the nine members of the New Orleans police vice squad. He answered some questions with rather more precision than most witnesses. Any interpretation of his testimony should consider this. When Liebeler asked him, "Do you know of any connection between Oswald and David Ferrie?" O'Sullivan did not say he had no such knowledge. Instead, he responded, "I have no personal knowledge of anything" What O'Sullivan was saying was that he had no knowledge admissible in court.

But this was not a court. In every conceivable manner the right of the Commission to take, even solicit, "hearsay" evidence was abused, as long as it could be used against Oswald. Here Liebeler should have asked O'Sullivan what he knew not of his own "personal knowledge." Possibly O'Sullivan knew nothing.

Liebeler telegraphed: "But you don't know of any time that Oswald associated with or knew Ferrie through the Civil Air Patrol?"

This is not a question; it is a statement. O'Sullivan's reply again was qualified. It was not an unreserved negative. "I am not sure of any," he said. Again, O'Sullivan may not have heard of or believed he knew of any, but Liebeler did not ask. Note, too, that Liebeler had been careful to restrict his question to "through the Civil Air Patrol."

Just before the end of the questioning Liebeler asked, "Am I correct in understanding that there has been publicity here in the New Orleans area concerning a possible relationship between Oswald and Ferrie?"

To this O'Sullivan answered, "Yes, sir; I believe Captain Ferrie was arrested. I am sure he was arrested, and I believe it was in connection with this Oswald situation. He was booked at the first district station. I don't know just what he was charged with, I believe just 107, under investigation of whatever it was, I don't know."

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That was the beginning and the end of any Liebeler -- or Commission -- interest in the Ferrie arrest. It should not have been, need not have been -- and was by intent.

Another man who should have been called as a witness and was not is Lt. Paul Dwyer who, with O'Sullivan, examined a plane said to be Ferrie's at the New Orleans airport at the time of the assassination. O'Sullivan said they found it not airworthy. Thus we are left with the inference that it was not possible for Ferrie to have flown to Dallas at the time of the assassination.

This is not the only time a flight, in Ferrie's plane or another, with or without Oswald as a passenger, could and should have been of interest to the Commission. As Liebeler well knew, there were a few hours between the time Marina Oswald left New Orleans with Ruth Paine for Irving, a Dallas suburb, and the time Oswald is presumed to have left for Mexico. Could, for example, Ferrie have flown Oswald in September, not November, to Dallas in time for it to have been the genuine Oswald rather than a false one who visited Mrs. Sylvia Odio's home and of whom it was said:

"You know, our idea is to introduce him into the underground in Cuba, because he is great, he is kind of nuts . . . He told us we don't have any guts, you Cubans, because President Kennedy should have been assassinated after the Bay of Pigs, and some Cuban should have done that . . . And be said, 'It is so easy to do it.' He has told us . . ." (11H372-3).

To whom was this testimony given? To Wesley J. Liebeler, by Mrs. Sylvia Odio.

This excerpting of testimony is from Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report where it and the story of the Cuban involvement with The False Oswald were first brought to light. That it may have figured in the New Orleans investigation and accounted for an interest in Ferrie is indicated in several news stories. The New York Times of February 21, 1967, printed

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this in a story from one of its 'Warren Report specialists," Gene Roberts:

However, a source within Mr. Garrison's office named a "suspect" but asked that his name be withheld This source also said one theory was that President Kennedy's assassination grew out of a plot by anti-Communist forces to kill Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba. According to this theory, the conspirators planned to send Lee Harvey Oswald to Cuba to kill Premier Castro, and later decided to attack President Kennedy when Oswald was denied entry into Cuba.

Garrison gave this opinion to reporters February 24: "There were several plots. A change of course did occur. Now that is more than I wanted to say." To this Lardner added, in his story printed in the Washington Post the next morning, "There have been indications that the conspiracy theory Garrison has built began not with a plot to kill the President but one to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro."

A similar account was distributed by the Associated Press for the morning papers of February 26:

District Attorney Jim Garrison said Friday his investigation of President John F. Kennedy's assassination indicates "there were several plots" involved . . . "There were several plots and a change of direction (in them) did occur" , Garrison is known to have considered a theory that a group of anti-Castroites had plotted to kill Premier Castro at Cuba. This group then later changed its target to President Kennedy . . . The plot supposedly collapsed when Oswald . . . failed to enter Cuba . . . the target was switched.

And in a copyrighted story in the Washington Sunday Star of February 26, Pulitzer Prize Winner Haynes Johnson, whose book, The Bay of Pigs,`was written with the help of Cuban refugee leaders, said under the subhead, "The Thread Is Cuba":

The thread that winds through the story involves one of the central problems of John F Kennedy's two years, 10 months and two days in the White House -- the problem of Cuba.

It is Garrison's obvious contention that Cubans were somehow involved In the President's death. From what can be learned at this time his case appears to rest on one theory about the assassination:

That Oswald was working with an anti Castro right-wing organization

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and actually intended to kill Fidel; that Oswald's publicly pro-Communist activities in New Orleans and his attempt to enter Mexico and secure a Cuban visa were to ruse to enable him to carry out that Castro assassination objective, that when Oswald was denied entrance to Cuba, the plot shifted, and Kennedy, accused of letting down the anti-Castro Cubans at the Bay of Pigs, became the target This theory has been examined at length in the past and has been discarded.

If one were to meditate on this theory from a knowledge of the Commission's evidence, it seems unlikely that, if he would have accepted this mission, Oswald was fit for it. He did not speak Spanish and he was a lousy shot. He was anything but the "shotman" of whom Mrs. Odio testified. In the words of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, he was "a rather poor shot." This plot makes more sense if one considers as the potential Castro assassin Oswald's look alike, The False Oswald, the man whose conspicuously fine shooting and bad manners attracted so much attention at the Sports Drome Rifle Range right before the assassination. If he looked enough like Oswald to fool to many observers, he could have used the passport Oswald sought in Mexico.

But with the real or the false Oswald as the Castro assassin, Ferrie, flying his own or another plane, could have supplied transportation to Cuba.

If O'Sullivan's observations were correct, his testimony does not by any means cover the possibilities into which Liebeler should have inquired. And, of course, it is no substitute for investigation to listen to the volunteered opinions of a vice-squad detective who knew nothing of the other circumstances and events involved.

The thrust of this testimony, even though it is entirely ignored in the Report, is that Ferrie could not figure in the case at all because his plane was not, in the opinion of O'Sullivan, in condition to fly on November 22,1963. This is not the only plane that could have been flown on that or another or other days that could have figured in the conspiracy, and Ferrie did,

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In fact, go to Texas that day.

The story that gained prevalence once the New Orleans investigation got into the papers and Ferrie's name was mentioned is an utterly improbable one, considering Oswald the only possible assassin and Ferrie's only role that of his get-away pilot. Oswald was not the assassin of President Kennedy, by the Commission's own best but misrepresented evidence. There is no reason to believe he ever considered murdering the President. Thus, this could not have been Ferrie's role. District Attorney Garrison early made this clear and public, repeating almost word for word the earlier conclusion of Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report. He said, "It is my personal opinion that Oswald did not kill anyone that day in Dallas."

The failure to call Ferrie as a witness is a major defect. Aside from the involvements already noted, Ferrie is known to have said President Kennedy should have been shot.

Cost and time were not problems. The Commission had passengers on the Mexico City bus with Oswald chased all over the world for their opinions. It caused the FBI to make the most elaborate examinations of Oswald's pubic hairs, as though this should have been of any concern to anyone but Marina. No. Time and costs cannot be considered the reason Ferrie was not called.

The FBI did not, as claimed, "look into" this. They were content with Ferrie's explanation of the thrust that it was a bad joke, that he really loved the late President.

Lardner, probably the last person to see Ferrie alive, concluded the story that appeared in the Washington Post on Saturday morning, February 25, with this paragraph:

Outspoken, with a background of arrests on homosexual charges and

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view on every issue from philosophy to politics, Ferrie had been both publicly and privately critical of President Kennedy for the lack of air cover in the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles. He had been quoted as saying that the President "ought to be shot "

We have not yet finished picking up the raveled threads Liebeler left in New Orleans. We have not yet finished with what he learned from Carlos Bringuier and did nothing about, quoted in Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report and here to be explored are the then secret documents precluded.

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3. THE UNSECRET SECRET

As though hoping that, if it were ignored, it would, somehow, go away, the Commission did try to ignore the existence in 1963 of a training camp for the anti-Castro forces on the shores of Lake Pontchartrain, even though it had been in the news. Directly north of New Orleans, across the 32-mile causeway that connects it with the northern shore of Lake Pontchartrain, is Mandeville. To the east of Mandeville and slightly to the south, connected by U.S. Route 190, is Lacombe. It was in this area. (Although the official documents refer to but one camp, there is solid evidence that there was another, on what is known as "the lower coast," at Algiers, also the location of a government military installation. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, I saw film of the second camp on T.V.) Revelation of the existence and the exposure of the camp did not get wide attention.

The New Orleans papers mentioned it, as they could hardly avoid doing, because on July 31 the FBI raided it. The Washington Post story of August 1 says:

Mandeville, La., July 31 (AP) -- FBI agents swooped down on a house in a resort section near here today and seized more than a ton of dynamite and 20 bomb casings.

An informed source said the explosives were part of a cache to be used in an attack on Cuba. But the FBI would only say that the materials were seized in connection with an investigation of an effort to carry out a military operation from the United States against a country with which the United States is at peace.

Although the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Fidel Castro government, the two nations technically are at peace.

The 20 empty 100 pound bombs, painted blue, were stored on a locked, screened-in porch of a single story dwelling house. The FBI declined to identify the owner of the house or to say if any arrests had been made.

The location of the camp was in St. Tammany Parish, between Mandeville and Lacombe.

On April 23, 1963, seven months before the assassination, Jack Anderson had a lengthy article in Parade, a

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weekly newspaper supplement. It was entitled, "An Untold Story: How Castro Double-Crossed the Gambling Syndicate." According to Anderson, the Time-Picayune description of Mike McLaney's position in Batista gambling circles is modest. And the losses were astronomical. Anderson's sources estimate the investment loss of the Nacional, where McLaney's casino was, at $7,000,000,000. The gamblers were separated from large sums of their money by the sale to them of pesos at cut rate. These are now worthless, except inside of Cuba, where the gamblers are not and are not likely to go.

Anderson also reported what he, without exaggeration, described as the "most bizarre experience" of all those "in this double-cross and triple-cross." He was referring to the "commandant who policed" the McLaney casino. That worthy traveled around in a Cadillac and with beautiful girls. He told McLaney at their first meeting, "You are going to pay." McLaney paid him off by letting him win at the gaming tables, where his appetite was "rapacious," only later to find out he was "a complete phony," not an official at all.

The gamblers expected a "shakedown." McLaney told Anderson he was hit for $102,000.00 in "back wages."

It can be understood that the McLaneys did not love Castro. It can also be understood that the FBI perhaps had reasons for originally declining to identify the owner of the house where the munitions were stored. Later, when we go into their probable source, this reluctance may be more comprehensible. This was quite a camp, with quite a history.

The Associated Press returned to this raid in its March 4, 1967, coverage of the Garrison investigation, as did the New Orleans States-Item. Both said there had been 48 cases of dynamite as well as firing caps and napalm. Both described the cottage as "unoccupied." Both identified the owner as William Julius

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McLaney, of New Orleans. Both also said the McLaneys had lived in Cuba until 1960 when, according to Mrs. McLaney (her husband seems never to have been available to the press), Castro made things impossible for their "tourist business."

Mrs. McLaney was quoted as saying the house "had been loaned to a Cuban exile friend she knew only as 'Jose Juarez.'"

If Castro had then known what Jack Anderson was to write in his syndicated column of May 4,1963, it is doubtful that he would have released McLaney and certain he would not have apologized. Anderson wrote:

The story that American adventurers tried to bomb a Havana oil refinery, though it caused a bigger blast in the newspapers than in Havana, gave oilmen the nervous skitters.

It also brought to light an earlier incident, never reported In the public print, which occurred during the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco.

A freedom fighter plane, loaded with bombs, radioed that it was over the Esso refinery in Havana and asked permission to bomb it, along with the nearby Texaco and Shell refineries.

Destruction of the three big facilities would have paralyzed the Castro war machine within weeks. But the CIA command post ordered the plane to ignore the refineries and look for gun emplacements to bomb.

Later, Mike McLaney, an American gambler who ran a casino ln Havana and stayed on for 18 months after Castro's takeover, sent the CIA a detailed plan for Knocking out the three refineries. But instead of getting his plan approved, McLaney got an urgent phone call warning him not to attempt such a thing under any circumstances.

Establishment of such an installation as this camp once would have been considered an act of international unfriendliness, if not an act of war. Norms, of diplomacy and relations between countries have changed since World War II. Nonetheless, the existence of this military installation, where Cubans prepared for an invasion of Cuba that was plotted on U.S. territory, violated American law and was counter to declared national policy at least since the end of October 1962.

There is little doubt that only the CIA could get away with both this violation of law and this opposi -

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tion to national policy. There can be little doubt that those Americans engaged in the training of Cubans in Florida for the coming invasion of Cuba were doing so for the CIA. The CIA is and has been a law unto itself making policy on its undemocratic own. It had been the "invisible government."

So those who read the brave statement of the Commission that it called the shots as it saw them about U.S. investigative and intelligence agencies in the context of the vast effort the Commission made to shelter these agencies will not be surprised at what follows. Others, I hoped, will be shocked.

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4. CREATURES OF THE CIA

"NO T-1" is an employee of the federa1 government. There is reason to believe other of the "NO T-" agents are also. In his report of October 31, 1963 (17H753-70), Special Agent Milton R. Kaack, then in charge of the 0swald case (4H438), said, "NO T-1is an employee of another government agency" (17H769).

An earlier reference to T-l in thi9 report (17H754) reads:

Confidential informant NO T-l advised on July 23, 1963, that Post Office Box 30061 was rented by L. H. OSWALD on June 3, 1963. He furnished as his address of 657 French Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. T-l advised on October 25, 1963, that the subject sent a forwarding address for P.O. Box 30061 on September 26, 1963, of 2515 West Fifth Street, Irving, Texas.

From this it might be inferred that NO T-l is an employee of the Post Office Department. But from other information, perhaps not. Whitewash: The Report on the Warren Report discusses this address change (page 139):

In tracing the other boxes the Report accurately describes Oswald's closing out of his New Orleans box and the filing of a change-of-address card immediately prior to his trip to Mexico in late September 1963. What the Report ignores is the intriguing revelation by Postal Inspector Harry D. Holmes (7H289-308; 525-30) that still another change-of-address card not written by Oswald was sent to the New Orleans office. It was postmarked in New Orleans October 1l, and in Dallas October 16. Assistant Counsel Wesley J. Liebeler frankly admitted the problem that presented the Commission, stating, "Let me come bluntly to the point. My problem is this: Oswald wasn't in New Orleans October 1l. He was in Dallas" (7H529).

Inspector Holmes could only conjecture that some unknown person had telephoned the change of address to the New Orleans post office (and even to its correct branch). The Report, in ignoring this, ignored obvious conspiratorial connotations, The Commission's attitude is reflected with unfortunate clarity by the disposition Liebeler made of his unwanted evidence, "Well, In any event, we will add this to the pile" (7H530) .

In reporting to the FBI and before tine assassination,

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if "NO T-l" were in the post office, there would seem to be no reason for withholding the information about the October 11 change of address and less reason for hiding the mystery of the Dallas postmark five days later. His report to the FBI was not made until October 25, after the dates on the card.

So there is a fair inference that "NO T-1" was not an employee of the Post Office Department. There are numberless federal agencies in New Orleans, as there are in all major cities, but there is no immediately apparent reason any agency save those dealing in intelligence would have such interest and be aware of the FBI's parallel interests.

Of those agencies handling intelligence matters, the most likely one would seem to be the CIA, whose involvement with the Cuban refugee groups is an open secret already well publicized and equally well documented. This is also consistent with the subject of "NO T-l's" report, the activities of Cuban refugees in preparing for a military adventure against Cuba.

The Treasury Department, which operates the customs service, is a good possibility, also. Later chapters will show they made some arrests in this case and others that may be related to it.

In this connection, the first line of the report deserves emphasis:

On July 30, 1963, NO T-l, who is in a position to learn of some of the activities by anti-CASTRO and pro-CASTRO Cubans in the New Orleans area . . .

Both sides? From the same man? It does not sound like Internal Revenue or Social Security. If it were the Border Patrol and one who knew of FBI interest, it is hardly likely that an efficient informant would wait six days to communicate.

If the "NO" and "T" are used consistently, it would seem that "NO T-2" has the same connections, for Special Agent Kaack reported (17H755).

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A confidential informant, NO T-2, advised on June 26, 1963, that LEE H. OSWALD, Post office Box 30061 New Orleans Louisiana wrote a letter on June 10, 1963, to The Worker, West 26th Street New York 10.

Kaack gave the contents of that letter, including Oswald's claim he was "a long-time subscriber to The Worker and the statement that he was forming a "Fair Play For Cuba Committee" in the New Orleans area.

Similarly (17H756), "confidential informant NO T-5" advised that Oswald had sent The Worker a change of address card. And on the same page "NO T-6" is identified as a woman who knew the FBI would be interested in the Oswald handbill distribution that led to his arrest when she observed it at 1:15 P.M., prior to the arrest, without knowing who Oswald was.

From this it would seem that the "T" represents an agency with access to the mails and in a position to open letters or to have them opened, and this, too, indicates CIA.

It is almost a lifetime job for one man to begin to try and make sense of the Commission files, to put them in the proper perspective, the perspective avoided by the government, through all its agencies, including the Commission. This material is an enormous monument to the willingness and desire of the government's investigative agencies and the Commission's staff to smother the Commission and history in a mass of trivia and unrelated literary garbage, to obfuscate the real story and roles of the characters in it.

One of the larger files is No. 75. It is so large it is bound into two separate volumes, each about two inches thick. It is largely a "New Orleans" file. It is a "Ferrie," a "Bertrand" file, a large part of which is suppressed.

On page 132 the discussion and content are consistent with having come from the mailman who served the area of 4907 Magazine Street, New Orleans, where

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Oswald then lived. It is8 difficult to imagine that the detail presented of the mail, what it contained, where it went and things like that, could have come from other than the Post Office Department. The informant is identified as "NO T4."

However, on page 82 there begins data supplied by "NO T-6." The nature of this information indicates that "NO T-6" is an employee of either the Social Security Administration or the State Unemployment Commission or has unrestricted access to the kind of intelligence these agencies have.

Everything reveals a massive spy operation against Oswald.

This could have been inspired by fears about him and his potential activities. Marina quoted her husband as bemused by the FBI's stated concern that the Soviet Union would seek to make an agent of him or of her. Marina and Lee both knew how intensely he detested the country to which he had defected and from which he had redefected , her native land to which she had no desire to return. Both Oswalds regarded as ridiculous the alleged FBI apprehension; because he could not credit it, Oswald, was, in Marina's account, perturbed after visit from the FBI. He told her they were playing kids' games.

This vast intelligence operation against Oswald is also consistent with the desire, really the need, of intelligence agencies to keep tabs on their operatives of whatever rank in the espionage and counter-espionage machinery. All agencies always worry about "double agents," that is, those who serve both sides while pretending to each that he is loyal to and serves it alone. The spook-master must know what each of his spooks is up to. He goes to great pains and trouble to learn.

But the intercepted Oswald letter contradicts the alleged FBI reason for reopening the case. Former FBI Agent John W. Fain, who bad been in charge of the

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Oswald case until his retirement, told the Commission on the morning of May 5, 1964 (when Wesley Liebeler was among the six members of the legal staff present at the hearings), that he had closed the Oswald case August 30, 1962 (4H423ff). That same afternoon James Patrick Hosty, Jr., testified (4H442) he had had the case reopened on the basis of two new things: Proof that Oswald got The Worker and because his wife is a Russian national registered under the law.

But neither of these is or was new. Oswald had been, as his intercepted letter said, a subscriber to The Worker and his wife had been in the same status all along. Former CIA head Allen Dulles took his seat after the hearing had started. Having heard in the morning that the Oswald case had been closed, he was puzzled.

"It is not clear to me," he said.

"You missed a lot of this," Oswald-expert Hosty replied, curtly.

At this point Assistant Counsel Samuel Stern explained to Dulles, "The file was closed, sir, until March of 1963 when Mr. Hosty decided it should be reopened on the basis of two items of information, one of them the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald was listed as a subscriber to The Worker newspaper."

The subscription list of The Worker is not secret from the FBI and has not been for a long time. Oswald's subscriptions were a matter of government record for years, going back to his Marine Corps days.

But if this seems confusing, it is no less so when the August 30, 1962, report of Special Agent Fain (17H733) and his earlier joint report with Special Agent Arnold J. Brown (17H737-8) are considered. Fain reported two things of interest: that Oswald refused to answer when asked why he went to Russia (in his testimony Fain referred to Oswald as arrogant and insolent); and, in effect, that he asked Oswald to become an informant. His exact language is, "OS-

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WALD agreed to report to FBI any information concerning contacts or attempted contacts by Soviets under suspicious circumstances."

The joint report quotes Oswald as saying he was assured against prosecution when he returned to the United States (17H737). He gave the same response to the questions on why he went to the Soviet Union and would he be an FBI informant if he were contacted.

The visit on August 15,1962, when the FBI insisted on interviewing Oswald outside his home (4H420), is one that Marina testified particularly disturbed him. Fain's account of the great solicitude of the FBI is not consistent with Marina's. Fain said the FBI "didn't want to embarrass you before your employer" (4H420). Marina told the Secret Service that every time Oswald got a job, the FBI got him fired.

There are intimations here of an Oswald-government association. The Commission denied this in the Report ("Oswald Was Not An Agent for the U.S. Government," beginning on page 325, is a subsection of the Report). Congressman Ford denied any such relationship in the first chapter of his own commercially sponsored "Warren Report" Portrait of the Assassin. The appropriate officials of both the CIA and FBI also denied it. All also ignored the Dallas police report I reproduce in Whitewash 11 (page 50) quoting the FBI as declaring before the assassination that Oswald was "all right." This police report is not mentioned anywhere else. It is suppressed from even the ten million words of evidence in the 26 volumes, although it is in

the Commission's files.

The evidence behind these denials is less than persuasive and anything but what the Commission represents it to be. The Commission began with the assumption that the`FBI or the CIA would admit a connection with the man accused of being the Presidential assassin -- an assumption warranted by neither common sense nor such events in history as the

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Francis Gary Powers U-2 case.

Alan H. Belmont, assistant to the Director of the FBI, testified the morning of May 6, 1964 (5Hlff). He had the "Oswald" file with him but the Commission declined to keep it for close examination(5H10-11). Four members of the Commission were present when the decision was made: Warren, McCloy, Ford and Dulles.

Belmont then offered an affidavit from Hoover (5H14) stating flatly that "Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI." It and a covering letter from Hoover became Exhibit 835 (17H814-8). While one might have expected this more properly would be introduced during Hoover's testimony on May 14 (5H97ff), the Commission and all its legal talent worked in magical ways and Belmont swore to the second-hand information. There was remarkably little discussion and not a single "penetrating" question. What it adds up to is that the FBI says Oswald was never its agent or informant because some agents say so and because they have no record of payment to Oswald -- neither a very valid reason.

One of the things missing here is the Secret Service report in which former Houston Post reporter Alonzo Hudkins, III, is quoted as having told the Houston Secret Service Office on December 17, 1963, that "Chief of the Criminal Division of the Dallas Sheriff's Office" Allen Sweatt told him Oswald was in the pay of the FBI. It is but a single page plus six lines of typing. The Commission could have printed it and the "0swald is all right" report both on a single page. It did not.

Hoover's four-page affidavit, seemingly detailed and complete, is actually rather evasive. He says, for example,

That he had caused a search to be made of the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, by employees of said Federal Bureau of Investigation acting under his direc -

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tion and that said search discloses that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI, was never assigned a symbol number in that capacity, and was never paid any amount of money by the FBI in any regard (17H815)

What he does not say is that he can guarantee this was not done under any name other than "Oswald" or under any other bookkeeping arrangement such as having to do with "expenses."

I am willing to believe that Oswald was never in the FBI pay. But neither Hoover nor the Commission proved he was not.

In his own private, commercially sponsored Warren Report Portrait of the Assassin, Congressman Ford, in the very first chapter, quotes Henry Wade, then Dallas District Attorney and formerly a long-time FBI agent. Wade told Commission General Counsel J. Lee Rankin that he had dispensed $2,000 a month to informants, with no official record. The denials are not persuasive. Wade also told Rankin, apropos of 0swald's use of post office boxes, that they were "an ideal way to handle such transactions and was a way he had used at various times in the past, too."

Suspicion in this matter is not diminished by the absence from the Report of the name "Ronnie Dugger" though Dugger had pertinent information. (His name is mentioned but once in all fifteen volumes of testimony (2H42), and then as having seen activity on what is known in Dallas as "the grassy knoll," west of the Texas School Book Depository Building. He was told the same story as Hudkins.) He is editor of the weekly Texas Observer. He had written a well-known book and for major magazines. At the time of the assassination, he was also corresponding for the Washington Post. Writing in the February 1967 issue of a Texas magazine, Latitudes he said of his own reporting of the assassination, ". . . an official told me that Oswald had been an employee of the FBI and had a certain pay number, which my source gave me. He

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would not give me his source but said it was solid."

The Commission failed, too, to call Dugger as a witness -- or Hudkins, or Sweatt. The Report lists those regarded as "witnesses," if only an unsworn statement was used. Not one of these men was called (R487, 490, 498). Thi3 is one way of "wiping out" a "dirty rumor," but not a persuasive one.

A number of other provocative items scattered throughout the evidence raise questions for which there is no satisfactory answer. For example, in Oswald's pocket address book there are these notations on a page (16H67) that faces a blank page:

Cuban Student

Derectorate (sic)

107 Decatur St

New Orleans, La

Carlos Bringuier

-------------------

N.O. City Editor "Cowan"

David Crawford

reporter

--------------------

117 camp

107 Decatur

1032 Canal

--------------------

After the middle of these three addresses but extending upward from it is "cuban exile store." This is the address of Bringuier's store. Why is it listed twice? What do the other two addresses represent? The Camp street address is across from the International Trade Mart, which since then has moved. It is the address of a clothing store where formal attire is rented. Oswald had no such interests. Why should he have noted it in association with Bringuier?

Or did he make a mistake, or have his own special code? In the building at 107 Camp Street, the Cigali Building, advertising man Ronnie Caire, who was connected with the anti-Castro Cuban groups, then had an office. It was on the Canal Street side, opposite the

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