On January 25, 1965, Atlanta requested a 90 day extension of the misur on King's house. On the twenty-sixth, Sizoo advised Sullivan he had authorized misurs of King for two days at a hotal in New York because of the potential for developing intelligence information.(u)

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Sclected memoranda between February 1965 and December 1967 indicated that the Eureau continued its campaign to discredit and neutralize King. In February 1965 Atlanta was reprimanded for not forwarding information about King quickly enough. In February the Eureau proposed to seek Cardinal Spellman's help in preventing the Davenport, Iowa Catholic Inter-racial Council from giving King an award. Hoover said no. But in March, Gov. Velpe of Massachusetts was briefed by the FBI about King's background in an effort to tone down "Martin Luther King Day"/W

## F. Early 1967-1968

1.110

The primary concerns of the Bureau relating to Dr. King at this time were his anti-Viet Nam statements and his planned Washington Spring Project which later became the Poor People's Campaign. On December 7, 1967 the Eureau elected various field offices and told them to develop ghetto informants, if they had none, and to report weekly on plans for the Project. On December 20, 1967 an updated monograph of King was prepared.

about Viet Nam and the Spring Project. (c)

In December 1967, King was preparing a taped series of lectures for Canadian radio. The Director instructed the Legat in Ottawa to determine who made the arrangements, including financing, for the series. The justification was to find the source of funds to finance a "new program... of massive civil disobedience demonstrations which may result in riots". The Director was referring to the Spring Project in which King had threatened continuing demonstrations until Congress passed a program designed to help blacks ( $\omega$ )

CONFIDENTIAL

3/31/76 raport

On January 3, 1968 Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned down a Bareau request to tap SCLC. In January Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) attempted to enlist DeLoach's assistance in preparing a speech for Byrd to deliver in Congress to help King meet his "Materloo" before the Spring Project. DeLoach refused. Other January memos dealt principally with the Project. (u)

INCLASSIF

On March 20, 1963, Hoover approved briefing Cardinal O'Boyle and Bishop Lord of Washington about the potential for violence in the Spring Project and asking them to call for nonviolence. On March 21, the Director sent an "Urgent" teletype to various field offices reminding them to carry out previous instructions concerning the Project. On March 25, the President was advised by the Bureau that Robert Kennedy (D-N.Y.) had attempted to contact King before he announced for the Presidency. The next day an updated 39 page monograph about King was disseminated and (b)(7) (Chas overheard discussing plans and fund raising for the Project. (B)

On March 28, 1968, Dr. King led a march in Memphis, in support of striking sanitation workers. The march turned violent and King was taken by his aides and the police from the area to a Holiday Inn. As a COINTELPRO activity, Hoover approved sending the following information to "friendly" news media: (4)

4.12.00

Martin Luther King injected himself into the strike in Memphis... and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting and riot. (w)

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting 'black power' and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out. ( $\omega$ )

Memphis may only be the prelude to the civil strife in our Nation's Capitol. (...)

On March 29 and 30, 1968 King engaged in several overheard telephone conversations and meetings, rome with [(b)(7)(c)] to discuss the Memohis violence. He was extremely dejected and considered his image and the image of nonviolence to have been adversely affected. The press was critical. At first he considered abandoning Memohis and the Spring Project; he considered a public fast. Aides feared for his safety if he returned to Memohis...(b)(7)(C)strongly urged him to go forward with his plans. He told King that he was not responsible for the violence of others. Finally, after a long meeting in Atlanta with his staff and (b)(7)(C) King decided to return to Memohis.(L) On April 1, 1968, the Bureau advised the White House, but not Attorney Ceneral Clark, of a tapped discussion between (b)(7)(Chad King concerning the Presidential race between Johnson, Kennedy and McCarthy. On April 2, Attorney General Clark turned down a request to tap SCLC in Atlanta and Washington (u)

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The Bureau directed four specific COINTELPRO activities against King in 1968. Most were clearly designed to have an adverse effect on the Spring Project, particularly with respect to fund taising. One, of course, concerned King's staying at the Holiday Inn in Memphis. f(x)

King was assassinated in Memphis on April 4, 1968. [(b)(7)(0)]continued to give advice to Coretta King, Andrew Young and others. The Eureau continued their campaign against King by various periodic briefings designed to thwart declaring King's birthday a national holiday. (.)

## TOP SECRET (our goe)