..... · diamin UNITED STATES ERNMENT Delor Memorandum Calles TO DATE February 29, 1968 Mr. C. Sullivan Moore g() 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach FROM 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan 1 - Mr. oore 1 SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM 1 BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

PURPOSE:

To expand the Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to 41 field divisions so as to cover the great majority of black nationalist activity in this country.

BACKGROUND:

By letter dated August 25, 1967,23 field offices were advised of a new Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalists and prevent violence on their part. Goals of this program are to prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups, prevent the rise of a leader who might unify and electrify these violence-prone clements, prevent these militants from gaining respectability and prevent the growth of these groups among America's youth.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

In view of the tremendous increase in black nationalist activity, and the approach of summer, this program should be expanded and these goals should be reiterated to the field. Attached airtel also instructs the field to submit periodic progress letters to stimulate thinking in this area.


Attached mirtel also reminds' the field that counterintelligence suggestions to expose these militants or neutralize them must be approved by the Bureau.

ACTION:

6 MAR 11 1968

That attached airtel expanding this program, defining goals and instructing periodic progress letters be submitted be sent Albany and the other listed field offices.

Enclosure TJD:rmm (6) ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HETEIN IS UST STSTEED EXCEPT WELRE SHOWN OTHERWISE. The second second second second second ST PL STORE STATE Same Statistics



Airtel to SAC, Albany RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

BACKGROUND

By letter dated 8/25/67 the following offices were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence Program against militant Black Nationalist-Hate Groups:

	Albany Memphis	1
	Atlanta	
	Baltimore New Orleans	
	Boston New York	
	Buffalo Philadelphia	
	Charlotte . Phoenix ,	
	Chicago	
1	Cincinnati Richmond	$s \not \to$
	Cleveland St. Louis	
	Detroit San Francisco	
	Jackson	1
	Los Angeles	
	and the second sec	

Each of the above offices was: to designate a Special Agent to coordinate this program. Replies to this letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against militant black nationalist groups that foment violence and several offices outlined procedures which had been effective in the past. For example, Washington Field Office had furnished information about a new Nation of Islam (NOI) grade school to appropriate authorities in the District of Columbin who investigated to determine if the school conformed to District regulations for private schools. In the process WFO obtained background information on the parents of each pupil.

The Revolutionary Action Novement (RAM), a pro-Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The Philadelphia Office alerted local police; who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent ;most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.....

The Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added to this program should designate an Agent familiar with black

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nationalist activity, and interested in counterintelligend to coordinate this program. This Agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested, but each agent working this type of case should participate in the formulation of counterintelligence operations.

GOALS

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For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence "ogram, and to provent wasted effort, long-range goals are fatter i the state of the

1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Hau Mau" in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.

2. Prevent the rise of a "mossiah" who could

unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. "alcolm X might have been such a "hessinh;" he is the martyr i the movement today. Wartin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael Subammed is less of a threat because of his age. King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. Carmichael has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance, and is, of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should also be a goal of the Counterintelligence Program. Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of fiscrediting block nationalistsmust be handled tactically an three ways. You must discrodit these groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community

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both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way. 5 M.C.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the longrange growth of militant black nationalist organizations," especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

Besides these five goals counterintelligence is a valuable part of our regular investigative program as it often produces positive information. .

TARGETS

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. Wo should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone .leaders, monbers, and followers of the:

> Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Revolutionary Action Novement (RAM). Nation of Islam (NOI)

· · · · Within 30 days of the date of this letter each office

1. Advise the Bureau of the identity of the Sped

 $(x_{i}, y_{i}) \in \mathbb{R}^{n}$ Offices handling these cases and those of Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, H. Rap Brown of SNCC, Martin Luther King of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Nuhammed of . NOI, should be alert for counterintelligence suggestions.

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gent assigned to coordinate this program.

INSTRUCTIONS

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2. Submit a very succinct summary of the black manne, number of members and degree of activity of each black manne, number of members and degree of activity of each black mationalist group. Also state your estimate of each groups propensity for violence. This is for target evaluation only, not for record purposes. Second, list Rabble-Rousor Index subjects who are militant black nationalists and any other militant black nationalist leaders who might be future targets of counterintelligence action because of their propensity for violence. Include a minimum of background information on each person listed; a few descriptive sentences

3. List those organizations and individuals you consider of such potential danger as to be considered for current counterintelligence action. Briefly justify each target.

4. Submit any suggestion you have for overall counterintelligence action or the administration of this program. Suggestions for action against any specific target should be submitted by separate letter.

5. Submit, by separate letter, suggestions for counterintelligence action against the targets previously listed as field-wide. These should not be general, such as "publicize Stokely Carmichael's travel to communist countries," but should be specific as to target, what is to be done, what contacts are to be used, and all other information needed for the Bureau to approve a counterintelligence operation.

Thereafter, on a ninety-day-basis, each office is to submit a progress letter summarizing counterintelligence operations proposed during the period, operations effected, and tangible results. Any changes in the overall black nationalist movement should be summarized in this letter. This should include new organizations, new leaders, and any changes in data listed under number two above. Suggestions for counterintelligence operations should not be set out in this progress letter. Use the following captions:

1. Operations Under Consideration, 2. Operations Being Effected, 3. Tangible Results, and 4. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest. These 90-day progress letters are due at the Burcau the first day of March, June, September, and December, excepting March, 1968.

Airtel to SAC, Albany COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM RE: BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

The effectiveness of counterintelligence depend on the quality and quantity of positive information available regarding the target and on the imagination and initiative of Agents working the program. The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Communist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence. 14.1 110 1

1.1.1 Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau.' Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.

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2.00 NOTE:

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See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned as above dated 2/2/68, prepared by TJD:rmm.