

SECRET

CLASSIFIED: SECRET.....EXEMPT _ 5 USC §552(b)(1)

On April 23, 1964 Sullivan authorized a misur on King in Los Angeles and one in Sacramento. Also in April Hoover approved permitting the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research to read the "recalled" monograph about King. The White House and Attorney General were told that King, in a near intoxicated state, said he was going to go on a hunger strike in D.C. and die unless the Civil Rights Bill was passed. Attorney General Kennedy was advised that King had refused to debate Malcolm X. King confused the Director when, for unknown reasons, he had his secretary advise the FBI he was going to give a speech in the Philadelphia area. Apparently this was the first time King had told the Bureau of his plans and the Director wanted to know why. In later months and years, King usually told the Bureau of his travel plans (u)

you'll never know this from what I have received, which indicates the report is subject from Atlanta, FD.

The pace of Bureau activity concerning King then seems to have slackened for a few months. In fact, in May 1964 the Atlanta office was told to leave personal material about King only in intra-Bureau communications and not in anything that might be disseminated. However, the New York office was directed to canvass New York banks to find any accounts of King. An updated profile of King was prepared in May and served as the justification for keeping King in Section A of the Reserve Index because of "subject's position as President of SCLC and he continues to be controlled by Communists." The summary of the profile originally contained a statement that King "...

(From context can this really be (b)(1)?)

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(S)

In May 1964 King repeated an earlier criticism of the FBI's concern with communist influence on him and the racial

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movement by saying that the Bureau should be more concerned with such things as bombings against black people. Also in May, the Director congratulated the Atlanta office for some investigative work that appeared to indicate (b) (7) (E) had prepared a letter for King in February. Headquarters considered this a most important development which showed continuing ties between (b) (7) (C) and King. On May 18, Headquarters told New York to update their information on O'Dell. (u)

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In June 1964, a New York attorney, Harry Wachtel, seems to have become an advisor to King. In the White House, Lee White, later to become Chairman of the Federal Power Commission, had become the liaison with King and civil rights groups. When his name appeared, Hoover asked, "What do we know about Lee White?" He was provided with background information that same day. On June 3 and 4, 1964 the White House and the Attorney General respectively were given double or triple hearsay information about [.....(b) (7) (C).....]

.....] On June 8, Headquarters sent another memo to various field offices reminding them to be "...extremely alert to any and all information available bearing upon the matter of [.....(b) (7) (C).....] We should be alert to any situation which might merit exploitation by the Bureau at the proper time..." Significantly, however, on the eleventh, Headquarters sent a memo to field offices in Jacksonville (St. Augustine was the scene of civil rights demonstrations at that time), Atlanta and New York emphasizing the necessity of advising local police officials, military and secret service personnel whenever the Bureau received information concerning a threat to King's life. The memo indicated it would be embarrassing to the Bureau if there were claims of inaction or delay concerning such threats. (u)

On June 12, 1964 Sullivan prepared a memo for Alan Belmont, telling of Sullivan's meeting with a Dr. Espy, the General Secretary of the National Council of Churches of Christ. Dr. Espy wanted to know of King's communist ties. Sullivan told him of that and of King's personal life. In the memo, Sullivan wrote, "I think that we have sowed an idea here which may do some good." (u)

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In July, an internal Bureau memo justified the continuance of tesurs previously authorized on King. On July 17, the White House (Jenkins), at Hoover's direction, was given a descriptive summary of [.....(b)(7)(C).....] The Attorney General was not (u)

RFK

In mid-July King was to appear in Greenwood, Mississippi shortly after it was learned that three civil rights workers were missing in the Philadelphia, Mississippi area. Hoover did not want to afford protection to Dr. King and he spoke separately with the President and the Attorney General. The President finally told Hoover he wanted the FBI to be with King and to make a statement that they would investigate violations of federal law in that regard (u)

On July 23, while listening to King's telephone, the Bureau heard of a report of plans to kill King. The rumor was checked with negative results. The Bureau was provided with a report of checks drawn in June from King's New York bank account. The Bureau briefed Congressman Pucinski of Illinois of some of King's background. And on July 29, 1964 King was overheard telling [..(b)(7)(C)..] he did not think he should speak in Harlem or Bedford - Stuyvesant (where there had been racial rioting) because the "...communists groups would do everything they could to discredit me". (u)

In August and September 1964, Hoover approved proposals to have an ASAC in New York try to get Cardinal Spellman to prevent the Pope from granting an audience to King, to have DeLoach go to former Eisenhower Press Secretary James Hagerty to prevent ABC from doing a television biography of King, and to have DeLoach go to the Chairman of the Board of Curtis Publishing Company which published the Saturday Evening Post to prevent the publishing of an article by King in the magazine. According to Bureau memos, although the Cardinal was "gratified that the Director thought enough of him" to convey the information, the audience was granted. Hoover wrote, "Astounding" on two news articles which reported the audience. On a third, he wrote "I am amazed that the Pope gave an audience to such a degenerate." (u)

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(c)

Attorney General Kennedy resigned in September and he gave Courtney Evans the material about King's hotel activities provided him on two earlier occasions by the FBI. Kennedy did not want the material in Department of Justice files and he recommended that the FBI destroy it. Hoover refused to do so and directed that it be retained in a secure location. (u)

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When King was overheard telling (now Congressman) Walter Fauntroy he was not sure he would attend a "get out the vote" meeting of clergymen in New York because of Cardinal Spellman's conservatism, Hoover wrote, "Have (SAC) Malone alert the Cardinal." (u)

In October 1964, James Bland of the FBI recommended that the tesur be kept on King's home. On October 11, two more internal Bureau memos defined the procedure to follow when the FBI was notified about threats on King's life. The Bureau was to notify the Atlanta police and appropriate local police, as well as federal agencies. The FBI would not notify King, leaving that to local police. Headquarters instructed Chicago to check on a possible account of King's at a Chicago bank. Eight days later, Chicago recommended against the attempt because they had no established sources in this "Negro bank in a Negro neighborhood." Hoover wrote, "Shameful!" on two news articles, one announcing King winning the Nobel Peace Prize and one, an editorial, praising King and the civil rights movement. (u)

note

The FBI stepped up its campaign against King during the next three months in probable reaction to his getting the Nobel Prize. By this time Nicholas deB. Katzenbach was acting Attorney General. On the third of November, Hoover advised the White House and the Acting Attorney General of King's forthcoming Saturday Evening Post article but he said nothing about his attempt to prevent its publication. On November 5, a telephone conversation between (b)(7)(C) and King was overheard by the FBI. In the conversation, (b)(7)(C) was referred to by both men as ..(b)(7)(C)..... pointed out that (b)(7)(C) had abided by earlier decisions but now they were not in the same situation as they were with the Kennedy Administration and that the Civil

In cases of the kind are they just cutting any person or are they using this as an excuse to withhold?

Rights Act had been passed. He said that (b)(7)(C) wanted to meet with King. King said that the matter could be discussed in a forthcoming meeting in New York and that, "...after the election, it would be a new situation". The White House and Acting Attorney General were advised of this information. (u)

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Primary for the Wash Post?

(c)
On November 12 information was given to the [(b)(7)(C)]
..... in the hope that the paper would expose King's possible
and prospective [.....(b)(7)(C).....]
.....] (u)

The State Department asked for security information about King because of the Oslo trip. On November 13, in a memo to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security, the Bureau discussed only [...(b)(7)(C)....] He was called [.....
.....(b)(7)(C).....]
.....] Also on the 13th, the Legat in London was told to advise the U.S. Ambassadors to England and Norway of King's background in an effort to forestall embassy receptions for King. (u)

On November 16, 1964, a memo was prepared which pulled together recent information indicating "further evidences of the influences in high places which Martin Luther King, Jr., and his associates are able to wield." On the 18th, Hoover

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met with a delegation of several women reporters. On the record, he called King "a notorious liar". Hoover's remark caused a sensation. Off the record, Hoover said of King: "He is one of the lowest characters in the country". Later one of these reporters apparently asked to cover a proposed meeting between Hoover and King. Hoover wrote on the memo reporting the request, "I have no appointment with King and I do not intend to make one" (u)

On November 19, 1964, Frederick J. Baumgardner sent a memo to Sullivan reporting a discussion between Wachtel and Rustin as to how to respond to Hoover's "liar" statement. The memo indicated that an investigation was being conducted to determine Wachtel's connection with the communist movement. In a rather lengthy observation, Baumgardner wrote: (u)

"The significant thing involved here is not that these individuals have jumped quickly to King's defense, but rather that they are seizing the opportunity, in line with a long-held communist objective, to launch a campaign to oust the Director as head of the FBI." (u)

The important thing at this point is to follow this matter closely to determine the degree to which King follows their advice in regard to issuing the statement prepared by Wachtel for we will then have further evidence of the extent to which King is being used by communist sympathizers in support of communist objectives." (u)

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King sent Hoover a telegram responding to the Director's calling him a "notorious liar". On November 20, it was recommended that Hoover ignore it. Hoover wrote: "OK. But I can't understand why we are unable to get the true facts before the public. We can't even get our accomplishments published. We are never taking the aggressive but allow lies to remain unanswered". A new 51 page profile of King was prepared on the 23rd. On the same day, Sullivan authorized the State Department to brief the USIA security officer about King. The security officer then requested supporting data so that he could dissuade USIA from sponsoring King on a trip through Europe, Africa and the Near East. Belmont approved disseminating the information (4)

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On November 27, 1964, Roy Wilkins requested and was granted a meeting with DeLoach after Hoover had given a speech at Loyola University in Chicago in which he referred to "sexual degenerates" in civil rights groups. According to a memorandum prepared by DeLoach of the meeting, Wilkins asked that the FBI not ruin King because that would ruin the civil rights movement.

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The memo states that Wilkins said he would try to get King to retire. DeLoach wrote that he chastized Wilkins for his comments about Hoover and the FBI. He said he warned Wilkins that if King wanted a war with the FBI, they had the ammunition and would win. Wilkins was reported as saying he knew King was a liar and had sympathies toward the communist movement. Hoover sent a letter to President Johnson about the meeting. (u)

writing

On November 30, permission was given to the Legat in London to brief U.S. Ambassadors in Sweden and Denmark about King. On the same day King asked (b)(7)(C) to discuss his five minute acceptance speech with ... (b)(7)(C) ... He also said he was going to ask Andy Young and Harry Wachtel to write a 5 minute speech each (u)

Andrew Young called DeLoach on December 1, 1964 and requested a meeting between King and the Director. Young said that King wanted to talk about the future and not the past. DeLoach said he told Young that the "...crusade of defamation against Mr. Hoover and the FBI... [the] campaign of slander and defamation against the Director and the FBI..." by King and his organization behind "our" backs, must be dropped. Hoover and King met in Hoover's office on December 1. DeLoach sat in on the meeting and wrote a 10 page memo to Mohr about the meeting. One and one half pages covered what King said; the rest covers what Hoover said. This may actually represent the relative amounts of conversation. King was overheard (by a tap) talking to a reporter and to Harry Wachtel and he told them that he had spoken for 10 minutes and Hoover had spoken for 45-50 minutes. During the meeting King said he could never be a communist and he referred to his removal of ... (b)(7)(C) ... Hoover covered many subjects, including FBI infiltration of the Klan, upgrading of local police, psychoneurotic tendencies of Gov. Wallace, assignment of northern agents to the South, some cases, Selma, that Aubrey Lewis (a black man) was an agent, that there were 10 or 11 Indian agents and "Mexican-blooded" agents, and that the Bureau couldn't lower its standards just because of color. He gave King some advice: register Negroes

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with King

and educate Negroes in certain skills. Hoover said he was in favor of equality in schools and restaurants but against busing. He mentioned a shoeshine boy in Florida whom he knew who was a doctor. He told King to advise him of any bias or prejudice by an agent. He told King that agents investigate and do not provide protection. He concluded by talking about how good agents were with guns. (u)

On the same day DeLoach met with James Farmer at Farmer's request. It was similar to DeLoach's meeting with Wilkins. (u)

Hoover memorialized a call he had from Katzenbach who had inquired about the meeting with King. He told Katzenbach that King was a persuasive speaker. Katzenbach answered by saying that's all he could say about King. Hoover told Katzenbach that King and Abernathy praised the Bureau and that he (Hoover) had "taken the ball away from King" at the beginning of the meeting. Hoover sent a letter to President Johnson and described the meeting as most amicable. (u)

On the same day, Joseph Sizoo of the FBI sent Sullivan a memo suggesting that selected Negro leaders come to the FBI on the pretext of learning the facts about what the FBI was doing under the Civil Rights statutes. They then would be told of King's background in an effort to have him removed. The White House would not be advised. The suggestion appears to be a follow-up to DeLoach's meeting with Wilkins in late November. The idea apparently did not get beyond Sullivan and was not executed. (u)

On December 2, 1964, the Bureau observed press reaction to the meeting. A columnist who took Hoover's side was sent a letter of appreciation; a TV commentator who said King had "turned the other cheek" by seeking the meeting was sent nothing. On the third, the Bureau was advised by a police officer who was assigned to protect King in Cincinnati that King had told

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him he had no controversy with Hoover; that he did not want to become involved in any controversy with Hoover; that he would be a "fool" to become so involved; and that he would, therefore, avoid press conferences. (u)

write

On December 4, 1964 Wachtel told King that Nelson Rockefeller might contribute \$250,00 to King and that Rockefeller had invited King to lunch. On December 11, Headquarters sent material to Albany for former SAC Cornelius to brief Rockefeller about King's background. This action revealed that the Bureau had not changed its attitude about King as a result of King's meeting Hoover. (u)

Also on December 4, 1964, Moyers called DeLoach and said that he and the President felt that an updated 13 page monograph on King should be disseminated to appropriate government officials if it was in the interest of internal security. It had been sent to the White House about two weeks previously with a request that Moyers advise whether it should be disseminated. It was sent to Justice, State and Defense Departments, CIA, USIA, and military intelligence officers on December 7. On December 10, after Hoover approved it, DeLoach briefed two members of the Baptist World Alliance about King's background in an effort to forestall an invitation for King to speak to the group. DeLoach had given a similar briefing six months earlier to the Associate General Secretary of the Alliance. Hoover had disapproved a proposal to permit the Associate General Secretary and another to listen to tapes of King. (u)

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On December 10, 1964 Wachtel advised King that Attorney General Katzenbach had called Jack Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to discuss "clearing" some one for the Fifth Circuit. King said he would back whomever Greenberg wanted. Hoover wrote on the memo: "This is shocking". The information was forwarded to the White House and the Acting Attorney General. (u)

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Also on December 10, after some internal discussion over whether the Willard tapes should be completely transcribed, DeLoach said: "I fully agree that this work should eventually be done, particularly if an additional controversy arises with King. I see no necessity, however, in this work being done at the present time inasmuch as the controversy has quieted down considerably and we are not in need of transcriptions right now. ...hold off... until there is an actual need". Hoover wrote: "I think it should be done while it is fresh in the minds of the specially trained agents. "H". It was done. (u)

On December fourteen, Baumbardner characterized a proposal by SCLC to put pressure on white businesses to support a homecoming for King's return from Norway as: "Sad commentary on tactics..." On the same day Headquarters was provided with a listing of checks drawn on King's New York account and the SAC in New York was instructed to uncover any possible paramour of King's on Long Island. Also on the 14th Sullivan proposed to Belmont that letters be sent to the White House and the Acting Attorney General in response to an editorial critical of Hoover and to a proposal by SCEF to send letters critical of Hoover to the White House. Sullivan characterized the SCEF proposal in terms of a conflict with King. (u)

It is evident from the enclosed... that it will be given widespread dissemination. This just highlights what to me is an indisputable fact and that is this Bureau has not yet emerged victorious in its conflict with Martin Luther King. I think we are deluding ourselves if we believe that King and his followers and supporters around the country have run for cover and are not attacking the FBI in one way or another. In view of this situation, realism makes it mandatory that we take every prudent step that we can take to emerge completely victorious in this conflict. We should not take any ineffective or halfway measures, nor blind ourselves to the realities of the situation. (u)

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hute

On December seventeen, Hoover sent a letter to Moyers

..... (b) (7) (C) Apparently

..... On the nineteenth the monograph about King was sent to the Director of the National Science Foundation in an effort to stop them from using SCLC as a recruiter of black applicants for southern schools in their scholarship program. (u)

On December 21, 1964, NSF's Director, Leland Haworth, was sent more information about King's personal life by Hoover.

[..... (b) (7) (C)] On the twenty-first, Katzenbach was advised by Hoover of an incident which was said to have occurred several years before in Memphis during a Negro Baptist Convention.

[..... (b) (7) (C)] That information was sent to various government officials this day. (u)

On December 29, 1964, Headquarters was advised by Atlanta of two conversations involving Coretta King, one with King's secretary and one with Andrew Young. They discussed King's mental state, his rambling conversations in New York, an attempted fight with Abernathy in London and the Hoover conflict. They discussed how King might be relieved of some pressures. The transmission from Atlanta noted: "The above information is being furnished for the Bureau's information to acquaint the Bureau how shaken Dr. King has become as a result of recent events and as a further indication of an area where he may be vulnerable to further pressures". [..... (b) (7) (C)]

(S)(C) in the prof?

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E. Early 1965

On January 5, 1965, Atlanta advised Headquarters that King was becoming more and more upset, that he blamed the FBI and felt his phone was tapped. On the same day a report was made on the previously ordered review of King's writings and books in an effort to detect possible communist influence. The conclusion was that there were certain parallels but no casual link. On January 6, New York was directed to discreetly cover King in New York by physical and electronic surveillance because he might meet a woman there. The memo indicated, "security is paramount". Also on the sixth the SAC in Atlanta called the Bureau and reported that the wire-taps indicated that King was very nervous and upset and was not sleeping well. He believed the Bureau had his phone tapped. King said a tape and letter which referred to the (b)(7)(C) had been sent to his home and his wife had read the letter. King said: "They are out to break me". The SAC knew nothing of the tape. King said in a tapped conversation that he needed to talk with Hoover or DeLoach. (u)

write

*This is not secret
Chyn's
Wynette*

The so-called-(b)(7)(C) had actually been mailed in late November 1964 by Lish Whitson, a former agent who flew to Florida at Sullivan's instructions. Sullivan had previously told [. . . (b)(7)(C)] to keep the microphone tapes together. Phillips was told to give some of the tapes to John Matter of the lab. He now thinks he (b)(7)(C) When Matter returned the tapes, there was a composite added. Sullivan had [(b)(7)(C)] get him non-watermarked stationery. Sullivan took the tapes and the stationery and later gave [(b)(7)(C)] a package to deliver to Whitson. The tape was accompanied by a letter advising King that

*No phone
tapes
Phillips
Matter
+ lab*

*- 4/15/65
Other
FBI*

. (b)(7)(C)
Apparently King did not listen to the tape until he returned from Oslo. His wife is supposed to have listened to it also. (u)

*to kill
himself
not dead*

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write

On January 6, 1965, Atlanta advised Headquarters and New York that King had been resting at a house and only about two people knew about it. While he was sleeping [..(b)(7)(C)..] fire trucks arrived but there was no fire. King believed the FBI sent the trucks. He believed that either the FBI or the Georgia Bureau of Investigation was tapping his phone. He said that Abernathy had received anonymous calls. He talked about the tape that had been mailed and wanted Young and Abernathy to see Hoover. "They are out to get me, harass me, break my spirit." He said that they must go to Hoover as there just wasn't any privacy. "What I do is only between me and my God." (u)

On January 7, 1965, an internal FBI memo proposed that letters be sent to the White House and the Acting Attorney General about King's condition. The memo referred to the taps, harassment and a forthcoming meeting between King and the Director. The letters were sent to the White House and the Acting Attorney General on the eighth but they mentioned only King's becoming emotionally upset, his use of medication, [.....
.....(b)(7)(C).....
.....]

There was no mention of the taps and harassment. (u)

At about this time, an aide of King's called Congressman Diggs and asked for advice about how to deal with Hoover. Diggs suggested seeing Hoover with ministers and telling him that the Bureau's harassment of King was immoral. The Bureau noted that Diggs referred to Hoover as "old man" and "Big Daddy", and mentioned the existence of Hoover's files. Hoover wrote: "And I thought DeLoach had commitment from Wilkins and Farmer that King would cease any further attacks on FBI. Yet King is spear heading this present agitation against FBI" (u)

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January 8, 1965, Young called DeLoach and requested a meeting with Hoover or DeLoach. It was set for January 11. DeLoach told Mohr that Young would be told on the eleventh that the Director was out. He suggested that he and Leinbaugh meet with Young. Hoover approved. Leinbaugh was the originator of the Lorraine Hotel COINTELPRO activity. (u)

*write
meshed
earlier? This
w/ first, un-
meshed
ment in
what the
part is?*

On January 7, 1965, a report from two NAACP contacts in Memphis said King ' [.....(b) (7) (C).....] These contacts were being developed as part of an FBI program, "Liaison with Groups Sponsoring Integration". On the same day, Headquarters received a report of checks drawn on King's New York bank in November 1964. (u)

January 8, 1965, Milton Jones of the FBI gave DeLoach an Italian magazine article about King's trip to Europe. The article is very racist in tone; the editor of the magazine had been a Fascist. It was read by Hoover. Jones forwarded the article with a note: "It appears the article... contains excellent public source material for our contacts in this country who would be interested in the true background of Martin Luther King." (u)

Joseph Sizoo advised Sullivan on January 8 that he had authorized misurs in King's and Young's hotel rooms in New York. On the tenth a three page memorandum was prepared from the products of the microphones. King, and perhaps Young and Bernard Lee, an SCLC aide, discuss phone taps and information the Bureau had and how DeLoach and Hoover should be approached. Some mention was made of Joe Rauh and the Bureau characterized him as being associated with communist causes and as being critical of the Bureau. The bugs also recorded King characterizing the mailing of the tape as, "God's out to get you", and as a warning from God that King had not been living up to his responsibilities in relation to the role in which history had cast him.

[.....(b) (7) (C).....] (u)

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On January 11, 1965 DeLoach sent Mohr an extraordinary memo about his (and Leinbaugh's) meeting with Abernathy and Young. DeLoach said Abernathy could not "cope" and that Young had to take over the conversation. Both were said to be unable to bring themselves to talk directly about King's personal life but kept alluding to it. DeLoach took obvious delight in their discomfort. When Young asked what could be done to protect SCLC from communist infiltration, DeLoach told him to go to HUAC for information because FBI files were confidential. On at least two other points, DeLoach lied to them: he told Abernathy that SCLC's funds were of no concern to the FBI; and, he said the FBI had taken no action on rumors regarding King's personal life. (u)

On January 12, 1965,]..(7)(C) discussed a meeting had attended with King and others to talk about Mississippi. Also on the twelfth a proposal was made to attempt to stop St. Peter's College from giving King an honorary degree. The idea was scrapped because the FBI didn't know anyone at St. Peter's well enough. [.....(b)(7)(C).....
.....
.....] (u)

On January 19, 1965, Headquarters sent a memo to Denver instructing agents to cover King's actions while in the area to give a speech but not to embarrass the Bureau. King had been assaulted while in Selma and there were news photos of the attack. [.....(b)(7)(C).....
.....] On January 21, Headquarters told Atlanta to [..(b)(7)(C).....]. Also on the twenty-first, Sullivan sent Belmont a memo of his meeting with Ralph McGill, Publisher of the Atlanta Constitution, who had been told by the Bureau about King's personal life. McGill said he was concerned and wanted to get King out of the Civil Rights movement. He said he had been talking with Adlai Stevenson, Bill Moyers, Ralph Bunche and Harry Ashmore about it. Hoover sent a letter forwarding McGill's views to President Johnson. (u)

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On January 25, 1965, Atlanta requested a 90 day extension of the misur on King's house. On the twenty-sixth, Sizoo advised Sullivan he had authorized misurs of King for two days at a hotel in New York because of the potential for developing intelligence information. (u)

Selected memoranda between February 1965 and December 1967 indicated that the Bureau continued its campaign to discredit and neutralize King. In February 1965 Atlanta was reprimanded for not forwarding information about King quickly enough. In February the Bureau proposed to seek Cardinal Spellman's help in preventing the Davenport, Iowa Catholic Inter-racial Council from giving King an award. Hoover said no. But in March, Gov. Volpe of Massachusetts was briefed by the FBI about King's background in an effort to tone down "Martin Luther King Day" (u)

F. Early 1967-1968

The primary concerns of the Bureau relating to Dr. King at this time were his anti-Viet Nam statements and his planned Washington Spring Project which later became the Poor People's Campaign. On December 7, 1967 the Bureau alerted various field offices and told them to develop ghetto informants, if they had none, and to report weekly on plans for the Project. On December 20, 1967 an updated monograph of King was prepared.

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It also referred to King's statements about Viet Nam and the Spring Project. (c)

In December 1967, King was preparing a taped series of lectures for Canadian radio. The Director instructed the Legat in Ottawa to determine who made the arrangements, including financing, for the series. The justification was to find the source of funds to finance a "new program... of massive civil disobedience demonstrations which may result in riots". The Director was referring to the Spring Project in which King had threatened continuing demonstrations until Congress passed a program designed to help blacks. (u)

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No mention of FBI's attempt to disrupt King's activities. No real statement of the claim. It does not appear that these can be a real (b)(1) hit. Data from report when King withheld all his materials.

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*write / print
they did prepare
a speech for
Byrd*

On January 3, 1968 Attorney General Ramsey Clark turned down a Bureau request to tap SCLC. In January Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) attempted to enlist DeLoach's assistance in preparing a speech for Byrd to deliver in Congress to help King meet his "Waterloo" before the Spring Project. DeLoach refused. Other January memos dealt principally with the Project. (u)

In February 1968, the Bureau learned that King had met in Washington with H. Ralph Brown and Stokely Carmichael to discuss the Project. King was angry that the two might attempt to foment violence. On February 20, 1968, at the request of the White House, the Bureau interviewed a former baseball player. The ball player apparently had no respect for King; [.....] ? *Secret*
.....(b)(7)(C).....
.....] (u)

Hoover approved another updating of King's monograph, to be completed by March 14, 1968 so that it could be disseminated to government officials before the Spring Project to remind them of "the wholly disreputable character of King". It was also recommended and approved to advise the White House and the Attorney General of the involvement of [(b)(7)(C).....] *can
then
be
un/known*
in the Project to show "the communist help King is receiving in his proposed Washington Spring Project". (u)

On March 20, 1968, Hoover approved briefing Cardinal O'Boyle and Bishop Lord of Washington about the potential for violence in the Spring Project and asking them to call for non-violence. On March 21, the Director sent an "Urgent" teletype to various field offices reminding them to carry out previous instructions concerning the Project. On March 25, the President was advised by the Bureau that Robert Kennedy (D-N.Y.) had attempted to contact King before he announced for the Presidency. The next day an updated 39 page monograph about King was disseminated and (b)(7)(C) was overheard discussing plans and fund raising for the Project. (u)

On March 28, 1968, Dr. King led a march in Memphis, in support of striking sanitation workers. The march turned violent and King was taken by his aides and the police from the area to a Holiday Inn. As a COINTELPRO activity, Hoover approved

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*(write)
no mention
was criticism*

sending the following information to "friendly" news media:

Martin Luther King injected himself into the strike in Memphis... and the result of King's famous espousal of nonviolence was vandalism, looting and riot. (u)

*(u) of King
for staying in Memphis
while rioting
when Longine
was a black
JMC*

Previously, King involved himself in this strike, called for a general strike, and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting 'black power' and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene; window breaking and looting broke out. (u)

* * *

Memphis may only be the prelude to the civil strife in our Nation's Capitol. (u)

On March 29 and 30, 1968 King engaged in several overheard telephone conversations and meetings, some with (b)(7)(C) to discuss the Memphis violence. He was extremely dejected and considered his image and the image of nonviolence to have been adversely affected. The press was critical. At first he considered abandoning Memphis and the Spring Project; he considered a public fast. Aides feared for his safety if he returned to Memphis. (b)(7)(C) strongly urged him to go forward with his plans. He told King that he was not responsible for the violence of others. Finally, after a long meeting in Atlanta with his staff and (b)(7)(C) King decided to return to Memphis. (u)

*how? &
not of who
any way?*

See Murphy is more dishonest than he is thought in his efforts to do what he can to shield the FBI. King announced he would return to Memphis before he left there. Murphy also omits the espionage on King when UNCLASSIFIED while he was in Memphis. omit on his communications from there to Atlanta Hy. He also omits mention of date of announcement of date of return.

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Hy or at
mem
in
Memphis

On April 1, 1968, the Bureau advised the White House, but not Attorney General Clark, of a tapped discussion between (b) (7) (C) and King concerning the Presidential race between Johnson, Kennedy and McCarthy. On April 2, Attorney General Clark turned down a request to tap SCLC in Atlanta and Washington. (u)

The Bureau directed four specific COINTELPRO activities against King in 1968. Most were clearly designed to have an adverse effect on the Spring Project, particularly with respect to fund raising. One, of course, concerned King's staying at the Holiday Inn in Memphis. (u)

all para mention not obliterated as living it to part of a sentence at bottom page 49 do used here it makes no sense and does not

King was assassinated in Memphis on April 4, 1968. (u) [S] continued to give advice to Coretta King, Andrew Young and others. The Bureau continued their campaign against King by various periodic briefings designed to thwart declaring King's birthday a national holiday. (u)

is especially
rule be-
cause
misphy

Layson, whose name & role are well known (to the space). This would have been his role. There is no mention of his name not obliterated in all of this yet he is allegedly the major FBI justification for what he did to King

gives absolutely no account of this one of 4 Cointelpro activities. This one was linked to one thing - and it never happens. The FBI did not plant the story.

Less than a single line on the assassination in a report that is to cover any FBI connection with it. (And no mention of the presence of & activities of known informants? Why? see comparison memo in which he recommended against any re-opening of the assassination investigation. Thus there also is a probable reason for this being withheld)

TOP SECRET (last page)

Memorandum

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J. Stanley Pottinger
Assistant Attorney General

DATE: March 31, 1976

Robert A. Murphy
Chief
Criminal Section

RECOMMENDATION
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr. Review

In 51 pages he has no mention of King. He has a single sentence of less than a full line on the assassination. No mention of intelligence connection

I recommend against reopening the assassination investigation because there is no evidence that the Bureau had anything to do with the shooting of Dr. King. While I believe that serious invasions of the privacy of Dr. King and many others occurred as a result of the Bureau's activity, I do not recommend that any action be taken against any individual for the following reasons: (1) if criminal acts occurred, the statute of limitations has long since expired; (2) no one has filed a civil suit against the Department or the Bureau, in spite of much publicity about the Bureau's activities, so no decision need be made as to what position the Department might take; (3) no Bureau employee who was a section chief or higher who was involved with the King case still works for the Bureau so no disciplinary action need be taken. (u)

I recommend against a public report by the Department or the appointing of a "blue ribbon" committee. The Church Committee has largely performed that function and the risk of adversely affecting the reputations of many people is too great. I certainly recommend against my report being made public. *If made public it would be subject to analysis, comment, use reputation. Biddle, was no CEO priority. [initials]*

It is clear that steps must be taken to change Bureau procedures to prevent anything like this from ever happening again. The Department was seriously at fault in not supervising the Bureau. I have certain ideas in mind about necessary changes that we can discuss but I have not set them out here because I believe that most, if not all, are being considered by one or more of the study groups and task forces the Attorney General has established. (u)

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White
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REPORT EXHIBIT

REPORT OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

- I. Introduction (pp. 1-11) (u)
- II. The COMINFIL Investigation is Opened: October 1962 (pp. 12-23) (u)
- III. Concern in the FBI and the Kennedy Administration Over Allegations of Communist Influence in the Civil Rights Movement Increases, and the FBI Intensifies the Investigation: October 1962 - October 1963. Introduction and Summary (pp. 24-26) (u)
 - A. The Justice Department Warns Dr. King about Advisors A and B - January - June 1963 (pp. 26-34) (u)
 - B. Allegations About Dr. King During Hearings on the Public Accommodations Act and the Administration's Response: July 1963 (pp. 31-37) (u)
 - C. The Attorney General Considers a Wiretap of Dr. King and Rejects the Idea: July 1963 (pp. 37A-40) (u)
 - D. The Attorney General Voices Concern Over Continuing FBI Reports about King: July - August 1963 (pp. 41-44) (u)
 - E. The FBI Intensifies its Investigation of Alleged Communist Influence in the Civil Rights Movement: July - September 1963 (pp. 45-57) (u)
- IV. Electronic Surveillance of Martin Luther King and the SCLC (u)
Introduction and Summary (pp. 58-59) (u)

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- A. Legal Standards Governing the FBI's Duty to Inform the Justice Department of Wiretaps and Microphones During the Period of the Martin Luther King Investigation (pp. 60-62) (u)
- B. Wiretap Surveillance of Dr. King and the SCLC (pp. 63-70) (u)
- C. Microphone Surveillance of Dr. King: January 1964 - November 1965 (pp. 70-71) (u)
 - 1. Reasons for the FBI's Microphone Surveillance of Dr. King (pp. 71-75) (u)
 - 2. Evidence Bearing on Whether the Attorneys General Authorized or Knew About the Microphone Surveillance of Dr. King (u)
 - a. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy (pp. 76-80) (u)
 - b. Attorney General Nicholas deS. Katzenbach (pp. 80-86) (u)
- V. The FBI's Effort to Discredit Martin Luther King: 1964 Introduction and Summary (pp. 87-88) (u)
 - A. The FBI Disseminates the First King "Monograph" and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy Orders It Recalled: October 1963 (pp. 89-91) (u)
 - B. The FBI Plans Its Campaign to Discredit Dr. King December 23, 1963 (pp. 91-94) (u)
 - C. William Sullivan Proposed a Plan to Promote a New Negro Leader: January 1964 (pp. 94-96) (u)
 - D. FBI Headquarters Order the Field Offices to Intensify Efforts to Discredit King: April - August 1964 (pp. 97-101) (u)

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E. Steps Taken by the FBI in 1964 to Discredit Dr. King (p. 101) (u)

No mention of use of informants including in HQ of SCLC?

1. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with the White House (pp. 101-102) (u)
2. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with the Congress (pp. 102-103) (u)
3. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Universities (pp. 103-104) (u)
4. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Churches (pp. 104-106) (u)
5. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with the Pope (pp. 106-107) (u)
6. The Attempt to Discredit Dr. King During His Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize (pp. 107-110) (u)
7. Attempts to Block Dr. King's Publications (pp. 110-111) (u)
8. Attempt to Undermine the National Science Foundation's Cooperation with SCLC (p. 111) (u)
9. Unsuccessful FBI Attempts to Locate Financial Improprieties (pp. 112-114) (u)

F. The Question of Whether Government Officials Outside of the FBI Were Aware of the FBI's Effort to Discredit Dr. King (pp. 114-128) (u)

VI. The Hoover-King Controversy Becomes Public and a Truce is Called: April - December 1964
Summary (p. 129) (u)

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- A. First Steps in the Public Feud: April - November 1964 (pp. 130-134) (u)
 - B. Tapes are Mailed to King: November 21, 1964 (pp. 135-140) (u)
 - C. Attempts by the FBI to "Leak" to Reporters Tape Recordings Embarrassing to King (pp. 140-141) (u)
 - D. Roy Wilkins of NAACP Meets with DeLoach to Discuss Allegations About King: November 27, 1964 (pp. 141-144) (u)
 - E. King and Hoover Meet: December 1, 1964 (pp. 144-153) (u)
 - F. Civil Rights Leaders Attempt to Dissuade the FBI From Discrediting King: December 1964 - May 1965 (pp. 153-154) (u)
 - 1. Farmer - DeLoach Meeting - December 1, 1964 (pp. 154-156) (u)
 - 2. Young - Abernathy - DeLoach Meeting: January 8, 1965 (pp. 158-159) (u)
 - 3. Carey - DeLoach Meeting: May 19, 1965 (pp. 159-161) (u)
- VII. The FBI Program Against King (u) 1965-1968 (p. 162)
- A. Major Efforts to Discredit Dr. King 1965-1968 (p. 162) (u)
 - 1. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Churches (pp. 162-164) (u)
 - 2. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Heads of Government Agencies (pp. 164-166) (u)

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at the very least
what the FBI did to
King in Memphis is
played
down. In
mention of
its effort to ruin
his IP on Peoples
Campaign

3. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King By Using the Press (pp. 166-172) (u)
4. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Major Political and Financial Leaders (pp. 172-173) (u)
5. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King with Congressional Leaders (pp. 173-174) (u)
- B. COINTELPRO Operations Against King (pp. 174-176) (u)
- C. The FBI's Efforts to Discredit King During His Last Months (pp. 177-181) (u)
- D. Attempts to Discredit Dr. King's Reputation After His Death (pp. 181-183) (u)
- VIII. Conclusion (pp. 183-185) (u)

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