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# Cuba Aided Weather Underground In War Protest Years, F.B.I. Says

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nage agents operating in the United mate targets of counterintelligence measures and Canada supplied limited aid ures. to the Weather Underground, a militant antiwar organization; in the late 1960's and early 1970's, according to a top-secret report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Some technical assistance was also provided by North-Vietnam, the report says; but there was no evidence that the Soviet Union, China or Eastern European nations ever made direct attempts to stir up American dissidents.

#### Key Disclosures

The 400-page report, a copy of which has been obtained by The New York Times, was prepared in August 1976 after the Department of Justice opened a criminal investigation into charges that bureau agents had committed burglaries and carried out illegal mail openings and wiretaps in their attempts to apprehend Weathermen fugitives

The closely held report—only: 10 copies were sent to the bureau director, Clarence States was a group of intelligence agents M. Kelley-was aimed at establishing that members of the Weather Underground were operating as secret agents

WASHINGTON Oct. 8-Cuban espio- of a foreign power and were thus legiti-The state of the s

The report disclosed, however, Communist bloc nations had given little tangible support to the American antiwar movement. The report was based upon information from the Central Intelligence Agency, several foreign intelligence services, a wide range of American and foreign police agencies, electronic eavesdropping and reports of several confidential informers.

The following were some of the key points: 5 12.

Three years before militant members of the Students for a Democratic Society split off to form the Weather Underground Organization in 1970; North Viets namese and Cuban officials were influencing radical antiwar strategy through foreign meetings. Many of these meetings were held in Communist Countries including Hungary Czechoslovakia and North Vietnam:

The conduit for contact in the United assigned to the staff of the Cuban Mission

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to the United Nations in New York. These agents arranged for American youths to be inculcated with revolutionary fervor and, occasionally, to be trained in practical weaponry through the so-called Venceremos Brigades, nominally sugar cane harvesting units.

gafter the Weathermen went "underground" in 1970 and many of them were being sought by the F.B.I. on criminal charges, Cuban intelligence officers were in touch with them from both the New York mission and the Cuban Embassy in Canada.

¶Cuban officials helped several Weather Underground adherents who feared arrest in the United States to travel to Prague, Czechoslovakia, and then to reenter the United States surreptitiously.

#### Advice Linked to Violent Protest

The report linked the growing militancy of certain members of the Students for a Democratic Society, which resulted in the so-called Days of Rage in Chicago in 1969; to North Vietnamese advice the year before to choose youngsters who would battle with police.

The North Vietnamese, according to S.D.S. literature of the time, had suggested that the antiwar movement needed not just intellectual protestors but also physically rugged recruits. The Days of Rage, unlike previous antiwar demonstrations, in which clashes seemed to be accidental, was a violent protest.

The report noted that the objective of Cuban intelligence officers in the General Directorate of Intelligence (known by its initials in Spanish as the D.G.I., Cuba's equivalent of the C.I.A.) was not always the same as that of the young members of the Weather Underground.

### Intelligence Objectives

It said the ultimate objective of the D.G.I.'s participation in setting up the Venceremos Brigades "is the recruitment of individuals who are politically oriented and who someday may obtain a position. elective or appointive, somewhere in the U.S. Government, which would provide the Cuban Government with access to political, economic and military intelligence."

The report said this conclusion was based on information from former officials of the D.G.L.

The Cuban intelligence officers were described as particularly eager to recruit Americans who had political contacts of who were related to United States government officials.

"A very limited number of VB members have been trained in guerrilla warfare techniques, including use of arms and ex-plosives," the report said: "This type training is given only to individuals who specifically request it and only then to persons whom the Cubans feel sure are not penetration agents of American intelligence."

#### Agents and Counteragents

It also reported that contact with the Cubans in the United States was made at the Cuban Mission to the United Na-tions on East 67th Street in Manhattana Several top officials stationed at the Em-bassy in 1969 and 1970 were identified in the report as Cuban espionage agents. A man who was publicly described as the most effective informer the F.B.L even blaced among the Weathermen, Larry Grathwool, reported to the bureau, that, a code system for communications had been set up by the Cubans, the seport, said.

"In February 1970, leading WUC member Bill Ayers told fellow underground WUO member Larry Grathwool that if communication could not be made through these Canadian numbers, an individual should get in touch with the Cuban Embassy in Canada in order to establish contact with, other members, of the WUO," the report said.

"To do this an individual should use the code name Delgado when referring to himself and the person with whom he desired to make contact," it said.

In another incident, the report said, the Cubana sent four Weathermen back to the United States through Czechoslowakia after an explosion of a house on West 11 Street in Greenwich Village killed two members of the Weather group Diana Oughton and Ted Gold. They feared arrest, the report said, and the Cubans "obliged" them.

Little Tangible Support

On the whole, however, the report appeared to be more significant for the pancity of support by Communist bloc. nations than for the extent of it. There was no firm evidence that senior Communist intelligence services in the Soviet Union, China or Eastern Europe ever made any active attempt to incite American dissidents, the report said.

Moreover, the data in the report indicate that the Cubans and the North Vietnamese gave relatively little tangible support. The only cash donation mentioned was \$5,000 from an American living in China.

There is no indication in the report that the bureau or other intelligence services ever established that weapons; communications equipment or espionage tools had been fed to the antiwar radicals by the Communists.

Several bureau agents have said privately that they believe the report might be helpful to John Kearney, a former bureau official under indictment in connection with the Weathermen investigation.

But Justice Department lawyers resisted turning it over to Mr. Kearney on the ground, as one of them put it, that it was a "classic red herring—it has absolutely no relevance to any available de-

lutely no relevance to any available defense."

The question of whether a particular target is a foreign agent or a collaborator with a foreign power is relevant only to the question of whether the President or his alter ego for such matters, the Attorney General, may constitutionally bypass the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement in permitting an electronic surveillance of such a target," a Government plea in court said.

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