

LETTERS TO THE EDITORS

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

Sirs: My commendation for your timely presentation of segments of *Khrushchev Remembers* ("The Terror of Life with Stalin," Nov. 27). Indeed, Stalin was a man of evil genius. His acumen for treachery was surpassed only by his capacity for brutality. The world rejoices in his absence.

JOHN R. S. ROBBLO
Memphis, Tenn.

Sirs: One could perhaps justify this type of trivia if one at least received some new insights into the "color" of the times or the unique personalities of the Russian leaders. Even this is lacking. I wouldn't admit to the authorship of such drivel either.

GENE DE ROIN
Chicago, Ill.

Sirs: As a man who lived for nine years as a slave in Soviet Russia and was sentenced to be shot by the Soviet Communists, I know that every word Khrushchev writes is true. We need more stories like this for the American Communists. Let them learn what has happened to Communists like them in Soviet Russia.

YAAKOV RIZ
Philadelphia, Pa.

Sirs: The story did not impress me at all. But the photos: What a collection! Communist leaders have sinister faces and deformed bodies; they seem to be degenerated specimens of the human race. No wonder there is a theory that the Communist leaders were chosen to destroy civilization.

ANGEL CANO
Richmond Hill, N.Y.

Sirs: I had hoped you would lend your efforts to something current and more pressing that is taking place in Soviet Russia. What about the Leningrad trial of 33 Jews whose only crime is wanting to leave Russia?

BESS E. GERSTEIN
Chicago, Ill.

Sirs: That Nikita Khrushchev is emerging through his memoirs as a man sensitive to the cruelties of social injustice will surprise many Americans. We war against a nation undoubtedly gripped by the same doubts and fears that often obscure our own view of the political philosophy of Communism.

JAMES LUX
Columbia, Mo.

Sirs: Khrushchev calls Joseph Stalin "a brutal, sick man" and blames him for the murder of millions of peasants during the forced collectivization era. Pardon me, but I see no halo around Nikita's head. He carried out Stalin's orders. He is just as guilty.

HAROLD JOFFE
Baltimore, Md.

Sirs: Whoever thought up the title for Comrade Khrushchev's memoirs,

"Khrushchev Remembers," came up with a winner. How could anyone with the load he's got on his mind ever forget?

ROBERT DURBACK
Cleveland, Ohio

Sirs: In denouncing Stalin for the 1937 purges, Khrushchev does not seem to be aware that there actually was a liaison between the Russian and German army staffs. As I read it years ago, Hitler contacted Stalin through President Hacha of Czechoslovakia, and sold Stalin, for three million dollars in gold, a long list of Russians who were involved with the German generals. I would guess that Stalin seized the opportunity to rid himself of Lenin's old cronies. But I don't think we should shed any Khrushchev tears for these vicious men. They tolerated that mass murderer, Lenin, because they thought he was killing the right people.

A. E. VAN VOGT
Hollywood, Calif.

Sirs: Khrushchev is wrong. Things haven't changed that much. The Stalin years aren't over when a Lithuanian seaman is beaten by Soviet crewmen into unconsciousness on an American Coast Guard vessel and then forcibly taken back to "Communist bias." And as for the inaction on the part of the U.S., remember what happened to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, East Berlin...

GIEDRE E. PENČYLA
Forest Park, Ill.

Sirs: You referred to Svetlana Alliluyeva as Mrs. Porter. It should be Mrs. William Wesley Peters.

CASS CANFIELD
New York, N.Y.

THE PRESIDENCY

Sirs: Hugh Sidey has his facts wrong about that picture by Buck May ("Fifty Years of 1/20th of a Second," Nov. 27) of President Coolidge saluting the fleet from a couch aboard the presidential yacht. Coolidge did not sit down because the chore of saluting the ships at the fleet review grew dull. The real reason was that he was seasick. The presidential yacht had put in at near the shore as possible so the President wouldn't get sick. But the weather started acting up the night before the review, and the next day the *Mayflower* had a definite roll to her. During the first half hour of the review, a queasy Mr. Coolidge played at being the confident mariner for the photographers. Then he retired aft to a sofa where this picture was taken.

ROBERT STEVEN KAPLAN
Whitestone, N.Y.

KNICKERS

Sirs: Knickers are still great for boys ("Knickers Sans Droop," Nov. 27). They are for me. I'm 12. The pockets are bottomless and there's storage in

the knitted cuffs. Other boys have forgotten how wonderful knickers are. Can skintights run or climb or bike faster than knickers? Can they jump as easily? No. Knickers are too good for girls.

BILLY JACKSON
Paoli, Pa.

Sirs: Tell me it's not true! You say that a knickerbocker outfit of moleskin "is moving quickly" for \$400 at Jacques Kaplan. Wouldn't it be far better to buy a pair of \$100 knickers instead, and with the remaining \$300 buy a toy for a child that has never had one, shoes for a ghetto unfortunate, a can of beans for a family that has already had one child die of malnutrition? It's nice to be rich, but you can be that without being morally ugly on the inside.

CHRIS KORSGAARD
Iowa City, Iowa

EAST PAKISTAN

Sirs: The U.S. weather satellite photo ("Portrait of a Deadly Pinwheel," Nov. 27) does indeed paint a vivid picture of the devastation that East Pakistan suffered. In addition to our satellite reconnaissance, we (the U.S.) have at our disposal a vast weather forecasting service which, I might add, I have used in many years of worldwide flying. If anything is to be learned by this disaster, I would think the allocation of foreign aid funds to prevent future calamities would be appropriate.

MAJOR ARTHUR AUTHIER
USAF (RET.)
Fort Worth, Texas

ETHIOPIA

Sirs: After reading your article on Ethiopia concerning the wanton annihilation of some of the world's rarest animals ("On the Rim of the Primeval," Nov. 27), I nearly died. It is so very sad that man must wait until there are fewer than 150 walia ibexes left in their natural habitat and then still be lax in enforcing an imperial edict. We'll continue to be phlegmatic, though, because as yet only a few species are gone forever.

GUY LANGER
Encino, Calif.

Sirs: Man kills animals for pleasure in the U.S. and for convenience in Ethiopia. Perhaps one day man himself will become rare. And when extinction comes—who will mourn?

MRS. R. E. BAILEY
Pittsburgh, Pa.

COMMENT

Sirs: I laughed so hard reading Calvin Trillin's review of *The Sensuous Woman* ("The Adventures of Roxanne," Nov. 27) that I decided to spare my husband having to cope with a contrived *Sensuous Woman*. So I put the \$8.95 toward some Cold Duck and hot hors d'oeuvres. But my ever-so-knowl-

edgeable husband asked me if I had read the book. And I thought I was being sensible, not sensuous!

JUNE CROSSON
River Rouge, Mich.

SENATOR TYDINGS

Sirs: I am curious to see if LIFE, after being partner to the impugning of Senator Joseph Tydings ("What the Senator Didn't Disclose," Aug. 28), will make mention of the government's complete clearing of him. Or does the format of your magazine preclude such integrity?

MRS. WILLIAM GARLICK
Baltimore, Md.

Sirs: The State Department has now disclosed further evidence concerning Senator Joseph Tydings' supposed misuse of his official position, and has publicly exonerated him. LIFE, in large part, can be held responsible for the wide publicity these charges received. That you were foolish enough to fall for the same perfidious trick that has twice before been attempted by opponents of Senator Tydings is simply shocking. Muckraking is fine. Helping to defame an innocent man is disgusting.

MICHAEL SCHWEL
Lynchburg, Va.

► *The State Department report, far from clearing Tydings, simply repeated LIFE's own factual findings about his visit to an AID official in connection with a project in Nicaragua. The report confirms that Tydings had a beneficial financial interest in the company which was seeking a federal loan guarantee for the project. While pointing out that several other congressmen approached the agency about the project on behalf of constituents (a perfectly routine and ethical procedure), the report failed to make clear that Tydings alone had a personal financial interest and had, moreover, paid his visit in company with a business associate who was not even his constituent. As the LIFE article stated, both Tydings and his associate Raymond Mason later admitted that the meeting had been "a mistake."*—ED.

CONSERVATION BILL

Sirs: In your July 19, 1968 issue you had an editorial entitled "Endangered Edge of the Sea." My wife, Josephine Margetts, a member of the New Jersey legislature, read the article and became convinced that the New Jersey wetlands should have the protection as set forth in the editorial. She prepared a bill, with the assistance of Mr. William Lanning of the State Legislative Services of New Jersey, and was finally successful in having it passed. On Nov. 5 Governor Cahill signed the bill.

I thought you would be interested to know that your editorial was the incentive for what is now considered one of the finest conservation bills in the state of New Jersey.

WALTER T. MARGETTS JR.
New York, N.Y.

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
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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS: PART IV



PLAYING FOR

Khrushchev speaks out on Mao, Kennedy,

Soviet Premier Khrushchev was joined by world Communist leaders in 1961 to salute the 44th anniversary of the Revolution. Between Cuba's Blas Roca and Khrushchev is Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh. Others, moving right from Khrushchev: Rodion Malinovsky, then Defense Minister; Hungary's Janos Kadar; Leonid Brezhnev,

who three years later helped oust Khrushchev; Central Committee Secretary Frol Kozlov; Party theoretician Mikhail Suslov; Anastas Mikoyan; Nikolai Shvernik.




HIGH STAKES

Nixon and the Cuban missile crisis

Articles prepared for LIFE
by Gene Farmer and Jerrold Schechter


'We gave the bourgeois



Khrushchev's favorite American statesman was John F. Kennedy. They met at Vienna (left) in 1961, shortly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and Khrushchev set out to intimidate the young President. But he was charmed by both Kennedy and his wife (below), and Kennedy's murder was for Khrushchev a personal tragedy.



heads of state a chance to look us over'



Aware that they were being "looked over," Bulganin and Khrushchev stepped on the world stage at Geneva in 1955. Waving from rear seat, beside the security policeman Ivan Serov, is Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, included in Soviet delegation because he and President Eisenhower were friendly.



Shaking hands at Geneva with "that sinister man Dulles," Party Secretary Khrushchev affects a cordiality he did not feel as Premier Bulganin beams. Khrushchev suggests that the Russians approached this meeting with a lack of self-assurance. When it was over, however, they felt they had acquitted themselves well.

Khrushchev's real education in foreign affairs began with the Big Four summit meeting in Geneva in July 1955. He was then Party First Secretary, although he was two years away from consolidating his personal power. Geneva was both an ordeal and a climax for the peasant who was now meeting opposite numbers with backgrounds of West Point, Eton and Oxford, the Lycée and the Sorbonne. In this conclusion to LIFE's series, Khrushchev seeks to justify his actions before history, and his interpretation is clearly self-serving.

Right up until his death Stalin used to tell us, "You'll see, when I'm gone the imperialistic powers will wring your necks like chickens." We never tried to reassure him that we would be able to manage. Besides, we had doubts about Stalin's foreign policy. He overemphasized the importance of military might. For him foreign policy meant keeping anti-aircraft units around Moscow on 24-hour ready alert.

Our trip to Geneva gave the bourgeois heads of state a chance to look us over. I think it was actually Churchill's idea to open contacts with the new Soviet government after Stalin's death. Churchill believed that the new Soviet government would be more vulnerable to pressure. We too were in favor of a meeting. It was our feeling that after such a bloody war we and the West could come to terms.

I think one reason we were able to agree to the Geneva meeting at all was that [Georgi] Malenkov had been released from his duties as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov was unstable to the point of being dangerous because he was susceptible to the pressure and influence of others.

Prime Minister [Nikolai] Bulganin was to head our delegation [the other principals: Khrushchev, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and his deputy Andrei Gromyko].

We knew that the No. 1 goal which the English, Americans and French would be pursuing would be what they called "the reunification of Germany," which really meant the expulsion of Socialist forces from the German Democratic Republic and the creation of a single capitalist Germany. We wanted simply to sign a peace treaty which would recognize the existence of two German states and would guarantee that each state be allowed to develop as its own people saw fit.

The leaders of the other three delegations arrived in four-engine planes, and we arrived in a modest two-engine Ilyushin. Their planes were certainly more impressive than ours, and the comparison was embarrassing.

At the airport an unpleasant incident occurred. Bulganin was supposed to step forward and inspect the honor guard. Just before he did so, a Swiss protocol officer stepped right in front of me and stood with his back up against my nose. My first impulse was to shove him out of the way. Later I realized he had been told to make sure that I couldn't step forward with Bulganin to review the troops. The Swiss government rudely had that man stand in front of me!

CONTINUED

This excerpt has been adapted for LIFE from the forthcoming book "Khrushchev Remembers," to be published in the United States and Canada by Little, Brown and Company in December 1970. The book was translated and edited by Strobe Talbot, and it carries an introduction and commentary by Edward Crankshaw.




'That cur



The 1960 U-2 incident, in which American pilot Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Russia in a spy plane like the one above, wrecked a Paris summit conference. It also spoiled the "spirit of



Dulles was snapping at Eisenhower'



Camp David" established a year earlier during Khrushchev's visit to President Eisenhower (below). The U-2 affair weakened Khrushchev's position at home (see box, p. 48B), although his text

does not comment on that point. When Soviet-commanded tanks confronted U.S. troops (left) during the Berlin crisis of 1961, Khrushchev claimed a victory, but he did not get the U.S. out of Berlin.



CONTINUED

The Geneva meeting was not the first time I met Eisenhower. I'd met him at the end of the war when he came to Moscow. If I had to compare the two American Presidents with whom I dealt—Eisenhower and Kennedy—the comparison would not be in favor of Eisenhower. Our people have told me that they considered him a mediocre military leader and a weak President. He was a good man, but he wasn't very tough. There was something soft about his character.

Our conversations with the American delegation were generally constructive and useful for both parties, although the United States refused to make even the most reasonable concessions because [Secretary of State] John Foster Dulles was still alive. It was he who determined foreign policy, not President Eisenhower. I watched Dulles making notes with a pencil, folding them up and sliding them under Eisenhower's hand. Eisenhower would then pick up these sheets of paper and read them before making a decision. He followed this routine conscientiously, like a dutiful schoolboy taking his lead from the teacher. It was difficult for us to imagine how a chief of state could allow himself to lose face like that in front of delegations from other countries.

We had made a point of including our Defense Minister, Marshal [Georgi] Zhukov, in our delegation. Zhukov had been a friend of Eisenhower's during the war. We hoped that Eisenhower and Zhukov might have a chance to talk alone together. But that vicious cur Dulles was always prowling around Eisenhower, snapping at him if he got out of line. Eisenhower did give Zhukov a spinning reel and sent personal greetings to Zhukov's wife and daughter; but other than such pleasantries, nothing came of Zhukov's conversations with Eisenhower.

Eisenhower suggested that after each plenary session we meet for refreshments. His idea was that if there had been any hard feelings aroused, we could wash them away with martinis.

The atmosphere of our conversations with [Sir Anthony] Eden was certainly warm. Naturally he was following the same general line as the Americans, but he seemed to be more flexible. During dinner one evening Eden asked us, "What would you say if you were invited to make an official visit to Great Britain?" We said we would accept such an invitation with pleasure. [Eden had succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister in April 1955.]

Ultimately we prepared a joint statement setting forth the position of the four delegations. The wording was the result of various compromises which allowed all of us to sign.

The Geneva meeting was a crucial test for us: would we be able to represent our country competently? Would we be able to keep the other side from intimidating us? All things considered, I would say we passed. We returned to Moscow knowing that we hadn't achieved any concrete results. But we were encouraged, realizing now that our probable enemies feared us as much as we feared them.


Vietnam

Khrushchev does not date his first meeting with Ho Chi Minh, but it must have taken place after open warfare broke out in 1946 between the Vietminh, as the Vietnamese Communists were then known, and the French.

Ho Chi Minh really was one of Communism's "saints." I first met him while Stalin was still alive. He had flown to Moscow directly from the jungles of Vietnam. During our conversation, Ho kept watching Stalin intently with his unusual eyes, shining with a special kind of sincerity and purity. Once he reached into his briefcase and took out a copy of a Soviet magazine and asked Stalin to autograph it. Stalin

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'I don't think China will release Vietnam




Khrushchev was proud of his prowess with a gun and liked to hunt whenever possible. Above, he relaxes in the woods of Usovo near Moscow. Below, during his last year of power (1964), he

watches the trophies of a bear hunt being cut up in Romania, the satellite country which in the post-Khrushchev era has had the greatest success following a foreign policy independent of Moscow.



from its paws'



Another Nikita Sergeevich, the son of Khrushchev's son Sergei, enjoys a pool swim at Pitsunda, on the Black Sea, with his proud grandfather (above). In this 1963 picture, a rare private glimpse of Khrushchev relaxing, little Nikita's face shows a decided family resemblance.



A genial family man, Premier Khrushchev posed in the early 1960s in front of a house at Usovo used for foreign guests. Khrushchev stands between his daughter Helen and son Sergei. The others, left to right: daughters Galina and Rada; Mrs. Khrushchev (Nina Petrovna); Rada's husband Aleksei Adzhubei, a career journalist who from 1959 to 1964 was the chief editor of *Izvestia*.

CONTINUED

gave Ho his autograph but shortly afterwards had the magazine stolen back because he was worried about how Ho might use it.

Before the Geneva Conference [the earlier meeting, in 1954, when Vietnam was partitioned] there was a preparatory meeting in Moscow. China was represented by Chou En-lai and Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. The situation was very grave. The resistance movement in Vietnam was on the brink of collapse. Hanoi was securely in the hands of the French.

After one of these sessions in Catherine Hall at the Kremlin, Chou En-lai buttonholed me and said, "Comrade Ho Chi Minh has told me that the situation in Vietnam is hopeless and that if we don't attain a cease-fire soon, the Vietnamese won't be able to hold out against the French. They want China to be ready to move troops into Vietnam as we did in North Korea. We simply can't. We've already lost too many men in Korea—that war cost us dearly. We're in no condition to get involved in another war at this time."

I said, "The Vietnamese are putting up a good fight. The French are taking heavy losses. There's no reason why you should tell Ho Chi Minh that you will refuse to help him if his troops retreat to your border. Why don't you just tell him a white lie? Let the Vietnamese believe that you'll help them if necessary, and this will be a source of inspiration for the Vietnamese to resist the French." Chou En-lai agreed.

Then a miracle happened. When the delegations arrived in Geneva, the Vietnamese won a great victory and captured the fortress of Dienbienphu.

At the first session of the conference Mendès-France [French Premier Pierre Mendès-France] proposed to restrict the northern reach of the French forces to the 17th parallel. When we were informed of this news from Geneva, we gasped with surprise and pleasure. We hadn't expected anything like this. The 17th parallel was the absolute maximum we would have claimed ourselves. We instructed our representatives to demand that the demarcation line be moved farther south to the 15th parallel, but only for the sake of appearing to drive a hard bargain. After haggling for a short time, we accepted Mendès-France's offer, and the treaty was signed. We had succeeded in consolidating the gains of the Vietnamese Communists.

All would have been well if everyone had adhered to the commitments of the Geneva accords. But then that sinister man Dulles and the United States stepped in and imposed a long, bloody war on the Vietnamese people, a war which is still going on today.

When the rupture between the Parties of the Soviet Union and China came out into the open, China began to lead the Vietnamese Party around by a halter. We have been unsparing in our efforts to assist Vietnam, and the hostility of the pro-Chinese elements in Vietnam has been a bitter pill to swallow. Why am I bringing this up now? Because it relates to what we can expect now that Ho Chi Minh is dead.

According to what I read in the press, it appears that all is going smoothly in Soviet-Vietnamese relations. But certain information that has reached me indicates that the Vietnamese are showing unwarranted restraint toward the Soviet government and Party. I would like to believe that Vietnam really does desire good relations with the Soviet Union, but I don't think China will release Vietnam from its paws. With the death of Ho Chi Minh, the infectious growth of pro-Chinese influence will be able to spread more virulently. If that happens it will be a great pity, and it will be a poor memorial to Comrade Ho Chi Minh.

China

The friction between Moscow and Peking began to build in the middle 1950s, although the signs were not yet evident to the outer world.

A few years after I retired, the story started circulating that I was the one who started the quarrel between the U.S.S.R. and China. I won't even bother to refute this slander.

CONTINUED

'I had run out of patience with Mao'



After the split with China, Khrushchev regularly hosted Communist chiefs like Poland's Gomułka, whose support he needed.



Visiting Yugoslavia in 1963, Khrushchev seemed reconciled to the determination of Marshal Tito (above) to go his own way.

Outwardly friendly, Khrushchev visited Mao (below) in Peking in 1958. In background: Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai.



CONTINUED

Ever since I first met Mao I've known that Mao would never be able to reconcile himself to any other Communist Party being in any way superior to his own. If Stalin had lived a little longer, our conflict with China would have come into the open earlier. Stalin was always fairly critical toward Mao Tse-tung. Stalin used to say that Mao was a "margarine Marxist."

When Mao's victorious revolutionary army was approaching Shanghai [in 1949], Stalin asked Mao, "Why didn't you take Shanghai?"

"There's a population of six million there," answered Mao. "If we take the city, then we'll have to feed all those people."

Now, I ask you, is that a Marxist talking? Mao didn't want to take responsibility for the welfare of the workers. But the fact remains that Mao, relying on the peasants and ignoring the working class, achieved victory. It was certainly a new twist to Marxist philosophy. Mao Tse-tung is a petty bourgeois whose interests are alien, and have been alien all along, to those of the working class.

One day we were sitting around at Stalin's, trying to figure out some way to meet the demands of our rubber industry without having to let us set up a rubber plantation in exchange for credit loans and technical assistance. The Chinese replied that they would let us use the island of Hainan. It turned out that the area we were given on Hainan was too small for a decent rubber plantation, and the idea was dropped.

Then all of a sudden Stalin took a liking to canned pineapple. He dictated a message to Malenkov: "Get a message off to the Chinese that I'd like them to give us an area where we can build a pineapple cannery."

I said, "Comrade Stalin, the Communists have just recently come to power in China. There are already too many foreign factories there. This is sure to offend Mao Tse-tung."

Stalin snapped at me angrily, and I said nothing more. A day or two later we received the Chinese reply. Mao Tse-tung said, "We accept your proposal. If you are interested in canned pineapples, then give us a credit loan and we will build the cannery ourselves. We will then pay back your loan with the produce."

Stalin cursed and fumed.

In my time we took great care never to offend China until the Chinese actually started to crucify us. And when they did start to crucify us—well, I'm no Jesus Christ, and I didn't have to turn the other cheek.

I remember when I came back from China in 1954 I told my comrades, "Conflict with China is inevitable." During my visit to Peking, Mao and I used to lie around a swimming pool, chatting like the best of friends. But it was all too sickeningly sweet. The atmosphere was nauseating. I was never exactly sure that I understood what Mao meant. I thought at the time that it must have been because of some special traits in the Chinese character and the Chinese way of thinking.

Mao once asked me, "What do you think of our slogan, 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom?'" I answered, "We simply can't figure out what this means. There are all kinds of flowers—beautiful flowers, nauseating flowers and even lethal flowers." Now it's clear that the slogan was intended as a provocation to encourage people to express themselves so that any flowers whose blossom had the wrong color or scent could be cut down and trampled in the dirt.

Then there was Mao's other famous slogan: "Imperialism Is a Paper Tiger." I found it perfectly incredible that Mao could dismiss American imperialism as a paper tiger when in fact it is a dangerous predator. Mao and I were lying next to the pool in our bathing trunks, discussing the problems of war and peace. He said to me, "If we compare the military might of the capitalist world with that of the Socialist world, you'll see that we have the advantage. Think of how many divisions China, the U.S.S.R. and the other Socialist countries could raise."

I said, "Comrade Mao Tse-tung, that thinking is out of date. You can no longer calculate the alignment of forces on the basis of who has the most men. With the atomic bomb, the more troops on a side, the more bomb fodder."

"Listen, Comrade Khrushchev. All you have to do is provoke the Americans into military action, and I'll give you as many divisions as you need to crush them—a hundred, two hundred, one thousand." I tried to explain that one or two missiles could turn all the divisions in China to dust. But he wouldn't even listen and obviously regarded me as a coward.

Clearly there was basic disagreement. But our split with China went even deeper. The Chinese understood the implications for themselves of the 20th Party Congress's repudiation of personality cults, autocratic rule and all other antidemocratic, anti-Party forms of life. Stalin was condemned at the Congress for having had hundreds of thousands of people shot and for his abuse of power. Mao Tse-tung was following in Stalin's footsteps.

In 1958, when we put our long-range submarines into service, we needed a radio station in China to keep in contact. The Chinese answer was no. I said to my comrades, "It's Mao's turn to make a state visit here. But given the present situation, maybe we'd better go talk to him so we can find out where we stand."

This was our last trip to China. It was in 1959. We discussed the radio station. I said [to Mao], "We will give you the money to build the station. It doesn't matter to whom the station belongs, as long as we can use it to keep in contact with our submarines. Couldn't we come to some agreement so that our submarines might have a base in your country for refueling, repairs, shore leaves and so on?"

"For the last time, no. I don't want to hear anything about it."

"The countries of the Atlantic Pact have no trouble cooperating and supplying each other, and here we are—unable to reach an agreement on so simple a matter as this!"

"No!"

I made one last attempt to be reasonable: "If you want, you can use Murmansk as a port for your submarines."

"No! We don't want anything to do with Murmansk, and we don't want you here. We've had the British and other foreigners on our territory for years now, and we're not ever going to let anyone use our land for their own purposes again."

It's always difficult to know what the Chinese are really thinking. It's difficult to figure out whether China is really for or against peaceful coexistence. There is one thing I know for sure about Mao. He's a nationalist, and when I knew him he was bursting with an impatient desire to rule the world. He asked me, "How many conquerors have invaded China?" He answered the question himself: "China has been conquered many times, but the Chinese have assimilated all of their conquerors."

He was setting his sights on the future. "Think about it," he said. "You have 200 million people, [and] we have 700 million."

Later the Chinese press started to claim that Vladivostok was on Chinese territory, that the Russians had stolen it from China. We consented to negotiate about our borders. They sent their version of how the map should read. We took one look at it and threw it away in disgust.

If you read my report to the 22nd Party Congress [in 1961], you'll see that I dedicated many of my remarks to the problems of China, although I didn't mention China by name. It was at the 22nd Congress that we rejected the main tenets of Mao's position. I had run out of patience with him.

I do subscribe to one of Mao's "egalitarian" reforms. He was right to remove epaulets from Chinese army uniforms. Who the hell needs them? We won the civil war and I didn't have any epaulets or stripes. Nowadays our military men are all dressed up like canaries.

While Mao Tse-tung may have abused his power and misled his Party, he's not a madman. He is very intelligent and cunning.

TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 47



KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

'By now Kennedy was in the White House'

TEXT CONTINUED FROM PAGE 25

Only a few years ago people were predicting that Mao Tse-tung would never win the power struggle which was going on. I said, "Nonsense, of course Mao will win." And I was right. But the Chinese don't recognize any law except power and force. If you don't obey, they tear your head off. They strangle you in the middle of a square in front of thousands of people. What sort of "politics" is that? You can't even call it barbarism. It's more than that.

Berlin

Khrushchev's account of the Berlin crisis, following the 1961 Vienna meeting at which Khrushchev sought to bully John F. Kennedy, is sketchy, but it is an interesting view of the conflict over Germany as seen from the other side of the Wall. The "victory" Khrushchev claims was not complete; the Allies hacked down on the Berlin Wall, but their troops remained in West Berlin, which was the central point of the argument.

By this time President Kennedy was in the White House. Not long before the events in Berlin came to a head, I had met Kennedy in Vienna. He impressed me as a better statesman than Eisenhower. Unlike Eisenhower, Kennedy had a precisely formulated opinion on every subject. I joked with him that we had cast the deciding ballot in his election to the presidency over that son of a bitch Richard Nixon. I explained that by waiting to release the U-2 pilot Gary Powers until after the American election, we kept Nixon from being able to claim that he could deal with the Russians; our ploy made a difference of at least half a million votes, which gave Kennedy the edge he needed.

I had met Kennedy before, during my visit to America. I remember liking his face, which often broke into a good-natured smile. As for Nixon, I had been all too familiar with him in the past. He had been a puppet of [Senator Joseph] McCarthy until McCarthy's star began to fade, at which point Nixon turned on him. So he was an unprincipled puppet, which is the most dangerous kind. I was very glad Kennedy won the election, and I was generally pleased with our meeting in Vienna. Even though we came to no concrete agreement, I could tell that he was interested in finding a peaceful solution to world problems.

Nevertheless Kennedy reinforced the American garrison and appointed a general named [Lucius] Clay to take command of Western forces in Berlin. We had picked up the gauntlet and were ready for the duel.

[Marshal Ivan] Konev reported that he had learned on what day and at what hour the Western powers were going to begin their actions against us. They were preparing bulldozers to break down our border installations, followed by tanks and wave after wave of Jeeps with infantrymen. We concentrated our own infantry units in side streets near the checkpoints along the border. We also brought in our tanks at night and stationed them nearby.

Then Konev reported that the American bulldozers, tanks and Jeeps were heading in the direction of our checkpoints. Our men were waiting calmly and did not move. Then all at once our tanks rolled out of the side streets and moved forward to meet the American tanks.

The American bulldozers and tanks came to a halt. The Jeeps drove past them and we opened the gates into East Berlin and let



Fidel Castro, Khrushchev says, was furious at the decision to pull Soviet missiles out of Cuba in 1962. But the two had made up when Castro visited Lake Ritsa in the Caucasus in 1963.

the Jeeps through. After they'd gone a short distance beyond the checkpoint, the Americans saw our infantry troops in the side streets and our tanks coming toward them. They immediately turned their Jeeps around and sped back into West Berlin.

The tanks and troops of both sides spent the night lined up facing each other across the border. It was late October and chilly. It certainly must have been invigorating for our tank operators to sit up all night in cold metal boxes. The next morning Marshal Konev reported to us that both the American tank crews and our own had climbed out in turn to warm themselves, but that the barrels of

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'We had to confront America'



In a lecture from the Soviet Mission balcony to U.N. newsmen in New York City, Khrushchev in 1960 was a mix of toughness, cunning and ebullient charm.

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their cannon remained trained on each other across the border.

I proposed that we turn our tanks around, pull them back from the border and have them take their places in the side streets. We should take the initiative ourselves and give the Americans an opportunity to pull back from the border once the threat of our tanks had been removed. I said I thought that the Americans would pull back their tanks within 20 minutes after we had removed ours.

Konev ordered our tanks to pull back. He reported that, just as I had expected, it did take only 20 minutes for the Americans to respond.

I think it was a great victory for us. By refusing to back down, we guaranteed the G.D.R.'s right to control its own [East German] territory and its own borders. We had good reason to celebrate this moral and material victory.

Cuba

Khrushchev's account of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 is perhaps the most open passage in this book, although the remarks attributed to Robert Kennedy are extremely unlikely. After the crisis was over the world had the strong impression that Khrushchev had backed down, and to some extent that was true. Yet Khrushchev claims that he got about what he wanted.

At the time Fidel Castro led his revolution to victory [in 1959] we had no idea what political course he would follow. For a long time we had no diplomatic relations with the new regime. However, our people who handled Latin American affairs did know some of the Cuban leaders. They knew Raul Castro in particular. We knew that Raul was a good Communist, but it appeared that he kept his true convictions hidden from his brother Fidel. Ché Guevara was a Communist too, and so were some of the others—or so we thought. We had nothing to go on but rumors.

We decided to send Mikoyan to America to establish unofficial contacts with the leaders of the American business world. We wanted to find out what the prospects were for developing trade with America. Anastas Ivanovich had been in the U.S. before the war and still had some of his old contacts. While Mikoyan was in the U.S., Fidel invited him to visit Cuba. Mikoyan traveled around Cuba, looked things over and talked with people.

Shortly after Mikoyan's visit we established diplomatic relations. The Americans had cut off the Cubans' supply of oil and it was urgent that we organize an oil delivery to Cuba on a massive scale. That was easier said than done. Our efforts put a heavy burden on our own shipping system and forced us to order extra tankers from Italy. When Italy agreed to sell us the tankers, it caused a sharp conflict between Italy and America. The lesson was that if a capitalist country sees a chance to make some extra money, it couldn't care less about economic solidarity.

We sent a veteran diplomat to be our ambassador in Havana. We also had [Aleksandr] Alekseyev there, a journalist who was friendly with Fidel and even more so with Raul. It was lucky we had Alekseyev there because our ambassador turned out to be unsuited for service in a country just emerging from a revolution. When the situation heated up and shooting started, he demanded that the Cubans give him a special bodyguard. The Cuban leaders were astonished and irritated. Here they were offering the enemies of the revolution far more enticing targets and going around without any bodyguards at all themselves, and now this Communist aristocrat of ours starts demanding some sort of special protection! So we recalled him and made Alekseyev ambassador in his place. He turned out to be an excellent choice.

Castro was no longer sitting on the fence; he was beginning to behave like a full-fledged Communist, even though he still didn't call himself one. All the while the Americans had been watching Castro closely. At first they thought that the capitalist underpinnings of the Cuban economy would remain intact. So by the time Castro announced that he was going to put Cuba on the road to Socialism,

the Americans had missed their chance to do anything by simply exerting influence. That left only one alternative—invasion!

The Cubans asked us for arms. We gave them tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft guns and some fighter planes. The Cubans had always fought with light arms only—automatic rifles, grenades and pistols. But with the help of our instructors they learned quickly how to use modern weapons.

We first heard on the radio [April 1961] that a counterrevolutionary invasion had been launched against Cuba. We didn't even know who the invaders were: were they Cuban conspirators or Americans? However, we knew that the [Bay of Pigs] invasion had to have the backing of the Americans.

Fidel's forces swung into action and made short work of the invaders. The Americans had put too much faith in the conspirators. They had assumed that with American support behind the invasion, the Cubans would topple Castro by themselves.

We welcomed Castro's victory, but we were certain that the Americans would not let Cuba alone. Given the continued threat of American interference in the Caribbean, what should our own policy be?

While I was on an official visit to Bulgaria one thought kept hammering away at my brain: what will happen if we lose Cuba? If Cuba fell, other Latin American countries would reject us, claiming that for all our might the Soviet Union hadn't been able to do anything for Cuba except make empty protests to the United Nations. We had to think up some way of confronting America with more than words. But what exactly? The logical answer was missiles.

It was during my visit to Bulgaria [in May 1962] that I had the idea of installing missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba without letting the United States find out until it was too late to do anything about them. I knew that first we'd have to talk to Castro and explain our strategy to get the agreement of the Cuban government. My thinking went like this: if we installed the missiles secretly and then if the United States discovered the missiles were there, after they were fixed and ready to strike, the Americans would think twice before trying to liquidate our installations by military means. I knew that the United States could knock out some of our installations, but not all of them. If a quarter or even a tenth of our missiles survived—even if only one or two big ones were left—we could still hit New York, and an awful lot of people would be wiped out. I don't know how many; that's a matter for our scientists and military personnel to work out.

The main thing was that the installation of our missiles in Cuba would restrain the United States from precipitous military action. The Americans had surrounded our own country with military bases and threatened us with nuclear weapons, and now they would learn just what it feels like. It was high time America learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened. America has never had to fight a war on her own soil—at least not in the past 50 years. America sent troops abroad to fight in two World Wars—and made a fortune as a result. America has shed a few drops of her own blood while making billions.

All these thoughts kept churning in my head the whole time I was in Bulgaria. I didn't tell anyone what I was thinking. I kept my mental agony to myself. But all the while the idea of putting missiles in Cuba was ripening inside my mind. After I returned to Moscow we convened a meeting and I said I had some thoughts to air on the subject of Cuba. I presented my idea in the context of the counterrevolutionary invasion which Castro had just resisted. I said that it would be foolish to expect the inevitable second invasion to be as badly planned and executed as the first. I warned that Fidel would be crushed and said we were the only ones who could prevent such a disaster from occurring.

We decided to install intermediate-range missiles, launching equipment and Ilyushin-28 bombers in Cuba. Soon after we began shipping our missiles, the Americans became suspicious. It was

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not long before they concluded on the basis of reconnaissance photographs that we were installing missiles. The Americans became frightened, and we stepped up our shipments. We had delivered almost everything by the time the crisis reached the boiling point.

There are people who argue with the benefit of hindsight that anti-aircraft missiles should have been installed before the ballistic missiles to close the air space over Cuba. This doesn't make sense. How many surface-to-air missiles can you fit on a tiny sausage-shaped island?

I want to make one thing absolutely clear: when we put our ballistic missiles in Cuba, we had no desire to start a war. Our principal aim was to deter America from starting a war. Any idiot could have started a war between America and Cuba. Cuba

was 11,000 kilometers away from us. Only a fool would think that we wanted to invade the American continent from Cuba. We wanted to keep the Americans from invading Cuba, and we wanted to make them think twice by confronting them with our missiles. This goal we achieved—but not without undergoing a period of perilous tension.

One day in October President Kennedy came out with a statement warning that the United States would take whatever measures were necessary to remove what he called the "threat" of Russian missiles in Cuba. The Americans began to make a belligerent show of strength, surrounding the island with their navy. Things started churning. The Americans were trying to frighten us, but they were no less scared than we were of atomic war. We had installed enough

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A 1969 conversation with Khrushchev: the beginning of his fall from power

by Dr. A. McGehee Harvey

A world-respected internist, Dr. Harvey is Director of the Department of Medicine at the Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore. A year ago he and his wife Elizabeth spent a week in the Soviet Union seeing, in medical consultation, a member of the Khrushchev family. They had a rare private day with the former Premier at his dacha 15 miles southwest of Moscow. In the course of the day's conversations Khrushchev offered an insight into the circumstances which led to his fall from power, a subject not dealt with in his reminiscences.

Dr. Harvey has arranged that the fee for this report be paid to Johns Hopkins.

I guessed that they were a prominent family, but I didn't know my patient's name until the night before we left the United States. Then I was told to wear a big red rose in my lapel so that the Khrushchev family could recognize my wife and me when we got off the plane at Moscow's Sheremetevo Airport. My patient turned out to be a member of the Khrushchev family, but not Nikita Khrushchev himself. His son, Sergei Khrushchev, came to the airport with two cars and arranged our plans.

We toured Moscow for a day. Sergei said that the next day, Sunday, we would visit the art collection at the Yusupov estate 15 miles outside Moscow, then leave our Intourist guide and spend the rest of the day at the dacha with "my friend." During our entire stay Sergei never referred to Nikita Khrushchev as his father, but always called him "my friend."

Sunday morning turned up with the first big snowfall of the year and the roads were slippery. The Intourist guide was upset. She wanted to turn back and cancel the excursion. Cars were sliding around on the road and I was afraid that we weren't ever going to get there. But young Khrushchev just insisted and made the driver press on. We slid down a hill and just got by six cars all jumbled together on the road.

We finally got to the old Yusupov estate, which looked beautiful in the fresh snowfall. After a quick tour we said goodbye to our guide and drove past snow-laden pines and birches to the family dacha, which is surrounded by a green wooden fence. There were guards in plain clothes at the entrance, but they didn't delay Sergei's car.

There's a little road through the birch trees that

leads up to the dacha. The house looks like an old Vermont or New Hampshire summer cottage, the kind a fairly well-to-do person would have. It's painted green with white trim and has a neat, well-constructed feeling.

Mr. Khrushchev and his wife Nina Petrovna came to the doorway to greet us. As we entered and took off our coats, I saw him smile. He was 75 then and I was prepared to see him looking a little older and a little more feeble, but he was quite vigorous and full of beans.

The inside of the dacha is filled with all sorts of interesting gifts he's gotten from all over the world. It is simply but tastefully decorated. There were fabulous ivory carvings, tapestries and crystal, the things that are sent to a head of state. The table was already set for lunch and most of the family were there, including the grandchildren. I immediately got the impression of strong family ties and great personal warmth.

The table was set with heaping plates of salads, bread, caviar, herring, wine and vodka. Mr. Khrushchev was especially proud of the tomatoes and cucumbers, which he had grown in his own small greenhouse next to the dacha. He kept explaining to me how he grew the tomatoes, while Mrs. Khrushchev told us about the magnificent Siberian soup she had prepared, with raviolilike dumplings called *pitmen*.

At first we talked about Khrushchev's visit to the United States. I told him I had been interested in his career and had watched it on television and that I had met some of the people he had known, including Nehru and Presidents Nixon and Eisenhower. "Would you mind if I asked some questions about them?" I ventured. "Certainly not," he said.

He described his encounter with then-Vice President Nixon at the American trade fair exhibit in Moscow in 1959 and indicated that he thought he had gotten the better of Nixon in the so-called kitchen debate. "How would you size up Nixon?" I asked. His answer was immediate: "He's a typical middle-class American businessman."

Mr. Khrushchev told me, "Eisenhower was an extremely nice person. I liked him and respected him," he said. "Eisenhower was a very conscientious man and he really had a sincere desire for peace, but I never could get it out of my mind that when I was meeting with Eisenhower, I always felt as though I were talking to John Foster Dulles."

Of the three American Presidents, Khrushchev

indicated that he had the deepest interest in Kennedy. I think Khrushchev seemed a little sad that he hadn't had a greater opportunity to know the young President. Khrushchev said, "When I first met President Kennedy in Vienna it was clear that he was a very intelligent, likable person. At that time I felt he was politically inept, but that he was learning fast."

Then I asked Mr. Khrushchev if he would be willing to tell me what had happened, what had caused his sudden change in status. Again he answered without a pause. He said that his own idea always had been to have our two countries live together peacefully and compete economically, not militarily. He said he personally deplored violence and that was why he had been so aggressive in de-Stalinization and in removing Beria from power. And he said: "Things were going well until one event happened. From the time Gary Powers was shot down in a U-2 over the Soviet Union, I was no longer in full control."

I remember asking, "How did you feel when you lost your status?"

He said unequivocally that his decision-making powers were weakened after the U-2 crisis in the spring of 1960 and that he was no longer calling the shots. He explained that "those who felt America had imperialistic intentions and that military strength was the most important thing had the evidence they needed, and when the U-2 incident occurred, I no longer had the ability to overcome that feeling." He said very simply and straightforwardly that after Gary Powers was shot down, his own ascendancy during the next four years was over.

Mr. Khrushchev took me on a tour of the dacha and his greenhouse. His bedroom has a nice picture window looking out on the birch woods and there were lots of boxes of film scattered on the table. We talked about his interest in photography. He was very proud of the greenhouse and chatted again, in detail, about how he grew tomatoes, cucumbers and fresh flowers. He also told me about his summer vegetable garden and pointed out trees that he had planted himself on the grounds around the dacha.

We'd been there most of the day and only as it got dark did we say goodbye.

I was deeply impressed at how alert, intense and alive Mr. Khrushchev was. You've seen him on TV, the way he approached political topics of the day directly and in an earthy manner. He was exactly that way even when he was talking only about his tomatoes and cucumbers. He's that kind of man.

KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

'Our ships headed through the U.S. blockade'

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missiles already to destroy New York, Chicago and the other industrial cities, not to mention a little village like Washington. I don't think America had ever faced such a real threat of destruction as at that moment.

Meanwhile we went about our own business. We didn't let ourselves be intimidated. Our ships headed straight through the American navy, but the Americans didn't try to stop our ships or even check them. [After the U.S. proclaimed a naval blockade, some Russian ships did idle at sea to await developments.] We kept in mind that as long as the United States limited itself to threatening gestures, we could afford to pretend to ignore the harassment. We had the same rights as the Americans. Our conduct in the international arena was governed by the same rules and limits.

The Western press began to seethe with anger and alarm. Our people were fully informed of the dangerous situation, although we took care not to cause panic by the way we presented the facts. Seeking to take the heat off the situation somehow, I suggested to the other members of the government: "Comrades, let's go to the Bolshoi Theater this evening. Our own people as well as foreign eyes will notice, and perhaps it will calm them down." We were trying to disguise our own anxiety, which was intense.

Then the exchange of notes began. I dictated the messages from our side. I spent one of the most dangerous nights at the Council of Ministers office in the Kremlin. I slept on a couch, and I kept my clothes on. I was ready for alarming news to come any moment.

President Kennedy issued an ultimatum, demanding that we remove our missiles and bombers from Cuba. I remember those days vividly. I remember the exchange with President Kennedy especially well because I initiated it and was at the center of the action on our end of the correspondence. I take complete responsibility for the fact that the President and I entered into direct

contact at the most crucial and dangerous stage of the crisis.

The climax came after five or six days when our ambassador to Washington, Anatoli Dobrynin, reported that the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin's report went something like this: "Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights.

"The President is in a grave situation," he said, "and he does not know how to get out of it. We are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. Probably at this very moment the President is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We want to ask you to pass President Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels. President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. That is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American army could get out of control."

I hadn't overlooked this possibility. We knew that Kennedy was a young President and that the security of the United States was indeed threatened. For some time we had felt there was a danger that the President would lose control of his military. We could sense from the tone of the message that tension in the United States was indeed reaching a critical point. We wrote a reply to Kennedy in which we said that we had installed the missiles with the goal of defending Cuba and that we were not pursuing any aims except to deter an invasion of Cuba and to guarantee that Cuba would be

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
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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

**'We have
to look
for a
dignified
way out'**

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able to follow a course determined by its own people rather than one dictated by some third party.

While we conducted this exchange through official channels, the more confidential letters were relayed to us through the President's brother. Once, when Robert Kennedy talked with Dobrynin, he was almost crying. "I haven't seen my children for days now," he said, "and the President hasn't seen his either. I don't know how much longer we can hold out against our generals."


We could see that we had to reorient our position swiftly. "Comrades," I said, "we have to look for a dignified way out of this conflict. At the same time, of course, we must make sure that we do not compromise Cuba." We sent the Americans a note saying we agreed to remove our missiles and bombers on condition that the President give his assurance that there would be no invasion of Cuba by the forces of the U.S. or anybody else. Finally Kennedy gave in and agreed to make a statement giving us such an assurance.

As soon as we announced publicly that we were ready to remove our missiles, the Americans became arrogant and insisted on sending an inspection team to the island. We answered that they'd have to get the Cuban government's permission. Then the Chinese and American press started hooting about how Khrushchev had turned coward and backed down. I won't deny that we were obliged to make some big concessions in the interests of peace. We even consented to the inspection of our ships—but only from the air; we never let the Americans set foot on our decks. We did let them satisfy themselves that we were removing our missiles.

The situation was stabilizing. Almost immediately after the President and I had exchanged notes at the peak of the crisis, our relations with the United States started to return to normal. Our relations with Cuba, on the other hand, took a sudden turn for the worse. Castro even stopped receiving our ambassador. It seemed that by removing our missiles we had suffered a moral defeat in the eyes of the Cubans. Our shares in Cuba, instead of going up, went down.

We decided to send Mikoyan to Cuba. I said, "He will discuss the situation with the Cubans calmly." Not everyone understands

Cuban crisis came to an end when Russians removed their missiles. Here U.S.S. *Vesole*, a destroyer, inspects missiles shown by crew of Russian freighter *Poltzinov*.



what Mikoyan is saying when he talks, but he's a reasonable man.

The Americans had, on the whole, been open and candid with us, especially Robert Kennedy. The Americans knew that if Russian blood were shed in Cuba, American blood would surely be shed in Germany. It had been, to say the least, an interesting and challenging situation. The two most powerful nations in the world had been squared off, each with its finger on the button. But both sides showed that if the desire to avoid war is strong enough, even the most pressing dispute can be solved by compromise. And a compromise over Cuba was indeed found. The episode ended in a triumph of common sense.

I'll always remember the late President with deep respect because, in the final analysis, he showed himself to be sober-minded and determined to avoid war. He didn't overestimate America's might, and he didn't let himself become frightened, nor did he become reckless. He left himself a way out from the crisis. He showed real wisdom and statesmanship when he turned his back on right-wing forces in the United States who were trying to goad him into military action. It was a great victory for us, though, that we had been able to extract from Kennedy a promise that neither America nor her allies would invade Cuba.

But Castro didn't see it that way. He was angry. The Chinese were buzzing in Castro's ear, "Just remember, you can't trust the imperialists to keep any promises they make!"

After consulting with Mikoyan on his return from Havana, I decided to write a letter to Castro, candidly expressing my thoughts: "The main point about the Caribbean crisis is that it has guaranteed the existence of a Socialist Cuba . . . for at least another two years while Kennedy is in the White House. And we have reason to believe that Kennedy will be elected for a second term. To make it through six years in this day and age is no small thing. And six years from now the balance of power in the world will have probably shifted—and shifted in our favor, in favor of Socialism!"

My letter to Castro concluded an episode of world history in which, bringing the world to the brink of atomic war, we won a Socialist Cuba. The Caribbean crisis was a triumph of Soviet foreign policy and a personal triumph in my own career as a statesman and as a member of the collective leadership. We achieved, I would say, a spectacular success without having to fire a single shot!

We can be gratified that the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro still lives and grows. Cuba exists as an independent Socialist country, right in front of the open jaws of predatory American imperialism. Other Latin American peoples are beginning to realize what steps they can take to liberate themselves from American imperialists and monopolists. Hopefully Cuba's example will continue to shine.

As for Kennedy, his death was a great loss. He was gifted with the ability to resolve international conflicts by negotiation, as the whole world learned during the so-called Cuban crisis. Regardless of his youth, he was a real statesman. I believe that if Kennedy had lived, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States would be much better than they are. Why do I say that? Because Kennedy would never have let his country get bogged down in Vietnam.

Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson, assured us that he would keep Kennedy's promise not to invade Cuba. So far the Americans have not broken their word. If they ever do, we still have the means to make good on our commitment to Castro and defend Cuba.

It's no small thing that we have lived to see the day when the Soviet Union is considered, economically, the second most powerful country in the world.

I think our foreign policy should be based in part on an old folk

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KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

**'I live
with my
memories
and little
else'**

CONTINUED

custom which I remember from my own childhood. If a housewife went to another village to visit friends or relatives, she would never go without taking a bundle of pastries—or, in our Kursk Province, a dozen eggs—as a house present for her hosts. The policy of giving "house presents" to other countries must be pursued intelligently so that our generosity will always repay us economically and politically.

There is a battle going on in the world: will the working class prevail, or the bourgeoisie? We Communists believe that progress is on our side and victory will inevitably be ours. Yet the capitalists won't give an inch and swear to fight to the bitter end. How can we talk of peaceful coexistence with capitalist ideology? Peaceful coexistence among different systems of government is possible, but peaceful coexistence among different ideologies is not.

Therefore I allowed myself at one point to use the expression, "We will bury the enemies of the Revolution." I was referring, of course, to America. Later I clarified what I had meant: we, the Soviet Union, weren't going to bury anyone; the working class of the United States would bury its enemy, the bourgeois class of the United States.

Now that I'm living with my memories and little else, I think back often to that period when in a creative surge forward we rearmed our Soviet army. Now that it's the size of our nuclear missile arsenal and not the size of our army that counts, I think the army should be reduced to an absolute minimum. There's no question in my mind that we have reached the stage where that's possible.

We must not lower our guard. We must keep in mind the true character of all imperialists, capitalists, monopolists and militarists who are interested in making money out of the political tension between nations. We must be prepared to strike back against our enemy, but we must also ask, "Where is the end to this spiraling competition?"

I remember a conversation I once had with President Eisenhower at his "dacha" at Camp David [in 1959]. He asked, "Tell me, Mr. Khrushchev, how do you decide the question of funds for military expenses?" Before I had a chance to say anything he said, "Perhaps first I should tell you how it is with us."

"Well, how is it with you?"

He smiled and I smiled back. I had a feeling what he was going to say. "It's like this. My military leaders say, 'Mr. President, we need such and such a sum for such and such a program.' I say, 'Sorry, we don't have the funds.' They say, 'We have reliable information that the Soviet Union has already allocated funds for their own such program.' So I give in. That's how they wring money out of me. Now tell me, how is it with you?"

"It's just the same. Some people say, 'Comrade Khrushchev, look at this! The Americans are developing such and such a system.' I tell them there's no money. So we discuss it some more, and I end up by giving them the money they ask for."

"Yes," he said, "that's what I thought. You know, we really should come to some sort of an agreement in order to stop this rivalry."

"I'd like to do that."

But we couldn't agree then, and we can't agree now. I don't know. Maybe it's impossible for us to agree. I keep coming back to my own feeling that we should go ahead and sharply reduce our own expenditures, unilaterally. If our enemy wants to go ahead inflating his military budget, then he's sure to lower the living standards of his own people.

I think Stalin's cultural policies were cruel and senseless. You can't regulate the development of literature, art and culture with a stick or by barking orders. You can't lay down a furrow and then harness all your artists to make sure they don't deviate from the straight

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BURLEY From the Captain's Locker

Commanding, brisk, rugged
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teakwood forests of the
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One of a kind.
Burley Cologne, After
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From the men at *Old Spice*.



KHRUSHCHEV REMEMBERS

'We should open our borders'

CONTINUED

and narrow. If you try to control your artists too tightly, there will be no clashing of opinions, consequently no criticism, and consequently no truth. There will be just a gloomy stereotype, boring and useless.

Naturally, under the dictatorship of the working class, there can be no such thing as absolute freedom. As for other countries which brag about all their freedoms, they have no such thing as absolute freedom either. In order to feel moral constraint, a man must have a highly refined conception of what human freedom is all about. Most people still measure freedom in terms of how much meat, how many potatoes, or what kind of boots they can get for one ruble.

We Communists believe that capitalism is a hell in which laboring people are condemned to slavery. We are building Socialism. To use the language of the Bible, our way of life is paradise for mankind. It's not paradise in the sense that the horn of plenty is overflowing. We don't have that kind of paradise—not yet. I don't know if we ever will. But relative to the capitalist world, our life is a great accomplishment.

So why should we build a good life and then keep our borders bolted with seven locks? Sometimes our own citizens scoff, "So you're driving us into paradise with a club, eh?" I think it's time to show the world that our people are free; they work willingly; and they are building Socialism because of their convictions, not because they have no choice.

I once asked Tito, "Tell me, how do you check all the Western tourists who enter Yugoslavia by car?" In the U.S.S.R. we have a huge bureaucratic apparatus that puts many roadblocks in a tourist's way.

Tito laughed and said, "We've solved the problem very simply. There are all kinds of ways that undesirable tourists, spies and so forth, can get into our country. Border checks are no guarantee. Therefore border guards in our country subject tourists to a minimum of formal checks. There's usually no identity check at all. It's just as free for citizens of Yugoslavia going abroad. They sim-

In retirement, Khrushchev, a man who could be many things at many times, grins widely after making a rare visit to Moscow to cast his vote.



ply tell the border guard, 'I'm leaving to earn enough money to buy a car,' and they're let right through."

I was intrigued by this approach. I have no doubt that it's practically feasible for us to open our borders. Is it possible that our confidence and trust in individuals will ever be betrayed? Of course it is. So let the garbage of our society float to the surface, and let the waves carry it far from our shores. We've got to stop looking for a defector in everyone. We've got to stop designing our border for the sake of keeping the dregs and scum inside our country. We must start thinking about the people who don't deserve to be called scum. We've got to give them a chance to find out for themselves what the world is like.

When I found out that Svetlanka [Stalin's daughter] had gone to bury her husband in his homeland and that she wouldn't return, I wanted to believe it was just the latest slanderous hoax concocted by bourgeois journalists. Then I received indisputable confirmation. I can't understand how she decided to take this step. She abandoned her Homeland and her children. She gave the enemies of the Soviet way of life something to gossip about, and she allowed her name, the name of Stalin's daughter, to be exploited by the enemies of Socialism. Nevertheless I still feel very sorry for her.

For her to run away to the West can't be justified. But there's another side to the whole case. Svetlanka was dealt with stupidly. Apparently after her husband's funeral she went to our embassy in New Delhi. [Ivan] Benediktov was our ambassador there. He's a very straitlaced person. Svetlanka said she wanted to stay in India for a few months, but Benediktov advised her to return immediately to the Soviet Union. Svetlanka was particularly familiar with our habits in this regard. She knew it meant she wasn't trusted. This was an offensive, humiliating tactic which would throw even a stable person off balance, and Svetlanka wasn't a stable person. She broke down and turned to foreign powers for help.

What do I think should have been done? When Svetlanka came to the embassy and said that she had to stay in India for two or three months, they should have told her, "Why only three months? Get a visa for a year or two or even three years. Then, whenever you're ready, you can go back to the Soviet Union." They should have showed her that she was trusted. And what if we had acted the way we should have and Svetlanka still hadn't returned home? Well, that would have been too bad, but no worse than what happened.

The very thought of Svetlanka brings tears to my eyes. I felt like a parent toward her. I felt a certain human pity for her as I would feel for an orphan. As a little girl she would be running around the house whenever we came by. Stalin always called her "the hostess," and we started calling her "the hostess" too. She was always dressed smartly in a little Ukrainian skirt and an embroidered blouse. She looked very much like her mother with her auburn hair and tiny freckles. "The hostess" grew up before our eyes.

Things were never easy for her. Stalin never showed any parental tenderness. His was the tenderness of a cat for a mouse. Stalin broke the heart first of a child, then of a young girl, then of a mother. It all resulted in Svetlanka's gradual psychic breakdown. There's something odd and even sick about her book. I've heard excerpts from it over the radio. For instance she writes that she used to cross herself and that she was very religious. How could a Soviet citizen who grew up in our society write this kind of stuff?

I still think that everything has not yet been lost. Her thoughts about returning to her children might grow stronger. She should be given another chance. She should know that if she wants to come back she's welcome, and that the weakness she showed when she left and went to America won't be held against her.

There you have it. That's the substance of my viewpoint. My time has come and gone. There's nothing I can do now but share my experience with anyone who cares to listen. ■