Memorandum

TO: Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

FROM: James J. Rowley
Chief, U. S. Secret Service

SUBJECT: Secret Service Report

There is attached report covered by Secret Service Control Number 1635.

Attachments
June 9, 1964

Mr. James J. Rowley, Chief
U.S. Secret Service
Treasury Building
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chief Rowley:

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum and attachments received in this office covering statements made by Superintendent Atsuyuki Sassa of the National Police Agency of Japan.

This letter is classified LIMITED OFFICIAL USE because of the attachments. It may be declassified upon removal of the same.

Sincerely yours,

Harold F. Smith
Regional Customs Representative

Enclosure - a/s
Mr. Paul Crowe
Deputy Director in Charge

Herald L. Child, Jr.
Legal Advisor

Dept. Abnormal SASA
National Police Agency of Japan

As you know, SASA recently made an official trip to the U.S. for purposes of studying presidential protective measures and visiting various federal and local law enforcement agencies.

The press this week has made reference to an article appearing in the "U.S. News & World Report" magazine of 6/1/64 attributing certain statements to SASA concerning his observations during the trip. SASA has advised that the article, written by an American reporter in Japan, Glenn Troelstrup, was based on an informal discussion which was intended to be "off the record" and contained many serious inaccuracies.

Enclosed for your information are copies of the following published in this article by SASA, who asked that they be provided to each of you. SASA asked also that I convey to you his apologies for not coming in personally with this material, but he said he felt sure you would understand how busy he is at this particular time.

(1) Article titled "NEW LIGHT ON THE ASSASSINATION: A SECRET AGENT'S TALE" appearing on pages 33 and 39 of "U.S. News & World Report" magazine of 6/1/64.

(2) Statement signed by TROELSTUP, SASA and others, undated but made on 6/2/64.

(3) Supplemental statement signed by TROELSTUP, dated 6/3/64.

(4) Article in Japan Times of 6/3/64.

SASA advised that the two statements enclosed (items 2 and 3) were signed by TROELSTUP only upon SASA's assurance that they would be used only for official purposes, and would not be made public. He asked that this restriction be specifically explained to you.

Above is for your information.

Enclosures - 4

cc - Mr. Harold Smith (File 1.4) Regional Customs Representative
ATTN: Mr. James J. Rowley, Chief
U. S. Secret Service
Treasury Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Chief Rowley:

Enclosed for your information is a memorandum and attachments received in this office covering statements made by Superintendent Atsuyuki Sassa of the National Police Agency of Japan.

This letter is classified LIMITED OFFICIAL USE because of the attachments. It may be declassified upon removal of the same.

Sincerely yours,

Harold F. Smith
Regional Customs Representative

Enclosure - a/s

HFSmith:ahy
NEW LIGHT ON THE ASSASSINATION:
A SECRET AGENT'S STORY

More light on President Kennedy's assassination comes from a Japanese agent's report to his Government, published here for the first time. The agent was assigned to the FBI investigation of the Kennedy-Oswald murders because the Japanese feared a wave of assassinations in Japan. Glenn Troelstrup, in the Tokyo Bureau of "U.S. News & World Report," talked to the agent and sent this dispatch.

TOKYO

In January, the Japanese Government secretly assigned a special security agent from the Japanese national police to join quietly with the American FBI in its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy.

The agent was 33-year-old Atsuyuki Sassa. He had just spent four hours with agent Sassa and Kuniyasu Tsuchida, director of the Tokyo metropolitan police guard division.

Only one man. It may take more than the Warren Commission report to convince many people that the assassination was not part of a larger conspiracy. The official report to the Japanese Government, however, holds that President Kennedy was shot by Lee Harvey Oswald and that it was the "impulsive act" of that one man.

Said agent Sassa: "President Kennedy was hit by a steel-jacketed high-powered bullet. It hit the back of the skull, pushing ahead a skull fragment the size of a quarter through the side of his brain.

"A sliver off the bullet came out of the lower left of the neck, giving rise to early speculation that it was from a shot made from in front of the car."

Sassa continued: "President Kennedy was dead before he arrived at the hospital. If he had not been a President, no doctor would have tried an operation."

Then why was it attempted? "There was one chance in a million he could be revived," Sassa said.

"There have been one or two examples of similar head injuries resulting from auto accidents in which the victim miraculously survived. So the operation was carried out for three reasons: "A miracle chance to revive the President."

"To make use of time—an hour or more—to ensure the safety and departure from the area of Vice President Johnson."

"To permit last rites of the Catholic Church to be carried out before an official death was recorded."

In refutation— At this point, Sassa tore into what he called the "emotionally imaginative speculations" of American expatriate writer Thomas Buchanan, which are being widely circulated in Asia. Buchanan has theorized that Oswald and Jack Ruby were hirelings of wealthy U.S. right-wing interests who connived with the Dallas police to carry out the assassination.

Refuting Buchanan's theories, Sassa reported, are these facts: "The bullet sliver wound on the President's neck left a scar so clean it was overlooked at first. Then it was thought it might be an entrance wound from a shot fired in front of the President's car. Later, however, the sliver was found on the car floor. Its route was traced in the autopsy. But even without that evidence, to make such a wound from the front the assassin would have had to lie on the pavement ahead of the car. Also his shot would have had to penetrate the front windshield."

"No shot from a nearby bridge could have made such a hit."

"The accusers say that three shots cannot be fired from a telescopic-sight equipped, high-powered rifle in slightly over five seconds. Well, the FBI officially timed the shooting as taking over six seconds—from 6.5 to 6.6 seconds. Also remember that you count after the first shot is squeezed. That means Buchanan contends two more shots couldn't be fired accurately in about 6 seconds. Do you see the psychological falsification or trap in the Buchanan argument? Any marksman can do what was done and hit the target. Any marksman can do it and come close. Remember the President's car was moving slowly away from the assassin. His telescopic sight cut the distance down to about one fourth of its actual length.

"The trick in firing successive shots with a telescopic sight is to let the rifle rock upward and back into position for firing without ever taking your eye off the sight and the point where the sight cross hairs intersect. This fact is so well known among police officials that I'll tell you frankly there is absolutely nothing we can do in Japan to prevent the assassination of some important person by some riddle man similar to Oswald."

Fear in Japan. Sassa then paused to explain that the Japanese have had a number of assassination attempts and that there was fear of a chain reaction from the President's assassination.

"You see," he said, "these things usually come in strings. We have had a number of assassination attempts in Japan over the past decade. We feared..."
the next tries would be made with high-powered rifles. So I was sent to join the FBI's assassination investigation.

Role of Tippit. Sassa turned again to Buchanan's writings:

"Buchanan holds that Policeman Tippit [J.D. Tippit, killed by Oswald about an hour after the President's assassination] was in on a right-wing plot to kill Kennedy. But let's look at the facts:

There are over a thousand men on the Dallas police force. More than half were assigned to guard the President. Buchanan says Tippit was driving alone, something unusual.

"Of course it was unusual not to have two men in a police cruiser. But the reason is that half of the force was on guard duty."

Sassa also said this about police work at the time of the assassination:

"The FBI and Dallas police were concentrating their surveillance on some 20 potentially dangerous ultrarightists in the Dallas area. They were not paying much attention to leftists. Recent assaults, such as that upon Adlai Stevenson, had been made by rightist elements. We've made the same mistake in Japan. I served as a bodyguard for Russia's Anastas Mikoyan, for example. We watched the rightists, not leftists."

"I met a number of Dallas policemen who were frequent in Ruby's place [Jack Ruby shot Oswald to death two days after the President's assassination], and regularly accepted free drinks. No good policeman leaves without paying for his own drinks no matter what the deal is with the management. But I could find no indication of any police connivance in exposing Oswald to possible assassination. In any security operation there's yudan (negligence). It's always obvious later. We are guilty of this in Japan too. In retrospect, we've done some foolish things."

Oswald: beatings and hatred. As for Oswald, the accused assassin of President Kennedy, agent Sassa said this:

"Oswald tried to preserve a small Russia in his own home. He beat Marina [his Russian-born wife] if she wore lipstick or any other kind of makeup. He demanded that she never speak English in their home and that she never wear gay American clothes."

"In Washington, the FBI psychiatrists noted that Oswald obviously hated his father for abandoning him. So, Oswald readily disliked anyone who wielded authority. He probably saw his own father in President Kennedy."

Agent Sassa said his report concludes that the assassination "was not planned much in advance. Oswald apparently got the idea after the President's visit to Dallas was announced. All evidence points to the shooting as a completely impulsive act. Oswald was not a man who could prepare or plan things. He was too unstable."

In the words of agent Sassa, that is the core of his official report to the Japanese Government.

The findings of Japanese Agent Sassa, who now has been transferred to a different Japanese agency, agree in all respects with the facts of the Kennedy assassination as they have been made known in the U.S.

On May 24 investigators for the Warren Commission re-enacted the assassination in Dallas, in order to prove, with photographs and other evidence, that the bullets fired at the President could have come only from the Texas School Book Depository Building, and not from in front of the car.

"The Dallas Times Herald" said the re-enactment proved conclusively that if the bullets had been fired from in front of the car they would have had to go through the limousine's windshield to hit either the President or Governor John Connally who was wounded by one of the assassin's bullets.

Results of the re-enactment will be part of the report by the Warren Commission. Headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission was appointed by President Johnson to find and tell all the facts about the assassination.

In re-enactment of Kennedy assassination in Dallas, federal agents sought to determine beyond all doubt exactly how tragedy occurred. At left: Circle shows window of school-depository building where assassin fired. Bottom: White marks on agents show where bullets hit the President, left, Texas Governor Connolly, right.

—Wide World Photos
To Whom It May Concern

Subject: Sassa Kennedy Assassination Investigation Story

Through common agreement of the parties concerned, the following should be stated for the record.

The discussion of the Kennedy Case, centering on Buchanan statements, was carried out in Japanese. Although Correspondent Troelstrup has a general comprehension of Japanese, he checked his material for a total of one hour on two separate occasions with another Japanese participant (neither Sassa, Sassa nor Tsuchida) who had invited him to the discussion. Nevertheless, Correspondent Troelstrup assumes any responsibility for the following errors in translation:

- Agent Sassa was assigned to study overall security measures and his interest in the Kennedy assassination was a part of the study. However, the Correspondent erred in saying that Agent Sassa's "real assignment" was to "join" the FBI's assassination investigation. This was not possible because of FBI policy which forbids the agent of a foreign government from such participation or receiving concerned official documents. Agent Sassa did receive FBI cooperation in such matters as a study of filing systems. But it was made clear to him that, concerning the assassination investigation, because of specific Presidential orders, he could receive no cooperation. So Agent Sassa's conclusions are based entirely upon unofficial, informal sources.

- Exact period of Agent Sassa's stay in the U.S. was February 26 to March 26, 1964.

- Because of a reverse translation, an Agent Sassa compliment for the Dallas Police Department appeared as a criticism. Agent Sassa did not say "I met a number of Dallas policemen..." Rather, he complimented them with "I never met any..."

- Unlike Correspondent Troelstrup, Agent Sassa was informed beforehand that whatever was said at the meeting was assumed to be off the record. He had no knowledge that neither Correspondent nor any others had not been so informed.

Be It Also Known by Those Concerned:

- Correspondent Troelstrup, the Japanese participant with whom he checked his story, and Agent Sassa met at the meeting for the first time. The three organizers knew all the participants but all the participants did not know each other. Neither Correspondent Troelstrup nor his aiding participant were able to learn until days after the meeting who was the sponsor or who had paid the bill for the gathering or the true nature of the meeting.
At no time either before, during, or after the meeting held on the evening of April 24, 1964, was it made known that any material was off the record. In response to Correspondent Troelstrup's inquiry, it was made known that the material might be made available to a certain Japanese magazine and that Agent Sassa was free to say what he said in the company of the group. Through this failure to qualify any statements it is agreed that the subsequent confusion resulted.

Correspondent Troelstrup was not informed that shortly thereafter there was an official police decision not to make the material available to the Japanese press in any form. He therefore made the material available to his editors through a memo three weeks later.

As soon as Correspondent Troelstrup was informed that the material would form the basis for a published story, it was going to press at that very moment on the night of May 29, 1964, Japan time, he informed a key participant who in turn informed concerned officials. He made the memo available to the concerned officials for purposes of any clarification. This situation gave Agent Sassa and Correspondent Troelstrup no opportunity to stop the story or make the foregoing corrections. It's to be regretted that this worked to the greater disadvantage of Agent Sassa.

It is agreed that both Agent Sassa and Correspondent Troelstrup acted in good faith and that neither was fully informed of the full circumstances.

Signed: 
Atanyuki Sassa
Dr. Hitoaki Aiba
Glenn C. Troelstrup
Noboru Kojima

Witnessed by: 
Hideaki Kase

--End--
I, Glenn Troelstrup, wish to voluntarily make the following explanation of any inaccuracies appearing in the article attributed to me in "U.S. News & World Report" magazine of June 8, 1964, titled "New Light on the Assassination: A Secret Agent's Story."

This statement must be considered as a part of and not separate from the five-party participant statement agreed upon yesterday.

The entire discussion in which I participated with Mr. Atsuyuki Sassa, Mr. Kuniyasu Tsuchida and others on April 24, 1964, at International House, Tokyo, was conducted in the Japanese language, in which I do not have complete fluency. In all, about eight persons were present. Most contributed comments to the discussion, which was carried on in an informal manner and lasted for about two hours. Of that time, Mr. Sassa expressed his opinion for at least a total of one and one half hours. I made no notes on anything that was said during the discussion. Immediately after, I made notes and on two occasions checked my information with a Japanese participant who has proved reliable in the past. Then I put together the notes which served as the basis for the June 8th article.

The article contains a number of statements set forth as direct quotations from Mr. Sassa. Such representation, as pointed out in the statement of yesterday signed by Messrs. Sassa and myself and three other Japanese participants, contain inaccuracies as in the first place only the Japanese language was used, and in the second place, no notes were taken so as not to interrupt Mr. Sassa's talk.
Title of the article uses the wording "Secret Agent's Story." The term "Secret Agent" is the term used by myself based on the journalistic definition. Mr. Sassa was introduced as a bona fide official of the Japanese Police.

Again in the second line of the article appears the phraseology, "secretly assigned" to the FBI investigation. This is a journalistic leader expression drawn by this writer from the total content of the discussion.

In paragraph 3 the article describes what may be inferred to be the full contents of an official report to the Japanese Government. I have never seen the official report. Mr. Sassa revealed only the information gathered from unofficial sources in the U.S.

Column 3, page 38, paragraph 1 quotes Sassa as saying, "Well, the FBI officially timed the shooting as taking place over six seconds..." Mr. Sassa in making this observation explained that his information was based on the assassination movie timed and reported by "Life" magazine.

Page 39, line 2 quotes Sassa as saying, "So I was sent to join the FBI's assassination investigation." Sassa did not, in fact, say he was sent to join the FBI. He said, in effect, he had been sent to the United States for the purpose of studying overall Presidential-level protection procedures. He said that the FBI was not responsible for the assassination investigation.

Page 39 further quotes Sassa as saying, "The FBI and Dallas police were concentrating their surveillance on some 20 potentially dangerous ultrarightists..." Sassa mentioned that according to some U.S. publication the police were concentrating their observation on some 20 ultrarightists. Mr. Sassa made no mention.
of the FBI in this connection.

Page 39, columns 1 and 2 quote Sassa as saying he had met a number of Dallas policemen who were frequently in Ruby's place. Mr. Sassa did not say this. What he actually said is that one of the most controversial points was whether there was any connivance between Jack Ruby and members of the Dallas police force. Somebody else in the gathering asked whether the Dallas police had accepted free drinks from Ruby, and Mr. Sassa commented that he had never met any such police officers in Dallas nor detected any evidence that such was the case. This was twisted in translation.

Page 39, column 2, quotes Sassa as saying, "In Washington, the FBI psychiatrists noted that Oswald obviously hated his father..." Mr. Sassa did not refer at any time to "FBI psychiatrists." What he said was that psychiatrists had stated that Oswald hated his father.

All the above observations reflect the correct character of remarks made formally at the gathering in Tokyo on April 24, 1964.

Witnessed:

Atsuyuki Sassa

Glenn Troleistrup
Hit-Run Driver Sought
13 Days. Seized in Osaka

Court Hears
Korean's Plea
For Asylum

Japan Cop Denies
Hand in J A Probe

U.S. Airman's
Appeal Rejected
Mr. Richard Helms
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

Enclosed is a letter from Leonard C. Hecker, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to J. Lee Rankin, dated June 29, 1964, and the enclosures thereto. The information obtained in the third enclosure to this letter seems inconsistent with the comments made by the Central Intelligence Agency in paragraph 6 of its memorandum dated April 6, 1964, subject: "Reply to questions contained in your memorandum dated 12 March 1964." We bring this to your attention because of the obvious importance of the point at issue.

We would appreciate the comments of your agency in the light of the information developed by the Department of State. If you believe that a conference with a representative of the Commission or with a person or persons at the Department of State, or both, would be desirable, please feel free to contact Mr. W. David Slawson of the Commission staff. The Department of State, through Mr. Thomas Erlich, has already indicated its willingness to confer on this point at any reasonable time.

Sincerely yours,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

Enclosures
WDSlawson/shk 6-30-64
cc: Mr. Willens
    Mr. Slawson
James J. Rowley  
Chief, United States  
Secret Service  
Department of Treasury  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rowley:

In Lee Harvey Oswald's "Historic Diary" the entry for October 28, 1959, reads as follows:

"An elderly American in the hospital grows suspicious about me for some reason, perhaps because at the airport I told him I had not registered as most tourists and I am in general evasive about my presence in Moscow and in the hospital."

The Historic Diary also notes that he was frequently visited by his Intourist guide, Rim Shirakawa. She was described in 1959 as blond, 5'2", 120 pounds, single, attractive and able to speak excellent English. The hospital in which Oswald says he was being treated was the Borokhaya Hospital in Moscow. He was being treated for a self-inflicted wound on the left wrist. He was confined from October 21 to October 23, 1959. The first two or three days were spent in the "psychiatric ward" and the remainder in the "somatic department."

A previous request to the Department of State as to whether it had any record of this "elderly American" in Oswald's ward might have been the answer that no records of any American in the hospital at the time existed. Very recently, however, the Department of State was discovered that such records do exist.

W. David Sloanen of our staff has already spoken with Inspector Thomas Kelley about this matter and has inquired to Mr. Kelley the Department of State's passport files on Mr. William Mignorton Morehouse, Jr., and Mr. Walter Boris Har-patitsky.
Both of these men were, according to Department of State records, treated in the Botkin'skaya Hospital on or about the time Lee Harvey Oswald was supposed to have been there. In addition, Mr. Slawson furnished Inspector Kelley with the name and last known address of Dr. Donald C. Martin, the American physician assigned to the Embassy in 1959, who frequently treated patients at the Botkin'skaya Hospital. It is our understanding that the Service has already taken steps to follow-up on Mr. Morehouse and Dr. Martin and has kept Mr. Slawson informed of developments there. Inspector Kelley has stated that follow-up on Mr. Kar-patinisky will begin immediately.

As already stated to Inspector Kelley, the Commission is interested in the Service trying to locate these men and question them on whether they ever saw Lee Harvey Oswald in the hospital at that time and, if so, what details they can remember about him and the persons with him. If they cannot remember having seen Oswald, we are interested in whether they can furnish the names of other Americans who were in the hospital at that time who in turn may have seen Oswald.

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

WDS/1/2/3/6/6

cc. Mr. Rankin
Mr. Willsen
Mr. Slawson

file room copy
Mr. J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy  
200 Maryland Avenue, N. E.  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rankin:

In response to your letter of August 7, 1964, concerning the entry in Lee Harvey Oswald's "Historic Diary", we have furnished Mr. Slawson reports regarding our contacts with Dr. Donald C. Martin and with Mrs. William Edgerton Morehouse, Jr. We have also furnished Mr. Slawson with a recent address on Mr. Walder Boris Kar-patnitsky in West Berlin.

We regret that the two Secret Service representatives in Europe are committed in connection with the visit of Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy in Europe until August 19. In view of our inability to conduct the necessary interview of Kar-patnitsky promptly, Mr. Slawson has advised us that he will arrange for the interview through another American agency with offices in West Berlin.

Sincerely yours,

James J. Rowley
Mr. Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20525

Dear Mr. Helms:

Enclosed and marked Attachment A is a list of documents supplied to the Commission by the Central Intelligence Agency which the Commission contemplated using as authority in the "Possible Foreign Conspiracy" section of its Report. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission contemplated publishing each such document in its entirety.

We would appreciate receiving a letter from you approving the publication of the documents on the attached list. If you believe that none of these documents, or portions of them, should not be published, will you please provide us with an itemized list of your objections, as a basis for discussion.

The second page of Attachment A also contains a list of documents entitled "State Department Files." These are papers which were sent to the State Department by the Central Intelligence Agency and turned over to the Commission by the Department. The Commission does not contemplate citing any of them in its Report. However, unless the Central Intelligence Agency objects, the Commission will leave them in the State Department files, where they will presumably be transferred to some repository, such as the National Archives, and made available for examination by anyone with a legitimate interest in them. Copies of each of these State Department documents have been enclosed with this letter to aid in your identification of them.

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Rankin  
Mr. O'Hearn  
Mr. Williams

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED  
By authority of:  

Name and title of person making the change  

Date 6/24/64
September 11, 1964

Mr. Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

The Commission would like to publish as a part of its Report the memorandums we sent to you from yourself, Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald, dated 2 July 1966 (Commission Document No. 1616) concerning statements made by an official in the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.

We would appreciate receiving the approval of the Central Intelligence Agency to do so as soon as possible or, if necessary, a substitute memorandum containing substantially the same information which can be published.

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

cc: Mr. Raymond Rocca
Central Intelligence Agency

cc: Shawsen
Rankin
Wiltens
Liebeler

MAD5100: Canceled 1/22/72

Name and title of person making the change:

Date 1/22/72
September 12, 1964

Mr. Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

The Commission would like permission to publish your memorandum to me dated 19 May 1964, subject: Hours of Work at Cuban and Soviet Consulates: Procedures and Regulations for Issuance of Cuban Visas: Mexican Control of U.S. Citizens' Travel to and from Cuba. (Commission Document No. 944).

If it is not possible for us to publish the entire document, we would like at least to be able to publish paragraphs 3 through 6.

Sincerely yours,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

cc: Raymond Rocca
Central Intelligence Agency
WDSlawson:MAB 9-12-64

cc: Rankin
Willens
Liebeler
Slawson

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of: C2D11811/12/72

Name and title of person making the change:

Date 6/12/72
September 12, 1964

Mr. Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

The Commission would appreciate receiving memoranda from the Central Intelligence Agency which can be published and cited as authority for the following propositions:

(1) "It is not unusual for a Latin American to exaggerate the lightness of a North American's skin or hair color." (This is in reference to Sylvia Duran's identification of Oswald as "blond").

(2) The Hotel Berlin and the Hotel Metropole were both under the same administration and both are closely watched by the KGB.

(3) The "Passport and Visa Office" which Nina Shirakova told Lee Harvey Oswald had been notified of his desire to become a citizen of the Soviet Union, is probably the Visa and Registration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

(4) There have been allegations that Sylvia Duran and her husband, Hrasio Duran Navarro, are members of the Communist Party.

(5) The usual Soviet procedure is to send defectors who have carried out their defection in Moscow to some place in the Soviet Union other than Moscow reasonably soon after it has been determined to accept the defector. (In establishing how long Lee Harvey Oswald probably waited to be accepted by the Soviet Union for residence there, the Commission would like to have authority for relying upon the fact that so long as Oswald was in Moscow staying in a room at the Metropole Hotel, he probably had not yet been accepted for residence in the Soviet Union.)

Sincerely yours,

cc: Rankin
Willens
Liibeler
Slawson

cc: Raymond Rocca
Central Intelligence Agency

W. David Slawson: MAB 9-12-64
October 13, 1964

Honorable John A. McCone, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

Attention: Mr. Rocca

We are enclosing a copy of your SECRET document dated January 31, 1964, concerning information developed by CIA on the activity of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963.

We have deleted all references to the Secret Agent by the marking, "D." Since this document was cited in our summary report, we are requesting your authority to publish it in this form. If this is not agreeable, may we have a synopsis of this document which may be published.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

Enclosure—CD 347 and 1064

DECLASSIFIED
By Archivist of the United States
By: M.E. ——— Date 7/11/73 ———

SECRET
The Honorable

The Secretary of the Treasury

My dear Mr. Secretary:

On behalf of the Commission and myself I wish to thank you and the Department of the Treasury for the complete cooperation that the Commission received on the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. We wish to especially acknowledge the aid and assistance we received from Chief James Rowley, your assistant Robert Caravel, Inspector Thomas Kelley, Mr. Forrest V. Sorrels, Mr. William Baber, Mr. E. W. Hecce, Mr. John Joe Rowlett, Mr. Leon Copas, Mr. Al Dickerson, and Mr. Bob Janison.

The Commission called upon the Secret Service for a great range of assistance in connection with the investigation and it was never denied the cheerful and full cooperation at all times.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel.
November 14, 1964

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of November 16. It is always a great pleasure to hear that our people have done a good job.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Douglas Dillon

Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy
200 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002
Mr. Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

FBI photograph exhibit No. D33-46 (Commission Exhibit No. 2625) shows Lee Harvey Oswald with a group of men who Marina has identified as fellow workers at the Minsk radio and TV factory. A copy of this photograph has been enclosed with this letter in order to assist your ready identification of it.

I know that the CIA has already furnished to the Commission a "Name List with Traces," (Appendix C to Chronology of Oswald in USSR, October 1959-June 1962—Commission Document No. 680). Since we do not know the names of the persons in the photograph, however, we have no way of identifying them from the name list. If the CIA can be of help in this matter, it will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel

cc: Mr. Rocca (with photograph)
WDSlawson/smh 9-21-64
cc: Mr. Rankin  
Mr. Willena  
Mr. Slawson
September 30, 1964

Honorable John A. McCone, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

We appreciate the cooperation of your Agency in furnishing to the Commission a number of documents which aided us in the preparation of our summary report.

The Commission wishes to publish at the earliest opportunity the attached list of classified documents which were cited in the summary report, and requests your authorization to declassify these documents.

Sincerely,

J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel

Attachment

cc: J.L. Rankin

Mrisko/at
Memorandum to Mr. Rankin dated May 6, 1964, Subject: Criteria for dissemination of information to the Secret Service; Recommendations of the Central Intelligence Agency relative to Presidential protection SECRET

Memorandum dated 23 July 1964 to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms,
Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald SECRET

Memorandum dated July 1, 1964 to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms,
Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald's Arrival Back in Dallas on 10 October 1959 SECRET