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Dear Mr. Babcock,

I do not presume that your interest is much greater than is required by a review, or that George Lardner's does (I'm sending him a copy of this letter), but because you report on intelligence matters I write you about two sentences in your review and to tell you a story that I think is relevant.

"Still, the research is compelling, backed up by devastating on-the-record quotes from more than 30 former intelligence officers" and "He could have addressed whether any of the spy hunter's machinations mattered."

I believe these two sentences are related in ways not easily perceived by any reviewer but can lead to what I regard as a hell of a story.

also, I'm surprised that in your thinking, for which I'm aware you may not have had much time, you did not wonder how it is that some 30 former intelligence officers would dare speak so freely, without worry about their employment contracts.

When Mangold was first getting started on his book he phoned me from London with what perhaps incorrectly I felt was some excitement. He asked me if I would help him with what he described as a biography of Angleton. I told him I would.

Before carrying this farther, you noted that what began as a biography evolved into something else. Something similar happened with a book by one of Mangold's sources, Ed Epstein. His book that appeared as "Legend" did not begin that way from the ads in Publisher's Weekly. It changed radically after Angleton stratated "helping" him.

Mangold told me he wanted me to know where he is coming from, so he was sending me three books he'd written. I told him that was not necessary but he insisted he wanted to. He also told me that he'd be here soon and would look me up.

I began immediately to collect for him copies of what I believed he'd find useful and to segregate FOIA records too voluminous for me to copy for him. Time passed and I got no books and heard nothing from him. So, I wrote and explained that I'm aging, unwell and did not want to waste any of what time I have left and would like to know whether he wanted the help he'd asked for. I got no reply and finally, cramped as my working space is, I put what I'd copied for him away and filed the FOIA records. I did wonder why his behavior was, from my experience with them, unlike my experiences with a number of other British reporters. and, of course, why he wanted the help he knew I could provide and then fell silent.

On reading his book I no longer wondered. As soon as I finished the book I wrote him. I do not expect an answer but until he has had time to respond I think it would be unfair to send you a copy. I do tell you, however, that I addressed him as "Faust".

Because I have special interests of which George is aware I read such books critically and annotate them, sometimes for a history professor who is a friend and asks it of me. I'm doing that now, for example, with Beschloss' remarkably dishonest "The Crisis Years."

What your review does not reflect your perceiving - and please do not take this as criticism because I have no such intent - is that the planned biography evolved into the serving of a special interest, as Epstein's book also did. Epstein's served Angleton's interest. I presume this was not lost on the CIA. As Mangold's book appeared it is as much an exculpation of the CIA as an institution as is possible.

Even when from time to time he appears to be critical of Helms, he falls far short of including what is relevant and is in the public domain about Helms. There is a considerable volume of what is not generally known about Helms that he could easily have gotten and not from me alone.

This gets to whether Angleton's machinations could have mattered. Helms was involved in some that are of special interest to me.

I do not remember Mangold's exact words but he wrote that Nosenko had told the FBI that the KGB did not suspect Oswald as a "sleeper" agent. The exact opposite is the truth.

Mangold cites Warren Commission 651 and the HSCA's record. He does not cite what his assistant Goldberg at least knew about, my publication in 1975 of what Nosenko had actually said about this and more about Oswald that Mangold omits: that he was openly anti-Soviet in the USSR. What Oswald's political beliefs really were I picked up from what the Commission and the FBI chose to ignore. I quote his writings in my first book. He referred to the Soviets as fat, stinking politicians and to the US CP as betrayers of the working class. With regard to both of these matters I call to your attention that when the CIA finally gave Nosenko a fair and unprejudiced polygraph it concluded that he had told the truth about Oswald.

Under Angleton, largely as I recall by Rocca and when needed strongly fortified by Helms in person, the CIA pressured the Commission <sup>NOT</sup> to take <sup>IN</sup> the secret <sup>THE</sup> testimony Nosenko offered, on the ground his bona fides had not been established. That was the judgement the Commission should have made but with some secret pressure, reflected in the executive ~~xxx~~ session transcripts I have from Ford in particular, it decided to abdicate to the CIA and it even omitted Nosenko's published identification from its Report.

There is much that relates to this for which I do not take your time. But I do call to your attention that Mangold has to have known, as Jeff Goldberg did know, that I'd published six books on the JFK assassination and have about a quarter of a million pages of formerly withheld records gotten by a series of FOIA suits, that Mangold did phone me and ask for help, that Goldberg and Mangold's lawyer know me, and that he never asked for anything from me or for access to these records. Including those on Nosenko.

The Commission's second panic - the first was FBI leaking that boxed it in - was what Ford described as a "dirty rumor" without any investigation, that Oswald had had some kind of government connection. I published two of the executive session transcripts on this, the first, which they decided to destroy and overlocked the stenotypists tape they had to have transcribed for me, 1/21/64, in "Post Mortem" beginning on page 475 and the second the subject of Whitewash IV and printed in facsimile in it.

Mangold reports that the CIA believed that Oswald had been dispatched to disinform on the JFK assassination, so that the KGB would not be suspected. Superficially this appears to be legitimate but to anyone with knowledge of the available information, it has no validity at all. What would be the official conclusions were leaked beginning with publication 12/2/63 and the whole world knew, including the KGB, and, of course, the CIA.

At two points, without reporting the subject matter of the FOIA lawsuit, Mangold has notes quoting what the CIA's ~~George~~ <sup>Charles</sup> Briggs attested. It was my suit for the Nosenko transcript. Mangold omits, and I think it is not unfair to say suppresses, what Briggs also attested to, that the Nosenko transcript had to be kept secret because Nosenko's treatment by the CIA was so wonderful that the CIA expected it to attract additional defectors! ~~He~~ <sup>Mangold</sup> cannot have cited that affidavit without having read this in it.

There is more in the disclosed and available CIA records that is relevant. In particular the questions it proposed that State address to the government of the USSR. They were so outrageous State had a fit. They were assured to offend. They also resulted in the U.S. government failing to request what it knew from Nosenko did exist, the KGB's records on Oswald in the USSR. This includes their suspicion that he was some kind of U.S. agent, was anti-Soviet openly, possibly why they suspected him and what would I am confident gives the lie to another seemingly reasonable CIA reason for not trusting Nosenko, that he said the KGB did not interview Oswald. It didn't but the MVD did. Moreover, it got all it wanted from the KGB Intourist guide, confirmed in effect by a later defector who was trusted: <sup>KGB</sup> the did not trust Oswald and considered him more or less flakey. <sup>That Mangold omits.</sup>

With Golitsyn so important a figure in Mangold's book and Angleton, of course, Mangold also does not mention the instant analysis of the JFK assassination by an unidentified KGB defector, clearly Golitsyn, <sup>and</sup> utterly irrational and extremely inflammatory.

So, while what the man I regard as Faust did publish is important information, I think it can be compared with Colby and the family jewels, as serving the CIA's interest to have the air seem to be cleared when it wasn't.

The net effect is to hold the dead Angleton alone responsible for the institutional misconduct. <sup>Mangold's</sup> ~~his~~ book is as close an approximation of exculpation of the institution as I think is possible.

Also missing, considering the influence Angleton had, is that fact that as I learned when I was in OSS, one of our greater intelligence failures was of what Angleton was in

charge of, counterintelligence in Italy. It was so thoroughly penetrated the Nazis picked up team after team when <sup>they</sup> ~~it~~ got behind Nazi lines. Such records passed through my hands.

I do not suggest that it has meaning but I do not recall that in reporting Angleton's friendship with Ezra Pound, in Italy when Angleton was <sup>there</sup> because he'd moved there, Mangold referred to the fact that Pound was friendly with the fascists and approved them and as I recall engaged in anti-U.S. propaganda for them during World War II. There was some consideration of charging him as a traitor.

I find it at the least provocative that not just Angleton and his staff but the CIA ~~to~~ the top bent such effort to keep the Warren Commission from listening to Nosenko and succeeded after the Commission knew what he would say, that none of those records were printed in the 10,000,000 words the Commission did print -not even a hint that they existed - and that initially they were all withheld at the Archives.

I also find it interesting that in his treatment of Oswald Mangold makes no reference to the fact that Helms admitted <sup>to HSCA</sup> that the CIA had a considerable volume of pre-assassination records on Oswald that had just happened to disappear without a trace.


And, of course, that ~~is~~ still has not complied with my 1975 request for its Nosenko information, repeated several times. Apparently at the CIA's bidding <sup>not Comint, FBI also did</sup> until it started disclosing them to someone who was known to follow what I refer to as the party line on Nosenko. I then got copies of only what was disclosed to him. It made a mistake once and addressed me using his name.

If ~~I~~ <sup>I</sup> were writing the book Mangold wrote and had none of the complications I believe he had I'd have found those records to be exceptionally important. From the first and with a series of never reasonable explanations people in the CIA were determined to prevent Nosenko's defection when his position and what he could know about Oswald was known. He was in the right place to know and of a rank that made it likely.

In any event, I think that Mangold's sudden lack of interest in having access to what he had to know I have when he phoned me is explained by his book: he preferred other sources he would not have had if he had had any relationship with me.

This gets back to how those 30 dared speak to him without fear of violating their CIA employment contract that it has so often sued to enforce.

Sincerely,

  
Harold Weisberg

# Obsessions Of a Spymaster

## **COLD WARRIOR**

**James Jesus Angleton—  
The CIA's Master Spy Hunter**

By Tom Mangold  
Simon and Schuster. 462 pp. \$24.95

## **DANGEROUS LIAISON**

**The Inside Story of the  
U.S.-Israeli Covert Relationship**

By Andrew and Leslie Cockburn  
HarperCollins. 416 pp. \$25

**By Charles R. Babcock**

**I**N MAY of 1986, friends of Stephen Millett gathered in Washington for a memorial service for the late CIA officer, who was so secretive The Washington Post didn't run his obituary because Millett wouldn't let his family say what he did for a living. Millett worked for James Jesus Angleton, the controversial head of the CIA's counterintelligence branch, who no doubt was proud his colleague carried his secret life beyond the grave.

Among Millett's tasks was helping Angleton, who died in 1987, run the "Israeli account," the liaison with Israel's intelligence agency, the Mossad. Millett rates only a passing reference in the book on Angleton by Tom Mangold, a senior correspondent with BBC television. This is because Mangold barely mentions Angleton's work with the Israelis, saying in a footnote he found it irrelevant to his main topic.

The focus is on Angleton's obsessive hunt for a mole, a Soviet agent, in the CIA, and the destruction of careers that accompanied that unfulfilled quest. The author says in his preface that the book started out as biography, but changed direction when he learned more about Angleton's secrets. The story of the mole hunt has been told before, most notably, as Mangold says, by David Martin in *Wilderness of Mirrors*. But most of Martin's sources are anonymous. Mangold's feat is attaching names to the charges, giving them greater weight. The result is a searing indictment of Angleton's tenure (1954-74) as the CIA's top spychaser.

Mangold details Angleton's reliance on Soviet defector Anatoli Golitsin, who

claimed his former employers had a master plan to deceive the West by deception and false defectors. The author digs deeply, too, into Angleton's role in the imprisonment of another defector, Yuri Nosenko. At times Mangold gets bogged down in the same arcane minutiae of the spy trade that he finds deplorable in Angleton.

Still, the research is compelling, backed up by devastating on-the-record quotes from more than 30 former intelligence officers. Chief among them is Leonard McCoy. He alleges that Angleton destroyed the credibility of a legion of Soviet defectors such as Nosenko, as well as the effectiveness of the officers who recruited them, and the entire Soviet bloc division.

Mangold's portrait of Angleton amounts to a major revision in the history of American espionage. His view of the cold warrior as an almost clinically paranoid poisoner of lives will cheer Angleton's critics and alarm

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his supporters. The problem for an outsider is how to judge one version of secret events over another. Few voices are heard explaining, much less defending, Angleton's views, and of course he cannot speak for himself.

The main biographical points of Angleton's life are known to students of the spy business. He was born in Idaho in 1917, first son of a Pershing cavalry officer who married a young Mexican woman. (She gave him the middle name Jesus, pronounced the Spanish way, Mangold notes.) He grew up in Italy, where his father was a businessman, and was schooled in England before going to Yale. Though considered brilliant, he was a lousy student, focusing his energies on a literary magazine.

When World II broke out, he quickly became a counterintelligence officer in England and then Italy. "America's spycatcher was made in Britain," Mangold writes, noting that Angleton was especially impressed with the lessons of the "Ultra" secret—cracking German codes—and the "double cross" system by which the British compromised German agents so that they sent false messages back to unsuspecting superiors.

Mangold marshals convincing, if not surprising, evidence that the defection in 1963 of Soviet agent Kim Philby, his friend from British intelligence, fed the mistrust that drove Angleton's obsession with the mole. He unearths other nuggets: Angleton's betrayal of a Soviet officer working for the CIA because he thought him another fake

defector; his climbing a wall to steal the codebooks from the French embassy in Washington; his ignoring leads from another suspect Soviet officer—leads that Mangold says led to major espionage cases in France and Switzerland when discovered years later.

Angleton was forced to retire in 1974 amid investigations of illegal mail opening and other domestic spying on American citizens (another aspect of Angleton's career Mangold ignores). He spent the years until his death fighting a rearguard action against the perceived Soviet threat. The author notes that in 1976 then-CIA director George Bush listened to Angleton's convoluted theories about Soviet deception for several hours and then told the new counterintelligence chief he "couldn't really understand what he [Angleton] was talking about."

With no more spies to chase in exile, Angleton held court with many reporters, including this one, often over lunch at the Army-Navy Club. Novelists and essayists

wrote of his solitary hobbies, growing orchids, flyfishing, making jewelry, burnishing a reputation where art imitated life.

Mangold commendably digs beneath the veneer. He gained the cooperation of Angleton's wife and daughters, who made available taped interviews and personal papers, including an intensely personal will from 1949. These glimpses of a fuller portrait tantalize the reader, especially one interested in what made Angleton tick. But the author never really develops them. The result is a one-dimensional view of a many-layered personality.

Despite the impressive documentation, then, the picture Mangold paints of Angleton's almost clinical paranoia on the mole hunt is unsettling. It was only part—one hopes the worst part—of his legacy. The author's conclusions sound convincing because officials like former CIA Director James Schlesinger refer to the "smoke, hints and bizarre allegations" behind Angleton's theories. After all, Angleton did believe several allied prime ministers were Soviet agents.

But the fuller story is missing. Did the spy hunter have no successes? As Mangold well knows, the essence of counterintelligence is challenging sources. He argues persuasively that Angleton did it too much (in branding a series of Soviet defectors as



*James Jesus Angleton, the late CIA chief of counterintelligence*

false). He seems to have done it too little.

Mangold has cracked the code on entering Angleton's secret world. And the case he makes against his quarry on the mole hunt is a shockingly good one. By choosing to focus so much on specific misdeeds, though, he misses an opportunity to step back and put his subject and his profession in context, to demystify the intelligence world. He could have pushed his sources more. He could have addressed whether any of the spy hunter's machinations mattered.

**I**N THEIR book, Andrew and Leslie Cockburn, both authors and documentary film makers, promise the reader an inside look at the covert relationship between the United States and Israel, which began even before the birth of the Jewish state in 1948 and the mating of James Angleton and the Mossad in 1951.

The subject is a ripe and timely one because the threat of Israeli intervention was always real in the recent Gulf war, and because the Israeli role in the notorious Iran-contra affair was never explored by investigators. But the Cockburns shed little new light on either topic.

Instead, they pull together threads from

previous books and newspaper articles with their own reporting over 10 years and describe several notorious episodes in which the intelligence and military services of the two nations joined in a symbiotic alliance. They argue that Israel has been able to procure American power and money to advance its own cause—chiefly selling weapons, the backbone of the economy.

The United States, in turn, gained a wily proxy in its fight against communist influence around the world, from Africa to Central America. Angleton (who is honored with a memorial forest outside Jerusalem) early on recognized the intelligence value of Soviet emigres to the new country, and realized, too, the possibility that they would include penetration agents.

The Cockburns demonstrate the Israeli prowess in the arms trade in Latin America—the subject of public television documentaries the authors have produced—and South Africa. But they don't convincingly make the case for American collusion.

The book's most provocative sections cover Africa. With one hand, the Cockburns say, the Israelis took \$10 million to \$20 million a year from the CIA in the 1960s in a program code-named KK Mountain to represent American interests in Africa. With

the other hand, the Israelis took an active role in generating a lucrative and secret cooperative arms venture—including nuclear—with South Africa, continuing to this day, despite the protests of many American and Israeli citizens.

The authors argue—not persuasively—that it was this interdependence that led a string of American presidents to ignore Israeli slights against its benefactor (which sends it \$3 billion a year in foreign aid, far more than any other country). They cite the cover-up of the Israeli killing of 34 American sailors in an attack on the U.S.S. Liberty in 1967, the Israeli smuggling of several hundred pounds of nuclear-weapons grade uranium from a Pennsylvania plant called NUMEC in the 1960s and the arms trade with South Africa.

"The intense effort on the part of five administrations to keep the lid on public knowledge of Israel's nuclear weapons program, and that ally's espionage inside the United States strongly suggest that the U.S. was aiding and abetting the effort," the Cockburns write in detailing the NUMEC case. They do not back up their conclusion with hard reporting, however. And the life sentence now being served by Israeli spy Jonathan Jay Pollard seems to contradict such an attitude.

This practice of dropping explosive revelations with little documentation and no follow up, unfortunately, is repeated several times in the book. The Cockburns quote the late Stephen Smith as saying that Israel put \$2 million into Harry Truman's 1948 campaign. They cite an anonymous former intelligence officer as saying we still have a program, once code-named GOLD, of eavesdropping on Jewish citizens who might be too sympathetic to Israel. They say the National Security Agency intercepted discussions in 1980 in which Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin discussed with New York Mayor Ed Koch how to defeat Jimmy Carter.

They let another NSA source say unchallenged that Angleton and the Israelis "spent a year cooking up the '67 war. It was a CIA operation, designed to get Nasser." Then they add on their own, "Such a verdict, from a source inside an agency that had the inclination and the facilities to monitor both the CIA and the Israelis, must carry some weight." Instead, accepting such statements without reporting them out detracts from the weight of the good work the Cockburns have done on an important subject. ■