Jan. 2, 1978

FROM: Howard Roffman

TO: Fans & Watchers of Mark Lane

RE: Mark bane's Scholarship or lack thereof.

On December 26, 1977, the New York Times printed an article about a CIA cable to discredit the Warren Commission. I was curious to see the Times' account, for I had read another account of the cable in an appendix to Lane's Code Name: Zorro. I have never seen the original cable, but a comparison of Lane's and the Times' version tells a lot--about Mark Lane.

The April 1, 1967 cable was apparently intended to instruct personnel overseas how to respond to criticism of the Warren Commission i.e., how to deflate it and discredit the critics.

The Times article notes that the cable singled out Lane's and Epstein's books for attack. It then quotes the cable verbatim:

"Although Mark Lane's book is much less convincing than Epsteir and comes off badly where contested by knowledgeable critics, it is also much more difficult to answer as a whole, as one becomes lost in a morass of unrelated details."

Here is how Lane represents this sentence, the only time he describes the cable's specific reference to his book:

"The CIA document explained that 'Nark Lane's book' is 'more difficult to answer as a whole.'" (CN:Z, p. 302)

Thus, Lane omits the CIA's unfavorable characterization of the book ("much less convincing" and "comes off badly...") and quotes the senter out of context to make it seem as if the book is "difficult to answer" because it is a solid work.

This is vintage Lane.

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A C.I.A. Cable Sought to Discredit Critics of the Warren Commission

often a gued that its worldwide propaganda efforts are intended only to alter the climate of public opinion in other countries and that any "fallout" reaching the eyes and ears of Americans is both unavoidable and nuntentional.

But a C.I.A. document, recently de-classified under the Freedom of Information Act, provides a detailed account of at least one instance in which the agency mustered its propaganda machinery to support an issue of far more concern to Americans, and to the C.I.A. itself, than to citizens of other countries.

This was the conclusion of the Warren Commission that Lee Harvey Os-wald alone was responsible for the as-sassination of President Kennedy.

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In a cable sent to some of its over-seas stations and bases on April 1, 1967, C.I.A. headquarters began by re-calling that "from the day of President Kennedy's assassination on, there has been speculation about the responsibil-ity for his murder."

Such speculation, the cable said, was "stemmed for a time" by the release of the Warren Commission's report in early 1964. But, the cable noted: "Various writers have now had time to come ous writers have now had time to scan documents for new pretexts for questioning, and there has been a new wave

tioning, and there has been a new wave of books and articles criticizing the Commission's findings."

"This trend of opinion is a matter of concern to the U.S. Government, including our organization," the C.I.A. said, adding that the agency was "directly involved" in the matter because "among other facts, we contributed information to the investigation."

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"Conspiracy theories," the cable went on, "have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization, for example by falsely alleging that Lee Harvey Oswald worked for us. The aim of this dispatch is to provide material for countering and discrediting the claims of the conspiracy theorists, so as to inhibit circulation of such claims in other countries." other countries."

other countries."

The C.I.A. was careful to caution its stations overseas not to initiate a discussion "of the assassination question" where such a discussion was "not already taking place." But where such discussions were under way, C.I.A. officers abroad were directed to "discuss the publicity problem with liaison and the publicity problem with liaison and

friendly elite contacts, especially politicians and editors," and to "employ propaganda assets to answer and refute the attacks of the critics."

"Book reviews and feature articles."

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the cable and, "are particularly appropriate for this purpose."

Among the arguments that the agency suggested were that the Warren Commission had conducted "as thorough an investigation as humanly possible, that the charges of the critics are without serious foundation, and that further speculative discussion only nlays into the bands of the opposition."

that further speculative discussion only plays into the hands of the opposition."
"Point out also," the cable directed, "that parts of the conspiracy talk appear to be deliberately generated by Communist propagandists."

Two of the strongest critics of the Two of the strongest critics of the Warren Commission, Edward Jay Epstein and Mark Lane, were singled out for attack. "Although Mark Lane's book is much less convincing than Epstein's and comes off badly where contested by knowledgeable critics," the cable said, in a reference to Mr. Lane's book, 'Rush to Judgment,' it is also much more difficult to answer as a whole, as one becomes lost in a morass whole, as one becomes lost in a morass of unrelated details."

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These critics and others, the C.I.A. said, should be depicted as "wedded to theories adopted before the evidence was in," politically or financially "interested" in disproving the commission's conclusion, "hasty or inaccurate in their research, or infatuated with their own theories."

Such critics the cable advised "have

Such critics, the cable advised, "have Such critics, the capie advised, "nave often been enticed by a form of intellectual pride: They light on some theory and fall in love with it; they also scoff at the commission because it did not always answer every question with a flat decision one way or tion with a flat decision one way or

the other.

"Actually, the makeup of the commission and its staff was an excellent safeguard against overcommitment to any one theory, or against the illicit transformation of probabilities into certainties."

In what was perhaps a burst of professional pride, C.I.A. headquarters asked that it also be pointed out that "Oswald would not have been any sensible person's shoice for a Co constitution." sible person's choice for a co-conspira-tor—he was a 'loner,' mixed up, of questionable reliability and an un-known quantity to any professional in-telligence service."