

Saxton/McKnight  
Amor. U.

The hot aspects (if they can be so called) of the new Cold War lie in an entirely different direction — who's doing what to whom economically and financially: rigging markets, transferring technology, enacting tariffs and boycotts, manipulating international money markets, laundering money, tracking capital flight, monitoring capital formation, analyzing international hedging techniques, analyzing international finance trends and patterns, detecting the formation of monopolies and cartels, monitoring the flow of strategic materials, pinpointing tradeoffs and compromises, detecting new alliances and the breakdown of old, and the list can go on and on.

In the new Cold War, intelligence takes the form of analyses and evaluations of economic and financial threats and opportunities throughout the world. This includes the analysis of industrial and marketing capabilities and of financial and monetary capabilities and vulnerabilities.

With this shift in emphasis the polarization of good guys-bad guys will give way to more or less, better or worse. The world becomes more mysterious as the forces and influences at work become more remote. Interrelationships and interdependencies among nations will become more complicated. Political and economic consequences of national strategies will unfold slowly. Cause-and-effect relationships will become slowly visible but only over a period of time.

In the new Cold War, intelligence will become ever more indispensable and vital as the Western standard of living becomes more vulnerable and more threatened. Let us hope that the intelligence agencies and government departments of Western democracies will be up to their new assignments.

F. Reese Brown

It was in January 1964  
Nosenko had been  
CIA permitted  
work in records  
I wrote

SAMUEL HALPERN AND  
HAYDEN PEAKE  
Did Angleton  
Jail Nosenko?

Re: Nosenko letter.

In his recent book, *America's Secret War: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, Loch K. Johnson discusses the problem of determining whether defectors from foreign intelligence services are genuine, a process called "establishing the defector's bona fides." As an example of the difficulties encountered, he cites the controversial case of former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko, who defected to the CIA in February 1964. Nosenko professed to have handled Lee Harvey Oswald's case for the KGB while Oswald was in the Soviet Union. The KGB, he maintained, had not recruited Oswald and had no role in President John Kennedy's death. These claims focused high level concern on Nosenko's debriefing, which produced a mixture of truth, lies, and contradictions that took years to explain. And although eventually accepted officially, Nosenko's bona fides remain in dispute even today in the minds of some of the CIA officers involved.<sup>1</sup> Professor Johnson summarizes the

<sup>1</sup>In 1962, while on a trip to Geneva, Switzerland, Yuri Nosenko, a 45-year-old KGB officer, contacted the CIA. Claiming to have worked in the KGB counterintelligence Directorate, Nosenko offered information to the CIA for some money, which he needed quickly. In exchange for the funds and other inducements, he agreed to serve the CIA in Moscow as an agent-in-place on the condition contacts would take place only outside the Soviet Union. Nosenko returned to Geneva in February 1964 and told the CIA he wanted to defect then and there. Permission was quickly granted after he informed his CIA case officer that he had personally handled Lee Harvey Oswald's case in the KGB. And, what is more, he insisted that the KGB had not contacted Oswald when he defected to, or while he lived in, the Soviet Union. Nosenko would maintain later that this was true even though Oswald had clearly stated he was a former U.S. Marine radar operator near a U-2 base in Japan. This exception to KGB policy was explained by Nosenko who said the KGB viewed Oswald as a loony. Nosenko's claims about Oswald, in the context of the Warren Commission investigation of President Kennedy's assassination, made it imperative that his bona fides be assessed as quickly as possible. If he was not genuine, he could be returned to the Soviet Union. In this event, his message about Oswald would be ignored, but the implications of Soviet involvement in

Both Samuel Halpern and Hayden Peake are former CIA intelligence officers. Mr. Peake is Executive Director of the National Intelligence Study Center and adjunct professor at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington.

forces in play in the Nosenko debriefing as follows:

Though the FBI counterintelligence officers accepted his [Nosenko's] reliability, James Angleton never believed in him. The CIA Chief of Counterintelligence felt sure that Nosenko was a plant whose purpose was to divert the mounting suspicion in the United States that the USSR may have been behind the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Angleton had Nosenko confined to a small building at a CIA facility in southern Virginia for 1277 days in spartan conditions, where, according to CIA insiders, he was interrogated relentlessly and treated in a shabby manner. (emphasis added)<sup>2</sup>

As a source for the first portion of the quote, which pertains to Nosenko's bonafides, Johnson cites his interviews with James Angleton in 1975. He then says that a "newsletter, staffed by retired CIA hands, finds Angleton's [KGB plant] hypothesis 'more likely' to be true." The newsletter article to which Johnson refers, and which he cites, is in the *Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene (FILS)*.<sup>3</sup> The "retired CIA hands" include the present authors. The subject of the article is a 1986 BBC-TV movie<sup>4</sup> about the Nosenko case. The qualifying words "more likely," which Johnson quotes, are extracted from the following sentence:

The story tells of the handling of a KGB defector who might have been a key intelligence source but more likely was a plant sent to deflect suspicion that the Soviet Union might have had something to do with Lee Harvey Oswald's assassination of President John F. Kennedy. (emphasis added)<sup>5</sup>

As is evident, the phrase "more likely" was not a comment by FILS on the truth of Angleton's hypothesis, but rather just a description of the story line. Johnson has not led his readers astray, however, because had FILS or the "retired CIA hands" been asked whether they agreed with Angleton that Nosenko was probably a plant, the answer would have been "yes." *This story needs additional clues with which to pin down who can be trusted.*

the Kennedy assassination would be strengthened. If he was what he claimed, then the FBI (and the Warren Commission) would have corroboration that Oswald had not acted as a KGB agent. In the end, neither result occurred. Instead, although he held steadfastly to his claims about the KGB and Oswald, Nosenko gave conflicting testimony to the CIA (and eventually to Congress) on so many critical points, that the CIA advised the Warren Commission not to consider his story, and they did not.

In an attempt to verify all the information Nosenko provided, his interrogation continued for several years after the Warren Commission made its report. And, although many of the important contradictions were never resolved to the satisfaction of all involved, Nosenko was eventually officially accepted and became an American citizen. Further details may be found in the subsequent footnotes.

<sup>2</sup>Johnson, Loch K., 1989, *America's Secret War: The CIA in a Democratic Society*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 34.

<sup>3</sup>FILS (*Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene*), November-December 1986, pp. 10-11. The article, "Yuri Nosenko, KGB" is unsigned.

<sup>4</sup>Yuri Nosenko, KGB." First shown in the United States by HBO on 7 Sept. 1986.

<sup>5</sup>FILS, op. cit., p. 11.

But, had Johnson asked the "retired CIA hands" about the portion of his comment (in italics in the first quote above) alleging Angleton's responsibility for having Nosenko confined and interrogated, the response would have been, "wrong, Professor Johnson, on both counts," notwithstanding the "CIA insiders" to whom he refers. The question is, then, what is the evidence to support these contrary positions, and who is right?

SUPPORT FOR JOHNSON'S VIEW

Loch Johnson does not stand alone with his charge that Angleton was responsible for Nosenko's incarceration. In his 1988 book, *The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard*, journalist David Wise wrote that Angleton "held one Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, locked up in solitary confinement, and frequently drugged, for three and half years."<sup>6</sup> Deferring comment for the moment on drugging Nosenko, it is worth noting that Wise gives no hint of the source of his charges; however, the confinement part may have come from *Newsweek* magazine.

In its 18 November 1985 issue, *Newsweek* wrote in an unsigned insert: "Convinced that Nosenko was a Soviet plant sent to debunk Goltisyn [sic], Angleton kept him in solitary confinement for more than three years." (emphasis added)<sup>7</sup>

Earlier, the Reuters news agency put out another version of the story which was carried in the *Baltimore Sun*: "Mr. Angleton ordered Mr. Nosenko to be locked up in a small cell without a toothbrush or sufficient food for 3 and 1/2 years."<sup>8</sup>

Two less specific versions of the charge were made the same year. The first was by Ernest Volkman in his 1985 book, *Warriors Of The Night*, where he noted that in his handling of the Goltisyn case, "Angleton made several errors of judgment. One was the mistreatment of Nosenko...."<sup>9</sup> The second comes from Phillip Knightley in his delicately titled 1986 book, *Second Oldest Profession: The Spy As Bureaucrat, Partier, Fantasist and Whore*. Writing of "Angleton and other Goltisyn supporters," Knightley says:

a CIA faction set out to show that Goltisyn was a genuine defector by trying to force Nosenko to confess. He was confined for three and a half years.

<sup>6</sup>Wise, David, 1988, *The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard, The CIA Agent Who Bartered His Country's Secrets and Escaped to Moscow*, Random House, New York, p. 16.

<sup>7</sup>In From the Cold, the Intrigue Has Run Both East and West," in *Newsweek*, 18 November 1985, p. 42.

<sup>8</sup>Goltisyn was a KGB officer who defected to the CIA six months before Nosenko. He provided a variety of information, some of which proved controversial. He was also a member of the CIA's "Special Source Unit."

<sup>9</sup>Unrigged, "Defector Reveals Fear of High 'Mole' at CIA," in *The Baltimore Sun*, 4 October 1985, p. 1A. Reuters cites Admiral Turner's book (see below) as the source. The charges regarding the toothbrush, pen and food are challenged in the congressional testimony to be discussed below.

<sup>10</sup>Volkman, Ernest, 1985, *Warriors Of The Night: Spies, Soldiers and American Intelligence*, Morrow, New York, p. 215.

sometimes in conditions as bad as those in any Soviet gulag....Nosenko was subjected to hostile interrogation....<sup>10</sup> *no by the author - but testimony*

Knightley cites David Martin's *Wilderness of Mirrors* as his source, but Martin neither makes comparisons with the gulag nor implies any Angleton involvement in Nosenko's interrogation or detention.<sup>11</sup>

The one book that unequivocally and authoritatively supports Johnson's position is *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, by former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Admiral Stansfield Turner. "It appeared to Angleton that the Soviets might have sent Nosenko to plant a story that would absolve them of any complicity with Oswald in the Kennedy assassination," says Turner. After Angleton balanced the pros and cons, "he decided that Nosenko was a double agent, and set out to force him to confess." "When Nosenko proved "tough and obstinate" and would not give in to normal interrogation:

Angleton's counterintelligence team set out to break the man psychologically. A small prison was built, expressly for him, on a secret base near Washington. He was kept there in solitary confinement for three and a half years. Ostensibly this was to isolate him so that the interrogation would be more effective. In fact, on only 292 of his 1277 days in that prison was he questioned at all....During the entire period he was administered one or more of four drugs on seventeen occasions.<sup>12</sup>

Later in the book Turner returns to the theme, writing, "We've already seen one instance of Angleton's excessive zeal in his treatment of the Soviet defector Nosenko....I still feel deeply ashamed that our government treated any human being the way CIA let Angleton treat Nosenko." And still later, "The last thing I wanted was more Angletons incarcerating more Nosenkos...."<sup>13</sup> No one will accuse Admiral Turner of waffling his position. And, even though he gave no sources, considering his former office, readers and scholars would seem justified in accepting his conclusions as the last word. But not everyone did.

#### SUPPORT FOR AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW

The most recent indication of an opposing view is found in the 1989 book, *Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA*, by Edward Jay

<sup>10</sup>Knightley, Philip, 1986, *Second Oldest Profession: The Spy As Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist and Whore*, Andre Deutsch, London, p. 310.

<sup>11</sup>Martin, David, 1980, *Wilderness of Mirrors*, Harper & Row, New York, pp. 155-177.

<sup>12</sup>Turner, Stansfield, 1985, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition*, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, pp. 43-46. For the CIA's official response to a Congressional question concerning drugs given to Nosenko, see ref. 37.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid. pp. 71, 141.

Epstein. In a discussion of what the CIA should have done once it had reason to doubt Nosenko's bona fides, Epstein states:

Because of all this damage that Nosenko could do, Murphy [Chief of the Soviet Russia Division (SRD), CIA] recommended that preparations should be made to imprison him to prevent him from redefecting....At some point, Nosenko would have to be confronted and broken through a process of "hostile interrogation." Bagley knew that this inevitable confrontation was strongly opposed by Angleton, who wanted to keep playing Nosenko and his KGB controllers like a fish on a line. But while Angleton might have inexhaustible patience, Murphy wanted results.<sup>14</sup>

Many of these points about Angleton's role were not new to Epstein's treatment of the Nosenko case. He had mentioned them in his 1978 book on the subject, *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*, the first to examine the case in public.<sup>15</sup> Epstein's firm position in *Deception* resulted from interviews with Angleton, David Murphy, "Peter Bagley," Raymond Rocca (then Chief/Research and Analysis Division, CI Staff), and Richard Helms. The interviews were augmented by two additional sources: testimony from the 1978 Hearings of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA),<sup>16</sup> about which more will be said below, and *Newsweek*.

When Epstein read the quote in *Newsweek* mentioned earlier, he wrote the editor giving him an alternate view, which is quoted here in full:

In its cover story on Yurchenko (National Affairs, 18 Nov.), *Newsweek* suggests that James Angleton, the CIA's former counterintelligence chief, was responsible for the incarceration of another KGB defector, Yuri Nosenko. Specifically, it asserts that "Angleton kept him in solitary confinement for more than three years." Although this charge has been made by no less an authority than former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, it is completely untrue. Angleton did not order the arrest, incarceration, or hostile interrogation of Nosenko. Nor did he, or his counterintelligence staff, ever have jurisdiction over the Nosenko case, which was the exclusive responsibility of the CIA's Soviet Russia Division. As its unambiguously set forth in congressional testimony, the chief of that division, David Murphy, made the decision to

<sup>14</sup>Epstein, Edward Jay, 1989, *Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA*, Simon & Schuster, New York, pp. 60-61. The Soviet Russia Division (SRD) later became the Soviet Bloc Division (SBD). The name "Bagley" used in this quote refers to a Peter Bagley identified earlier by Epstein (*Deception*, p. 46) as Nosenko's case officer, giving former DCI Richard Helms as the source. Robin Winks, 1987, *Cloak and Gown: Spies in the Secret War, 1939-1961*, Morrow, New York, p. 420, also uses the name Peter Bagley, giving Angleton as his source. For consistency, "Peter Bagley" is used herein.

<sup>15</sup>Epstein, Edward Jay, 1978, *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*, McGraw-Hill, New York, pp. 260-261.

<sup>16</sup>*Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy*, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Assassinations, 95th Congress, 2d session, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1979.

imprison Nosenko without consulting Angleton. Murphy's main concern was that Nosenko, if not physically restrained, would stage a defection back to the Soviet Union as part of "a massive propaganda assault on the CIA." He pointed out the uses the KGB might make of a "defected CIA agent" in his original memorandum requesting authority to put Nosenko in escapeproof quarters.<sup>17</sup>

Although Epstein did not provide chapter and verse citations from the congressional testimony to which he referred, *Newsweek* apparently did its own checking. In any case, the editor's reply to Epstein was printed just under his letter and reads as follows: "Newsweek regrets the error." Had *Newsweek* been able to find a single authoritative source to contradict Epstein, it is unlikely that either the letter or the admission of error would have ever been printed.

Other authors, writing before Epstein, had made similar though less detailed comments. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, in his recent book, *The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors*, provided a footnote to his discussion of Nosenko that states:

It needs recording that some of Angleton's colleagues have maintained that he had absolutely no part in the decision, made later in 1964, to intensify the hostile interrogation and transfer Nosenko to a specially constructed 'bank vault' for this purpose.<sup>18</sup>

Just a year earlier, Robin Winks, in his *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961*, took an even stronger position. "Angleton," Winks writes, "was not responsible for Nosenko's incarceration and hostile interrogation, and he learned of it only after it had begun." Then, in a somewhat startling comment, Winks adds, "Both Angleton and Rocca are said to have protested that hostile techniques should not be used in peacetime in the United States." Later Winks notes that David Murphy "made the decision to handle Nosenko first through hostile interrogation and then through the Office of Security...." Unfortunately, Winks does not supply a source for these statements.<sup>19</sup>

Still other authors have provided pieces of the puzzle regarding Nosenko's confinement and interrogation. David Martin, in his book *Wilderness of Mirrors*, noted that Helms, David Murphy, and CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston were the ones who went to the Deputy Attorney General, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, to determine what actions could be taken to assure continued control

<sup>17</sup>Letter from Edward Jay Epstein, to *Newsweek*, printed under the title, "The Nosenko Case," 23 December 1985, p. 12. Epstein had made the same points in greater detail in an October 1983 *Commentary* magazine article, "Who Killed The CIA?" (pp. 54-55).

<sup>18</sup>Brook-Shepherd, Gordon, 1989, *The Storm Birds: Soviet Post-War Defectors*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, New York, p. 232.

<sup>19</sup>Winks, op. cit., pp. 417, 420. Winks is incorrect about Murphy making the decision to handle Nosenko through the Office of Security. This decision was made by DCA Richard Helms. See the testimony of Richard Helms in Hearings of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), September 1978, Vol. IV, p. 28. The comment regarding Murphy and hostile interrogation is dealt with below.

of Nosenko. Martin makes no mention of a role for Angleton in the decision.<sup>20</sup> Thomas Powers notes, in his *The Man Who Kept The Secrets*, that Nosenko was still the subject of dispute in the agency, even after being "held in virtual solitary confinement for years while counterintelligence interrogators from the Soviet *Russia Division* and the *Office of Security* pored over every detail of his account of himself" (emphasis added).<sup>21</sup> On the point of responsibility, Henry Hurt wrote in his book, *SHADRIN: The Spy Who Never Came Back*, that "David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Division, which had custody of Nosenko during the period in question [Nosenko's incarceration]...."<sup>22</sup> None of these authors provided specific sources for their statements.

A final comment, here, notes a significant omission during a discussion of the Nosenko case by Leonard V. McCoy, former Deputy Chief/CI staff (after Angleton left). Writing in the *CIRA Newsletter*,<sup>23</sup> McCoy leaves absolutely no doubt that he is convinced of Nosenko's bona fides. He then takes vigorous and lengthy exception with those who do not share the "official" agency point of view; especially Angleton, the only one identified by true name, and Nosenko's case officer, whom he calls "Steve Daly."<sup>24</sup> Says McCoy, [Gollitsyn's] "outlandish theories and fanatic beliefs" were the problem, not Nosenko, "the most valuable defector from the KGB... whose human rights were blatantly violated by the CIA." Where McCoy sees errors, he points them out along with the offender and then gives his version of what was wrong. Had McCoy thought or known that Angleton had been the one behind the incarceration and hostile interrogation, or had any connection with it, he would, it seems probable, have made the point loud and clear. Indeed, in the only allusion he makes to the subject of specific responsibility, McCoy writes of "the team working under 'Daley's' dogmatic direction to prepare the case against Nosenko."<sup>25</sup>

#### AN INTERIM DECISION

Forced to make a judgment on the basis of the arguments presented so far, the "Angleton is responsible" position might well get the nod, depending on how

<sup>20</sup>Martin, David, 1980, op. cit., p. 162. The visit to Katzenbach was documented in a memorandum for record by CIA General Counsel Lawrence Houston, a copy of which is reproduced in HSCA, Hearings, Vol. IV, p. 26. This memo notes that they were informed that the agency "could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole."

<sup>21</sup>Powers, Thomas, 1979, *The Man Who Kept The Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, p. 54. In a conversation with author Peake on 4 August 1989, Powers said that Angleton's name never came up in connection with the decision to incarcerate and submit Nosenko to hostile interrogation.

<sup>22</sup>Hurt, Henry, 1981, *SHADRIN: The Spy Who Never Came Back*, Reader's Digest Press, New York, p. 278.

<sup>23</sup>A quarterly publication of the Central Intelligence Review Association (CIRA).

<sup>24</sup>McCoy identifies Nosenko's case officer as "Steve Daly" because this is the pseudonym used in the TV movie cited in ref. 4. The reference is to the same person referred to herein as "Peter Bagley" (see ref. 14).

<sup>25</sup>*CIRA Newsletter*, Vol. XII, No. 3, Fall 1987, pp. 17-22.

Murphy was asked by the Committee counsel, "What division or unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had primary responsibility for Nosenko?" He answered, "The Soviet Russia Division." After a few questions about dates, counsel returned to the responsibility issue and had another exchange with Murphy:

Counsel: As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have primary responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where he was kept, what he was asked?

Murphy answered: I was responsible for the case.

Counsel responded: "OK."

Murphy then added: Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the division.

Counsel: But they report to you?

Murphy: Yes.<sup>36</sup>

Murphy went on to testify that the decision as to who would question Nosenko was also made in his division, and that no "truth drugs" were given to him. Helms later stated that the question of sodium pentothal did come up, but he said "no" to its use.<sup>37</sup>

Early in his testimony, Helms was asked by HSCA Chairman Louis Stokes, (D, Ohio) "what unit within the CIA had the primary responsibility for handling Mr. Nosenko in 1964?" He replied that "the Office of Security was given responsibility for his housekeeping, his care, his feeding, his guarding, and that the Soviet Bloc division had the responsibility for his interrogation." Mr. Helms added that SB division had operational (incarceration and interrogation) responsibility until 1967 when it was transferred to the Office of Security.<sup>38</sup>

Then Chairman Stokes asked: "Whose decision was it, Mr. Helms, to place him in solitary confinement?" Helms replied:

I think it was a decision arrived at by those involved in the case — well it was a kind of a decision jointly arrived at, I am sure, on the recommendations of the individuals who were going to do the interrogating.... This is probably not the kind of a decision an individual makes all by himself.... I assume it went to the Director for his approval.... I was a party to the decision, I am sure of that.... It would not have been my final decision to make.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup>HSCA, Hearings, Vol. XII, p. 531.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., Murphy testimony, p. 533; Helms testimony, HSCA, Hearings, Vol. IV, pp. 116-117. See also: HSCA, Hearings, Vol. XII, p. 543, which lists the six drugs administered to Nosenko from January 1964 to 1968, all of which are therapeutic medicines.

<sup>38</sup>HSCA, Hearings, Vol. IV, p. 28.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid. p. 103.

The Rockefeller Commission Report of 1975 had commented on this point stating that Nosenko's confinement "was approved by the Director of Central Intelligence."<sup>40</sup> Clearly, if it went to the Director, it was not made by James Angleton.

The Congressional testimony on responsibility for the Nosenko case is also supported by the documentary evidence. A 17 February 1964 memorandum from the Chief, SR Division, to then DDP Helms, summarizes alternative courses of action for handling Nosenko in light of the doubts about him. Recommended to Helms was an initial debriefing period in an atmosphere of trust, "rather than moving into an immediate showdown and hostile interrogation." Helms approved this recommendation the same day (subject to an oral modification), giving SR Division the authority to proceed. Except for the notation that a copy of the memo was sent to the Chief/CI, Angleton was not mentioned.<sup>41</sup>

It is true that the CI Staff eventually assumed a more direct role in the Nosenko case, but not until October 1967 when the hostile interrogation was stopped and the Office of Security assumed case responsibility from the SB Division. The CI Staff role involved submitting "questions to be used for continued elicitation from Nosenko" during questioning by the Office of Security.<sup>42</sup>

#### SOME FIRST-HAND COMMENTS

The testimony and documentation mentioned above indicates: (1) that the responsibility for the Nosenko case fell to SB division, *not* the CI Staff and Angleton, and (2) that the recommendation concerning his incarceration and hostile interrogation was made by officers other than Angleton. But there may still be some who will argue that Angleton exercised a sinister, all-powerful, behind the scenes role in the drama, to achieve these ends. And, since no one in the hearings even asked, there is no direct congressional testimony on whether it was

<sup>40</sup>Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities within The United States (Rockefeller Report), June 1975, p. 32. This report also stated that "[T]he CIA maintained the long confinement because of doubts about the bona fides of the defector [Nosenko]." At the time the decision was made it was anticipated the interrogation would take from two weeks to two months at most. For more details see HSCA, Vol. XII, pp. 599-601.

<sup>41</sup>Memorandum For: DDP, Subject: *Nosenko, Current Status and Immediate Plans*, dated 17 February 1964, from Chief, SR Division, 4 pages, routed through Chief, Office of Security, copies to Chief/CI and AD/DP, in HSCA Hearings, Vol. IV, pp. 86-90. This memo clearly indicates that Angleton was aware that hostile interrogation was under consideration in February 1964. None of the documents available, however, disclose whether he opposed, concurred, or took any action at all on this point. A note on the memo by Mr. Helms indicates there is an "oral condition" but does not specify what is involved.

<sup>42</sup>HSCA, Hearings, Vol. XII, pp. 344-345. Memorandum For: DCI, Subject: *Preparations for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Yuri Nosenko*, dated 24 March 1966, paragraph 4, page 1 of 5 and Step 5, page 5; approved by DCI (Helms) 2 April 1969, routed through and initialed by the General Counsel, DD/P, D/Security, Cited in HSCA, Hearings, Vol. IV, pp. 80-85. This memo also mentioned that the Office of Security and the DD/P would coordinate with the CI Staff, but no operational responsibilities were assigned the Staff.

Angleton's desire that Nosenko be incarcerated and questioned as he was, or whether he had ever worked toward that end.

There are, however, comments available from two of those directly involved who have not been quoted by name elsewhere or published written accounts on these issues. Both worked for Angleton: Raymond G. Rocca was his deputy, and Newton S. (Scotty) Miller, his Chief of Operations.

When asked by the authors, did Angleton jail Nosenko, Rocca replied: "It is my clear recollection that Jim Angleton was always opposed in principle to the confinement and hostile interrogation of Yuri [sic] Nosenko and had no part in the decision to do so." Rocca went on to explain that he and Angleton were informed of the decision, prior to its implementation, during a meeting in New York, which he recalls clearly because he had not anticipated that topic. He then added some details about their reaction and the others present.

I was, in fact, present when Jim Angleton learned from Dave Murphy that the Director of CIA, on the recommendation of Mr. Murphy and his staff, had authorized that course of action forthwith. Jim Angleton, Dave Murphy and I, among others, were in New York City at the time for a day-long planning discussion dealing with a totally unrelated matter. These conversations took place in the 5th Avenue Hotel (24 5th Avenue), New York City. Jim Angleton's reaction: "It was a mistake." I remember those words because I agreed with them. As far as I know from my contacts with JA until his death, he never changed that opinion.<sup>43</sup>

Scotty Miller was assigned to the CI Staff in October 1964 while Nosenko was still being interrogated in a safehouse in the Washington area. One of Miller's first assignments, given him by Angleton personally, was to "review and monitor the Nosenko case," which he continued to do, among other things, until his retirement in December 1974. Recalling the initial briefing Angleton gave him on the case progress until that time (October 1964), Miller said:

Angleton made it clear he had had no role in the decision to confine Nosenko. He opposed the hostile interrogation approach — he told me defectors should

<sup>43</sup>Mr. Rocca is not certain of the date of the meeting. If the DCI authorization mentioned was the decision to resort to the hostile interrogation which began on 4 April 1964 in the Washington area (HSCA, Vol. p. 544), the meeting must have occurred before then. On the other hand, if the decision mentioned concerned the movement to and continued interrogation of Nosenko in a specially constructed facility outside the Washington area, the meeting could have taken place in late 1964 or early 1965, allowing time for construction. Nosenko's movement to the latter facility was in October 1965. In either case, since Angleton knew that hostile interrogation was an alternative (see ref. 41), only the DCI decision to do so would have been new information. At the time of Nosenko's incarceration, Mr. Rocca was in Angleton's Chief of the Research and Analysis Division. His comments quoted here were made in discussion with the authors and in a memo to the authors dated 28 August 1989, signed by Mr. Rocca. Mr. Rocca also confirmed that he had never been asked by John Hart, or any other investigator on the Nosenko case, about any role of the CI Staff.

be interrogated on the basis of their own information and not confronted hostilely. He said he did not expect the hostile interrogation to work but that given the fair accomplish situation I was to review Nosenko's information available to the CI Staff and submit questions to the SR/SB for possible use with Nosenko.<sup>44</sup>

Finally, contrary to Admiral Turner's charge that Angleton's counterintelligence team set out to break the man psychologically," Miller noted that "no CI Staff personnel ever interrogated or interviewed Nosenko from 1964 to 1975."<sup>45</sup>

#### THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE

After 15 years under CIA control, during which he repeatedly gave contradictory statements in interviews by agency officers and in testimony to the Congress, Yuri Nosenko was "resettled on the economy in April 1969."<sup>46</sup> Ten years later, the FBI informed the HSCA that, "On May 11, 1977 the CIA and the FBI concurred that Nosenko was a bona fide defector, based upon an assessment of the totality of information furnished by him." Neither the FBI nor the CIA has provided a public explanation as to why this decision was made eight years after Nosenko was resettled. Moreover, no details were provided to indicate how Nosenko's contradictions were resolved, if they were. And, throughout this period, despite subsequent claims to the contrary, the only mention of James Angleton and his CI Staff in connection with Nosenko, had to do with the questions to be asked during

<sup>44</sup>Like Rocca, Miller states Angleton "had no part in the decision" to confine Nosenko and in fact opposed the approach. "Peter Bagley," on the other hand, recalls things a little differently. Bagley says, "I remember no opposition (as opposed to reservations, which we all felt) prior to the incarceration from any of the participants in the decision which, as Dick Helms testified, was taken jointly 'by those involved in the case' — including Angleton." [Letter to the authors from "Peter Bagley," dated 19 October 1989.]

The documentary evidence available does not indicate any advocacy of hostile interrogation by Angleton. Likewise, there is no indication that Angleton took any formal action outside the CI Staff to oppose hostile interrogation, which in bureaucratic terms can be interpreted as passive support (not responsibility), principles notwithstanding.

Miller went on to point out that after Nosenko was released from confinement and the Office of Security took over the case, it started to apply the approach Angleton had originally recommended, what he called elicitation, using some questions from the CI Staff. But by then, November 1967, the pressure to resolve the case was intense, the questioning was condensed, none of the CI Staff questions were asked during Nosenko's final polygraph examination, and the process of elicitation was never completed. [Phone conversation with Miller, and letter to the authors from Newton S. Miller, dated 18 August 1989.]

<sup>45</sup>Rocca and Miller conversations with the authors, July and August 1989. The contradictions varied from claims about his rank (he said at various times he was a major and lieutenant colonel and admitted eventually he was actually a captain), to descriptions about the size and nature of Oswald's KGB file and his inability to describe adequately KGB organizational elements to which he said he had been assigned. The resettlement details are given in a Memorandum For: Director of Central Intelligence, signed by the Director of the Office of Security, dated 5 October 1972, and reproduced in HSCA, Hearings, Vol. IV, pp. 92-94.

*Handwritten note:*  
Miller's Recs

Nosenko's interrogations. For these reasons at least, the Nosenko case in general, and his bona fides in particular, remain controversial.<sup>47</sup>

But, concerning the responsibility for Nosenko's incarceration and hostile interrogation, the congressional testimony, *Newsweek's* admission of error, and the firsthand accounts of Rocca and Miller, support the conclusion that neither James Angleton nor his CI Staff were responsible.

The remaining unanswered question is the obvious contradiction between this conclusion and Admiral Turner's version of the events; both cannot be correct. Perhaps Turner had information that has never been revealed publicly. But if this be the case, the public testimony of many witnesses would then be incorrect because the specific question of responsibility for the operation did arise, was answered, and excluded Angleton. The alternative is that Admiral Turner got it wrong, and the facts indicate that is what happened.

<sup>47</sup>Letter of Federal Bureau of Investigation to the HSCA, dated 8 January 1979, reproduced in HSCA, Hearings, Vol. XII, p. 568. Unfortunately, the CIA records made public do not discuss the 11 May 1977 date, but they do suggest continued organizational confusion on the bona fides question. Deputy DCI, VADM Rufus Taylor, submitted his study of the case with a 4 October 1968 memorandum to the Director in which he stated, "I conclude that Nosenko should be accepted as a bona fide defector." His judgment agreed with the Office of Security.

In the same vein, in an attachment to a 1 September 1978 letter to the HSCA from the CIA contact for the Committee, Scott D. Breckinridge, it was stated that, "Following acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides in late 1968, Mr. Helms approved an arrangement which resulted in Nosenko's employment." See: HSCA, Hearings, Vol. IV, p. 46, 49, 116; see also HSCA, Hearings, Vol. XII, pp. 546, 552, 553, 556. But a subsequent memo indicated the bona fides were still in doubt officially. A 24 March 1969 Memorandum to the Director discusses handling Nosenko and what to do "When we have favorably resolved disagreement within the Agency as to his bona fides." It goes on to note that "The problem of Nosenko's bona fides and his rehabilitation and treatment can be considered separately." See: HSCA, Hearings, Vol. IV, p. 45. Mr. Helms testified that if Nosenko's bona fides were established in 1968, 1977 as the FBI memo states. Moreover, Helms testified he could not account for the statement in the 1 September letter that Nosenko's bona fides had been accepted in 1968. (See: Hearings, Vol. IV, pp. 62-63.) The idea that some in the CIA thought that Nosenko had been formally "given" his bona fides in 1968 may have come in part from VADM Taylor's 1968 memo.

None of the public documents indicating that Nosenko's bona fides were "accepted" deal with the specific fundamental operational reasons that raised the doubts in the first place. For a more detailed account of these reasons see HSCA, Hearings, Vol. XII, pp. 573-644.

## JEREMY R. T. LEWIS

### Freedom of Information: Developments in the United Kingdom

While numerous changes have occurred in official secrecy and Freedom of Information in Britain during the last few years, structural and cultural factors cause continuing difficulties for the British Freedom of Information movement.

Traditionally, government authority descended from the Crown rather than rising from the people in a revolution; that authority was reinforced by deference to the national security establishment during World War II. Generations of young people up to and including that of the early 1960s were brought up with parental stories of being bombed nightly while doing homework under the stars. "Careless talk costs lives" was the slogan for keeping things "hush hush." Britain came very close to being invaded by the Nazis; simulations and war games after the event have confirmed that southern England would have been lost, and the fight for survival continued by underground guerrilla forces. While the Royal Air Force (RAF) was principally responsible for stopping German invasion plans, counterintelligence subsequently played a major role in turning around the war by cracking the German and Japanese ciphers. Knowledge of that effort had to be guarded (some have written) even at the expense of permitting the bombing attack on Coventry, which cost 40,000 lives.<sup>1</sup> Since 1974, the government has authorized publication of these codebreaking successes to offset scandals occurring

<sup>1</sup> Nigel West, in his book reexamining intelligence myths of World War II, argues that Coventry was not in fact deliberately sacrificed to protect the fact that the codes had been broken. His suggestion is that fighter aircraft were not successfully vectored onto the German bomber stream by RAF signals interception stations monitoring German publishing beams.

*Dr. Jeremy Lewis is an assistant professor, Department of Political Science, Lehman College/CUNY, New York.*