

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

~~SECRET~~

DATE: January 28, 1964

FROM : A. Rosen *ARM*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
JOHN F. KENNEDY, 11-22-63
DALLAS, TEXAS

SEE RIV	Loach
SIDE P	Evans
CLASS	Gale
ACTION	Rosen
	Sullivan
	Tavel
	Trotter
	Tele. Room
	Holmes
	Gandy

*Classified by SP-1 [redacted] 1/26/84
Declassify on: OADR 1/23/88
Per CIA letter 9/23/88*

*67C/FBI
[redacted] 66454
M. J. Malley
J. [redacted]*

In response to a request from Mr. J. Lee Rankin, Malley attended a meeting which was scheduled at the offices of the President's Commission at 4:00 p. m., today. The meeting actually commenced about 4:35 p. m., and those present consisted of Chief Justice Earl Warren, Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Tom Bellem of the Treasury Department, Inspector Tom Kelly of the Secret Service and Mr. Rankin.

Chief Justice Warren stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider information now available as a result of investigation relating to Oswald's activities in foreign countries to determine if there was any way to prove or disprove the information now available. Chief Justice Warren stated that he had in mind that there might be some way of talking to individuals that had lived in some of these countries or any other sources that would know whether or not it was possible the information received is correct.

CIA representative Helms then stated that this problem had been presented to the CIA and that they did have some sources who were previously connected with Russian intelligence agencies, one of these having defected from Russia less than two years ago [redacted] and that the question involved was whether information that had been developed could be made available to these individuals for a verification as to whether the situations could have occurred as we now have them from correspondence received from Russian authorities, as well as information from Mrs. Oswald. Helms stated that the FBI had previously indicated they did not want their information turned over to such individuals.

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(50
U.S.C.
1181)
per
CIA*

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62-109090
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Stokes
1 - 105-82555

JRM:hw
) 9 ()
66 FEB 18 1964

**XEROX
FEB 14 1964**

*REC-43
62-109090-97
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[Handwritten signatures and initials]

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Re: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

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b3 (T SO USC 402)

PM CIA

(S) 3-1(3)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We have disagreed with this procedure in that we do not trust the defectors to this extent and, therefore, have told CIA that our information is not to be shown to the defectors. Some weeks ago CIA informally proposed to us that they talk to these defectors regarding Oswald, and we told them they should not use our information. Up to now, this has not been a request from the President's Commission. Our fear is that defectors [REDACTED] in an attempt to build up their importance, will come up with an alarmist picture as to the tactics of Soviet intelligence in recruiting and using persons, whom they allow to leave the Soviet Union, for intelligence and terrorist tactics. If such a report is made to the Commission, the Commission will be stuck with the report, which cannot be proved or disproved, despite the fact that there is no indication that Oswald was recruited by the Soviets; in fact, all the information is to the contrary. Frankly, we think the Commission may be making a mistake in following CIA's suggestion. However, we cannot be put in the position that we refuse to allow our information to be used. We do want to know what they are going to use so we can see if it will imperil our sources.

Examined method in the Commission's hands

At this point the members present were told that the FBI *not* desired to cooperate in every way possible with this investigation. In any instance where information had been developed by the Bureau which would be of value in a particular situation, we would like to be advised so that we could look it over.

Helms stated at this point that it would not be necessary to necessarily turn over any written record for examination, but that in many instances it could probably be accomplished by merely furnishing some facts, without identifying the sources to these individuals, to see if a verification could be obtained.

The group was again told that the FBI would be glad to assist in any way possible, and as soon as a specific instance was made known to us it would be checked.

Following this discussion, Mr. Rankin stated that he believed that all the agencies represented were more than desirous of cooperating.

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to the fullest extent and that he would have members of the Commission staff select that information which he believed offered possibilities along the lines desired, and would then have the respective agencies contacted for the determination of the best procedure to follow.

RECOMMENDATION:

The Director may wish to consider having Malley point out to Rankin that by having these defectors interviewed, the Commission may be saddling itself with theoretical dissertations on the procedures of the Russian intelligence system in using persons, who have been in the Soviet Union, for intelligence and terrorist tactics; that, by inference, this would apply to Oswald, and the Commission will thus have a charge which cannot be proved or disproved, even though all information received to date indicates that Oswald was in no way recruited by Soviet intelligence. Malley would tell Rankin that we are merely pointing this out, and the decision is completely in the hands of the Commission.

John
No. That is Rankin's
problem and I think
there is a lot of non-sense
to it but I don't want
stuff in making any obstacles.
Let them have everything & do it
promptly so as to avoid
delay and war.

Key, n/c

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