

11/15/72

Dear Howard,

Your letter including the xeroxes of Freedland's book came today. I'll comment on those as I read because I'm more than usually pressed for time. Remarkable coincidence, this coming on the day Martin Dies' death is announced or reported. I'd be interested in the relevant Dies pages.

From my recollection, which is dimmed and numbed by years, or what in some cases was not first-hand investigation (I had to whip the others into line, not easy, and obtain counsel, no easier), the first passages I read are incomplete and I think inaccurate.

P/202 If Bridges was active in this, I don't recall it. I think Taber was but a figurehead for Harold Barger, on his staff. My source: ADL friend who I'd helped. Now dead. The means of "force" was appropriations blackmail. I don't believe it was "administration inability" to cope but reluctance to or unwillingness to.

Summary powers to dismiss: not to State alone. McCarran Act.

Not one of 10 involved in "overseas information program" to best of my recollection. Not one I knew, anyway. (Two were anthropologists, proteges of Margaret Head. After I persuaded them to join a united front in fighting that, as you know, was successful, she was able to place both in decent jobs.)

203: Much to kind to Marshall et al. I don't think there is any chance Congress would have supported the committee. There was no outcry when we won. The anti-Semitism was open.

23-4. No basis for "foreign power" jazz. Even J. Edgar Hoover said otherwise, to the late Bert Andrews. There was never any statement or even suggestion to us that there was any question of "internal security" or anything remotely like it. Or anything, for that matter.

How Arnold Fortas and Powter got the case is quite a story-mine. The great "liberal" to whom the union had sent me, a personal friend, by the way, demanded an excessive fee of the unemployed and presumably permanently unemployable.

205. This is not unfair to Hoover. It is probably kind. But there is this one exception: when Bert Andrews bearded him on us he said there was nothing. And there was not to the best of my knowledge. Especially in the case of mistaken identity, of a man named Rennie for a redbaiting woman named Rennie! Her crime was being (again the coincidence in the news) anti-Peron.

I had a complete and extensive Dies file on this. I did my own investigation on that, and it was thorough and successful. I got his man convicted, you may remember, which was hard of the gut but quite a lesson. Lil was an indispensable ingredient, a real Mata Hari, at the pivotal point, when I was away. She was what has come to be called a "self starter". Never thing it from how she appears now, huh? She was great, man! I came back in response to her call and was able to do the necessary in time. Perhaps when you are here again we might talk about this and make a tape for the future.

Anyway, when the UnAmericans went after The Hollywood Ten, a man with whom I'd worked for the Senate appeared at my home one night with Edward ~~XXXX~~ Dmytryk, one of the Ten to ask for help and access to my files. They took what they wanted. I've never heard from either since, never got the files back (sound familiar?), and D turned out to be the fink in the Ten. I've often wondered if I could approach any of the Ten who are today successful if they'd find some way of reciprocating in my present work. Their representative decimated the research for a book on Dies. If I got his man convicted, does it convince you that I had a book? Ever hear of it since?

When I read a couple of chapters of Anthony Quinn's book after the ABA convention in June I wrote his publisher to correct an error and wrote him because of his comment on this. His editor thanked, said my letter was forwarded, and silence since. Trumbo is the one who might do something, if any would. If any.

By the way, Dies has never dared print my testimony. I testified twice. The first hearing was set in type. I read proofs. Need I say more? And are you aware that I have been left alone since, at least overtly? Passed a WWII security check, too.

But what this account misses is the incredible: they actually passed a law to get me. It was the basis of the grand jury and is still on the books. They held up the appointment of the DC DA to get him to get me. The man who handled the case was later war-crimes chief lawyer, Tokyo, and he wound up with enough respect for me after I took his grand jury away from him to give me the grand jury minutes that I might in the future need. Ever hear of that?

measure sponsored by Congressman Rees. Only the existence of the President's loyalty order provided the Administration with the leverage it needed to defeat the substitute in Senate committee and assure the establishment of a program under its own control.

Predictably, the President's victory on employee loyalty did not prevent legislators from making regular attacks upon the new program or preclude specific demands by Congress with regard to other problems of internal security. Indeed, in the months immediately following the Truman Doctrine speech the Administration was provided with strong evidence that its difficulties arising from the political relationship between internal security and Cold War foreign policy were just beginning. In May, for example, Styles Bridges won a point in his battle with the State Department regarding John Carter Vincent, the Asian expert, who according to Bridges was influencing American policy toward China in favor of the Communists; Vincent was transferred out of the Division on Far Eastern Affairs.<sup>1</sup> Even more striking was the success of Bridges and Taber in forcing the State Department to dismiss summarily ten employees on grounds of disloyalty. The latter incident merits a moment's discussion, since it provided the most striking possible evidence of the Administration's inability to resist the demands of Congressional Republicans in the field of internal security.

When the Senate Appropriations Committee had been considering the State Department budget in 1946, Committee members had criticized Secretary Byrnes for retaining on the payroll, particularly in the overseas information program, employees of whose loyalty the Committee was suspicious, shortly thereafter, to enhance Byrnes's ability to cope with this problem, Congress had granted powers of summary dismissal to the Secretary of State. During the following year, no State Department employees had been removed under this provision. In the spring of 1947 the Department's budget again came before the Congress, and in May Taber's House Committee voted to strike the entire proposed allocation for the overseas information program. When the Department appealed

this decision to Bridges's Senate committee the following month, Secretary Marshall had just delivered his speech at Harvard College, committing the Administration to new initiatives in the field of foreign aid. Marshall's proposal bore upon the Senate committee's deliberations in several ways. First, should the committee support the House committee's decision to eliminate the information program, the State Department would be denied a tool it considered essential to combat communist propaganda in Europe against American economic aid. Such propaganda was no small problem, as indicated by the attention given European sensibilities in the framing of Marshall's proposal. Marshall repeatedly expressed concern about communist propaganda in Europe and during the summer of 1947 he delivered a major address specifically denouncing it. Second, Marshall's proposal made the establishment of cooperation between the State Department and the Congressional appropriations committees even more essential than it already was, since both committees would be in positions to exert major influence over Congressional action on the Marshall Plan. (In fact, Taber was explicitly identified by Marshall as one of those whose response to the Harvard speech he most feared.) This was the setting in which Administration representatives testified on the State Department budget before Bridges's committee. The issue of internal security was quickly raised and the State Department representatives were criticized for the Secretary's failure to make use of his power of summary dismissal. The Senators indicated that the price of this laxity would be a cut in the State Department's appropriation, undoubtedly from the information program, and the action of Taber's committee left no doubt of the potency of this threat. The State Department thus faced both the loss of a program of great importance to the success of the Marshall Plan and a serious conflict with the appropriations committees if it failed to satisfy the Senate committee as to the loyalty of its employees.

On June 23 ten officials of the Department of State were summarily discharged from their positions. Newspaper reports, based upon a State Department press release, indicated that

the employees had been discharged for reasons of security. Secretary Marshall, in announcing his personal review and approval of the dismissals, stated that several of the ten employees had been involved with a foreign power. The inference was widely drawn that some of them had been Communists. The ten dismissed employees, who had been granted no hearings or statements of charges, found themselves stigmatized as disloyal and unable to find other employment. Their requests that they either be presented with formal charges and an opportunity to answer them or permitted to resign without prejudice were ignored. It was not until the prestigious law firm of Arnold, Fortas and Porter accepted the cases and subjected the State Department to months of legal harassment and adverse publicity that its officers agreed to permit all the employees to resign without prejudice. In terms of its political significance, this was decidedly not a happy ending, for the Department had shown itself either unwilling or unable to offer any basis for the dismissals and thus seemed to have been motivated only by a desire to appease the appropriations committees. The *Washington Post* likened the State Department's action to the Administration's concessions in the area of policy toward China, and expressed the view that Marshall and Lovett could have been induced "to defend so indefensible a procedure" only because they "were the victims of ruthless blackmail from the appropriations rulers on Capitol Hill." The comment was appropriate. Following the announcement of the ten dismissals, a suitable compromise was obtained on the budget for the overseas information program.<sup>2</sup>

The Rees bill and the cases of Vincent and the ten State Department employees left no doubt that the Congress would continue to press the Administration for more aggressive action in the field of internal security. This in itself would have provided the impetus for continued attention by the Administration to the question of subversion during the spring and summer of 1947. But the driving force behind concern with internal security was by no means limited to the political infighting between a Republican Congress and a Democratic administration. Within the Administration itself were individuals

and agencies as anxious as the Republicans in Congress to take strong steps in this field.

None was more distinguished in this respect than F.B.I. Director Hoover, who had long been anxious to move decisively against the forces he felt were subverting traditional American values. Given the circumstances of increasing public concern with communism, Congressional interest in this issue, and Hoover's immense personal standing among groups especially concerned with internal security, the F.B.I. Director was in a strong position. Hoover seems to have comprehended the situation fully. He indicated this in April by asserting the right to conduct a full background investigation of any incumbent federal employee on whom the preliminary check of F.B.I. files, required by the President's loyalty order, developed "derogatory information." As the loyalty order had specifically left the decision to make such an investigation to the head of the employing department or agency, and had specifically designated the Civil Service Commission as the agency responsible to make this kind of investigation when requested, Hoover's action seemed a blatant effort to expand his influence over the loyalty program and thus over the entire federal bureaucracy. In the opinion of Stephen Spingarn, a member of the staff of the Presidential Commission that developed the loyalty order, Hoover's move looked "as if the F.B.I. were subverting the Temporary Commission's report and the President's E.O. without so much as a by-your-leave to any of the interested parties outside of Justice." The issue was brought to the attention of the White House and precipitated a major showdown between the Civil Service Commission and the F.B.I. that clarified the attitudes of several important individuals in the Truman administration. Attorney General Clark strongly backed Hoover and interceded with the President in his behalf. Truman, however—in the words of a note by Clifford—felt "very strongly anti-F.B.I. and sides positively with Mitchell and Perkins [of the C.S.C.]. Wants to be sure to hold F.B.I. down, afraid of 'Gestapo.'" Although a compromise acceptable to the President was devised, Truman was not optimistic that it would stick. As he wrote in a note to Clifford, "J. Edgar will in all