

THE EXTENSION of Henry Kissinger's job to what now looks like an eight-year term carries within itself the seeds of disaster, unless he makes some drastic changes in his own method of operation.

The next stage of the international power game will be infinitely more complex than it was in the last four years. There will be many more players, and they will be acting at cross-purposes. They will be playing for the biggest stakes ever, for a "generation of peace" that should open the way to a world without wars, and, for Nixon and Kissinger, to a place in history unsurpassed by any figure of antiquity or modern times.

But they have only four years in which to do it, and the danger is that they may push history more than it is willing to be pushed. "We are moving with history," as a good Marxist would put it, "and moving history ourselves." Only the words are Mr. Nixon's.

The Nixon-Kissinger formula that would allow Europe, China, and Japan to join the two main superpowers, the United States and Russia, in a five-sided power structure to keep the world's peace, is viewed with suspicion outside the White House and the Kremlin. Even the Kremlin has its doubts, but the outsiders will have to be coaxed and bullied into an international framework which the two superpowers may design in the interest of all—but which the others will believe is in the interest of the two.

THE UNITED STATES has already browbeaten both Japan and Europe into accepting an international economic arrangement which they see as being mainly in the American interest—and they fear that there is more to come. The Sino-Soviet dispute began in earnest when Nikita Khrushchev tried, as Peking saw it, to make a global deal

with President Eisenhower at China's expense. Washington and Moscow came together to impose a settlement on North and South Vietnam, both of whom were screaming "betrayal." The White House and the Kremlin are already working to impose a similar deal on their Israeli and Arab clients.

This is certainly in the interests of peace, and small countries in Indochina or in the Middle East may be told that if they don't like it, they can lump it. But Europe, China, and Japan are a different proposition. They will have to be talked into it in a protracted series of interlocking negotiations that cannot possibly be completed in four years.

If obstacles threaten to interfere with Mr. Nixon's time-table, he is apt to increase the pressure to the very limit, as he did, for instance, when he ordered the bombing and mining of North Vietnam. But this always carries the risk of crossing the limit, and endangering the whole intricate structure of negotiation.

When the international power game becomes so much more elaborate than it was in Mr. Nixon's first term, the sheer quantity of Kissinger's work will grow so greatly as to threaten a rapid deterioration in its quality.

KISSINGER REFUSES to rely on the State Department, but his own staff cannot provide the detailed diplomatic footwork which will now have to be integrated with his own thinking and activities.

These weaknesses will be greatly multiplied unless an altogether new working formula is developed for the altogether new situation which we are now approaching. If the State Department has to be bypassed, and there may be good reasons for this, some other framework must be devised, or the "generation of peace" may prove to be as elusive as many people think it is.

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Four More Years: Kissinger's Role