

Dear Greg,

5/12/84

Because you appeared to feel it so strongly I read Richard Cummings's Evergreen piece on Al Lowenstein as soon as it came.

He does not call Al an agent but he does say, explicitly and implicitly, that Al "worked" for the CIA, i.e., was its employee, like Buckley was.

What it boils down to is that for some reason Cummings was out to get Al, was willing to go to enormous effort to do this, and condemns him for being a true-believing, practising liberal, like a wing of the CIA is liberal, and therefore Al is a CIA employee.

After reading this I am inclined to continue to believe that the best thing is to ignore this. It will get no real attention in Evergreen, witness the fact that the papers have done nothing with it; and trying to do something now will merely attract attention to the book.

Among those who matter this will not really hurt Al, whose record more than speaks for itself. This is not to say that it is not defamatory, for it is and is intended to be.

I am wondering why, why Cummings went to all this trouble, all this cost, for a book that I think has little prospect of returning its costs, in cash and time, to him.

What master or spirit or emotion may he serve.

Thanks,


I've annotated it if you ever want to discuss it.

Evergreen

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ALLARD
LOWENSTEIN'S
CIA!
THE GOOD, THE BAD
AND THE UGLY

BY
RICHARD CUMMINGS

"If you only knew what we're really doing, the liberals and leftists, the democratic leftists that we're supporting around the world, you'd see that we represent the good wing in the CIA."
—a CIA agent

In denouncing the Rengana administration's policies in Nicaragua, Senator Alan Cranston accused it of promoting a policy "that inevitably leads from cruel, authoritarian dictatorships through guerrilla warfare to Marxist regimes." And former editorial page editor of *The New York Times*, John H. Oakes, recently wrote that the way to "undercut what influence the Soviet Union and its satellites have is not to ape them, not to send arms to every tin-pot dictator who calls himself an anti-Communist. It is to accept the inevitability of social revolution in countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua that are ripe for it—and try to guide it along democratic lines, not fight it along undemocratic ones."

This argument is not a new one. It harks back to the influence in the State Department of Chester Bowles who served Presidents Truman and Johnson as Ambassador to India and President Kennedy as Under Secretary of State and then as a roving ambassador. It was Bowles' theory that the way to defeat the Communists was not from the right but with another form of the left that was

non-Communist. Bowles' influence in foreign policy was far-ranging. In the CIA, it led to what former Associate Director of the Peace Corps under President Kennedy Harris Wofford, a Bowles protégé, calls the "good wing," which gave assistance to democratic socialists in Third World countries, including India, to counter the pro-Soviet Marxists. The "good wing" of the CIA reasoned that most underdeveloped countries were not really ready for American-style democracy and would have to pass through some form of revolutionary stage first. But it was better, the CIA liberals submitted, for America to engender this revolutionary stage itself than to wait and let the Soviet Union exploit the situation. When Jimmy Carter was elected president, this approach to Third World revolution was at its zenith. The hard line in Vietnam had been a failure. As new revolutionary situations sprang up closer to home, an alternative method of dealing with them became essential. Two countries where the "good wing" theory was put into practice were Nicaragua and Portugal. Deeply involved in the imple-

mentation of this policy in these countries was former Congressman Alford K. Lowenstein who had gained fame as a key organizer of the "Dunp, Johnson" movement in 1967. At the urging of Andrew Young, who was appointed Carter's Ambassador to the United Nations, Lowenstein was named U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva and then Ambassador to the UN, for Special Political Affairs. It was from this latter position that Lowenstein was used to promote the anti-Somoza factions in Nicaragua and the Democratic Socialists in Portugal.

Lowenstein, a friend of Bowles, had come to the "dovish" line through his own experiences in Africa. He had been a fairly traditional anti-communist during the Fifties, winning election as president of the National Student Association in 1950 after a speech in support of Truman's military action in Korea. While he was close to both Eleanor Roosevelt and Adlai Stevenson, he was generally quite "hawkish" when it came to countering Soviet influence around the world. Friends such as his successor as NSA, president William Dentzer found his approach unsuitable and criticized his strong anti-Soviet rhetoric as counterproductive, particularly when dealing with idealistic and impressionable young Third World students.

While Lowenstein worked for Senator Hubert Humphrey in the late Fifties, he did things like go to a dinner given by the Council Against Communist Aggression and help organize the effort to send American students to disport the Mos-

cow-backed International Youth Festival in Vienna in 1959. In that particular effort, he had collaborated with Gloria Steinem, Smith graduate and Fulbright scholar to India, who founded the Independent Service for Information on the Vienna Youth Festival, the organization that became the Independent Research Service, a CIA-funded operation based in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It was used to get the anti-communist Americans to Vietnam. Lowenstein had written letters for Humphrey which were sent to the American campuses encouraging students to participate. But Lowenstein learned that it was sometimes necessary to take a less strident position. The black students he met in South Africa in 1958 were critical of the United States for not forcing South Africa to end apartheid and because the United States itself practiced racial segregation in parts of the country.

When Lowenstein returned to South Africa in 1959 on a trip to gather evidence in South West Africa of abuses by the South African government in administering its mandate over the territory, sources report that he was asked by the CIA to help smuggle a colored South West African student out of the country. The student, Hans Beukes, had been awarded a scholarship to study in Norway, but was prevented from leaving by his government. Lowenstein hid Beukes, got him out and arranged for him to testify at the United Nations, where Lowenstein presented his own tape recordings of tribal chiefs complaining about South African rule.

Up until that point, the United States

had been in danger of alienating the new black African countries because it refused to oppose South Africa at the U.N. Young Keegan labor leader Tom Mboya, who was being cultivated by the United States and for whom Lowenstein helped to write his African Freedom Day speech in 1959, was saying that unless the United States responded to the legitimate demands of the Third World, it was in danger of going Communist. Mboya was addressing himself primarily to Africa, but his remarks were applicable to the world at large.

At the United Nations, the American Representative to the Trusteeship Council, Mason Sears, joined with Beukes and another South West African and took the offensive. He openly criticized South Africa and called for a World Court decision ending the mandate, catching the Soviet Union by surprise. After some hesitation, the Russians found themselves obliged to support the American initiative at the U.N., creating an enormous amount of goodwill for the United States. This was the strategy of the CIA's "good wing" working.

As Harris Wofford explains, the fibers both in the CIA and out used the fear of communism as a way to deal with American public opinion. He insists that there was a threat from the Soviet Union, but recognizes as well that this was a way of getting Americans to accept the need for change. Lowenstein himself wrote in 1966:

"It is high time we tried to understand the bitterness of people held in bondage in what we call the 'Free World' because

of the 'practical considerations' of the Cold War. Democracy's strength is that to her, decency is universal and concerned with the freedom of *all*. But, even ignoring ethical considerations, we should realize that to support tyrants is to court the hatred of the oppressed. We have spawned too many Batista's not to realize that Batista's inevitably spawn Castro's."

A CIA agent once told Wofford, "If you only knew what we're really doing, the liberals and leftists, the democratic leftists that we're supporting around the world, you'd see that we represent the good wing in the CIA."

Wofford, who admitted Lowenstein and shared his political outlook, observes: "I could see that someone representing the 'good wing' got some kind of collaboration with AI. I could imagine it. It would not surprise me if for a while he saw this as a good thing."

According to sources, Lowenstein did start working for the CIA in 1962 as an expert in Southern Africa, and continued doing so until 1967, when he became totally involved in the "Dunp, Johnson" movement. It is suggested that Lowenstein's opposition to the war in Vietnam is proof that he could not possibly have been involved with the CIA; in actuality, his opposition to the war confirms his CIA involvement as much as anything. Roger Hilsman, who was the Director of Intelligence at the State Department from 1961 to 1963, has commented:

"Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were deeply divided about the nature of the struggle in Vietnam.

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How did Lowen-stein
become
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One group saw it as part of global Communist expansionism. Although connect- ing that purely Vietnamese issues were also at work, they insisted the Viet Cong was ultimately inspired by Moscow and Peking, who would profit by a Communist victory strategically, economically, and politically. It followed that such an aggression could be met only by military force.

The rival view agreed the insurgency was led by bona fide Communists, with full support from Moscow and Peking. But, they argued, the insurgency was more accurately described as an anti-colonialist and essentially *nationalistic* movement, feeding on social discontent in the South, over issues such as the need for land reform and whose leaders just happened to be Communist Party mem- bers. A Communist Vietnam, they con- ceded, would be troublesome politically to American interests in Southeast Asia, but the economic implications were miniscule. And not only was Vietnam of little intrinsic importance strategically but, they argued, Hanoi's demonstrated determination to remain independent of Moscow and Peking was ample assurance that neither would turn Vietnam into a military base.

Since the insurgency was a nationalis- tic, anti-colonialistic movement, they concluded, sending foreign troops would be self-defeating. Foreign troops would recruit more peasants for the Viet Cong than they could possibly kill. As Presi- dent Kennedy said, "In the final analysis, it is their war."

This was the essence of the "dovish"

position that Lowenstein came to avow. He took this position on the Third World, including Vietnam, because he believed it to be realistic, not because he was in any way opposed to American interests, as detractors to his right accused him of being. He was, in actuality, in the main- stream of liberal thought. There was nothing inconsistent about Lowenstein working for the CIA because it was partly a liberal institution. It was the logical place for him. It was, in fact, his friend William Buckley, who had also worked for the CIA, who was the conservative dissenter. The problem was not so much the CIA itself as Lyndon Johnson. Since the CIA is the covert arm of presidential policy, it is the president who ultimately determines the thrust of the agency.

When Lowenstein became a dissenter within the agency on Vietnam, he was inevitably forced to take on Johnson. Lowenstein was a logical candidate for the "good wing" of the CIA. He was long involved in the international affairs of the National Student Association, which were CIA funded, and while leading writ- ers such as Milton Vorst and David Halberstam concluded that Lowenstein had no knowledge of the CIA involve- ment, Emory Bundy—who made the 1959 trip to South West Africa with Lowenstein and entered the Vietnam Youth Festival along with him with forced documents Bundy believed had been pro- vided by the CIA—asserts that Lowen- stein must have known about the CIA connection. Acknowledging that Lowen- stein denied it, Bundy counters: "But I believe someone that bright must have

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doubtless he was
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AL Bundy
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Lowenstein
CIA
CIA

had knowledge of it. My opinion is that he was at least somewhat knowledgeable about it. . . ." And Adlai Harkin, Adlai Stevenson's cousin who traveled to South Africa with Lowenstein in 1958, goes further, concluding that Lowenstein was in the CIA. Dwellling on Lowenstein's speech to black students at Fort Hare in South Africa in 1958, Harkin observes: "That experience, which was quite extra- ordinary, was one of the things that led me to believe that some smart S. O. B. in Washington thought it would be a good thing if a guy like Al Lowenstein talked to the students at Fort Hare."

Lowenstein's own activities as presi- dent of the NSA from 1950 to 1951 showed him to be firmly anti-Communist. He was a key mover and shaker in pre- venting the NSA from joining the inter- national Union of Students, which was alleged to have been Moscow-supported. Instead, he joined with Olaf Palme of Sweden in establishing the COSMIC, the Coordinating Secretariat of the National Unions of Students, and the International Student Conference, which staged coun- ter-festivals to those run by Marxist countries.

Moreover, Lowenstein's work was con- sidered sufficiently important for him to avoid serving in the Korean war. A basic tenet of the Lowenstein myth was that he had to force his way into the army because he kept getting rejected on ac- count of his bad eyes. Yet, after graduat- ing from Yale Law School in 1954, Lowenstein did serve as a private in the army from 1952 to 1956 and was stationed in Germany. His records indicate that he

This is normally to be expected
of all soldiers
Action R on in the same way

earned the designation of "marksman" in his rifle training program. Harkin re- sponds for the delay in Lowenstein's service was not the one given by journalists or by Lowenstein himself. Though requir- ing thick glasses, his eyesight was ad- equate for the draft.

After graduating from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1949, Lowenstein joined the staff of his mentor, Senator Frank Graham, who had been president of the University while Lowen- stein had been a student there. Graham was defeated in a primary and the Ko- rean war broke out. In the late summer of 1950, Lowenstein was elected presi- dent of the National Student Association after a "spellbinding" speech in support of America's military support for South Korea. But although Lowenstein was an enthusiastic supporter of this military intervention, he avoided participating in it. On December 15, 1950, he was classi- fied I-A and was called for his physical on January 5, 1951. After a hiatus, dur- ing which time Lowenstein was not drafted, he received his formal reclassi- fication on September 20, 1951: 2A-5. 2A stood for "Registrant deferred be- cause of civilian occupation." Lowen- stein's occupation was president of the NSA. 2S stood for "Registrant deferred because of activity in study." Lowenstein was entering Yale Law School, having de- ferred this in order to serve as NSA presi- dent for a year. On February 21, 1952, Lowenstein was reclassified I-A and again on March 3, 1952, showing that his physi- cal had deteriorated no reason for him not to serve in the military. But while a law

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What is wrong with this? It also is the opposite of working
for the CIA with the CIA?
action of 1951

student at Yale. Lowenstein applied for and received a further deferment, the army writing him on April 25, 1952, that he was classified 1-S, as a full-time student. On May 2, 1952 he received a 1-Sc classification (Student deferred by statute-college) and finally a 2-S classification on July 9, 1953 (student deferment). Only when the Korean war was over and he had been graduated from Yale Law School, did Lowenstein get himself reclassified and volunteer for induction.

The use of the deferment to NSA officials who were co-operating with the CIA became standard practice. The NSA and its international wing were major propaganda tools for the United States during a period when the Cold War reached critical proportions and as Czechoslovakia fell to the Communists. Lowenstein provided trustworthy leadership during the Korean crisis and the wide spread activity of the International Union of Students. Best of all, he was not just anti-Communist and anti-Soviet. He was a liberal.

Following his trip to South West Africa, in which he proved his reliability again by helping to smuggle Hans Beukes out of South Africa, Lowenstein became deeply involved with white South African liberals who feared that the racist policies of Pretoria would cause a Communist revolution in South Africa itself. He authored *Brutal Mandate*, the story of his trip to South West Africa, and became active in various anti-apartheid groups and the American Committee on Africa. He was also a central figure in the protest over the infamous Sharpville

Massacre after a protest against the South African pass system exploded in violence. The protest was organized by young South Africans in the Pan Africanist Congress, an organization alleged to have ties with the CIA.

Lowenstein became a faculty member at Stanford and taught courses in African politics, keeping up his contacts in South Africa. In 1962, when, as sources indicate, he joined the CIA, he started making regular trips to Africa, developing contacts with the various African liberation organizations, as well as to London, where many South African exiles conducted their activities. Lowenstein also became increasingly involved with anti-Franco groups in Spain where he also traveled extensively, writing at one point in his diary in the winter of 1963 that "Tom Hughes asks Spanish data; 'Salazar' and plan makes little progress." Tom Hughes, who had been a Humphrey staffer before Lowenstein, in 1963 served as Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department.

Hughes, now the head of the Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, observes: "It could have happened. He came to the State Department in the 1960's. He dropped into everybody's office. He had lots of friends in the State Department." As to whether Lowenstein had a working relationship with the government, Hughes asserts: "He could have. But I didn't know it." Lowenstein's involvement in Spain had started while he had been on Humphrey's staff, as part of the policy, as Humphrey staffer Ernest Believer explained it to his boss, to "keep contact with the opposition." "The problem in Spain stemmed from the 1953 treaty of cooperation the United States signed with Franco. After that, anti-Americanism was rampant amongst the Spanish left. Since it was feared that Franco was creating a power vacuum that the Communists would eventually fill, the United States needed to cultivate an opposition to Franco within Spain that, if it came to power, would not damage European defenses against the Soviet Union, and which also appealed to popular Spanish sentiment.

Lowenstein's job was to develop the anti-Communist opposition and to organize anti-Communist American "Pro-Spain" groups who would press for democracy in Spain, to show that Americans did not support Franco and to serve as contacts for this opposition. "The CIA also wanted Spain to stop aiding Portugal's fight to keep its African colonies, because this weakened NATO and strengthened the hand of the Soviet Union in Black Africa. Lowenstein used his position as a professor at Stanford and later at North Carolina State, to argue these points academically at conferences sponsored by CIA fronts, such as the American Society for African Culture, while he participated directly in various covert operations in both Spain and Africa. The long-term goal of all this activity was to create pro-American "front line" states in Africa which would pressure South Africa to give up control of South West Africa before the Communists took control there. To this end, the Americans cultivated leaders in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, Eduardo Mondlane and Holden Roberto, who were supposed to take over these colonies as new pro-Western African countries which would join with Zambia and Tanzania in pressuring South Africa. Lowenstein praised Roberto in his paper "Force: Its Thrust and Progress" which he co-authored with John Markham, a University of Pennsylvania professor, and which he gave at a 1963 conference sponsored by the American Society for African Culture and became a good personal friend of Mondlane.

While working with the CIA, Lowenstein developed ties to the Peace Corps and with the American volunteers in Africa. Many of them wrote intelligence reports in the form of letters that were circulated among the American intelligence community concerned with African politics. Although his CIA background prevented him from being appointed to a high position in the Peace Corps, he managed to be involved with an effort to overthrow Dr. Hastings Banda of Malawi, a black African leader regarded as too cozy with South Africa for the purpose of American foreign policy, in which Peace Corps volunteers close to Lowenstein were utilized.

Lowenstein also had a continuing working relationship with the Independent Research Service. After it funded the American students to disrupt the Vienna festival in 1959, which both Lowenstein and Steinem had attended, it continued to support American delegations to other Moscow-backed, international youth festivals so they could be disrupted

How can we make sense of this?
What is the CIA doing with it?
The CIA is the CIA

as well. Lowenstein had planned to go to the festival in Algiers in 1965 with Georgetown law student Eugene Theroux who had been recruited by Gloria Steinem to work for the Independent Research Service and who was the brother of Peace Corps Volunteer and novelist Paul Theroux, who had been expelled from Malawi while a volunteer for smuggling messages out of the country to the anti-Banda movement and smuggling arms back in. Lowenstein wanted Eugene Theroux to join him as part of a delegation to "cause trouble," as Theroux puts it, or to "engage people in debate," as he corrects himself, at the 1965 festival. But Theroux explains that the 1965 south festival did not take place in Algiers because Ben Bella was overthrown in Algeria. It was then rescheduled for Accra in 1967, but in Theroux's words, "Nkrumah ran into trouble," and was overthrown as well, with the CIA deeply implicated in the effort.

Having started in the anti-Communist liberal camp with Herbert Humphrey, Lowenstein became a Kennedy loyalist. He found in the Kennedy's muscular liberalism that had been lacking in his hero Adlai Stevenson. And in Robert Kennedy, Lowenstein found the kind of leader he had dreamed of: someone who related to the needs of the oppressed while never backing off from his hatred of the Communists. In 1966, Lowenstein used his African expertise to assist Robert Kennedy by helping to write a major address Kennedy gave in Cape Town at a time when American credibility in Africa was suffering. Students in Africa,

black and white, responded enthusiastically to Robert Kennedy. They believed that he was opposed to apartheid and that he would not be following the policies of Lyndon Johnson in Vietnam. But in actuality, there had been no more respect for the independence of African countries during the presidency of John Kennedy than the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. Cold War considerations remained paramount no matter who was president. And Lowenstein continued to do his duty. He made trips to Africa in 1966 and 1967 to keep up his ties with the leaders of SWAPO, which had adopted a policy of armed struggle to gain independence for Namibia, and the African National Congress, the banned South African group with ties to the South African Communist Party. Lowenstein did not approve of SWAPO and its leader Sam Nujomo and took a dim view of the African National Congress. But he did cultivate individuals within these organizations such as Theo Ben Gurriah of SWAPO as valuable contacts.

Involvement with the establishment opponents of the Vietnam war and his own political career suspended his CIA-related activities, except for a 1969 Trip while in Congress to Biafra which had clear CIA overtones. They were resumed in South West Africa had made South Africa's role there a major international issue again, as the large block of non-white Third World countries pressed for its independence. Lowenstein was invited by the Johnson Foundation (funded by the Johnson & Johnson pharmaceutical company) to a key symposium on South Africa which explored ways to prevent the worst from happening in South Africa from the point of view of the American companies that had invested heavily there.

Lowenstein's analysis was classic "good wing" CIA. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were supporting liberation movements throughout the world, including Africa, he explained. Lowenstein traced anti-American sentiment to the fact that the United States was identified with the colonial oppressors in Africa and asked, "Will we identify with the oppressed people, including those of South Africa?" Because Africans were finding that the only way to produce change was through violence, this was playing "into the hands of the Soviet Union and China" who were providing money and training which were, in fact, producing results.

Lowenstein asked the rhetorical question: "Can we influence Africans to accommodate their demands to less violent ways?" His answer was that of those who, since Magna Carta, have understood the best way to avoid violent revolution: "Only if we pressure for the necessary reforms at an acceptable pace." With regard to the specific question of South Africa, with which the conference was concerned, Lowenstein postulated: "This means finding ways to get South Africa out of Namibia and Rhodesia, to permit black regimes to develop in both states. Instead of 'buffer states', there might emerge on the border of South Africa the appearance of privileged sanctuaries

no more than liberal position of liberals.

so that the pressure for change within South Africa would be stepped up. As the international dimensions proceed, they are the priority; the domestic ones should follow. Eventually, changes within South Africa will have to occur. If they do not come non-violently and in a rapid, evolutionary way, they will be forced with sabotage, violence and warfare."

Lowenstein believed the change in American policy would not come until after a new election in 1976. The election of an enlightened Democrat meant to Lowenstein that "we have a chance to suggest priorities and directions that will be realistic and humane." Loosely translated, this meant finding ways to retain the important American interests while making those concessions that were essential to stave off communism.

Implicit in the implementation of this approach is the understanding that governments established in Third World countries should be controllable, not reactionary. And when Jimmy Carter was elected president, Lowenstein found himself in a position to put his point of view into practice. Black civil rights leader and Georgia Congressman Andrew Young used his influence to have Lowenstein appointed the United States Representative to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva and then as Ambassador to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs under Young, whom Carter named the Permanent Representative to the UN.

As a spokesman on human rights for the Carter administration, Lowenstein went on numerous trips abroad sponsored

The 40 million men Mr. Jones etc

by the USIA (called the International Communications Agency during the Carter years). His job was to talk up America's support for human rights and to meet with opposition groups in the countries to which he traveled. During 1977, on a major trip through Central and South America, he visited Nicaragua where the Somoza regime was under increasing pressure from all the opposition groups in the country, from right to left. The threat of Communist revolution loomed large in Nicaragua and the more Somoza resisted change, the greater that threat became.

One of Lowenstein's contacts in Managua was Edgar Chamorro, a leader of the Democratic Conservative Party who also served as an ambassador to the United Nations with the Nicaraguan delegation. An opponent of Somoza, he had been placed in the delegation by the dictator, who was head of the Liberal Party, in an attempt to show that political diversity was permitted in Nicaragua. Chamorro was from a very old aristocratic Nicaraguan family which held power before Somoza. His party wanted a return to electoral democracy. When Lowenstein came to Nicaragua, he spent time not only with Edgar Chamorro, but with his brother Eduardo, who had served in the Nicaraguan congress.

The Chamorros assert that Lowenstein was instrumental in putting the Sandinistas in power in Nicaragua. Based in Miami, where Edgar is one of the seven-member National Directorate of the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (known popularly as "Combras"), the

Chamorros submit that the Carter administration backed the Sandinistas, believing them to be the only viable alternative to the Communists, and that the CIA destabilized Somoza so they could take power. They argue that this was not a matter of bad intentions but of a lack of knowledge of the true nature of the Sandinistas. A word they both use to describe Carter administration policy is "misguided."

"They felt they could work with the Marxists and buy the revolution," Eduardo asserts. In his view, Lowenstein was "the leading force" in the policy of getting the Sandinistas into power because of the "fear that unless these non-Communist leftists were put in, the Communists would take over after Somoza."

Eduardo Chamorro states that Lowenstein was from what he calls "the extreme left" of the CIA. "I still believe," he asserts "that the CIA has different colors, shades of political opinion depending on where they are working. In the back of their minds, they believe that the Caribbean and the underdeveloped part of Latin America couldn't afford to be democratic." Eduardo Chamorro concludes that this "extreme left" of the CIA, which included Lowenstein, supported those Marxists in the Caribbean and Latin America it believed to be controllable.

Eduardo Chamorro's conclusion is that "the CIA was finally outwitted by Castro." He explains that when the Sandinistas were put in power, the Communists "overtook" the moderates and "seized control." In his opinion, Lowen-

stein's wing of the CIA was "academic and naive," but Lowenstein's performance itself was impressive. "It was like the messiah," Eduardo Chamorro relates, "telling us there was going to be a change. After he arrived, things started to change, to be more decisive in the diplomatic, political and military areas. After Lowenstein's presence, the United States military relationship with Nicaragua weakened. Support for Somoza weakened dramatically after Lowenstein's appearance." And a friend of Chamorro's, who works primarily within Nicaragua in opposing the Sandinistas and who does not want to be named, adds, "After Lowenstein's arrival, everything happened. He was the one who started the momentum." "Everyone knew Somoza had to go," Eduardo asserts. "The real secret war was the one against Somoza, not against the Sandinistas."

Edgar Chamorro recalls once going to Lowenstein's office at the U.N. and seeing a copy of "The Sandino Affair" on his desk. They talked about the broad coalition front which was being assembled to get rid of Somoza and how active the United States was in this period. "Lowenstein was very much in favor of the Sandinistas," the former ambassador reflects. "Lowenstein was very active in destabilizing Nicaragua. They wanted to get rid of Somoza by any means."

This analysis by the two Nicaraguans is partially confirmed by Sidney Lens, Senior Editor of *The Progressive*, who has written: "Sometimes Washington's tactics are crowned with quick success—as they

were in Salvador Allende's Chile ten years ago. Sometimes they meet with repeated failure, as in the twenty-five-year campaign against Fidel Castro's Cuba. And sometimes the outcome remains in doubt—as it does with respect to the Sandinistas of Nicaragua.

"For years, the brutal Somoza dynasty enjoyed Washington's whole-hearted support as it amassed all but incalculable wealth at the expense of the Nicaraguan people. In the late 1970's when it became clear that the Somoza days were numbered, the Carter administration (in conjunction with Catholic prelates and Nicaragua's official Moscow-oriented Communist Party) tried to ease the last Somoza out of power while leaving the system relatively intact."

Lens argues that the Sandinistas would not make a deal with the United States and took power themselves. He writes further that "Washington, probing to see whether the new regime in Managua was for sale, offered a \$75 million loan. But the Sandinistas refused to accede to U.S. conditions: They would not turn their backs on the revolution in nearby El Salvador, for example, nor would they reject Cuban offers of assistance. Once it became clear that Nicaragua would no longer be a submissive satellite of the United States, Washington began turning the screws."

Sandinista officials became incensed at the suggestion that the United States helped put them in power. They prefer the Lens version of what took place: the Americans did want Somoza out, but the Sandinistas took power without their

How did any of this mean that it was not a real victory for the Sandinistas?

This memo is a copy of what they did find in what had a chapter of American & his

For what had a chapter of American & his

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help. But could they have come to power unless the United States let them?

Lowenstein greeted the Sandinista victory in 1979 with enthusiasm. He was no longer in the Carter administration, having resigned his United Nations post, partially because of differences with Andrew Young over American policy in Southern Africa. Lowenstein was to the right of Young, who favored supporting the more radical black liberation movements. Lowenstein sided with the "moderate" blacks and the "verlichte" or "enlightened" Afrikaners of South Africa who had sought out his advice and assistance, as well as with the white liberals that Young found to be "irrelevant" in South Africa and Rhodesia. What Lowenstein was clearly looking for in Nicaragua was a scenario similar to the one he helped to write in Portugal with his friend Frank Carlucci, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from 1975 to 1978 and then as Jimmy Carter's Deputy Director of the CIA.

What this involved was riding out the far left and the Communists as well as the right-wing reaction to the revolution and finally installing the moderate Socialists who were pro-American. True, Portugal was a European country, but Lowenstein was a believer in the applicability of democratic institutions in any situation where it was essential to halt the advance of the Communists.

the Portuguese revolution was pushing increasingly leftward. In March of 1975, Carlucci wrote Lowenstein that the coup attempt in Portugal, which he described as "unbelievably ill-conceived, poorly organized and badly led," was suspected of being organized by the powerful Communist Party. Carlucci disagreed with this assessment, but added: "I think it is a serious question about whether your friend Mario Soares will remain as Foreign Minister. With the parties to the center coming under attack and almost certain to be banned, the whole spectrum shifts to the left and the Socialists in turn must be considered a center or center-right party! This is hard to conceive of through our eyes but that is what is indeed happening, particularly since there are a number of small splinter groups to the left of the Communists." Carlucci was looking for a way to restore the equilibrium but acknowledged that "certainly life will become more difficult."

Lowenstein began making trips to Portugal, passing through there several times while he was an ambassador to the U.N. Lowenstein visited Carlucci and his wife Marsha in Lisbon on various occasions and stayed with them at the Ambassador's residence. Writers for Ralph Nader, Ronald Brownstein, and Nina Eason, have reported accusations against Carlucci that he was a CIA agent, stating: "But if Carlucci, as he maintains, was never involved in any of the CIA's covert intrigues during the 1960s, he at least seemed regularly to pop up in the vicinity of some of the agency's sleazier operations." The controversial "Dirty

Tricks II, the CIA in Africa," devotes a whole chapter to Carlucci, and while Carter's appointment of him as Deputy Director of the CIA does not in itself confirm the allegations, it lends credence to the argument that Carlucci had previous experience, making him a logical candidate for the position.

Lowenstein was extremely useful to Carlucci. According to Carlucci, Lowenstein "had a relationship with Mario, I think through the Socialist International. And he knew him and Soares liked him and he would call on him when he came to Lisbon."

Lowenstein admitted knitting needle approach to Communist revolution; to work it out from the inside out, opening the knot with subtlety with the fine instrument of a Mario Soares. Carlucci's blind exterior concealed a tough personality. Lowenstein was helpful to Carlucci when he was having what Carlucci refers to as a "difference of opinion" with Henry Kissinger over policy toward Portugal. He had a "range of contacts right to left" and used these contacts to help Carlucci. Lowenstein spoke with Senator James Buckley, William Buckley's brother (Lowenstein was close to William Buckley who, like Lowenstein, had served in the CIA) to get him to talk to Kissinger to persuade him to be more supportive of Carlucci's approach, which was to ride the situation out until the pro-American moderate left which Soares represented could be put into power. According to Brownstein and Eason, Carlucci was Ambassador "at a time when the CIA

was shoring up conservative elements there with money and manpower to prevent the Communist Party from taking power. During that period Carlucci led a minority of policymakers who argued —against Secretary Henry Kissinger— in favor of supporting Portugal's leftist military government in 1975 'as long as appearances of democracy remained intact', as one official said. Carlucci's position eventually gained the White House's support."

It was alleged that Kissinger complained during a meeting, "Whoever sold me Carlucci as a tough guy?" and although the State Department denied the report of Kissinger's complaint, Carlucci did have to work feverishly to prevent Carlucci from imposing an arms embargo against the independent socialist government, firing off cables to counter those opposing Carlucci's U.S. military assistance plan for Portugal. Carlucci reported that the most satisfying aspect of his experience as the Ambassador to Portugal "was watching the Portuguese people move from the brink of communism to equilibrium."

The Portuguese Communist Party then published a 167-page book called "Dossier Carlucci C.I.A.," accusing him of working to "subvert the revolutionary process initiated in Portugal." After he became Deputy Director of the CIA, they charged: "What should one think of the president of one country whose representative to the president of another country afterwards becomes director of the spying service?" But Carlucci was doing what the CIA did often, and con-

times to do, and which has never been appreciated by the right or the left in America. With Allard Lowenstein's assistance, he was defeating the Communists with another form of the left: the pro-American, anti-Communist Socialists. According to Carlucci, Lowenstein's "contacts with the Socialists were very close." Lowenstein knew Soares through the German Socialists who "were very close to Mario Soares. He was also close to the British Socialists and the Socialists were all very chummy." Carlucci describes Soares, who eventually became Prime Minister of Portugal, as "a very pro-American, pro-NATO Socialist who's now trying to turn back some of the government-owned banks to the private sector."

Carlucci has expressed his gratitude to Lowenstein for his assistance in stopping the Communists in Portugal. "He was very supportive. He was definitely helpful," Carlucci concludes. "The U.S. government was of two minds." Carlucci explains. "One was the fatalistic frame of mind that said Portugal was lost and that the best thing to do was to insulate them from the rest of NATO, and in effect, ostracize them. I was arguing that Portugal was not lost, that it had too many ties to NATO, to the West, and that while most of the country was in the hands of the Communists, our only logical course of action was to work with the moderate non-Communist elements, and that included at that time in particular the Socialist, who were the strongest non-Communist political force."

How close were Carlucci and Lowen-

stein? According to Carlucci, their friendship went back to the late Sixties when Lowenstein was elected to Congress and he was with the Office of Economic Opportunity in the Nixon administration. But Carlucci had also been heavily involved in Africa as a Foreign Service Officer and was in Johannesburg in 1959 at the same time Lowenstein was asked by the CIA to smuggle Hans Beukes out of the country. Carlucci became a legend because of his daring exploits in Africa. Was he the man who gave Lowenstein the request? Carlucci says "It's entirely possible that we met at the time but didn't remember it. I was in South Africa in the late fifties, but I was a very minor functionary." Carlucci also insists that he never heard of the Hans Beukes affair although he was Vice Consul at the Consulate in Johannesburg in 1959, and by both Lowenstein's and Emory Bandy's accounts, it was a major story in the South African press. Carlucci maintains that Lowenstein "had no association with the C.I.A. other than knowing me or knowing people in the C.I.A., as anybody does who travels around the world." But he adds that "those of us who have been associated with the C.I.A. neither confirm nor deny any kind of association with it," and says "even if he had been in the C.I.A., there's nothing wrong with it." When the story of how Al Lowenstein smuggled out Beukes is related to Carlucci, he just smiles, revealing the slightest hint of amusement. In Carlucci's office at the headquarters of Sears World Trade in Washington where he works as its head, having resigned as Deputy Secre-

tary of Defense in the Reagan administration, there is a color photograph of him and his attractive wife Marsha beaming in front of a partially visible big Central Intelligence Agency insignia. They are being honored.

If Lowenstein was regarded as part of the "far left" of the C.I.A. because of his support for the Sandinistas and Mario Soares, he was at odds with his old friend Andrew Young and his colleague, black American diplomat Donald McHenry, who served as Young's deputy at the United Nations and later as his replacement, when it came to Southern Africa. Young particularly saw the necessity of dealing with Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, the leaders of the Patriotic Front that had launched an armed struggle against Ian Smith and the white supremacists in Rhodesia, while Lowenstein did what he could to exclude them from the process. Lowenstein did not reject the use of force to overthrow a government. He had celebrated when the Sandinistas took the presidential palace in Managua. But he thought both Nkomo and Mugabe were Communists who could not be trusted.

There were tensions between Andrew Young and Lowenstein on the whole question of Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. "Young said anyone who found merit in the transition government in Rhodesia was a sell-out," Lowenstein aide Ken McCormick asserts. "He said anyone who tried to work with Ian Smith was a sell-out. Al believed there would be lots of whites in Zimbabwe and that they would have to be dealt with. He was an anti-Communist. He knew Stalinism for what it was; oppressive, treacherous and murderous. He wasn't interested in seeing that imposed anywhere, including South West Africa. The others just wanted the whites out and whatever came afterwards was acceptable." William Buckley puts Lowenstein's feelings about Young even more strongly: "He didn't trust Andy Young," he states. "He didn't believe what Young was telling him."

Lowenstein viewed Mugabe and Nkomo in the same light as he viewed Sam Nujoma, the head of the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), who launched an armed struggle to oust South Africa from Namibia. As Lowenstein's friend Wendell Wilkie II, with whom Lowenstein spoke after his last African trip, puts it, Lowenstein "got distressed over Andy Young's role. He felt that Young was pushing the Carter administration toward supporting the revolutionaries. His feeling was that Bishop Muzorewa was elected and that there were problems with that and that there should be more elections. He was on the conservative side, or to the right of the Carter administration on Rhodesia. Al perceived Mugabe, who was waging a revolutionary war, as a rigid Leninist and felt Nkomo had a Russian connection." How right was Lowenstein about Nkomo from power by Mugabe, fled to London, not Moscow, before returning to Zimbabwe and his seat in parliament. Mugabe, after dining at the White House with President Reagan, was assured of continued American aid, although more

recently the Rengim administration has reduced the assistance. Zimbabwe calls itself "socialist" but is capitalist in practice, indicating that Lowenstein's fears were unwarranted. Both in Africa and in the United States, Lowenstein, like other white liberals, had trouble with strong, outspoken nationalist black leaders, whether from the Patriotic Front or the SNCC.

Lowenstein told his aide at the U.N. Tom Flynn that he thought Muzorewa and the Rhodesian white liberals could form the center of a bi-racial coalition. He said to James Symington at a memorial for Bobby Kennedy that Bishop Muzorewa deserved a chance in spite of his white support. It was his opinion that Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo could not form a government because they were guerrillas. Wendell Wilkie II speaks of Lowenstein's "frustration" with Andrew Young's approach to foreign policy and says that Lowenstein "believed in the possibility of peaceful change in Southern Africa. He was hostile to violent revolution." Wilkie adds that Martin Luther King had greatly influenced Lowenstein, neglecting to point out that Andrew Young had been King's aide. And since Lowenstein had supported the Sandinistas, his opposition to violent revolution depended on who the revolutionaries were and if, in his opinion, they could be controlled. Young's position in Rhodesia was similar to Lowenstein's in Nicaragua, but because he was black, he felt that he would have input and win Mugabe over. He evidently succeeded, even if Mugabe still expresses his sym-

thy for a one-party system in Zimbabwe and detested white air force officers after their acquittal in a treason trial. Young who has expressed his serious reservations about covert operations, thinks being up-front about our foreign policy objectives is the best bet. But neither he nor Lowenstein disagreed with the need to have governments favorable to America in Third World countries. Their disagreement was over how to get them.

Lowenstein stressed publicly, both in his testimony to Congress and to the press, that his goal was to preserve the democratic process in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia. He suggested threatening Muzorewa and Nkomo with lifting the U.S. ban on Rhodesian chrome as a way of forcing them to the bargaining table. The Carter administration was not enthusiastic about this proposal. Young saw Mugabe as the eventual winner and did not want to offend him. In the end, with the British handling the negotiations, the Patriotic Front agreed to a cease fire and joined the electoral process, with Mugabe winning the election in February of 1980, becoming Prime Minister and ending white rule.

Although Lowenstein was at odds with the Carter administration, he remained extremely active in Southern Africa. It was, in fact, Lowenstein's involvement with certain white South Africans and his relationship with Frank Carlucci, appointed Deputy Director of the CIA by Jimmy Carter, that enabled him to continue his work in Southern Africa in the summer of 1979, when he made an ex-

tensive trip there with his three children and an aide.

In July of 1979, Lowenstein's old friend Ernest Wenzel, a former president of the National Union of South African Students with whom Lowenstein stayed during his 1959 trip and an official in the defunct South African Liberal Party, wrote to Hank Shack, the American director of Harry Oppenheimer's Anglo-American Industrial Corporation, Ltd., explaining the arrangements for the trip. Lowenstein was to come to South Africa for about six weeks, leaving the United States on July 1, and traveling "via London" where he planned to "spend a day with Lord Harlech to discuss matters with him." Harlech, the British Ambassador to the United States while John Kennedy was president, was serving as the negotiator on the Rhodesian crisis.

Lowenstein, his children and his aide, Mark Childress, a Yale undergraduate, were to be given round-trip air fare aboard the Concorde. In Johannesburg, a house would be supplied to Lowenstein and children with arrangements made for the children for recreation. The house was also to serve as a base for Lowenstein to have extensive meetings with key figures from Southern Africa. Lowenstein was also to have his traveling expenses covered for trips to Zimbabwe, Namibia and within South Africa. Lowenstein's fee for his work was \$7,000, with an additional \$1,000 paid to Childress and another \$1,000 to Lowenstein's secretary. Wenzel needed quick confirmation from Shack and concluded: "Do you think you

could confirm them immediately? I propose, when you do so, to arrange lectures by AI at Wits, Stellenbosch, UCT, the Institute of Race Relations, International Affairs, etc. to give some additional reasons for his visit." The lectures to the South African universities and other institutions were given by Lowenstein to friends as the purpose of the trip. He was evasive about how he was going, telling some friends that he was paying for it himself and suggesting to others, such as Theo-Ben Gurrah, SWAPO's chief representative to the United Nations, that wealthy South Africans and Americans were involved. He even dropped hints to others that Harry Oppenheimer had something to do with it.

Most of the arrangements were taken care of in New York through Shack, who, in addition to his important position at Anglo-American, headed a "personal service" company in Manhattan called R.L. Clare, Inc. When Shack's name was mentioned to a South African at their Consulate in New York, she observed: "Mr. Lowenstein must have had something to do with the very top people at Anglo-American." At the very top of Anglo-American was, of course, Harry Oppenheimer.

Oppenheimer was clearly the source of the money that was paid to Lowenstein. Speaking from his chambers on Priehard Street, Wenzel, a South African barrister, does not deny that it was Anglo-American that put up the \$7,000 for Lowenstein and the rest of the money for Mark Childress who accompanied him and Lowenstein's secretary who worked

on planning the trip. When asked exactly what the source was, he responded: "I don't know if I'm very happy to tell you that." To the specific question "Would it have been Anglo-American?" he answers: "What an extraordinary question. You know, I'm not sure I've got the right, he's deceased, to discuss that sort of matter with you. It was kept highly private and personal. Alhard and I were friends for a very, very long time, more than twenty years, and that matter was something entirely private between him and me. I raised the money. But I truly don't know that I would feel happy on a telephone just to rattle off what happened in this connection. Without being unpleasant about it, I don't know who the hell you are. . . . I just wouldn't ordinarily answer such a question." Wentzel also refuses to explain Slack's role, saying "I really don't think I should have a discussion with you about it. I think it would be quite nutty of me to do that." Slack himself has not responded to questions submitted to him.

It may well have been a private matter, but Lowenstein, who was in close contact with the Nationalist government on a very high level as well as Harry Oppenheimer, was working hard in the United States to effect American policy in Southern Africa through legislation and presidential decisions, and United States policy at the U.N. He was, in this instance, almost certainly required to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Lowenstein had the assistance of the Deputy Director of the CIA, Frank

Carlucci. According to Carlucci, Lowenstein "would report to me" and "kept the State Department informed" through David Newsome. Under Secretary of State. "The State Department, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, they thought of Al as somebody who kept getting in the way of their negotiations in the State Department," Carlucci asserts. "I, on the other hand, felt that he could make a useful contribution and urged them to listen. Dick Moose was the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and they kind of wished Al would stop interfering in their affairs and I said no. He could be useful, because Al did have invitations. He had invitations from South African officials and had invitations, of course, from the people in Rhodesia. He would come back and tell me what was going on and try to get the State Department to be more . . . to try and establish some channels between Zimbabwe, South Africa and the State Department." According to Carlucci, Lowenstein thought the problems of South Africa could be "worked out."

As for how Lowenstein managed to get to South Africa in the summer of 1979, he declares: "For all I know, he paid for the trip himself. I don't know if for a fact, I just never questioned it. For all I know, he could have had clients who paid him and he could have coupled that with some legal business."

According to Carlucci's financial disclosure statement, when he was Deputy Director of the CIA the only income besides his salary that he received were dividends from family holdings in a handful

of companies and the interest on his savings account. But one of those companies was DeBeers, Harry Oppenheimer's diamond business. While this does not indicate a conflict of interest, it does reflect a mind-set of the holder of the shares and his attitude toward South Africa. And it casts a shadow on the kind of role Carlucci had in mind for Lowenstein in a country where Harry Oppenheimer, the man whose company was the provider of the funds that paid Lowenstein, was making fortunes using black labor which is paid far less than white. Anglo-American was the leading corporate presence in Zimbabwe. DeBeers ran the diamond mines of Namibia. Both were controlled by Harry Oppenheimer who was financing the political parties backed by the South African Government in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

But Oppenheimer was still regarded as the ally of the liberals in South Africa, such as Ernest Wentzel, because he did not oppose all change and recognized that many racial barriers would have to fall, such as the pass system, if there was to go to be a violent revolution which would cost him everything. And there-fore in South Africa were now working with the "verligte" Afrikaners in the Nationalist government who were finally coming around to the views they had denounced in the past, views which Lowenstein had expressed in his book *Struggle Mandate*.

Like Carlucci, Ernest Wentzel believed that Lowenstein had an important role to play in South Africa and Rhodesia. He states: "I thought that Alhard had two


very important things that he could do. The first one is that he always had an uncanny ability, in my experience with him, to bring together people of very different opinions and in South Africa, obviously, people of very different racial backgrounds and get them into the habit of talking the one with the other. And I was pretty anxious that—he had a particular ability to talk to Afrikaners, white Afrikaners in South Africa, and I was very anxious that he should take an increasing interest in Southern Africa and, you know, particularly try to show that there are sympathetic people—I was very anxious that he should have some exposure again to South Africa and more particularly to Afrikaners, to try to persuade them that the whole world is not entirely hostile and uncaring and unthinking about them, but that they've got to move forward and move in a very perceptible and obvious way. And that was one factor. The other factor was that I wanted at the time for him to take a very much greater interest in Zimbabwe and where the development and future of Zimbabwe at that time was very critically posed. And I wanted him to be, in other words, get much more involved in Southern Africa than he had been for some time."

Lowenstein met with the top leaders of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, or their representatives. He even spoke with imprisoned black South African nationalist, Nelson Mandela. Richard Moose, Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, told former CIA analyst Sam Adams that Lowenstein was talking to "a lot of opposition

groups" in Southern Africa and that there was concern about him in the State Department. "State was scared as hell about what Lowenstein was doing in South Africa," Moose said to Adams, and he himself had been "worried about the Lowenstein problem," thinking that Lowenstein was "a loose end knocking around Africa." But Moose learned more about his work in Africa and then said he was "surprised that Lowenstein wasn't as doctrinaire a liberal as I thought."

Lowenstein told the Pretoria Press Club that America's attitude to South Africa should be seen as one of affection, concern and "brotherly identification." Although America would not prescribe to South Africa how to solve its problems, only decisions supported by all groups in the country would be acceptable, he said. "It is our duty to end White rule and nothing will change that," Lowenstein added, saying the flexibility and change in Namibia was encouraging and that there was no reason why the same principles could not be applied in South Africa. With regard to Namibia, Lowenstein told Ivor Wilkins of the *Sunday Times* that the atmosphere he recorded twenty years ago in his book *British Mandate* had changed vastly. "The contrast between what I found in SWA/Namibia twenty years ago and the situation now is the most remarkable example

of people being able to change more than they think they can," he stated. He insisted that people who twenty years ago were "suspicious, distrustful and hostile" were now "sitting down and making decisions to erase social injustice." Lowenstein's assessment of Namibia, like his previous analysis of the first elections in Rhodesia before the Patriotic Front was included, was as much a projection of his own values and experiences in the United States as an attempt to describe reality. He always spoke of the civil rights movement in the United States and how events in other countries resembled it as those societies made what he believed to be progress in the field of human rights. But as Eduardo Chamorro observed, "Lowenstein was an extraordinary person, but there was an enormous cultural gap. He saw an analogy between civil rights in the United States and Nicaragua. As in the case of Zimbabwe, he believed the analogy of the United States system was applicable. But the courts were not the same in these places." But on another level, Lowenstein was a professional in the intelligence business, working in the interests of the West. There is an impossible contradiction in this. The very interests he was serving resisted the kinds of changes he wanted to take place because ultimately those changes would lead to the loss of what the interests wanted to preserve.



For ten years, Margaret and I have been best friends.