

Part 14/14/60

# Khrushchev Recalls Cuba, JFK

Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis report that Robert Kennedy told the Soviet ambassador that President Kennedy feared the American military might "overthrow him and seize power." The story, told in the fourth and final installment

in Life magazine out today, is attributed to Anatoly F. Dobrynin, then and now Moscow's top diplomat in Washington. In a prelude, Life says the remarks attributed to Robert Kennedy "are extremely unlikely." This Khrushchev installment covers the missile

crisis, the 1961 Bay of Pigs debacle, his 1955 meeting at the Geneva summit with President Eisenhower and their 1959 Camp David meeting, a hitherto unknown 1954 meeting on Vietnam with the Chinese and North Vietnamese, his conversations with Mao Tse-tung, the

1961 Berlin crisis and his personal appraisals of Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon, of Fidel Castro and of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva.

### Installation of Missiles

Khrushchev reveals that he first thought of putting nuclear missiles in Cuba while he was visiting Bulgaria in May, 1962. His justification was to prevent the United States from launching what he calls "the inevitable second invasion" in which Castro surely "would be crushed."

"We had to think up some way of confronting America with more than words. But what exactly? The logical answer was missiles," he says. He says he and other Soviet leaders first heard on the radio of the Bay of Pigs effort of the previous year.

Khrushchev's idea was to get the missiles into Cuba "without letting the United States find out until it was too late to do anything about them." But the result was "a period of perilous tension" in which "the Americans were trying to frighten us, but they were no less scared than we were of atomic war."

The former Soviet leader takes full responsibility for the plan and for personally dictating the messages from Moscow to Washington during the crisis. He says he slept on a Kremlin couch with his clothes on, ready for "alarming news to come at any moment."

### Visit Described

This is his account of what occurred after President Kennedy "issued an ultimatum" in 1962:

"The climax came after five or six days when our ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, reported that the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, had come to see him on an unofficial visit. Dobrynin's report went something like this: Robert Kennedy looked exhausted. One could



By Frank Cancellare—United Press International

U.S. Navy patrol plane and destroyer Barry, foreground, inspect Soviet freighter Anosov, removing nuclear missile equipment from Cuba, during the 1962 crisis.

see from his eyes that he had not slept for days. He himself said that he had not been home for six days and nights.

"The President is in a grave situation," he said, "and he does not know how to get out of it. We are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. Probably at this very moment the President is sitting down to write a message to Chairman Khrushchev. We want to ask you to pass President Kennedy's message to Chairman Khrushchev through unofficial channels."

#### Irreversible Chain

"President Kennedy implores Chairman Khrushchev to take into consideration the peculiarities of the American system. Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. This is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khrushchev for his help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power. The American army could get out of control."

KHRUSHCHEV, A17, Col. 3


#### KHRUSHCHEV, From A1

Khrushchev says he had not overlooked such a possibility. So, he contends, he and his Kremlin colleagues proposed taking out the Soviet missiles in exchange for a Kennedy promise of no invasion of Cuba and that Kennedy gave such an assurance.

When the crisis was over, however, there was a problem with Castro who "even stopped seeing our ambassador." But Khrushchev contends the whole affair was a "triumph of Soviet foreign policy" because "we won a socialist Cuba."

#### Seen as "Triumph"

Khrushchev also considers the outcome "a personal triumph" in his own career. But Castro didn't "see it that way" and the Chinese



Associated Press

SOVIET Premier Khrushchev gestured as he greeted President Kennedy at Russian Embassy in Vienna at 1961 conference. At center is Foreign Minister Gromyko.

"were buzzing in Castro's ear." Khrushchev wrote Castro a letter saying he now foresaw peace for Cuba for six years since President Kennedy would be re-elected "and six years from now the balance of power in the world will have probably shifted—and shifted in our favor, in favor of socialism!"

President Johnson, adds Khrushchev, assured us" he would keep Mr. Kennedy's non-invasion promise.

Fidel Castro, says Khrushchev, initially was an enigma to Moscow but "we know that Raul Castro (Fidel's brother) was a good Communist" and Che Guevara as well.

After telling his version

of the missile crisis, Khrushchev relates a 1959 conversation with President Eisenhower at Camp David, Md. They talked of the need to halt the arms race and how each was pushed by the military into more and more weapons. Then he adds:

"But we couldn't agree then, and we can't agree now. I don't know. Maybe it's impossible for us to agree."

#### Suggests Cut

Khrushchev suggests that perhaps the way to stop the spiral is for a unilateral Soviet cut in military expenditures. At any rate, the Soviet army should be cut to "an absolute minimum" in the missile age.

Of President Kennedy,

Khrushchev says he has "deep respect" because he was "sober-minded and determined to avoid war." Robert Kennedy, especially, was "open and candid with us."

But President Eisenhower, says Khrushchev, while "a good man" had "something soft about his character" and was "a dutiful school-boy" taking his lead from of State John Foster Dulles. "that vicious cur," Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Khrushchev view his 1955

summit meeting with Eisenhower as "a crucial test" the Soviet leaders "passed" because "we were encouraged, realizing now that our probable enemies feared us as much as we feared them!"

The 1954 meeting on Vietnam, Khrushchev says, was preparatory to the Geneva Conference that ended with the division of Vietnam and the collapse of French power. Attending, in Moscow, were China's Chou En-lai and Premier Minister Pham Van Dong from Hanoi.

#### Victory at Dienbienphu

Khrushchev says Chou told him that Ho Chi Minh had said the situation was hopeless and that if there was no a cease-fire soon the Communists would not be able to hold out against the French. Chou said Hanoi wanted Chinese troops but Peking demurred. Khrushchev suggested "a white lie" promise of help. All was saved when "a miracle happened," the Communist victory at Dienbienphu.

Khrushchev declares the Communists were amazed when the French offered a division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel, which was "the absolute maximum we would have claimed ourselves." So they asked for the 15th just to appear to be driving a hard bargain. Later, that "sinister man Dulles" renewed he war President Kennedy, he adds would never have let the U.S. "get bogged down in Vietnam."

Khrushchev repeats the story he told in a 1967 NBC

television show about joking with President Kennedy at their 1961 meeting in Vienna about how he, Khrushchev, had elected Mr. Kennedy over Vice President Richard M. Nixon by refusing to release U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, at Mr. Nixon's request, before the election. In the 1967 version Khrushchev claimed to have influenced 200,000 votes; in Life the figure is at least half a million.

Khrushchev terms Mr. Nixon a "son of a bitch" and he repeats his 1967 accusation that Mr. Nixon was "an unprincipled puppet" of Sen Joseph McCarthy. But there are no comments on Mr. Nixon as President.

#### Account of Berlin Crisis

His account of the 1961 Berlin crisis contains a report that Soviet Marshal Ivan Konev "had learned on what day and at what hour the Western powers were going to begin their action against us," which he claims, was to use bulldozers to break down "our border installations" followed by tanks and infantry in jeeps.

So Khrushchev countered, he says, with tanks, which ended up facing American tanks at the Berlin border. Khrushchev claims he gave the order to pull back his tanks on the grounds the Americans would do likewise within 20 minutes, which he says they did.

Khrushchev does not go into the U-2 case but Life prints an account by Dr. A. McGehee Harvey of Johns Hopkins Hospital in Balti-

more of a 1969 meeting he had with the former Soviet leader. He quotes Khrushchev as dating his own 1964 downfall from the U-2 affair.

"Things were going well" with him as top man in the Kremlin, Khrushchev is quoted as saying, "until one event happened. From the time Gary Powers was shot down in a U-2 over the Soviet Union, I was no longer in full control."

#### Quarrel With Peking

Khrushchev's view of Moscow's quarrel with Peking is that it was the Chinese who were responsible and of China today he says that he does not think "China will release Vietnam from its paws."

He claims he told his colleagues when he first came back from China in 1954 that conflict was inevitable. He says he found the atmosphere in Peking "nauseating" and that "I was never exactly sure that I understood what Mao meant."

Mao asked him what he thought of his, Mao's, "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom" policy, and Khrushchev replied that the Soviets could not figure it out. As to Mao's slogan that "imperialism is a paper tiger," Khrushchev says Mao did not understand the meaning of nuclear weapons as compared to China's mass armies.

He recounts that Mao rejected a Soviet request to erect a radio station in China for contact with Soviet submarines and rejected an offer of reciprocity by allowing the Chinese to use Murmansk. Mao said

he wanted no foreigners of any kind in China.

#### **Calls Mao Cunning**

"It's always difficult to know what the Chinese are really thinking," says Khrushchev, or whether China is for or against peaceful coexistence. Mao he describes as a "nationalist" and says that when he knew him, Mao "was bursting with an impatient desire to rule the world." But Mao is no madman, rather he is "very intelligent and cunning."

Khrushchev concludes with some views on Soviet policy today. He writes that while there can be no such thing as absolute freedom in the Soviet Union, he feels that "it's practically feasible to open our borders." He

also opposes controlling Soviet artists "too tightly."

Of Stalin's daughter, toward whom he says he "felt like a parent," Khrushchev declares she was dealt with stupidly by the current Kremlin leadership whose names he does not use. She should have been allowed to stay in India a year or two or three and then she probably would have come home.

But of her personally, while "Stalin never showed any parental tenderness," there is "something odd and even sick about her book," excerpts from which he heard over the radio. She should know that "if she wants to come back she's welcome" but for her to "run away to the West can't be justified."