

CHAPTER NINE

THIS DESPICABLE AND UTTERLY DISREPUTABLE REWRITING OF THAT GREAT TRAGEDY

Quite the opposite of Hall's uninformed, really ignorant propaganda pretended to be serious for his Sobeloff speech and Maryland Law Review article in which, as we have seen, he has never been in touch with the realities and has with undeviated concentration made no reference to any of the actual, official evidence of the assassination and its investigation (of which he is undoubtedly ignorant), the FBI was well aware of the realities. It was well aware of the fact that could not be avoided, shun it as the FBI did. This fact is that there had been a conspiracy to kill the President.

Of it we have seen but the tiniest fraction of the existing and long-public and available official evidence.

Separate from the evidence that is in all my books--and I repeat for emphasis that after all these years not a single one of those whom I have been critical has written or phoned to complain that I was unfair or inaccurate in what I wrote about him--there are significant opinions that there had been a conspiracy to kill

the President. One is President Johnson's. We come to another of his several such expressions below.

In a conversation with Cartha DeLoach April 3, 1967, DeLoach says "late at night," Lyndon Johnson's close associate of so many years, Marvin Watson, quoted Johnson as telling him "that there was a plot in connection with the assassination" and that "the President felt that the CIA had something to do with this plot." (62-1090605-5075), pages 1,3, and 4 attached. (see Exhibit 57).

So much for Hall et al and their pretense that only nuts and paranoids believed there had been a conspiracy.

Among the sources Johnson having said this to others are Walter Cronkite in a CBS interview, John Judas for an Atlantic Monthly story and what may have been the earliest, which follows.

It is not easy to believe that historian that Hall is he was not aware that it was not only Oliver Stone and many Americans who believe there had been a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. Early on even the man made President by that assassination also believed there had been a conspiracy.

That Hall could laugh at an Oliver Stone can be understood. But that he could forget that the President of the United States, regardless of what Hall thought of him, with all the sources on which the President can draw, also not only believed that but said it is not as easy to understand.

Particularly when Hall had to know that he himself was and is really a subject-matter ignoramus.

He knew, of course, that the major media ridiculed all

questions about the official solution; that it always found some way to support the Warren Report. So he knew it would not be critical of him and might laud him for what he had decided to do.

But he knew also that he would be depending on others and no matter how high a regard he had for those others, he knew that a mistake by any of them could damage his reputation, perhaps seriously.

He knew also that he was not in a position to evaluate any of them and what they said and wrote, and he should have known, after he was on the board, that he said more in public than any other member. So, he really was not in any position either to evaluate sources or draw on any knowledge of the established assassination fact of which he was, and alas, remains ignorant.

This also relates to his speech and to the law review article.

It does not relate to his being on the Assassination Records Review Board. On that he needed say nothing that would appear in the papers although, being the kind of person he is, he used his membership on the board for publicizing himself extensively.

Maybe he is just a wise guy, regardless of his academic achievements and the positions he holds, beginning with dean of the humanities at a major university. Maybe he did not regard it as being a wise guy when he told the Columbus, Ohio, TV station after his appointment that his subject-matter ignorance was his greatest asset. As I said earlier, after all the months he has served on that board and after all he had said in public when he had not been required to say a word, the asset with which he began was undiminished.

He could have meant, although in what was aired he did not say it, that knowing nothing about the assassination he had nothing to unlearn, something like that. However, he knew so little about both the subject and what would be required of him on the board the course of wisdom would have been to say nothing. He did not have to say a thing and the others are not quoted as having spoken for attribution as he was.

It is also not easy to understand that as a historian Hall had not heard of the vast quantity of records the government had. He should have known, for example, that in what the FBI referred to as its "general release" it had disclosed almost a hundred thousand pages. He may not have known how many pages the government had been forced to disclose through FOIA lawsuits but if he did he knew that I alone got a quarter of a million pages mostly from the FBI and that a much greater quantity of paper remained to be processed and disclosed. This was the FBI alone of many agencies.

There simply is no way of knowing what can be in so much paper, what mistakes can be made in handling it, whose judgment is faulty, what reputations can be hurt by it.

So the course of wisdom, once he decided to accept the appointment, was to say nothing and give up that opportunity to get and keep his name in the papers and on TV and radio.

Even if before accepting the appointment Hall had been told it would require of him but a couple of days a month, that, too, should have given a reasonable man with a reputation to protect, if not an ambition to move up in his university, something to think about. To be careful about.

The subject matter could, he knew, get attention. But if what the agencies were saying was true, mistakes could cost lives. Did he want to have any responsibility for a life or lives being lost?

It is true that disclosure of the name of an informer can get that informer killed.

Disclosing informer names would come before the board. It would then have to decide whether or not to make the information public.

Then there is what should have occurred to all those asked to serve on that board, could they meet that responsibility adequately serving only a couple of days a month, and what would that be their situation in their existing employment if they had to take a couple of days a month off and with them some extra time for travelling.

In Ohio, from what he says about himself in the beginning of this article, Hall had a full plate if he met the responsibilities he had there. But in accepting his appointment to the board he was, necessarily, reducing the time he had available for meeting his many existing responsibilities in Ohio. For doing all he was paid for and from which students who paid were to be helped in getting their education.

All the time it took two Presidents to decide to appoint this board and that George Bush, who had been CIA director, just would not appoint anyone to the board, despite the law, should have made anyone offered the post wonder about the wisdom of accepting it.

Then, too, what that board would be required to do would be controversial. It could damage as well as help reputations.

Appointments alone helped reputations but after that the situation could be one that endangered those reputations, especially of professional scholars.

Also, when they began knowing nothing about the subject, how wisely could members of the board decide what should and should not be made public?

How wisely could they decide when they spent so little time at the board? And knew so little to begin with?

There are many questions that should have given anyone asked to accept appointment to the board reason to wonder about accepting it.

But Hall appears not to be that kind of person.

He appears to be one who longs for attention and perhaps believes that it can help his move upward at his university.

A part-time board with a full-time staff of those unknown to the board, which would not be in a position to do the hiring and learning that should go before hiring is a situation that can make for trouble, trouble that can damage reputations.

How much could the board really participate in decisions and how much would it have to leave to its staff? Of strangers.

Serving on the board, if all went well, could add to what might be regarded as experience worthy of justifying professional achievement. But a single fiasco and the opposite was as likely, if not more so.

Given all Hall's existing responsibilities and obligations, it does not seem that he accepted appointment to the board with only

altruistic or unselfish motive.

He did have a full plate and if all the time he took for the board was being present when it met, he took that time from what for most was at the least full-time responsibilities.

Now if we add to this writing, writing at the length of this speech and this law review article, Hall was again depending on others. Another way of putting this is that in this he perhaps put himself and his reputation in the hands of others.

From the way in which he writes of them it does seem that Hall had the highest regard for them and sincere appreciation of their efforts.

What they did may have been what Hall made clear he wanted them to do. But then it may also reflect the prejudices and preconceptions with which they began which they then wished on Hall.

I have a knowledge of the field that enables me to know who the authentic subject-matter experts in it are. None of those who are thanked for their help by Hall is a real subject-matter expert.

They may, of course, include other experts, such as in library science.

It is beyond reasonable question, even as Hall did not have all those other obligations, he simply could not have read all the literature he cites and of which he is in various ways critical.

Then there is what he does not have in his source notes, what he does not pretend to have read, of which we have seen but a glimmer.

If we presume that he depended upon those others to do his reading for him and convey the content of what they read and their impressions of it, then he has put his reputation, if not his future, in their hands.

But he does not say this. It is his representation that the writing is his, the opinions are his and these opinions and criticisms come from his reading of the simply enormous amount of literature of which he gives the impression his article and his speech before that are based.

From what appears over Hall's name about my books, they were not read at all/ were not understood, or were just lied about.

What seems most likely in that the invalid opinions were picked up from earlier prejudicial or dishonest writing, of which there is no shortage.

We do not know and we have no way of knowing.

We know, too, that Hall has not learned the Santayana wisdom, simple as it is, that he who does not learn from the past is doomed to relive it.

The past, particularly appropriate to his board position, is that of the Warren Commission.

Hall may be the kind of professional scholar who adopts what is widely accepted and asks no questions, makes no effort to determine for himself whether the popular belief is justified.

There were several members of the Warren Commission for sure, probably at least one other at a minimum, and some of their staff who would have told Hall that on this subject it is unwise to let

the staff do what ought be the responsibility of the members or with the board, the members of the board.

I had a relationship with the most conservative member of the Warren Commission, Senator Richard B. Russell. It did not begin until he was in terminal illness. His trust was impose upon as, for all his years in public service, particularly the years he spent in the Senate, he had considered impossible.

What happened to him is, I hope without precedent in our history and will not be repeated again.

Senator John Sherman Cooper was as firm in his refusal to accept what they did not know was essential in the Warren Commission's conclusions, what was so basic, so absolutely indispensable in those conclusions, as was Russell. Russell told me, and records confirm him, Senator Hale Boggs shared their disagreement but did not express it as vigorously in anything that is known and may not have felt it as strongly.

I had reason to believe that Russell had doubts about this most basic conclusion other than of Oswald as the lone assassin but I did not want to go to him with empty hands. I wanted to have what he would find bore on that, what he could regard as significant.

After I got that I wrote him. In return I was invited in to see and speak with him.

Before he died, as a result he broke his long and close friendship with Lyndon Johnson and, I was told, never spoke to Johnson again.

If Hall or any of those whose work he used and whose judgment

he trusted had read Whitewash IV, one of my books not mentioned in his article--as in fact most are not although they are basic in the field and report what is not in any works they list and depend on--he and they would have at the very least have had an inkling of this (pages 20-21 attached). (see Exhibit 58).

Russell believed he made a record for history of his disagreement with that most basic conclusion that Hall et al just love, that single-bullet myth that seems to have been the invention of Arlen Specter. (It did not hurt him a bit, witness the fact that he is a Pennsylvania Senator and has been for years).

Under the Commission's agreement to procedures, referred to above, there was to have been a permanent record for history of all their meetings.

Russell, when the Report was in page proof, refused to agree with that single-bullet fiction. As he told me, he told Warren not to worry about that, and merely to put in what I remember his referring to as 'a little ole' footnote saying "Senator Russell Dissents." Russell chuckled as he said this because he knew that Warren very much wanted unanimity, for all the members to agree with the conclusions of the Report.

Russell's absolute refusal to agree with the single-bullet concoction that was made up out of nothing but need and Warren's determination to have unanimity resulted in an executive session on Friday, September 18, 1964.

What Russell did not know and found it difficult to believe is that in violation of the long-standing understanding referred to

above it was seen to that there would be no court reporter at that executive session so that there would be no record for our history of the refusal of Russell and those who also refused to sign the Report including that single-bullet impossibility without which the Warren Commission could not have concluded that Oswald was the lone assassin, the conclusion with which it began.

According to what Russell told me, supported by Cooper and records he left, Cooper was also inflexible in his opposition to this single-bullet concoction. Boggs was opposed but I know of no record reflecting his degree of opposition to it.

Russell was shocked, totally shocked, when I gave him a copy of the obvious fake of a transcript of that executive session.

Hall would have seen this, too, if he had used Whitewash IV as a source instead of some of the trash he used for propaganda purposes. This phony transcript is in facsimile on pages 131 and 132. Rankin used page 131 to counterfeit the usual court-reporter beginning, including even the correct page number in the sequence used by the court reporter. The second page refers to a couple of minor housekeeping items only. (see Exhibit 59).

That is the entire "record" of that heated discussion without which that Report would not have been issued. Without a word of that discussion, disagreement of a supposed compromise.

Russell was certain a stenographer was present. He had seen one taking it, or seemed to be taking it all down in shorthand.

I had the Commission's records of its employment of court reporters and there was none for that day. I also had other

documentary proofs that established the court reporting firm had not assigned any court reporter for that heated executive session.

Unwilling to believe that anyone in the government would so betray trust, would so impose upon trust, would or could be so corrupt and dishonest, Russell asked me to get proof from the Archivist of the United States that there was nothing other than what I gave him that was a transcript of that executive session.

Which what I gave him was not!

The Commission's court reporters was the firm of Ward & Paul. Almost thirty years earlier, in 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939 I had worked with them. They were the court reporters for the Senate Civil Liberties Committee for which I was first an investigator and then was its editor. I worked with them at each of our many hearings and never once had any problem and never once, to the best of my recollection, even had any complaint about the transcripts they prepared and delivered.

I knew the work of Ward & Paul well. I knew as soon as I looked at what is in the Commission's files was supposed to be the first page of the transcript of its executive session of September 18, 1964, that it was a fraud and an incompetent, careless fraud. (see Exhibit 59).

Court reporters get paid by the page. When they sell copies, as they do to witnesses and to those of special interest, they are again paid by the page. To increase the number of pages for which they will be paid they are first, generous with margins and in those days before computers, used pica-faced typewriters. They

never ever used an elite type.

Which is smaller, gets more characters to the inch and to the line, often meant more lines to the page--both meaning less money--and was used for the fraudulent fake of a transcript that so shocked Russell when he saw it.

In response to Russell's request I asked the Archivist and, unwilling as he had to be to engage in any controversy with one of the more senior and more influential senators, James B. Rhodes gave me a letter stating there was no other "transcript" of that September 18 session Russell had forced. That letter is included in his university archive.

As a practical matter there was not a thing Russell could do. He could not make a statement that he had signed what he did not agree with, which was the fact. He could not, when the end of his life was near, demand a new investigation, even a new executive session or another hearing, the Commission not having existed for several years. All he could do, other than encourage me until his dying day, was to encourage me in my work and express regret that his Senate obligations and the state of his health precluded his having an active role in it.

He did, once he knew he had been had, end his long friendship with Johnson. I was told he never spoke to Johnson again.

Russell had a good opinion of my work. He gave the books I gave him to his assistant to read and report on to him. I've forgotten now whether C. E. Campbell was his legislative assistant or his administrative assistant but he expressed a high opinion

Russell shared. Russell did have one doubt we come to. (see Exhibit 60).

Campbell perceived correctly that I believed the Commission "had delegated too heavily to the staff."

The lesson Hall did not learn.

In the same paragraph Campbell makes it clear that Russell was the first critic of the Warren Report. Not me because I wrote the first book. Not Mark Lane or anyone else.

Russell.

With this quote:

"He completely agrees with your thesis that no one shot hit both the President and the Governor."

Before then Campbell wrote Russell about my writing that "One of his strongest points of departure with the Commission is on the number of shots and on which shots hit Connally and/or the President."

These are the very points of at least two Members of the Commission on which the subject-matter ignoramus Hall is critical of others when it is obviously impossible for him to have read all the books of which he is critical. He also did not read the records these Members left to our history.

On what is quoted from Campbell's report to Russell and from other records Russell and Cooper strongly and Boggs we do not know how strongly disagreed with the Report about which they knew more than Hall, who endorses it all, obviously.

Russell's question comes from the publisher of Oswald in New Orleans having asked Jim Garrison to write a forward for that book.

This led Russell to write, "The only trouble with this chap is his apparent ties with Garrison, whom I don't trust."

Russell had an additional area of doubt, or disagreement with what the Report said.

In preparing for the executive session he had forced, when the Report was already in page proof, he wrote out what he intended to say. He left the original with the Commission in whose files I did not see it. His carbon copy was deposited with other of his records at the University of Georgia at Athens, which is identified on these records.

He did believe Oswald was an assassin. He was not convinced that Oswald was the lone assassin. Hear that Kermit Hall of the snide cracks about that very point?

Here is the part of what he prepared in which he told his colleagues about that as he expressed his doubt and explained his unwillingness to agree that there had been no conspiracy:

I concur with my colleagues in the finding that there is no clear and definite evidence connecting any person or group with Oswald in a conspiracy to assassinate the President. I am confident that if any such evidence exists, it is out of the reach of this Commission or any of the investigative agencies of the United States Government.

For example, no amount of diligence could disclose detailed information as to the extent of Oswald's associations and connections with the large number of Cuban nationals other witnesses testified were studying in the educational institutions at Minsk during his residence in that city, or to the scope and number of connections he may have had with foreign nationals after his return to the United States or to reconstruct in detail all of his movements, contacts and associations on his secret visit to Mexico a few weeks before the assassination of the President.

In these and a number of other areas involving the nature and extent of his relations with foreign nations, the evidence

available to the Commission precludes any determination that Oswald planned and perpetrated the assassination without the knowledge, encouragement or assistance of any other person.

The evidence adduced, including that relating to Oswald's background and character as well as his activities within this country, show that he desired to associate himself with groups or with governments generally considered hostile to the United States. The same evidence would indicate that every group that he approached considered him a very poor risk or prospect. He was undoubtedly bent upon association with any hostile or subversive entity, within or without the United States.

Toward the end of 1966, when Russell heard that there had been something written about this position, which he had not discussed other than with fellow Members of the Commission, he asked Alfreda Scobey if she could tell him where that got started.

Scobey was a lawyer who had been assigned to help Russell with his Commission work one of the times he was thinking of resigning. He was, particularly because he did lead the southern fight against Civil Rights legislation, really overworked.

Scobey was then the law assistant to the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia.

In thanking her Russell from his home in Winder, Georgia, on December 24, 1966, said that the published report "is not nearly as strong as the position that Senator Cooper and I took in regard to the single bullet theory. As I recall, Congressman Boggs had mild doubts, but Senator Cooper and I refused to accept the single bullet theory." (see Exhibit 61).

The origin of what then was known as Inquest, the Epstein book that is cited repeatedly among the sources for Hall's article.

In it Epstein wrote--and Hall suppresses:

In fact, Russell reportedly said that he would not sign

Report which concluded that both men were hit by the same bullet. Senator Cooper and Representative Boggs tended to agree with Russell's position. Cooper said, 'I, too, objected to such a conclusion; there was no evidence to show that both men were hit by the same bullet.' Boggs said, 'I had strong doubts about it[the single-bullet theory].' and he added that he felt the question was never resolved (pages 149-150).

The initial leak of Russell's position to Epstein was from Alfred Goldberg, whose Commission position was historian. What Epstein said Cooper said he attributed to Cooper. He attributed what Boggs said to Boggs. But he did not speak to Russell.

Stronger than this, which it was, was pretty strong.

But again, what kind of research did Hall do or what kind did those who did it for him do when this is what is in Inquest, one of Hall's sources. If Hall read Inquest rather than use it as propaganda he knew this. Yet he does not report it and, suppressing it, ridicules and is critical of those who do agree with those Commission Members.

This is simply dishonest. Or all those books listed as sources Hall did not read, which in itself is also dishonest.

There is more in the Russell archive as the University of Georgia at Athens than what follows but for the present purposes, more is not needed than what follows. First is a section of an oral history prepared for that archive. Senator Cooper was questioned by Hugh Gates on April 29, 1971. That was almost a decade later and Cooper was still under the impression that in his opposition Russell had prevailed. Cooper had not yet realized that he and Russell had been had, had been tricked into accepting as representing their opposition what did no such thing but was merely

a rephrasing of what they had refused to agree with, designed to make them believe it did encompass their strong objection. This is an excerpt from that oral history of Cooper's:

The most compelling position he took in the Commission was this: there was a question of whether or not the shot which struck President Kennedy or one of the shots, had . . . passed through Governor [John] Connally of Texas on the front [jump] seat. To . . . find that it had passed through both would make the decision somewhat easier in the time frame. It wasn't conclusive. And so there's first . . . an opinion by most of the Commission that we should say that the shot passed through both President Kennedy and Governor Connally. Governor Connally was a very strong witness. I see now why he has the present opinion in the country that he's a very strong man. He's a very strong witness. He said categorically that he knew it . . . that the first shot did not pass through him. And he. . . I remember he said, 'I turned my head when I heard the shot. It did come from the direction which you have decided it came from because I'm familiar with firearms. But as I turned again to the left, I felt the impact of another shot.' Senator Russell just said, 'I'll never sign that report if . . . if . . . this Commission says categorically that the second shot passed through both of them. I agreed with him. I must say he had great influence with me, but I too, have been impressed by Governor Connally and so the Commission then did agree that, I cannot recall the exact words, that while there was evidence that the same . . . that the shot passed through both President Kennedy and . . . and Governor Connally it was not conclusive. And with that, why, Senator Russell won his point. I think he's correct.

Cooper also recorded as a record for our history that Russell insisted the Commission not say there had not been any conspiracy. As Cooper put it, Russell had argued that, "we cannot say that at some point there may not be some other evidence" establishing that there had been a conspiracy.

In the remarks he prepared for that executive session is what Russell also told me, it was not possible to say absolutely there had not been any conspiracy. He also told me that "they," and he did not say who he meant by the "they" but in context it was mostly

the CIA but also the FBI, "did not tell us all they know about Oswald."

Russell believed, as Cooper said, that "there may be facts that are developed in the future . . . which may show otherwise," that there had been a conspiracy.

Until I gave him proof to the contrary, Russell also believed that, Cooper's words, he had won his point. That came out the afternoon of the day of that executive session, September 18, 1964. Johnson apparently had gotten wind of it and had his White House operators track Russell down. In early 1997 the Archives disclosed the tape of that phone conversation. No official transcript was disclosed. I did get the tape from the LBJ Library. To be certain of impartiality and that nobody could have basis for wondering if I had altered it in any way I asked my friend Dr. Gerald McKnight, professor of history at local Hood College, to prepare the transcript of that brief conversation.

I asked the LBJ Library for all of that tape relating to this conversation that follows:

Johnson: Hello

Russell: Yes, sir.

Johnson: Well your're always leaving town. You must not like it up here.

Russell: Well you left. I figured if you got out of town that the country could get along a whole lot better without me then it could you.

Johnson: I don't know.

Russell: So I got out. No, that damn Warren Commission business whopped me down. So we got through today and I just

. . . . You know what I did. I went and got on the plane and came home and didn't have a toothbrush and I didn't bring a shirt. I got a few little things here. I didn't even have my pills, my antihistamine pills to take care of my emphysema.

Johnson: Well you ought to take another hour and go and get your clothes.

Russell: No, no. Well they were trying to prove that the same bullet that hit Kennedy first was the one that hit Connally, went through him, went through his hand, his body and into his leg, and everything else. Just a lot of stuff there. I couldn't hear all the evidence and cross-examine all of them. But I did read the record and so I just . . . I don't know. I was the only fella there that even practically suggested any change whatsoever and what the staff got up. I . . . this staff business always scares me. I like to put my own views down.

Johnson: Well what difference does it make which bullet got Connally?

Russell: Well it don't make much difference. But they said that they believe, that the Commission believes that the same bullet that hit Kennedy hit Connally. Well I don't believe it.

Johnson: I don't either.

Russell: So I couldn't sign it. I said that Governor Connally testified directly to the contrary and I am not going to approve that.

I finally made them say that there was a difference in the Commission on that. Part of them believed that it wasn't so. And of course if that fella was accurate enough to hit Kennedy in the back with one shot, and knock his head off with the next one, when his head was leaning up against his wife's head and not even wound her. Why he didn't miss completely with that third shot. According to that theory, he not only missed the whole automobile but he missed the street. Well that man is a good enough shot to put two bullets into Kennedy, he didn't miss the ole automobile nor the street.

Johnson: What's the [word missed]of the whole thing? What's it state: That Oswald did it and he did it for any reason?

Russell: Well he was a general misanthropic fella. He never been satisfied anywhere he was on earth. In Russia or here; and he had a desire to get his name in history and all

. . . .

I don't think you will be displeased with the report.

It's too long. But its [missing] volumes.

Johnson: Unanimous?

Russell: I tried my best to get in a dissent. But they came around and traded me out of it by giving me a little ole thread of it

While my main point here is that shortly after that session at which Russell's record for history was destroyed by not being made, what was required by the agreed-to Commission procedure, there are a few other comments worthy of note. Except to scholars like Hall and his assistants. They have their own concept of scholarship, more or less like the new math. That is not traditional scholarship at all in any way. It is propaganda pretending to be scholarship.

First the President himself did not believe that one bullet wounded both men. He said so. He volunteered it.

Russell told Johnson that he had refused to sign the Report until "I made them say there was a difference in the Commission on that," which, while promised, was not said.

Going back to an earlier comment about those who do not learn from the past being doomed to relive it, as Hall will at some point recognize he is doing, Russell told Johnson, then his old and trusted friend, "this staff business always scares me."

Country boy that he was and country man that he remained all his life, Russell, who had lived most of his life around hunters and hunting, had a trenchant comment to make about the shooting, about that missed shot. It is worth repeating for emphasis:

And of course if that fella was accurate enough to hit Kennedy in the back with one shot, and knock his head off with the next one, when his head was leaning up against his wife's head and not even wound her. Why he didn't miss completely

with that third shot. According to that theory, he not only missed the whole automobile but he missed the street. Well that man is a good enough shot to put two bullets into Kennedy, he didn't miss the ole automobile nor the street.

Russell said this on other occasions. It is not easy to believe that the shooter could be so much superior to William Tell on two shots and have his third miss by half the length of Dealey Plaza.

It deserves being emphasized: that Russell and Cooper and Boggs, half but one of the Commission, did not agree with what is so basic to the Report on the shooting and their disagreement had been public knowledge for more than thirty years before Hall's speech and article. He had all the research and assistance at the beginning of his article, he had whatever he learned on the board, and he has not a word about this. But he ridicules, belittles and is generally critical of those who followed after Russell and Cooper for sure and to perhaps a lesser degree, Boggs.

Hall does not criticize them, ridicule, or belittle at all. If he was not such a world-class assassination ignoramus and knew about it. If he did know, then he did not dare deprecate them. If he did not know, what has he been doing on that board other than make foolish statements and praise what is not worthy of praise in any way?

I think it is appropriate to repeat at this point that if Hall and his helpers had looked at Whitewash IV they would have seen that Russell did absolutely refuse to agree with what is the centerpiece of the Warren Report, what is essential to any claim that there was only one assassin, and he would have known about the

disreputable and let us hope unprecedented and never to be repeated corruption of our history with the memory-holing of the Russell/Cooper dissent.

And much more we do not here and now take time for.

It is also in my NEVER AGAIN! which Hall also does not include in his list of to him literary horrors--which in fact is what his law review article really is.

It disgraces him personally.

It disgraces him professionally.

It disgraces his scholarship.

It disgraces his board.

It disgraces the law review.

And it assures that there will forever be questions that linger about that board and what it does and does not do.

What Hall does is in itself manifestation, albeit the opposite of his intended manifestation, of "The Virulence of the National Appetite for Bogus Revelation."

The virulence of the insistence that what cannot be believed must be both supported and believed no matter how completely it is proven wrong by the official assassination evidence itself because it began as and continues as national policy on the coup d'etat that turned the country and the world around. It, among other consequences, disenchanting millions of Americans, particularly younger Americans. It led them not to believe and not to trust their government.

The Maryland Law Review does itself no credit, nor did those who invited this prostitute of our tragic history to deliver the prestigious Sobeloff lecture at the university's law school. The University and its law review deceived and misled many, many people, including those who paid the university to be truthfully informed so they could be better and more productive and honest and caring citizens, and so they could have and practice a better understanding of the law and become lawyers with a proper understanding of what the law requires, from evidence to justice.

The University, its law review and those who invited this debaucher of our great national tragedy and perverts it to deliver that Judge Simon E. Sobeloff lecture, owe it to themselves, to those on whose trust it imposed and to the nation to rectify this fraud, this despicable and utterly disreputable rewriting of that great tragedy and all it means and has meant and with that, terrible as it is for a scholar and a lawyer, his denial of truth to the people and his protection of what was a de facto coup d'etat such as those once restricted to what we called "banana republics."