

3. Blakey's "Evaluations" and His "Science"

Blakey's next chapter, a mere eight pages, is on Blakey's committee. It has a title that modestly does not suggest that he ran that committee. The title is "Congressional Inquiry: 1976-1978" (pages 62-9). In suggesting that his committee did other things better than it did he has another quotation from the past immediately under the title:

*Without insight
nothing will
happen*

If it is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk too much about what it sees . It is meant to be the eyes and the voice . . . (sic) of its constituents, Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government."

Nice words, Wilson's but not the Blakey practise nor that of his committee. He and it did not "look diligently into every" ~~affair~~ lead they had into the subject of their responsibility. They did not "talk much about what" he and it saw, knew ~~about~~, ^{about} Ad it was anything but "the voice" of "its constituents,"

Under the heading, "An Investigation Initiated" Blakey begins with an abbreviated account of ~~what~~ what led to the resolution that created his committee, but even in ~~it~~ Blakey has to insert his propaganda that proves to be untruthful. His writing is to be taken to be the opposite of what it says, that Members of the Congress were shown "the Zapruder film in which President Kennedy's head appears to snap back and to the left, as if driven in ~~that~~ ^{that} direction by a shot from the right front" (page 62),

In his first sentence in this chapter Blakey certifies that as an investigator he is a Pink Panther. He also certifies that either he did not study that film, or have it studied, or that he is no real investigator. ~~On~~ Of this I have personal knowledge coming from my understanding of what the Warren Commission published that anyone,

with any doubts about the Warren Commission, Blakeley included, should have had.

Separately the Commission published Zapruder frames ending with 334 ^{which} and the information that "Life magazines had given it ^{why} 343 frames, what the commission had asked Life for.

Apparently nobody, including even Blakey and his hawkshaws after the fact, noticed that the Commission had published nine frames fewer than it was supposed to. When I published this fact in Whitewash II, publication date December 2, 1966, the Archives, which had inherited the Commission's records, pointed me, explained that the omissions were a mere oversight by the FBI and invited me in to ^{all these nine} ~~arr the nine slides~~.

When the Commission saw the original 8mm film it told Life which frames of the film it would like to ^{have} be in the form of standard 35 mm slides. (in black and white, for publication)

Those the Commission had ended with 334 instead of 343. The nine missing slides were 335-343. I saw them projected onto a screen about five feet wide, a considerable enlargement for a film only 35 mm wide. The actual enlargement was from a little under an inch and a half to about five feet.

And at that enlargement the individual frames were startlingly bright, sharp and clear.

Those frames, which were not omitted from the original or any 8mm copy of it, begin only a fraction ^{more than} of a second past Frame 313, which is referred to as the frame showing the cause of death. Frame 313 shows the ghastly spray of blood and tissues in all directions from the President's head. But those withheld nine frames, withheld from publication by the FBI, beginning 24 frames after the fatal frame, do show what Blakeley

Blakey says it only "appears" to show. It actually shows that the President's body goes ^{violently} sharp^{ly} backward and then falls ^q rapidly onto his wife, who was on his left. As it does this, with surprising rapidity (nine frames represents only a half of a second) for ^{(an eighth of a second),} two frames, 337 and 338, the back of his head is startlingly clear.

In the official story the President was first struck with a bullet that hit him in the back of the head. And, there is not ^{But,} bullet hole ^{in these two frames.} visible in the back of the head. There is no blood visible on the head, either. Not is there on the collar of the President's shirt or on his jacket, but ~~but~~ ~~so far~~ and entirely unsmeared.

Thanks to the FBI,

And not a word of this is indicated in any way in any reporting on that from that I remember. And I noticed it in 1967!

At that time a copy would have been denied me. Years later, when Girard "Chip" ^{and I} Selby each sued for copies, he got and used part of the motion picture in his fine documentary, Reasonable Doubt. I won the right to make my own slides because I could not afford ^{the} ~~the~~ price the Archives charged for 343 individual slides, I had had a promise from Robert Groden to make them for me but when the time came he refused, so I did not get them.

When I sought copies in ~~19~~ 2001, the copies the archives made were remarkably unclear. I cannot explain this but the Archives did make two efforts and neither is even useful ^{is} ~~able~~ to leave alone depicting what was so bright and clear in the slide that was ^{projected} ~~projected~~ for me in 1967.

The reason for making prints of those slides was because the slides were in color and the printing was to be in black and white. The slides provided by Life were numbered by FBI agent Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt. It was he who made the black and white copies of those

color frames. I ~~had~~ never seen his copies projected but the film he ~~was to~~ reproduce ^d for publication did not include those nine frames, so, I never saw them in 1960. My last request of the Archives has not been responded to at the time I ~~were~~ rewrite this. It is for a copy of the original slides 337 and 338, *in color*.

Or, once again Blakey begin a chapter with less than the truth when it as his responsibility to get to the truth in his ~~A~~ Congressional investigation and with a string suggestion that what was true and he would have learned is ~~true~~, if he had done his job, is not true.

Blakey being Blakey again.

This is hardly what he suggests his "investigation" was in his quotation of Woodrow Wilson, the fine words with which he begins this chapter.

Fine but the opposite of the Blakey readily.

In fact, with his suggestion that this is not true Blakey says ^{Congressmen} that when critics gave a copy of the Film to the Representative who presented the resolution that the Congress passed, this head-snap part of the Zapruder film is what "second confirmed" Thomas N. Downing's "doubts" about the official assassination story.

Which, aside from Blakey, it certainly should have.

Blakey says that the Downing resolution was languishing until:

57
Walt
Jimm
Spud

Downing's cause got a boost when FBI chicanery in the Dallas investigation was revealed for the first time. According to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, a newsman confronted FBI officials in July 1975 with a report that Lee Harvey Oswald had visited the Dallas FBI office shortly before the assassination and had left a threatening note for Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr., who had been conducting a bureau investigation of Oswald. It developed from further checking by the Senate Committee that about two hours after Oswald was pronounced dead on November 24, 1963, Hosty, on instructions from @superior, destroyed the note by flushing it down a toilet, and the incident had been concealed for over twelve years. By the end of 1975 Downing had some one hundred colleagues lined up behind his resolution, but when, in the early months of the second session of the 94th Congress, an attempt was made to move it out of the Rules Committee it failed in a tie vote.

Downing had about given up hope by the summer of 1976, believing that support for a new investigation had peaked. He had decided not to seek reelection in November, so he thought it was fitting to announce he was not a candidate for chairman of an assassinations committee even if there was to be one. Then, unexpectedly, he got a call one day in early September from Speaker of the House Carl Albert, inviting him to a meeting with Coretta Scott King, Dr. King's widow. Mrs. King had come to Washington to tell the Congressional Black Caucus of new evidence in her husband's death in 1968 that she believed to be significant and Albert was proposing that Downing get together with Gonzalez and Walter E. Fauntroy of the District of Columbia, a Black Caucus leader to draft a new resolution that would create a 12-member committee to investigate the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. King. Albert asked Downing to be chairman for the balance of the year, realizing Gonzalez would succeed him when Congress returned in 1977.

Blakely refers to only the withholding by the FBI of any knowledge of that Oswald note, Chicanery is trickery. But there was more than that in it and more investigations of it than ^{the Blakely} other one he cites, by the Senate. There were two by committees of the House and one by the FBI's inspector general. Not even mentioning the three he ignores does lead to the belief that in his investigation, if it can be called that, ^{Blakely} he ~~there~~ ignored them, too.

If ^a Blakely had not been off and running at top speed on his mafia fixation, which had no actual reason to be believed, he would not have ignored what I had made public by obtaining it under FOIA.,, the the FBI's so-called internal investigation was so determined to avoid learning what could lead to criminal charges it had to return to request a witness as many as two times, or it had to

question her three times when her story was a very simple one and she was straightforward when she spoke to them. Some of those "investigations" took so little time that from the beginning, including the time it took for the "investigators" to write what the witness said and then for the witness to read what was written ^{the witness} for him to sign took as little as fifteen minutes -in all.

The "superior" Blakey does not name was Gordon DShanklin, Dallas special agent in charge, who received his orders from headquarters, which Blakey also does not mention, and in ~~the~~^{P31} official Congressional investigations, Dhanklim , without any question, perfured himself in his protections of ~~headquarters~~. But when the Justice Department considered whether to indict him, it decided ~~aa~~against indicting the perjurerer on the ground that indicting him after so much time would be "bootstrapping" the indictment.

^{here} None of this was within the Woodrow Wilson definition of the responsibilities of the Congress^⑥

Blakey also says that Hosty "had been conducting an bureau investigation of Oswald." This also is not true, much as Hosty pretends it was. What had happened is that an FBI informer had reported that Oswald had subscribed to that Communist newspaper, ^{The Daily Worker} Hosty held that was cause for an investigation and on this he was upheld. Only ~~the~~ the Oswald file was in New Orleans and he did not have the Oswald file until the morning of the assassination, from his own testimony. Not having ~~the~~ the file he had conducted no investigation and then, ^{that very day} when Oswald made accusations against Hosty to his face, he was removed from that case. So, the only investigation Hosty made of Oswald is the non-investigation he exaggerated into an actual investigation.

So, the only investigation Hosty made was the non-investigation talk that in his talk he made into his investigation that was no investigation. In fact, Hosty complained, particularly to the

As Blakey ~~also~~ would have known if he had not been off on his childish notion ^{is fiction} that the mafia did it and if instead he had only read what I had forced out of FBI secrecy and was readily available to him.

Commission, that he did not even get the Oswald file from New Orleans until the morning of the ~~sudden~~ ^{fact} assassination, only a few hours before the ~~assassination~~.

Blakey is so careless with ^{fact} even the simplest fact that he refers to Arlen Specter as ^{Sprague's} ~~dear~~'s old boss when Specter was Philadelphia's District before he was on the Warren Commission. Actually Specter then was a young ^{assistant} and an ~~assistant~~ ^{district} attorney (page 64).

In speaking of what caused Sprague's departure Blakey ~~says~~ says that "Don Edwards of California, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional rights, warned that the investigative techniques proposed by Sprague, were 'wrong,

~~and very likely illegal".~~ (Page 76). Blakey does not report that Edwards was a former FBI agent. ~~For that matter, he does not report that Spragues co., iyy and Blakeys also had an FBI agent on yrm, One of who, he soon metions and does not include this vackground:~~

The members of the committee were its most vocal ~~supporters~~. Samuel L. Devine, the ranking Repunblocam, ^{which} had ~~not voted~~ ⁵ for H.R. 1440 (the resolution that created that committee) (page 66).

But, Blakey then says, Devine voted for appropriations.

Devine also had been an FBI agent, as Blakey does not say.

Here is part of that:

*Winfrey
Single
use*

The period from July 1977 to January 1978 was one for rebuilding the staff; mastering the literature, the work of the Warren Commission and its critics; establishing working relationships with the investigative agencies, not only the FBI, CIA, and others in Washington, but authorities in Dallas, some of whom were defensive and leery of leveling with us; devising a fact-finding format and a public hearing policy; conducting a preliminary file review; doing exploratory fieldwork; and, most important, preparing a comprehensive investigative plan for the balance of the life of the Committee. The plan was a prerequisite, because we could not, even with infinite resources, expect to answer every question that could be asked. We had to choose carefully from the alternative courses of action open to us, hoping to achieve a balanced approach to the requirements of our congressional mandate and not to succumb to the temptation to concentrate on the question of conspiracy to the exclusion of other tasks. It was a matter of assessing and assigning the proper priorities. We decided to rely primarily on the hard data of science and technology, because the physical aspects of the evidence had not been as affected by time as had human testimony. Further, we stood to gain from scientific advances that would enable our experts to apply testing techniques that were not available to the Warren Commission, an advantage of particular relevance, we were to find, with respect to the acoustical evidence. There was no new physical evidence in the case, as far as we could tell, but there might be new ways to read it. In this respect, we possibly could put the passage of time to advantage.

page 69).

With the size of the staff Blakey had all of this did not require half a year and as he does not say, there were hearings he could have held after only a little time. Conspiracy, for example, and Blakey did not investigate that at all, did not exclude other tasks, Rather the opposite in a real investigation. With regard to "critics' literature," the only interest Blaket had in tht was to put it down. He avoided the use of it when that use wwould prove the opposite of what some of the critics did prove,

From my experience working for a Senate committee in the 1950s, when there were no computers, np copying machines what Blakey says here is unreal, All of it.

Much of what Blakey said about this is ludicrous. Preposterous.
~~In my~~
 I had personal experience with a Senate investigation in the 1930s, We had nothing like the funding Blakey's committee had, ~~only~~ a tiny fraction of its staffing, and after a short existence we began to hold hearings. I was called back from investigations in the field and assigned, on a Saturday morning, to prepare for a hearing three mornings later. It was not easy to do, but I did it. It was not on the subjects on which I had been working ~~and~~ there no copying machines then. But I had what we called "briefs" for each Senator before the hearing began. Those briefs were, on the right-hand side of the legal-sized file folder, the questions carbon to be asked, the correct answer, and of the left-hand side, copies of the ~~rele~~ relevant documents.

Despite an unfriendly press, that hearing was a big success and it was the beginning of the end of the nasty business of labor spying for industry, particularly ~~in~~ big industry.

And Blakey says that his committee had to spend ~~the~~ six months ~~in~~ ^{which} such things (as they never did) as mastering the literature, including of the Warren Commission and its critics. Which he ~~had~~ did not do and did not intend doing. He could not have done that and published that massive nothing of a report he published,

By then I had published seven books. He did crib from them, using what it brought to light as his own work, but other than plagiarism and the single nasty crack above, there is no mention of it or of me.

He has but two mentions of Sylvia Meagher, whose Accessories After the Fact was a fine and one of the earlier work,.

He makes no mention at all of Paul Hoch, an authentic scholar

who brought much evidence to light and distributed it to those who wanted copies.

Blakey

He has two insignificant mentions of Josiah "Tink" Thompson.

But he had eight mentions on Edward Jay Epstein, whose Inquest was a triviality of error and incompejce.

As for "establishing working relationship with the FBI, CIA and other agencies, as indicated above to FBL lauhghed haat Blakey and n 2his committee and as it planned, in the end, he had gotten from the FBI only about half lg shat I'd already gotten from it in FOUSA litigatio , which made ot public.

At the outset the CIA got him to sign his rights away. It got from th e CIA the tiniest fragmen of what it had already realeases and what it had no reason not to trelease. Vomacompstimg ehcy hj COCIS's disclosures to the Bla,ey committee with its later dodisclosures make it obvious that he really got frpm yjsy "rela-tionship only a screwing

Blakey
Actuality, the only use ~~we~~ he had ~~for~~ the critics was to ridicule and put them down at his piublic hearings. With ~~one~~ exceptom: he ~~never~~ mentioned me at those hearings

Actually, he could have held hearings fairly rapidly if his intent had not been to support the unsupportab~~e~~ warren Report, That is the use he made of what he refers to as science and technology. Had he even dreamed of a real investigation, he needed little more than the exsting official evidence^{which he ignored} That alone proved the the Warren Commission had conducted no real investigations and, like Blakey and his committee, was dominated by the nstinel policy stated in the Katzenbach pmen~~o~~. However, that mass of records with which at the end Blakey was ~~all~~ ignorance, included in various parts of his ⁱⁿ ~~series~~ books, proved beyond any question that the Report is false.

After the end of that Congressional session, when Downing retired and Gonzales, Sprague got fired for exactly what I told him no Congress would tolerate, his pose as being superior to the Congress that employed him.

~~Speaker~~ Speaker Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, ~~Ex~~, ordered Sprague to fire twenty-three people. When Sprague refused, Gonzalez fired Sprague. One of Gonzalez's blistering comments, as Blakey quotes it, is "It is hard to imagine anything less responsive than that." What is more Sprague assumed he had the authority of a member of the House. even ~~a committee chairman~~ chairman.

Gonzalez also referred to Sprague as a "rattlesnake" (pages 66-71).

After reporting Sprague's firing Blakey says that "the committee clearly was not equipped to conduct a sophisticated investigation." after all, that committee had only the largest budget any Congressional committee had ever been given (page 69).

Then saying nothing about how he was selected to succeed Sprague, even that he had been, Blakey starts a series of apologies for what he did and did not do by ticking off the problems he said his committee had. They boil down to its failure to do its job and its, meaning Blakey's, predetermine that the Commission was right and his hamhanded effort to prove the impossible because what the Warren Commission didn't pursuant to that Katzenbach memorandum, which became national policy, was so unacceptable, so obviously dishonest and impossible (page 69-70), ~~69~~ 70, 69-70.

Having apologized for and sought to explain what he knew was his and his committee's failure. Blakey continues with his Chapter 5, "The Warren Commission Evaluated," (pages 11ff). Blakey evaluates and reevaluates everyone but himself.