germans -- who, on 13 July 1969, exchanged him for eleven West German agents held by the Communists in Eastern Europe.

In using Loginov as a club with which to beat Angleton, however, Mangold has to engage in some fancy verbal footwork to cope with the awkward information provided by KGB Colonel Oleg Gordievskiy, one of the most knowledgeable and reliable of all Soviet defectors, that Loginov had not been tried when he reached Moscow in 1969, let alone executed, because the Soviets were not aware that Loginov had been serving as a CIA agent -- and as of the mid-1980s, a very live Loginov was teaching English in Gorky.

Gordievskiy's information gives Mangold a tricky problem, which he tries to solve by asserting:

"The CIA were so convinced that [Loginov] had been shot that they allowed confirmation of his defection and recruitment by the agency to be openly printed (in all good faith) in 1988 in an unclassified article in *CIRA*, the newsletter of the Central Intelligence Retirees Association." (p. 226)

In the back-of-the-book (note 48, to Chapter 14), not in his main text, Mangold acknowledges that the author of the article in question was none other than now-retired Leonard McCoy -- Mangold's greatly admired anti-

Angleton guru and his principal source! (p. 407) In short, it was Leonard McCoy, not James Angleton, who first flagged Loginov's CIA relationship to public, hence Soviet, attention -- with Tom Mangold then adding the juicy details. Should Loginov still be alive, that fact would add considerable support to the belief of Angleton, among others, that he was always acting under KGB direction. If Loginov has *now* been tried and imprisoned, or worse, the responsibility for his fate lies with Leonard McCoy and Tom Mangold -- not with James Angleton.

The 1950s and 1960s Climate

In his tunnel-visioned attack on Angleton, Mangold ignores the context and climate within which Angleton lived and worked, professionally. Angleton took over the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff in 1954, in the wake of the still-reverberating shock of the flight to Moscow three years earlier by two British diplomats, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, and amid growing though then-still-unproven doubts about the trustworthiness of Kim Philby -- a senior officer in Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, or MI6), who had been the SIS/MI6 liaison officer in Washington when Burgess and Maclean fled and whom Angleton had long regarded as a friend.

1954 was the year in which Otto John, the first head of West Germany's FBI (the BfV) defected to East Germany. 1961, the year of Golitsyn's defection, was the year in which Heinz Felfe -- head of the Soviet Counterintelligence Section of West Germany's external service, the BND -- was arrested as a Soviet spy, as was the Briton George Blake, another senior SIS/MI6 officer. In 1963, Philby's flight to Moscow removed all doubts about the former head of MI6's Soviet Counterintelligence Section's having been a long-time Soviet agent, a fact further confirmed in 1968 by the publication of Philby's smug, smirking autobiography *My Silent War*.

Several writers have argued, as does Mangold, that the realization of how completely he had been gulled by his supposed friend Kim Philby was a psychological shock from which

Angleton never recovered, and which colored all of his subsequent behavior, but this allegation, at a minimum, is considerably overdrawn. In the overall climate of the 1950s and 1960s, quite apart from Philby, James Angleton would have been derelict in the discharge of his professional responsibilities if he had not been concerned about Soviet penetrations and covert moles.

Mangold dismisses as "paranoia" Angleton's concerns about possible Soviet influence over, even manipulation of, various Western political figures and leaders including West Germany's Chancellor, Willy Brandt. He neglects to mention, however, that in 1974 -- the year of Angleton's enforced retirement -- Brandt was compelled to relinquish his Chancellorship to Helmut Schmidt because Brandt's close, long-time personal assistant, Guenter Guillaume, was discovered to be an officer in East Germany's intelligence service and convicted of espionage.

Angleton's Successes

In Mangold's eyes, Angleton did little, if anything, right -- in his personal, family or professional life. Angleton's achievements, of which there were many, Mangold either blandly ignores or cursorily dismisses. From 1951 until his retirement in 1974, for example, Angleton did a brilliant job in handling the "Israeli account," -- a job Mangold dismisses in one sentence: "Angleton's ties with the Israelis gave him considerable prestige within the CIA and later added significantly to his expanding counterintelligence empire." (p. 49)

In a subsequent, back-of-the-book note (6, to Chapter 4), Mangold does acknowledge that Angleton "was held in immense esteem by his Israeli colleagues and by the state of Israel, which was to award him profound honors after his death." The note into which this acknowledgment is tucked, however, begins with a sentence that reads:

"The distinction of being placed in charge of the CIA's Israeli Desk, and his handling of this new and important Counterintelligence Staff function,

added considerably to Angleton's prestige, but nothing in this aspect of his work had a direct bearing on the subject matter of this narrative." (p. 362)

Mangold makes no mention whatsoever of the fact that through his Israeli contacts, Angleton played an instrumental role in the public surfacing of Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 "secret speech" denouncing Stalin's crimes. The publication of that speech sent shock waves throughout the Soviet Union, and the Communist movement worldwide, whose continuing reverberations contributed significantly to the eventual collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and then in the Soviet Union itself in the summer of 1991. Nothing in "this aspect" of Angleton's work may "have had a direct bearing" on the subject matter of *Cold Warrior*, but it certainly had a direct, beneficial bearing on the course of world history.

Mangold also gives scant attention to another major "aspect of [Angleton's] work" that has a direct, unquestionable bearing on *Cold Warrior's* subject matter -- an aspect flagged by Oleg Gordievskiy. Mangold quotes Gordievskiy as saying "that Angleton's reputation alone was one of the main reasons the Soviet bloc had such little success in penetrating the Western intelligence services after its postwar triumphs. His name became a legend at No. 1 Dzerzhinsky Square [KGB headquarters] even before his fame spread around his own institution's offices." (pp. 61-62)

Mangold neglects to mention, however, that Gordievskiy made this comment in 1988, the year after Angleton's death and fourteen years after his retirement. Hence it reflects Gordievskiy's and, presumably, the KGB's summary judgment on Angleton's overall effectiveness during his entire counterintelligence career -- a judgment very different from that of Mangold and his anti-Angleton sources.

One of the intelligence profession's many peculiarities is the fact that an intelligence officer's, particularly a counterintelligence officer's, greatest triumphs lie in things that do not happen. During James Angleton's two decade-long tenure as the head of the

CIA's Counterintelligence Staff, there was no known Soviet penetration of that agency, though Angleton went to his grave convinced that there were some such penetrations that he had failed to identify -- and indeed, a long-term Czech penetration, contract employee Karel Koecher, was identified in 1984. Also, a long-term Chinese Communist penetration, Larry Wu-tai Chin -- a staff employee of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, which the CIA administers -- was identified in 1985.

Summation of Record

James Jesus Angleton had his failings and faults, many of them. He was overly influenced by Anatoly Golitsyn and as a result, too suspicious of some of his colleagues (though it is ironic that while berating Angleton for these suspicions, Mangold also faults him for not being suspicious enough about Philby). In the final years of his career, he let his control slip and his paranoia predominate. Indeed, it would doubtless have been better for the Agency, as well as for him personally, if James Angleton had been gently but firmly eased into retirement -- with eminently appropriate ruffles and flourishes -- in the late 1960s. By 1974, he probably did have to go; though when he was compelled to retire, it was a great mistake to scatter his staff and destroy the bulk of his files -- thus eviscerating the institutional memory without which no counterintelligence office can hope to be effective.

James Angleton was a complex product of his time and his responsibilities, who deserves to be regarded, and evaluated, in perspective -- in light of his achievements as well as his failings. He does not deserve the relentless posthumous savaging that Tom Mangold gives him in *Cold Warrior* -- a savaging that does far more to discredit Tom Mangold, and those who broke their oaths of secrecy to abet Mangold's vendetta, than it does to stain the memory of James Jesus Angleton.

(A condensed version of this review was published in *The Wall Street Journal* on October 22, 1991.)

George Carver, a former intelligence officer, is the John M. Olin Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.