

provision by the CIA); the establishment of moles (once clearly a monopoly enjoyed by the Soviets); the management of double agents (a craft being perfected by the Cubans as Soviet surrogates); resourceful exfiltrations (undertaken with ruthless determination by Mossad); and the provision of adequate resources. In this latter class the CIA excels, boasting impressive training facilities and state-of-the-art communications technology. Only the KGB's facilities at Bykovo and Kuchino, and the GRU's headquarters at Khodinka, compare with 'the farm', Camp Peary in Virginia. Neither the British equivalent, at Fort Monckton in Gosport, nor the DGSE's centres at Beuil in the Alpes Maritimes, and Noisy-le-Sec on the outskirts of Paris, are anything like as elaborate. Whilst Mossad's headquarters in Tel Aviv have a high reputation, there can be little doubt that only the CIA, KGB and GRU compete on an equal footing.

When it comes to technology, the CIA probably has the edge, but Soviet ingenuity should not be underestimated. On several occasions, particularly in the highly specialized area of clandestine listening devices, the Soviets have surprised Western experts with their mastery of remote-powered bugs and electronic counter-measures. They have also been the first to develop reliable burst transmitters and other sophisticated paraphernalia, such as miniaturized document copiers and concealed cameras. None the less, the Agency devotes large sums of money to the development of new methods of intelligence-collection and, accordingly, must be regarded as the heavyweight. Certainly it routinely relies on satellites for communicating with its assets, thereby reducing the chances of interception, while the KGB has misled some of its illegals in North America into believing that their signals were being relayed via satellite, when, in fact, they were receiving conventional broadcasts from Cuba.

In addition to communications technology and training facilities, there are two other items that ought to be taken into consideration: the deployment of agents and the co-operation of 'honourable correspondents'. As we have already seen, Israel is at a tremendous disadvantage because of its lack of diplomatic premises in its target countries. As a result, Mossad is obliged to lean heavily on liaison and illegals. The British have a diminishing number of overseas stations to which SIS can post its staff, and those that survive cutbacks offer fairly transparent cover. The Americans and Russians, on the other hand, use a wealth of business and other fronts to act

as vehicles for their personnel. With the expansion of tourism in the Eastern Bloc, it may well be that the previous advantage of maintaining 'denied areas' enjoyed by the Soviets will be negated. However, they are undoubtedly compensated by the power exercised by both the GRU and KGB when it comes to co-opting extra helpers. A *Resident* can demand immediate support from the local Soviet colony, and no TASS or *Izvestia* journalist could risk refusing a request for assistance. The same level of help would not be expected by a CIA station chief from the American media. But when it comes to voluntary aid from the private sector, it is the French who have the upper hand. A surprising proportion of businessmen working away from Paris consider it their patriotic duty to forward reports to the nearest DGSE representative, in contrast to the British approach which involves the discreet protocol of seeking consent from a company's chairman before an approach can be made to a particular employee. Following the well-publicized experiences of Greville Wynne and James Swinburn, two British businessmen who went into imprisonment having been caught spying by the KGB and Egyptian *Muhabarat* respectively, SIS does not get many amateur volunteers. Against that handicap should be weighed SIS's unique asset, the British honours system. Several senior members of the American intelligence hierarchy have been honoured, such as Louis W. Tordella, Deputy Director of the NSA for sixteen years, who was awarded an honorary knighthood upon his retirement in 1974. Similarly, Anatoli Golitsyn was thrilled with his reward of an honorary CBE in 1963 for having collaborated with M15. These decorations cost the taxpayer nothing, but they are of inestimable value to the recipients. The nearest the CIA can come to competing with such an inducement is its privilege, enshrined in the 1947 National Security Act, to grant a limited number of US citizenships annually, bypassing the usual formalities.¹³ The corresponding Soviet prerogative, to offer residency permits to defectors allowing them to settle in Kuibyshev (a drab industrial city more than 500 miles from Moscow), as accepted by Guy Burgess in 1951, seems captivating but hardly appealing.

In conclusion, when it comes to operational prowess, it must be acknowledged that, despite some shortcomings in the thorny area of counter-intelligence, the CIA seems to benefit the most from its huge financial investment in a bewildering array of collection systems, ranging from atomic-powered sensors to submarine cable-tapping.

*golitsyn was awarded a medal by the CIA Sec
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managed the Cold War*