TIME *presents a second installment of excerpts from* Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, *to be published in June by Little, Brown & Co. Based on tape recordings made by former Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev during the last years of his life, the book was translated and edited by* TIME *Correspondent Strobe Talbott and has introductions by Soviet Affairs Expert Edward Crankshaw and* TIME *Diplomatic Editor Jerrold L. Schecter.*

The U.S. Tour: Dreams Denied

When I was invited by President Eisenhower to visit the United States in 1959, our embassy in Washington informed us that a certain number of days in our schedule had been set aside for meetings with the President at Camp David. I couldn't for the life of me find out what this Camp David was. I began to make inquiries from our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They said they didn't know what it was either. Then we turned to our embassy in Washington and asked them what it was. One reason I was suspicious was that I remembered in the early years after the Revolution, when contacts were first being established with the bourgeois world, a Soviet delegation was invited to a meeting held on some islands where stray dogs were sent to die. In other words, the Soviet delegation was being discriminated against by being invited there. In those days the capitalists never missed a chance to embarrass or offend the Soviet Union. I was afraid maybe this Camp David was the same sort of place where people who were mistrusted could be kept in quarantine, like a leper colony.

Finally we were informed that Camp David was what we would call a dacha—a country retreat built by [President Franklin D.] Roosevelt during the war as a place for him to get away for a rest. Far from being an act of discrimination, I learned, it was a great honor for me to be invited to spend a few days at Camp David with Eisenhower.

We never told anyone at the time about not knowing what Camp David was. I can laugh about it now, but I'm a little bit ashamed. It shows how ignorant we were in some respects.

Eisenhower told me I would be accompanied on my cross-country tour [of the U.S.] by Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge [then Ambassador to the U.N.]. Lodge was a middle-aged man—tall and strapping. He told me he'd been an officer in the war. According to our system, his rank would have been major general. Lodge and I got to know each other well. He was a clever man, but I can't say the same for the policies he's always stood for. I'd say he is an intelligent official of a not-so-intelligent government. When it came to politics, there was never any doubt that he belonged to the Republican Party, but he treated me well and often joked with me.

Mr. Lodge," I once said, "you're a former military man, and therefore you know the rules of rank. You're a major general and I'm a lieutenant general. Therefore you're my subordinate, and I'll expect you to behave as befits a junior officer."

He started laughing. "Yes, sir. I understand, General." Sometimes when we'd meet, he'd salute and snap, "Major General Lodge reporting for duty, sir!"

Later, while I was in New York, Mr. Nelson Rockefeller, the governor of the state, sent word that he would like to pay a call on me. I answered that I'd be happy to receive him. I'd known him from our meeting in Geneva [in 1955 when Rockefeller was an adviser to Eisenhower at the four-power summit conference]. He was a tall, lively man, very energetic and dignified-looking. He certainly wasn't dressed in cheap clothes, but I wouldn't say he was dressed elegantly either. He was dressed more or less like other Americans. I say this only because here was Rockefeller himself —not just a plain capitalist, but the biggest capitalist in the world!

His visit was brief. He greeted me, and we exchanged a couple of sentences about our previous meeting. There was no real discussion. He simply said, "As the Governor of New York, I am honored to welcome you to our state" —everything according to etiquette. And then he dropped an interesting remark: "I don't exclude the possibility that this meeting won't be the last. I hope we might be able to have certain business contacts with you." I replied I would be delighted to meet him again, especially on business matters. I took his remark as a hint that he hoped to occupy a certain position in the White House, namely the position of President. In that case, of course, he would be meeting me in a different capacity, and we would have an opportunity to build new relations between our countries.

During our stay in Los Angeles, the mayor of the city [Norris Poulson] made a speech at a dinner in my honor. His remarks were brief but very offensive to us. When we got back to our hotel, we

SOVIET PARTY LEADER NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV THREATENING, ARGUING, DENOUNCING AT THE UNITED NATIONS IN 1960


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


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all gathered in one of the suites. I was still upset about the way we had been treated and seriously considered canceling the rest of our tour. "How dare this man attack the guest of the President like that!" I shouted. Gromyko's wife ran off to get me a tranquilizer. I threw a look in her direction and made a sign so she would stop worrying and realize I was in full control of my nerves: I was giving vent to my indignation for the ears of the American accompanying us. I was sure that there were eavesdropping devices in our room and that Mr. Lodge, who was staying in the same hotel, was sitting in front of a speaker with an interpreter and listening to our whole conversation. So, for his benefit, I ranted on about how I wouldn't tolerate being treated like this and so on.

During his meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David, Khrushchev continues, the American President rejected a Khrushchev proposal—put forward, he concedes, "to serve a propagandistic purpose" —that both sides eliminate military bases on foreign territory. The U.S. was willing to accept a ban on the production and testing of nuclear weapons, but only on condition that there would be international controls and that each side could conduct reconnaissance flights over the other's territory. At that time, the proposal was unacceptable to the Russians, Khrushchev admits, primarily because they lagged behind the U.S. in both the number of nuclear weapons they had and in effective delivery systems.

I was convinced that as long as the U.S. held a big advantage over us, we couldn't submit to international disarmament controls. Now that I'm in retirement, I still give this whole question serious thought, and I've come to the conclusion that today international controls are possible because they would be truly mutual.

Our conversations weren't too productive. In fact, they had failed. We had been unable to remove the major obstacles between us. Eisenhower was deflated. He looked like a man who had fallen through a hole in the ice and been dragged from the river with freezing water still dripping off him.

Lunchtime came; it was more like a funeral than a wedding feast. Well, maybe that's going too far: it wasn't so much like a funeral as it was like a meal served at the bedside of a critically ill patient. Afterward, Eisenhower suggested we go back to Washington by car. If we'd both been more satisfied with the outcome of our talks, it might have been a pleasant drive. But we weren't and it wasn't. I asked some questions just to be polite, and he answered with a few words. Every sentence was a strain to get out. I could see how depressed Eisenhower was, and I knew how he felt, but there wasn't anything I could do to help him.

The U-2 Affair: A Foot in A Quagmire

At 5 o'clock on the morning of May 1, 1960, my telephone rang. I picked up the receiver, and the voice on the other end said, "Minister of Defense Marshal Rodion Malinovsky reporting." He went on to tell me that an American U-2 reconnaissance plane had crossed the border of Afghanistan into Soviet airspace and was flying toward Sverdlovsk. I replied that it was up to him to shoot down the plane by whatever means he could. Malinovsky said he'd already given the order, adding "If our antiaircraft units can just keep their eyes open and stop yawning long enough, I'm sure we'll knock the plane down." He was referring to the fact that already in April we'd had an opportunity to shoot down a U-2 but our antiaircraft batteries were caught napping and didn't open fire soon enough.

Khrushchev then explains that the Soviet Union had several times protested to the U.S. about U-2 overflights, but the protests were brushed aside. Soviet fighters could not fly high enough to intercept the American reconnaissance planes, and it was not until surface-to-air missiles were developed that the Russians had what Khrushchev calls "the answer to our problem."

Later on in the day, the annual May Day military parade took place in Red Square. In the midst of the proceedings Marshal [Sergei] Biryuzov, commander in chief of our antiaircraft defenses, mounted the reviewing stand on top of the Mausoleum and whispered in my ear. He informed me the U-2 had been shot down; the pilot [Francis Gary Powers] had been taken prisoner and was under interrogation.

The next day the American press published the story that a U.S. plane based in Turkey had disappeared while flying over the Caucasus Mountains—but on the Turkish side of the border. We smiled with pleasure as we anticipated the discomfort which the spies who cooked up this false statement would feel when confronted with the evidence we already had in our pocket.

Two or three days later, after they talked themselves out and got thoroughly wound up in this unbelievable story, we decided to tell the world what had really happened.

I went out of my way not to accuse President [Dwight D. Eisenhower] in my own statements. As long as [he] was dissociated from the U-2 affair, we could continue our policy of strengthening Soviet-U.S. relations, which had begun with my trip to America and my talks with Eisenhower.

But the Americans wouldn't let the matter rest there. One day in May we got a report that President Eisenhower had publicly acknowledged that he had known about the U-2 flight in advance, and he had approved it. He argued that he was forced to resort to such means because the Soviet Union was, as they used to say, a "closed society."

EISENHOWER & KHRUSHCHEV AT CAMP DAVID, SEPT. 1959

This was a highly unreasonable statement, not to say a foolish one. It was as though Eisenhower were boasting arrogantly about what the United States could do and would do. Eisenhower's stand canceled any opportunity for us to get him out of the ticklish situation he was in. It was no longer possible for us to spare the President. He had, so to speak, offered us his back end, and we obliged him by kicking it as hard as we could.

The U-2 affair was a landmark event in our struggle against the American imperialists who were waging the cold war. My visit to the United States the preceding fall had seemed to herald a prom-

ising shift in U.S. policy toward our country, but now—thanks to the U-2—the honeymoon was over.

[A few days later] after we were already in the air flying toward Paris for the [four-power] conference with Eisenhower, [Foreign Minister] Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Malinovsky and I began to think over the situation. We felt our responsibility—and the tension that went with it—more acutely than ever before. We were haunted by the fact that just prior to this meeting, the United States had dared to send its U-2 reconnaissance plane against us. It was as though the Americans had deliberately tried to place a time bomb under the meeting, set to go off just as we were about to sit down with them at the negotiating table. What else could we expect from such a country? Could we really expect it to come to a reasonable agreement with us? No! So the conference was doomed before it began. These doubts kept nagging at my brain. I became more and more convinced that our pride and dignity would be damaged if we went ahead with the meeting as though nothing had happened. Our prestige would suffer, especially in the Third World. After all, we were the injured party. We simply could not go to Paris pretending everything was fine.

Our reputation depended on our making some sort of protest. I saw that the only way out was to present the United States with an ultimatum: the Americans would have to apologize officially for sending their spy plane into the U.S.S.R., and the President of the United States would have to retract what he said about America's "right" to conduct reconnaissance over our territory.

...consulting with Gromyko and ...ovsky, Khrushchev decided to draft a tough new declaration, which was transmitted to Moscow for approval by the collective leadership in the Kremlin.

We received an answer right away; the comrades in the leadership gave their complete approval to our new position.

When we arrived, I thought to myself, "Well, here we are, ready to demand an apology from the President. But what if he refuses to apologize? What if he doesn't call off reconnaissance flights against us?" I remembered that when we were Eisenhower's guests in Washington, we had given him an invitation to pay a return visit to the Soviet Union. He had accepted our invitation with thanks. But under the conditions that had developed, with our relations falling to pieces, we couldn't possibly offer our hospitality to someone who had already, so to speak, made a mess at his host's table. To receive Eisenhower without first hearing him apologize would be an intolerable insult to the leadership of our country.

I demanded an apology from Eisenhower, as well as assurances that no more American reconnaissance planes would be permitted to fly over Soviet territory. My interpreter, Comrade [Viktor] Sukhodrev, told me he noticed, while reading the English translation of my statement, that Eisenhower turned to his Secretary of State, Christian Herter, and said, "Well, why not? Why don't we go ahead and make a statement of apology?" Herter said no—and he said it in such a way, with such a grimace on his face, that he left no room for argument on the issue.

As a result, Eisenhower refused to apologize. Thus, once again, Eisenhower showed himself to be under the strong influence of his Secretary of State. At the earlier four-power meeting in Geneva in 1955, Eisenhower took all his cues from the late John Foster Dulles. Now he was following instructions from Herter. To me, this incident meant that if Eisenhower had followed his own good instincts and used his own considerable intelligence, he would have done the right thing and given in to our demand; he knew it was possible for him to give us the apology and assurances we were asking for. But unfortunately, Eisenhower wasn't the one who determined foreign policy for the U.S. He let himself be pushed around by his Secretaries of State, first Dulles and now Herter.

Many years have passed since then, but I'm still convinced that we handled the matter correctly. Moreover, I'm proud that we gave a sharp but fully justified rebuff to the world's mightiest state. There's an old Russian saying: Once you let your foot get caught in a quagmire, your whole body will get sucked in. In other words, if we hadn't stood up to the Americans, they would have continued to send spies over our country.

Vienna: Politics Without Mercy

For the 1960 U.S. Democratic presidential nomination, Khrushchev's personal choice was Adlai Stevenson; but when John F. Kennedy received it, Khrushchev decided to support him over Richard Nixon.

The Americans are very good at making you think a huge struggle over major issues is under way, a struggle which will determine whether the United States will continue to exist or not. But in essence the battle between the Democrats and Republicans is like a circus wrestling match. The wrestlers arrange in advance who will be the winner and who will be the loser—before they even enter the arena. Of course, I'm not saying that the outcome of an American election is actually prearranged by the two candidates, but they're both representatives of the capitalist circles which nominated them; and everyone knows that the foundation of capitalism will not be shaken, regardless of which candidate is elected.

Still, once the Republicans had nominated Nixon and the Democrats had nominated Kennedy, we had to make a choice in our own minds. We thought we would have more hope of improving Soviet-American relations if John Kennedy were in the White House. We knew we couldn't count on Nixon in this regard: his aggressive attitude toward the Soviet Union, his anti-Communism, his connection with McCarthyism—all this was well known to us. In short, we had no reason to welcome the prospect of Nixon as President.

In the heat of the campaign, just before Election Day, the United States ad-

JACQUELINE KENNEDY & FRIEND IN VIENNA DURING 1961 SUMMIT

dressed itself to us, officially asking for the release of [U-2 Pilot] Francis Gary Powers. The timing of Powers' release had great political significance. At that time, voices in the press were saying that whichever candidate could show himself more able to improve Soviet-American relations stood a better chance in the election. In fact, they weren't just talking about America's relations with the Soviet Union, but with me, personally —by name. That's typical of the bourgeois press: it always plays up the individual leader.

During the campaign, Khrushchev recalls, Nixon's running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge, visited Moscow and told the Soviet leader: "Mr. Khrushchev, don't pay any attention to the campaign speeches. Remember, they're just political statements. Once Mr. Nixon is in the White House, I'm sure he'll take a position of preserving and perhaps even improving our relations." Khrushchev, however, did not believe that Nixon would do so. Thus he argued to the Kremlin leadership that they should not release Powers until after the election lest it seem that the Russians were favoring the Republicans.

My comrades agreed, and we did not release Powers. As it turned out, we'd done the right thing. Kennedy won the election by a majority of only two hundred thousand or so votes, a negligible margin if you consider the huge population of the United States. The slightest nudge either way would have been decisive.

So Eisenhower left the White House and Kennedy became President. Later, I felt I could joke with him about the election: "You know, Mr. Kennedy, we voted for you."

He looked and smiled. "How?"

"By waiting until after the election to return the pilot."

He laughed and said, "You're right. I admit you played a role in the election and cast your vote for me."

Of course, it was a joke, but it reflected the reality of the situation, and I must say I had no cause for regret once Kennedy became President. It quickly became clear he understood better than Eisenhower that an improvement in relations was the only rational course. Eisenhower had fully appreciated the danger of the cold war leading to a hot war; he'd told me more than once, "I'm afraid of war, Mr. Khrushchev."

Kennedy feared war too. He never told me in so many words, but he tried to establish closer contacts with the Soviet Union with an eye to reaching an agreement on disarmament and to avoiding any accidents which might set off a military conflict.

Kennedy was a flexible President and, unlike Eisenhower, he was his own boss in foreign policy. He hired bright, young, well-educated advisers who were equally flexible. He let us know he would like to meet with representatives of the Soviet Union.

We too wanted to establish contacts with Kennedy because we shared his fear of war. I certainly was afraid of war. Who but a fool isn't? That doesn't mean I think we should pay any price to avoid war. Certainly we shouldn't back down at the expense of our self-respect, our authority and our prestige in the world. On many occasions while I was head of the government we were confronted with the jealousy and aggressiveness of others toward our position, and we had to counterattack these forces. By counterattacking when we did, we won a number of significant moral victories. But these were victories in the cold war. We managed to avoid a hot war. Kennedy seemed committed to the same goal.

During our talks in Vienna [in June 1961], Kennedy recognized the need to avoid military conflict. He felt we should sign a formal agreement to the effect that we would adhere to principles of peaceful coexistence. But what he meant by peaceful coexistence was freezing existing conditions in all countries insofar as their social and political systems were concerned. Well, this concept was completely unacceptable to me, and I told him so.

"Mr. President, we too would like to come to an agreement with you on the principles of peaceful coexistence, but for us, that means agreeing not to use force in solving disputes and not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries—it does not mean freezing the conditions which prevail in those countries today. The question of a country's sociopolitical system should be decided by that country itself. Some countries are still determining what sort of system is best for them, and we have no business freezing them into one form or another."

Kennedy wanted to maintain the status quo in the world. In other words, he wanted countries with capitalist systems to remain capitalist, and he wanted us to agree to a guarantee to that effect. This was absolutely unacceptable. I tried to make him see that his was a reactionary position.

Had John Kennedy realized the implications of the proposal he was making, I don't think he would have suggested freezing internal political systems. He was a highly intelligent President, but here he was defending his class and defending capitalist tradition —and he wanted us to be party to such a thing!

Frankly, I was somewhat surprised at him. I think even today the Americans still haven't given up the point of view Kennedy set forth to me. My belief is confirmed by the war which the United States has been waging in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia.

At one reception Kennedy introduced me to his wife and to his mother. Jacqueline, Kennedy's wife, was a young woman whom the journalists were always describing as a great beauty. She didn't impress me as having that special, brilliant beauty which can haunt men, but she was youthful, energetic and pleasant, and I liked her very much. She knew how to make jokes and was, as our people say, quick with her tongue. In other words, she had no trouble finding the right word to cut you short if you weren't careful with her. My own conversation with her consisted of nothing more than small talk, the sort you'd expect at receptions or during intermissions at the theater. But even in small talk she demonstrated her intelligence. As the head of the Soviet delegation, I couldn't care less what sort of wife

KHRUSHCHEV, WITH BREZHNEV, TALKS TO ORBITING COSMONAUTS, JUNE 1963

Kennedy had. If he liked her, that was his business—and good luck to them both. The same was the case with his mother. We knew she was a millionaire, and consequently we had to keep in mind whom we were dealing with at all times. We could smile courteously and shake hands with her, but that didn't change the fact that we were at opposite poles.

It was at one of these receptions or evenings at the theater [in Vienna] that I had my last meeting with Kennedy. I remember he looked not only anxious but deeply upset. I recall vividly the expression on his face. Looking at him, I couldn't help feeling a bit sorry and somewhat upset myself. I would have liked very much for us to part in a different mood. But there was nothing I could do to help him. The difference in our class positions had prevented us from coming to an agreement—despite all possible efforts on my part. Politics is a merciless business, but that realization did not keep me from feeling sorry for Kennedy.

On Arms and Co-Existence

When I was the head of our party and government, we decreased the size of our army both in the Soviet Union and in the fraternal [Warsaw Pact] countries. Some people who read my memoirs may misinterpret that policy and say it was wrong for us to cut back our troop levels. I think the majority of those who might take this view can be found among the military. However, I'm convinced we were right to do what we did. I'm still in favor of removing Soviet troops from other countries, and would fight for implementing that policy if I could. But how can anyone fight for the reduction of armed forces when a certain orator* is preaching quite the opposite? How can anyone propagate the doctrine I've been advocating if the troops under the command of this orator are stationed on the territory of other countries? We can't make propaganda [for peaceful coexistence and noninterference] and then turn around and put our troops in other countries. Under such circumstances, our propaganda tends to be regarded with suspicion. It accomplishes nothing and earns the confidence of no one.

We must press for arms control. In my day we were able to persuade the imperialists that it was in their interests, as well as in ours, to limit the arms race. During my political career we reached a partial agreement on nuclear testing. We agreed to ban tests in three spheres: the air, the land, and under water. The treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963. It was a good beginning, but the United States refused to include underground tests in the ban.

While it might still be true that the United States has quantitative advantage over us—and that NATO has a quantitative advantage over the Warsaw Pact—in terms of total accumulated means of destruction, we no longer lag behind to any significant degree. In my last years as head of the government, our military theoreticians calculated that we had the nuclear capacity to blast our enemies into dust. We stockpiled enough weapons to destroy the principal cities of the United States, to say nothing of our potential enemies in Europe.

Therefore, I think there is no longer any reason for us to resist the idea of international control. If I had any influence on the policy of the Soviet Union, I would urge that we sign a mutual agreement providing for on-site inspection in designated parts of the country around our [western] frontiers.

Sticking to the matter of our relations with the West, I'd also favor on-site inspection at all military bases, especially airfields. It's essential that airfields be open to inspection, so that neither side could concentrate troop transports for a sneak attack. We're afraid of a surprise attack by our enemies just as much as they're afraid of such an attack by us. We need a system of inspection as much as they do.

In short, I would like to see us sign a mutual treaty of nonaggression and inspection. I emphasize "mutual." The treaty would have to be genuinely reciprocal; neither side should try to deceive or cheat the other.

"But what about espionage?" people might ask. "Wouldn't we be inviting NATO to send spies into our country masquerading as control-commission inspectors?" My answer to that is: We'll learn as much about the other side's military technology as it will learn about ours. In other words, we will have the same opportunities as our potential enemies to engage in military intelligence. After all, what is military intelligence but an attempt to find out what your adversary is doing? And isn't that basically the same thing as arms-control inspection? Both sides are engaged in military intelligence. As long as there are two opposing social systems in the world, those whose profession is espionage won't be out of a job.

Besides, I was never too impressed by our ability to keep secrets from the enemy. The size and composition of our army was supposedly top secret, but the Americans and British knew that information anyway.

Up until now, I've hesitated to mention my thoughts on extending arms control over rocket technology and the deployment of warheads. You could say I've been saving the subject for dessert. Missiles are the most destructive means of all—and I don't care whether you call them offensive or defensive. I believe that until we have established mutual trust with our current adversaries, our ICBMs must be kept in readiness as our major deterrent. It is to be hoped that someday missiles too can be included in a disarmament agreement; but for the time being, our ICBMs are necessary to maintain the balance of fear.

What if the capitalists drag their feet in agreeing to disarmament? I believe that even if a Soviet-American agreement on bilateral reduction in military spending were impossible, we should go ahead and sharply reduce our own expenditures—unilaterally. If our enemies want to go on inflating their military budgets, spending their money right and left on all kinds of senseless things, then they'll be sure to lower the living standards of their own people.

Any leadership which conducts a policy of arms control and disarmament must be courageous and wise. The members of that leadership must be able to exercise their own independent judgment and not let others intimidate them. Who, in our own country, are the "others" who can intimidate the leadership? They are the military. I don't reproach the military for that—they're only doing their job. The military is made up of men who are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their motherland. However, leaders must be careful not to look at the world through the eyeglasses of the military. Otherwise, the picture will appear terribly gloomy; the government will start spending all its money and the best energies of its people on armaments—with the result that pretty soon the country will have lost its pants in the arms race.

When I say "the government," I mean the collective leadership, and I stress the word collective. When I was the head of the government and also held the highest post in the Central Committee, I never made a decision without securing approval of my comrades in the leadership. The conditions were such that it was impossible for one man to dictate his will to the others; I was in favor of those conditions, and I did my best to reinforce them.

I also did my best to resist the counsel of those who can't stop shouting "We'll destroy our enemies! We'll wipe them out!" It requires considerable inner maturity and a well-developed understanding of the world not only to grasp the narrow bureaucratic aspects of defense policy, but also to see things in the broader perspective.

A government leader should keep in mind exactly what sort of destruction we're capable of today. He should be aware of the losses his own country will suffer if, God willing, he were able to destroy his enemies. There are those who don't seem able to get it into their heads that in the next war the victor will be barely distinguishable from the vanquished. A war between the Soviet Union and the United States would almost certainly end in mutual defeat.

*The "orator" is clearly Leonid Brezhnev, whom Khrushchev seems to be castigating for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.