MEMORANDUM FOR
Edwin Martin, State General Craig, Defense William Harvey, CIA Donald Wilson, USIA
SUBJECT
Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba, Contingency Planning
This confirms the oral assignment of tasks for further contingency planning.
The Defense operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open, wide-spread revolt in Cuba. This contingency is expected to be activated in mid-June 1962. The revolt is anticipated to involve a significant number of people and could spread rapidly. The plan should include a description of the assumed contingency situation, specific actions to be taken and by whom, timing required, and an indication of post-action requirements.

The State operational representative is responsible for the preparation of a contingency plan for U.S. actions in a situation of open revolt in one or a few localities in Cuba. This scenario involves a more localized uprising and may be expected to involve fewer people. The plan should address how to respond to the local revolt in a way that minimizes the risk of spreading the revolt to other areas.

All U.S. Departments and Agencies participating in Operation Mongoose will assist in the preparation of these plans, as required. Plans should include a description of the assumed contingency situation, specific actions to be taken and by whom, timing required, and an indication of post-action requirements.

Although current operations take priority, it is expected that working drafts of these contingency plans will be ready by 16 July. A working meeting of operational representatives will then ready these plans for submission to the Special Group (Augmented).

Washington, June 14, 1962
SUBJECT: Progress, Operation Mongoose
Political Actions.
At its 7 June meeting, the Group desired that my list of suggested priority actions be re-issued, to include agreed-upon tasks for State. Completion of this is awaiting the appointment of a representative for the Department of State who can devote full time to Operation Mongoose, as agreed upon. When the appointment is announced to the Special Group, it is my plan to hold a meeting promptly with him and other representatives to work on the schedule of special-effort activities. Meanwhile, we are working on the special-effort activities.

The Cuba Council of the Pan-American Institute has voted to exclude Cuban delegates from meetings.

Cuban Recruits in U.S. Armed Forces.
Concept approved and directive issued by the Secretary of Defense.

Outstanding Studies (including Blockade).
My 8 June memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented) reported on the current status of all outstanding studies. The desired Defense and CIA papers on the means required for and possible effects of a blockade of Cuba were transmitted with this memorandum.

Also transmitted by my 8 June memorandum was a Defense reminder of the Attorney General's question about U.S. actions in case the Soviets establish bases in Cuba. Mongoose representatives were alerted to the last paragraph of the Defense paper, which asked for comments by the 14 June Group meeting.

Possible Contingency.
The rumored uprising of the Cuban people in mid-June continues to be watched closely. The CIA coverage inside Cuba has not confirmed this uprising from resistance organizations there, and

EG Lansdale
Brigadier General, USAF

Source: Department of State, ARA /CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Inter-Agency Staff Study. Top Secret; Unclassified. A copy was sent to General Taylor.

Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Mongoose Operations. Top Secret; Sensitive; Unclassified. An attached distribution list indicates that seven copies of the memorandum were prepared. Copies were sent to Robert Kennedy, Taylor, Johnson, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, and McCone. One copy was kept by Lansdale.

2 Document 338.
3 Not found.
4 Document 345.
Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist, expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:

a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to plan implementation,

b. As requested by Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.

4. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by the President.

b. Military operations, including clandestine and paramilitary activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of military operations will be with the cooperation and support of the Department of State.

c. Political, psychological and economic operations will be accomplished in accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.

d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.

e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The Washington Office of the Secretary of State, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

363. National Intelligence Estimate NIE 85-2-62

Washington, August 1, 1962.

THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism: the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships; the political and economic ties of mutual interest between Castro and the "old" Communists and between Cuba and the USSR. (Parris, 1-10)

13. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11)

C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military reinforcement. The Soviet Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-19)

D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrection likely to develop in the face of adequate preparation and support. Any popular insurrection which may develop in Cuba is likely to be suppressed by force of arms. (Para. 20)

The background information contained in this estimate remains generally valid. (Footnote in the source text. For NIE 85-62, see Document 315.1)
In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency will:

(a) Assign informational specialists to work with Defense Psywar units during combat operations.

(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into Havana with the Department of State contingent at the time and place to be decided on by the Department.

(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS operation in Cuba.

Basic considerations in Agency informational support of direct US military action:

(a) Medium wave radio should receive priority attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba. Immediately upon securing any beach-head or other enclave on the island, and perhaps a week later, at least one effective 60 kw medium wave station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short wave facilities will also be increased to provide necessary backup.

(b) The messages of this initial phase should be simple and direct, reassuring the people of their personal safety and the protection of their individual rights, instructions on the maintenance of public order and how to protect themselves from Castro's forces. The focus of this phase must carefully refrain from criticism or ridicule of Castro, his government or his people.

(c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the anti-Castro Cubans, to avoid alienating possible support by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and worker groups during the Castro regime.

(d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the themes of the broadcasts should also be available and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by air drop ahead of military action where deemed advisable.

(e) Any provisional military government must also have a news bulletin for factual news summaries and instructions to the civilian population.

(f) In all psychological planning, special attention should be given to avoiding in so far as possible any indications of plans to return to the status quo ante, all information output to be designed to carry forward the realization of the social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people.

Phase II—(Post Invasion)

(a) Provide immediate emergency economic and other assistance to the civil populace.

(b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban Government for administration the territory taken by United States troops and assist that government to the extent feasible as it requests.

(c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Government with long range economic assistance.

(d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government to control entry into and exit from Cuba.

(e) Re-establish the United States country team in Havana.

(cia operations against Cuba are controlled by a component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida, with sub elements at other Florida locations.

In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give covert support to the revolt through introduction of communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as appropriate and feasible.

When US Military intervention is directed and contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA Command Relationship Agreement.

Before the initial assault and during the consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces and objectives.

The Agency will provide complete, but strictly factual and impartial informational coverage to a spontaneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of action.

Conveyence of CIA/Department of Defense Joint Action Arrangements:

(a) The US military component shall be notified of the existence of a Joint Action Agreement.

(b) CIA will be responsible for the initial and follow-up briefings to the US military component on CIA actions and plans.

(c) The Joint Action Agreement shall be signed by the Director of CIA and the US military component.

(d) The US military component shall be responsible for implementation of the Joint Action Agreement.

(e) The US military component shall be responsible for the dissemination of CIA information products to the public.

(f) The US military component shall be responsible for the production and distribution of CIA information products.

(g) The US military component shall be responsible for the coordination and integration of CIA information products with other information products.

(h) The US military component shall be responsible for the evaluation and analysis of CIA information products.

(i) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of military guidance to CIA.

(j) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of legal guidance to CIA.

(k) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of technical guidance to CIA.

(l) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of logistical guidance to CIA.

(m) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of personnel guidance to CIA.

(n) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of financial guidance to CIA.

(o) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of administrative guidance to CIA.

(p) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public relations guidance to CIA.

(q) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public affairs guidance to CIA.

(r) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public opinion guidance to CIA.

(s) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public leadership guidance to CIA.

(t) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public education guidance to CIA.

(u) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training guidance to CIA.

(v) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training support to CIA.

(w) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training evaluation to CIA.

(x) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training feedback to CIA.

(y) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training follow-up to CIA.

(z) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training awareness to CIA.

(1) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training information to CIA.

(m) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training materials to CIA.

(n) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training resources to CIA.

(o) The US military component shall be responsible for the provision of public training assistance to CIA.

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Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume X

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d. Supporting plans are required from all Task Agencies. Direct coordination between agencies should be effected for planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and maintained in current status.

e. During implementation of the plan, the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator for the 5412 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency activities. The administrative offices of this group will be established in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.

The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

The Problem
To analyze the situation in Cuba and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so, with particular reference to Castro's relations with the Communists and to the potential for resistance to his regime.

Conclusions
A. Fidel Castro has asserted his primacy in Cuban communism; the "old" Communists have had to accommodate themselves to this fact, as has the USSR. Further strains may develop in these relationships. Additional information on these questions will be available in the future. (Paras. 1-10)

B. By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies. (Para. 11)

C. The Cuban armed forces are loyal to the personal leadership of the Castro brothers. Their capabilities have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military assistance. The US government has no clear policy on the question of stationing Bloc combat units in Cuba, at least for the period of this estimate. (Paras. 12-19)

D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popular insurrections that develop in present circumstances. They are probably capable of containing and controlling any popular insurrection that may develop in the near future. (Paras. 20-28)


Washington, August 1, 1962

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NIE 62-26

Cuba, 1961-1962