

Dear Paul,

3/7/98

Thanks for your card and your note of the 4th, along with the Miami Herald Bay of Pigs report story and the page on the Kennedy tapes.

It is possible the Herald delayed the story long enough to get and read the report for itself. If that is not true, that record is much better than the record of the Washington Post, which has done no story on it at all! Is it not to wonder why? (AP did write a story that was in our local paper.)

What the editors wrote about Corona and the 4-2, alleging secrecy for the latter, is incorrect. The USSR knew all about it, as the CIA knew. You find this in detail in a book by Dino Brugioni, who was with the ^{CIA's} NPIC. I think the title is Cuba on the ^{all in Eye Ball} brink but I'm not sure ^{as} I am of the author's name.

Some years ago I'd planned a book, Tiger to Ride, and when I did not get to writing it, loaned the research to a young friend for a college thesis. He did not return all of it but what he did return I still have. Only it is not organized as I'd had it. I did make my own analysis of The Bay of Pigs and in the Herald story I find a little I take to confirm what I'd believed. It quotes Bissell as saying "that there was solid ~~evidence~~ reason to believe that it had a good chance of at least initial success." Now, what kind of success is only "initial" success if no more than that means getting beaten?

My belief always was that the CIA hope only for a beachhead it could hold long enough to proclaim recognition of a government in exile. That ~~was~~ ^{would} have been possible if the ~~re~~ had been only "initial" success. ^{against Castro,}

There was no ~~chance~~ chance at all of any general uprising, ^{(no chance at all with} the vast changes he had brought about for the ordinary people that ^{he} wanted him out, replaced.

Maybe those right-wing nuts in the CIA expected what they wanted to happen but there was no chance of it and no decent analyst would have considered it at all possible. They just hoped and wanted their hope to become the reality, ^{but} ~~as~~ with the vast changes for the average Cuban there was no possibility at all,

Power can lead to enormous self-deceptions. Such as expecting an uprising in Cuba. For all the hardships they are now suffering I doubt that there is much possibility of it now. In the Operation ^{ongoose} papers and commentary on it, it was recognized then that there would not be any such uprising, and any US invasion was to have been only if there was such an uprising and it looked as though it might grow into something.

Just before Kennedy was killed he had approved an effort to see if there could be a way for us to get along with them. He was to have met on that with his emissary on that project, ~~ambassador~~ William Attwood. But when JFK got

back from ~~Cuba~~ Dallas he was a corpse, not a President.

Attwood testified to this to the Church committee and the AARP has forced its disclosure as an assassination record. The Cuban end was Carlos Lechuga, who was then Castro's ambassador to the UN. The feeler was through Lisa Howard, of ABC News and to facilitate talk in private she held a party at which they could slip away and talk. Lechuga wrote a small book on it that The Last Murrah has. I think he titled it In the Eye of the Storm.

JFK also asked the then respect French journalist, Jean Daniel, who was going to interview Castro, to feel him out and return and report on the impression he got. Daniel was with Castro when ^{Castro} he got the news of the ^a assassination. He wrote a series of articles that in this country The New Republic carried.

Had that come to pass it would have come close to putting the CIA out of business.

The Herald story seems fair and balanced to me, although what gives it balance is plain b.s. from those responsible for the fiasco.

Sure sounds crazy when we had diplomatic relations with the then USSR and among other countries, China.

Many thanks and best wishes,

Hand

March 4, 1998

Dear Harold,

I'm sure you are aware of those who are digging into the demise of Jedge?? I am enclosing an article on the Bay of Pigs (BoG). No surprises there except that the Miami Herald was so late picking it up. Also, I wrote to you before that the discovery channel had on the story of the government's CORONA space program and it appeared in THE KENNEDY TAPES!! First time I ever saw reference to it in print!! Must have run along with the Mercury program?? Bissell was in charge of CORONA. Makes me wonder what was running through his mind when he squared off with the new, greenhorn president especially as he (Bissell) was then the CIA's Golden Boy and was expected to take over the "secret" government???

It is a very strange case especially since not reason or logic is allowed to stand.


As I told people on Dallas last year, "Feral spelled with one "L" means to return something once tamed to the wild, while, Ferrell with two "L's" means the opposite or to tame something that was once wild, especially wild rumors - and especially where such rumors, 'facts' evidence and material is being passed off as wild truth!!!! Perhaps what is most wrong with this case is that so much wild truth is being offered as "fact!!" "

Even though time passes, like the Lincoln case, the truth will not "ripen."

Have a very nice birthday and best of everything!!!!!!!!

The very best,

Paul Haller

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Paul" followed by a stylized flourish.

and in a second strike no less than in a first. The second, which was closely correlated, was a surge within the administration of hope for some kind of détente with the Soviets, which would reduce the danger of nuclear war. The third was a nagging reemergence, in connection with the congressional elections of 1962, of public debate about the role of Cuba in the global Cold War.

From the beginning, there had been doubts about "the missile gap." U-2 photography had never found ICBM launchers in numbers corresponding to Khrushchev's boasts. Because the capabilities of the U-2 remained secret even after the May 1960 affair, Eisenhower could only hint that he had evidence calling into question the "missile gap" thesis. Kennedy and other Democrats paid no attention. Moreover, some insiders supported them. Air Force intelligence estimates discounted U-2 imagery, pointing out that it covered only a fraction of the Soviet Union, noting that Soviet radar had detected every U-2 flight from the first one on, and arguing that the Soviets would therefore base their ICBMs where clouds would ordinarily mask them.

Soon after taking office, Kennedy and his principal aides learned that most of the intelligence community apart from the Air Force doubted the existence of a wide "missile gap." Coping with competing service budgetary claims, the new administration also found itself in need, like its predecessor, of questioning service estimates of the Soviet threat. Hence Kennedy, McNamara, and others increasingly moderated their language about U.S.-Soviet competition in long-range missiles. They did sponsor, and obtain congressional approval for, substantial increases in strategic and other defense programs. They did not, however, agree to anything like the ICBM deployments advocated by the Air Force. LeMay's protégé and successor as head of the Strategic Air Command, General Thomas Power, urged acquiring 10,000 Minuteman ICBMs. White House analysts concluded that a few hundred would be ample. McNamara set a ceiling of 1,000, acknowledging that the extra hundreds would go primarily to appeasing Air Force friends on Capitol Hill.

From 1957 on, the CIA had attempted to top its accomplishments with the U-2 by putting up a satellite that would take pictures of the Soviet Union from space. This effort, code-named CORONA, suffered 13 successive failures. In the summer of 1961 it finally scored the first of what would be an extraordinary series of successes. The very first imagery recovered from a CORONA reentry vehicle provided more photographic coverage of a greater area than had all the U-2 flights combined. Though it showed the Soviets hard at work on new versions of an ICBM, it provided convincing evidence that their existing ICBM arsenal numbered at most six.

By coincidence, the CIA's human intelligence collectors had nearly acquired a prime agent high in the Soviet military bureaucracy, Colonel Penkovsky smuggled to them microfilm of numerous Soviet Defense Ministry documents. He also told his handlers in great detail about what he heard by virtue of his status as a senior officer well connected not only Strategic Rocket Forces but in Soviet military intelligence.⁵² All this jibed with what appeared in U-2 and CORONA imagery.

Although the intelligence community phrased its conclusions in characteristically guarded language, these conclusions were much more revealing than in the past. A year later, in July 1962, a National Intelligence Estimate would say: "By the mid-1960's, the USSR will have acquired a submarine missile capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the US . . . however, Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing numbers of US harbor, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery vehicles."⁵³ In words, second-strike capability seemed assured for a long time to come. Kennedy notified the Soviets of his new knowledge. To keep the notification in low key, he had it put into a speech by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric. This, presumably ensured its being read attentively in Moscow out being front-page news at home. Gilpatric said: "The fact is that this has nuclear retaliatory force of such power that an enemy move which it into play would be an act of self-destruction . . . Our forces are so deployed and protected that a sneak attack could not effectively disarm us . . . In we have a second strike capability which is at least as extensive as we Soviets can deliver by striking first."⁵⁴

Armed with this knowledge about the favorable strategic balance, Kennedy and his advisers became modestly hopeful that the Soviets would perceive far behind them, calculate how much it would cost them to catch up, and conclude that their best interests would be served by arms-control agreements that put a stop to or at least braked the nuclear arms race. Just the missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged messages about a possible meeting in November, when Khrushchev planned to come to New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly. Kennedy wrote that he might be "within striking distance" of a test-ban agreement, which would be a harbinger of yet greater accomplishments.⁵⁵

Troubling Kennedy also were continuing questions about Cuba. Kennedy, who had learned about the Bay of Pigs plan only at the last moment, expressed concerns immediately afterward lest the fiasco have wider implications for the Cold War. He wrote his brother: "If we don't want Russia to set up