

In Russo

along with the FBI,

Because both the CIA and the Archives had in the past developed an adversarial relationship in which noncompliance was its objective rather than meeting their obligations under the law - I had sued ^{them} both under FOIA and had obtained what was withheld improperly - I asked others to seek copies of the CIA director's memos on his meetings with JFK.

The CIA replied to my friend, Dr. Gerald McKnight, head of the Hood College history department, with its usual no-spik ^{visions} untruths. The ~~the~~ archives provided my friend, ^{Dr. Dan Wroner} retired University of Wisconsin history professor with a hundred and five pages. The selections from this that Wroner sent me are of early 1963 only.

To discourage McKnight from further effort, Lee S. Srickland, the CIA's Information and Privacy Coordinator, wrote him on September 8, 1999 that "our workload is some 5,000 FOIA and Privacy Act requests, and it is our policy to handle each on a first-in, first-out basis which is equitable to all requesters." Or, it will take forever for you to get anything at all if you try again.

And on that first-in, first out jazz, I have FOIA ^{*of the CIA that are*} requests now thirty years old that the CIA had ^{*has ignored completely*} never complied with.

Not only that, it invented excuses for ignoring requests after that. It sent me what I had not asked for ^{*in full*} month after telling me it had complied with that request, refused to take it back and ignored my citing its own regulations, which require them to inform the requester in advance of the cost and to obtain a down payment in advance. It did nothing ^{*as*} required of it and held me responsible for its own transgressions. Since then, two decades ago, the only CIA records I have obtained are the copies of other agencies or copies friends have sent me.

The Archives sent Wroner a packing list and within the documents it sent him is the CIA's identification of the relevant file. The Archives has those records in Records Group 263 Central Intelligence Agency Assassinations ~~Records~~ Records Collection. In that file these sent Wroner came from "CIA MISC. FILES BOX ^{*F2*} Fe, F15, F16, F17 JFK99 - 0699." In identifying to Wroner the source of

the records sent him the Archives included a number of pages giving the "AGENCY FILE NUMBER" as CIA - DCI FILE. "The DCI is the director. These were records the CIA created for its own purposes, "MEMO FOR THE RECORD". The "TITLE" is "DCI MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT," followed by the dates of those meetings. The "SUBJECT" is "DCI MEETINGS PRESIDENT."

Under "COMMENTS" the CIA stated, among other things that are given as unexplained numbers, "ARRB REQUEST." Or, the disclosure was pursuant to the requirements of the 1992 law that supposedly required full public disclosure of all assassination information. However, what disclosure there was was not for another six years, according to the information the Archives provided.

However, despite the explicitness of the Archives' identifications on a series of these records, the CIA stamped some of them as disclosed under its historical records program. It got away with this typical spook trickery in which the people it supposedly serves are its enemy because there was no possibility that the ARRB would require it to reprocess millions of pages it had disclosed under that so-called historical records program which permitted withhold that the 1992 Act did not permit.

The records CIA's records copies of which the Archives sent Wrono contain no reference of any kind to any Kennedy desire to kill Castro or to get him killed and none to any planned invasion of Cuba, despite what those whoring with our history proclaim.

Besides this, the CIA just withholds information, period, and within my experience it then lied to the federal court about what it did and did not do. Two decades later it was still withholding what it had been directed to disclose but in the concept that it is the government the CIA did not make those disclosures. It does regard itself as better informed than the elected government of which it supposedly is but a part. It has a long record of this with regard to disclosures that can embarrass it by disclosing its anti-democratic record. One of the more recent illustrations of this was in the Washington Post of October 7, 1999.

The CIA had helped ^{militants and} native fascists overthrow the democratically elected Chilean government in an election won by the Socialists and including what was known as a "popular front" of other parties. The Pinochet dictatorship was one of the bloodiest on a continent in which bloody dictatorships were common.

The main headline over the Post story is "CIA accused of 'Whitewash' on Pinochet." The subheading is, "Document Release to Exclude Papers on Agency's Role in '73 Coup, Activists told." To the Post, the nonprofit ^{research} organization which seeks to make our history freely available, the National Security Archive, and those who lost loved ones to Pinochet's bloody dictatorship are "activists," with what that word can be taken to be intended ^{d/ convey:} to indicate.

By VERNON LOEB
Washington Post Staff Writer

Researchers and relatives of victims of human rights abuses in Chile charged yesterday that the CIA is withholding information about its covert operations in that country, contrary to a White House directive.

The National Archives is expected to make public on Friday hundreds of documents from the State Department, Pentagon and CIA relating to the military rule of Chilean Gen. Augusto Pinochet.

But activists said they have been told that the documents will not include any information about the CIA's involvement in a 1973 coup against Chilean President Salvador Allende or its support for Pinochet.

Peter Kornbluh, a researcher at the nonprofit National Security Archive, said the CIA seems to have adopted a narrow interpretation of the administration's declassification directive in an initial release of information June 30 and again this week. "Not a single word about CIA operations in support of the Pinochet regime" has been released, Kornbluh said. "This is a whitewash of history, pure and simple."

Moreover, the CIA recently succeeded in pulling back hundreds of documents on Chile that

were discovered in the files of the Nixon White House during the declassification initiative, he said.

"These are the best documents," Kornbluh said. "These are the documents which detail the history of U.S. covert operations to foment chaos and violence in Chile. And there's only one reason to withhold them—to continue to cover up this history."

~~"Twenty-five years later—come on, this is ridiculous."~~

~~—Joyce Horman, whose husband was killed in Chile in 1973, on delay in document release~~

Joyce Horman, the wife of an American journalist murdered in Chile in 1973, raised similar concerns in a letter last week to Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright. She wrote that the CIA has yet to release a single document about her husband, Charles Horman, even though such documents are known to exist.

"Twenty-five years later—come on, this is ridiculous," Horman said in an interview yesterday.

The Clinton administration agreed to declassify selected documents about human rights abuses in Chile from 1968 to 1991 after Pinochet was arrested last October in London. The arrest resulted from a Spanish request for Pinochet's extradition to face charges of human rights violations during his 17 years in power. A judge in London is expected to rule Friday on the extradition case.

A senior administration official overseeing the declassification process said yesterday he has a written commitment from CIA officials that such documents will be reviewed and released. "They agree with Peter Kornbluh that covert action files from this period will be searched," the official said.

A senior State Department official called the CIA's commitment "progress" but said, "There's concern, absolutely, within this building about the CIA's performance thus far... and its narrow reading of the directive."

Mark Mansfield, a CIA spokesman, said the agency recognizes its obligation to release documents about covert actions in Chile. "Declassification review is a time-consuming process," Mansfield said. "It requires a page-by-page review. By the time this process is completed, the documents I've mentioned will be released, consistent with our obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods."

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Two days ^{later} ~~farther~~ the Post carried another story. On the front page it was headlined, "CIA May Have Had Role in Journalist's Murder." ~~The~~ carryover onto the inside page is headlined, "CIA Link to Journalist Death Cited." And, finally, ~~years~~ ^{two} later, that "activists" are reported to have "applauded yesterday's release of about 1,100 ~~pages~~ government documents about Chile, which were declassified in a review ordered by President Clinton in February, after Pinochet's arrest."

~~to~~ after so many years of ~~data~~ denials and suppression.

After so many years of Pinochet murders and "disappearances."

After twenty-five years, or twenty-five years after the law required it to disclose what was requested under the law, the CIA ^{spokesman} is quoted as saying that "the agency recognizes its obligation to release documents about covert actions in Chile." He also said, without mention of the twenty-five years that had passed without its being done, that "Declassification is a time-consuming process because "It requires a page by page ^{review} ~~review~~." Release will be further delayed by the CIA's claimed "obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods." *insert 44 here*

The CIA has interpreted this provision of the law as a license to hide all the bloody thugs with which it dealt and which it paid to do their dirty and bloody deeds. That was not the intent of the law, *the FOIA or the 1992 Act.*

Nothing shames the CIA in its refusals to obey the laws that are typical of a democratic society. As with Pinochet's bloody dictatorship, the CIA was connected ~~to~~ ^{its} to the murder ^{and} and oftentimes the torture before murder of ^{men} ~~men~~ ^{and women} who believed in a ~~democratic~~ democratic society. That is not something ^{the CIA} it wants to be well-known and that is the reason for the withholding of what is, in essence, known without all the details being known and without identification of those in the CIA who ~~were~~ had responsibility of any kind in ^{Pinochet's} these duplications of the terrors of the Hitler and Stalin regimes.

Nothing shames the CIA in federal courts because it knows the chances are that it will get away with anything at all ^{including the} and by ^{lies} it lays on the courts. In one of my FOIA lawsuits intended to bring to light ^{government information that} ~~was~~ was suppressed, ~~in the official investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, where~~

hundreds of pages were withheld ~~to~~ allegedly to "protect" the "source."

The bureaucrat who made that lie up did not bother to consult the disclosed record, because where what the government wanted to ~~to~~ suppress was withheld there was a slip sheet which, in each and ~~for~~ every case identified the source supposedly "protected" ^{the withholding} from disclosure as a United States source!

The actual purpose of these withholdings is to reduce the possibility of embarrassment to the CIA or to the federal government.

This is hardly all. Far from it. But it does reflect the dishonest record of the CIA with regard to disclosures that, under the law, are required of it. Supposedly required of it, anyway.

However, for his own protection and that of the CIA he headed, the CIA's director, in the memos he wrote for the record ~~and for his and the CIA's protection~~, did not make any reference of any kind, no matter how indirect, of any request or order by Kennedy to have Castro ~~eliminated~~ assassinated.

Nobody writing to the contrary has ever produced any credible source and actualities of the not one has mentioned the political situation in which Castro, Khrushchchev and to deal with the doves others so clearly preferred Kennedy to what his assassination would give them, the hawk, Lyndon Johnson. (This is in greater detail in the manuscript I have written about the Seymour Hersh's largely fictional, The Dark Side of Camelot. It is also included in other manuscripts.)

This is to say that in addition to this fiction making no sense at all there is no factual support for it. There is no basis for the conjecture and there is no support of any kind for it.

And, what records do exist and are disclosed prove the opposite,

Eisenhower was careful to see to it that he would not be blamed for what he initiated, what he approved, what he wanted and got, and that on the failure of his plan his successor would be blamed for it. He kept from his successor all the doubts he had about the possibilities of his own plan and he actually planned for the invasion to be during the administration of his ~~own~~ successor — to whom he communicated none of the ^{doubt} ~~doubts~~ he had. When Eisenhower, at the very end of his administration, did not dare cancel his ^{own planned} Cuba invasion project, he knew very well that the ^{coming} President ~~so~~ would not dare do that. He gave Kennedy a situation about which Kennedy could do nothing, as a matter of practical politics, other than what Eisenhower arranged for him to do, to go ahead with Eisenhower's seriously ^{flawed} ~~flawed~~ and actually impossible plan that was actually a ~~plan~~ ^{plan} for scheme for getting the United States directly involved in the overthrow of Castro ^{But} that had no possibility of succeeding without United state involvement in it. Eisenhower, former General of the Armies, the general who lead the defeat of Hitler after Hitler had ^{the continent} ~~conquered~~ more than all of Europe, understood the realities and was careful to see that none of the responsibility that ^{his} ~~was~~ would ~~fall~~ fall on his shoulders. He was likewise careful to see to it that only Kennedy would be blamed for what Eisenhower wanted and turned over to Kennedy when the realities of that situation were that Kennedy could not cancel it and survive politically. What it could have meant for the country to have a President who was ruined in the first days of his Presidency can only be conjectured but it would have meant a disaster for the country ~~as~~ as well as for Kennedy.

That Eisenhower's scheme ~~worked~~ worked is obvious from all the calumny ~~to~~ heaped on Kennedy's head over it, without any major element of the media, without any political leader, without any great thinker, laying ~~any~~ responsibility ~~on~~ for it on Eisenhower himself.

Aside from his cunning in this, Eisenhower was the President who greatly

escalated United States intrusions into other lands, the intrusion that became
the accepted and approved national policy. This John Prados makes clear in
his President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon ^(Covert) Operations from World War II
Through the ~~EXTRANEUS~~ Persian Gulf (Ivan R. Dee, Inc, Chicago, 1986,
1996). Three pages of what Prados writes about Eisenhower and his Cuban operation
he contrived to be Kennedy's responsibility and the realities of which he was
careful not to communicate to Kennedy, begin at the top of page 191 in
one of Prados' chapters on Cuba and extend to the bottom of page 193. Nothing
is omitted from what is quoted:

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the Pentagon at these Cuba meetings. In the discussion on Decem-
ber 8, Douglas agreed to recommend the release of twenty-seven
Special Forces advisers but made it clear the Pentagon in no way

~~For his part,~~ Eisenhower worried that there was not enough syn-
chronization among different agencies on Operation Pluto. On De-
cember 7 the President approved the selection of special
representatives at CIA and State who would serve as focal points in
the bureaucracy for all matters related to the Cuba operation. Dick
Bissell chose Tracy Barnes as his representative; State's man was
Whiting Willauer, who had done so well during Operation Success
in maintaining the Honduras base for the CIA's Guatemala coup.

The leaders of the secret war gathered again on January 3, 1961,
to discuss both ending diplomatic relations and the progress of
Pluto. Dick Bissell reported that Ydigoras of Guatemala had asked
for the Cubans to be removed from his country by March 1, and
that the exiles' own morale would suffer if they did not see action
by that time. Willauer agreed that there was also a time problem
with the OAS and that the only suitable alternative to Guatemala
would be training on American bases, a suggestion that had been re-
peatedly rejected already. There was, however, considerable confi-
dence in the exile troops—Gordon Gray mentioned an observer's
report that called the Cubans the best army in Latin America. Al-
though he warned of some equipment shortages, General Lyman D.
Lemnitzner agreed.

President Eisenhower summarized: The only two reasonable al-
ternatives were supporting the Cubans to go in March or abandon-
ing the operation.

Exactly one week later a detailed account of the Cuban training
in Guatemala by Tad Szulc was on the front page of *The New York
Times*.

Did the President bequeath his successor a "developing emer-
gency"?

President Eisenhower's administration ended with the Cuban op-
eration in mid-course. Only two days before the inauguration of
John F. Kennedy, Ike's councils were still uncovering problems
with Pluto that could only be passed along. It was left to Jack Ken-
nedy to choose between the alternatives that Ike had summarized
on January 3. It was a tough choice for a novice President.

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PRESIDENTS' SECRET WARS

By not confronting that choice himself, Eisenhower has left questions history has yet to resolve. The consequent CIA failure at the Bay of Pigs has usually been cast as the fault of the Kennedy people, who came in implicitly trusting the secret warriors. Eisenhower had been sitting at the apex of the secret war for eight years; he knew better. He knew the difficulties with the 5412 Group, the CIA's penchant for keeping implementation issues out once approvals had been given, and the conflicts between military and civilian intelligence agencies. Ike also knew the current status of Pluto and the specific problems of the Cuban operation. On January 3, or up until the time that JFK stood to take his oath of office, President Eisenhower could have shut down the Cuba operation with just a few words. But he didn't.

The recently declassified memoranda of the Operation Pluto meetings in December 1960 and January 1961 reveal that the arguments Kennedy was given to continue the operation were well rehearsed. Before JFK assumed office, many in high places were aware there were significant weaknesses in the CIA's operation plan. It was clear that Castro's FAR forces were much more powerful than any force the exiles could raise. Moreover, the point had also been raised, by State on January 3, that American forces would have to back up an invasion force. The conditions necessary for success simply had not been created.

On the morning of the inauguration, as they left for the ceremonial motorcade to the site, Ike advised JFK to do whatever was needed to ensure the success of the Cuba operation.

Eisenhower believed in the secret war. His administration had consistently made efforts to improve the efficiency and range of covert operations while protecting both presidential control and plausible deniability. These aims were just too ambitious. In the operations themselves, failures were as common as gains, while leaks routinely occurred. Mechanisms designed to preserve plausible deniability had deteriorated to such a degree that the President allowed himself to become a principal participant in special group discussions of the Cuba operation.

Control of covert action would seem to imply the imposition of some discipline in the costs of these activities. But, such spending data as are available indicate that *no* major operation of this period was accomplished within the original budget estimated. Operation Ajax in Iran was estimated as low as \$100,000 or \$200,000, but cost

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\$10 million. Operation Success cost twice as much as the \$10 million allotted to it. Before the last failure of a Cuba operation, the \$13 million or \$15 million estimated for Operation Pluto would mushroom to something over \$100 million. It seems that once the aim of a covert operation was accepted, the controls were thrown away.

The question of direct American involvement in Operation Pluto also illustrates that the control system had gone awry. That no Americans were to be involved in combat was one of the fundamental assumptions. After the fiasco in Indonesia it is doubtful whether Ike would have accepted any direct American involvement. But, before the end of his administration, Americans were flying with the Cuban rebel air force, and CIA agents were commanding the rebel LCI mother ships.

Two years after President Kennedy's tragic death, Dwight Eisenhower would maintain, in interviews and in his memoir *Waging Peace*, that he had never approved a specific invasion plan because the exiles had never had a unified political leadership. According to Ike there had been a "program" but no plan. This recollection is supported by Ike's son and some others from the White House staff. Yet the date on the CIA's plan for a conventional invasion around Trinidad, Cuba, is December 6, 1960. There was a date for the invasion, too—March 1961—as well as a specific timetable for invasion-related events.

Ike's memory is correct only in a technical sense: Approval was withheld from *the* invasion plan because the President's counselors found problems with it. Eisenhower nevertheless had approved *an* invasion plan, and he knew that John Kennedy was entering office without the detailed understanding of the evolution of Operation Pluto that would have facilitated a decision. Not acting to halt the operation was tantamount to an approval—the only real question remaining was the landing site.

At numerous meetings on Pluto, Gordon Gray remembers, the President repeated one conclusion he had reached. "Now boys," Ike would say, "if you don't intend to go through with this, let's stop talking about it."

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Prados is cautious and understates. He says that "By not confronting the choice himself, Eisenhower has left questions history has yet to resolve."

But in Eisenhower's and Kennedy's lifetimes history had resolved this and had placed the blame on Kennedy when it was Eisenhower's contrivance and responsibility.

There was never any talk about getting even by assassinating Eisenhower. It was Kennedy who was blamed for what Eisenhower contrived ^{and it was Eisenhower} and who arranged for there being no real choice for Kennedy and for Kennedy not to have been fully informed after he was elected. As a result, and as a result of their ignorance, the Kennedy assassination is written about as a kickback against what is attributed to Kennedy and was really Eisenhower's responsibility. The Bay of Pigs fiasco was the Eisenhower plan and the CIA/mafia attempt to kill Castro was also Eisenhower's, with no Kennedy knowledge of it ^{until it was public knowledge}